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ABSTRACT 
        
This study presents a general overview of Augustine’s insights into passions as 
well as his approach to the therapy of emotions and their sanctification. Attending 
to various phases of his writings, this work explores the systematic structure of 
Augustine’s tenets on passions and on the freedom from passions in the context of 
his philosophical and theological convictions on the issue of amor sui and amor 
Dei.  
 The analysis begins by examining Augustine’s language of passions and 
the doctrinal connections between Augustine and his predecessors. I provide a 
survey of Augustine’s usage of emotional terms and criticise the position that 
Augustine suggested a dichotomy between passio and affectus as well as the claim 
that none of Augustine’s Latin terms can be justifiably translated by the modern 
term “emotion”. On the basis of terminological and doctrinal observations, I 
clarify the general features of Augustine’s psychology of passions in Chapter 2. In 
addressing the issue of how Augustine transformed his predecessors’ therapy of 
passions and their ideal of freedom from emotion into his theological framework 
in Chapter 3, I examine a series of related concepts, such as propatheia, 
metriopatheia, apatheia and eupatheia, to determine how he understood them in 
various stages of his philosophical and theological thinking. On this basis, I draw 
an outline of Augustine’s interpretation of emotions in his theological 
anthropology. 
 During his early period, Augustine adopted the Stoic and Platonic therapy 
of passions and the Stoic ideal of freedom from emotion (apatheia), but he 
changed his position later, re-evaluating the received terminologies and values of 
emotions (love, will, justice, virtue, etc.) from the perspective of the doctrines of 
sin and grace. He developed a theological vision and evaluation of the human 
condition of emotions and he expressed a pessimistic attitude towards the human 
condition without the help of supernatural grace. Chapter 4 addresses Augustine’s 
position on the criticism and renewal of passions in social life: the household, 
city, and the world.  
In Chapter 5, I argue that Augustine’s ideal of freedom from passions was 
participation in the inner Trinitarian spiritual life by the bond of the Holy Spirit as 
a hallmark of deification. This is wholly dependent on the divine kenosis and the 
transaction in the person of Christ. By virtue of the gift of grace (the salvific real 
presence of the Holy Spirit in faith), the pilgrimaging citizens of the City of God 
will be elevated to the divine realm and become transformed into a better 
substance in the union with God in Heaven. Contrary to arguments by some 
Orthodox theologians, Augustine’s theory of deification is not simply a matter of 
fulfilment of humanity without a genuine transformation. While grace improves 
the control of sinful impulses in the emotional life of believers who suffer the 
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consequences of the damage of the soul through original sin, Augustine 
maintained that the new life in Heaven denotes freedom from this emotional 
condition as well as the non-apathetic peaceful love and joy of resurrected persons 
in their participation in the divine spiritual nature. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
        
Quare tristis es, anima, et quare conturbas me? Spera in Domino. (Psalm 42:5; Conf. 
13.14.15)  
 
Affectus sunt, amores sunt, immunditia spiritus nostri defluens inferius amore curarum et 
Sanctitas Tui attollens nos superius amore securitatis, ut sursum cor habeamus ad Te, ubi 
Spiritus Tuus superfertur super aquas, et ueniamus ad supereminentem requiem, cum 
pertransierit anima nostra aquas, quae sunt sine substantia. (Conf. 13.7.8)  
 
In hoc enim loco infirmitatis et diebus malignis etiam ista sollicitudo non est inutilis, ut 
illa securitas, ubi pax plenissima atque certissima est, desiderio feruentiore quaeratur. 
(CD 19.10) 
 
1.1. The Aim and Scope of the Study 
 
Augustine was preoccupied with passions1 throughout his life, both in theory and 
in practice. In his Confessions, Augustine mentions that various experiences made 
him consider the role of passions in life, such as a theft of pears, sexual adventures 
with concubines, and the death of his mother, Monica.2 Through his education, 
Augustine was also acquainted with theoretical views on the nature of passions. 
For Augustine, central questions during the Platonist period after Manichaeanism 
and his early Christian life concerned how passions indicate sins and weakness 
and how he could free himself from these disturbances.3 Before his conversion in 
Milan, Augustine was influenced by various philosophical traditions and two of 
                                                 
1 The term “emotion” did not appear during Augustine’s time. Like his predecessors, Augustine 
uses a group of Latin words, such as passio, affectus, perturbatio, motus, motus animae, libido, 
concupiscentia, to refer to the source of behavioural changes other than free choice. I prefer to use 
the term “passion” in my present work when referring to emotions; the word “passion” is close to 
the Latin passio and the Greek pathos. However, I will occasionally also use the term “emotion” in 
the same meaning when it is more convenient. I will discuss the terminology of passio and its 
relation to the term “emotion” in Chapter Two. For a survey of the evolvement of the category of 
emotion, see Thomas Dixon, From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular 
Psychological Category (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
2 See Augustine’s Confessiones, Book II, VI and IX in particular. 
3 In his narrative of his early life, Augustine describes his enslavement by erotic pleasures that led 
him to fall victim to lusts and his suffering from the pain of loss and grief related to the death of 
his friend and mother. A longing for “taking flight to live in solitude” (Conf. 10.43.70: Conterritus 
peccatis meis et mole miseriae meae, agitaveram corde meditatusque fueram fugam in 
solitudinem) and freeing himself from the misery of anxieties become more intense in the latter 
part of Confessiones (after Book IX). For a historical study of Augustine’s life, see Peter Brown, 
Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000 
[First edition published in 1967]). 
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them, Stoicism and Neoplatonism, 4  became the main sources in shaping his 
understanding of passions as well as of how to learn a way of life without their 
disturbances. A range of conceptions, such as propatheia, apatheia, 
metriopatheia, and eupatheia, provided a general vision for considering the 
possibilities of emotional control. In seeking a satisfactory philosophical approach 
to addressing passions, Augustine was also puzzled as to how he should orient to 
good passions.5 After he became Bishop of Hippo, Augustine focused more on the 
role of grace in the therapy of desires and attempted to review that issue from a 
theological perspective. Especially in one of his later works, De civitate Dei, it 
can be seen that the motif of this magnum opus lies in freeing oneself from the 
passions devoted to worldly matters and moving from egoistic desires (especially 
pride and the passion for domination/libido dominandi) to the love of God. He 
summarises this history as encountering two loves, amor sui and amor Dei.6 In 
light of this characterisation of Augustine’s long-term considerations, his 
conception of freedom from passions deserves careful attention and an in-depth 
exploration.  
 The main objective of this study is to provide a systematic analysis of 
Augustine’s conception of passions as well as his approach to the salvation from 
their domination and the sanctification of passions. Exploring Augustine’s notion 
of the improvement of passions as a way towards salvation involves the following 
series of questions: How does Augustine use the term passio?; What are the 
doctrinal sources for his conception of passions?; Does he follow his 
predecessors’ example concerning the therapy of passions and their ideal of 
                                                 
4  Augustine’s early understanding of passions was closely connected to the teaching of the 
Platonists and Stoics, but he was neither proficient in Greek, nor familiar with philosophical works 
in Greek. Even though he refers to Plato, his main source for Platonism was Neoplatonist 
philosophy. See Brown 2000, 23–28; 79–92. For Augustine’s sources, see Sarah Catherine Byers, 
Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine: A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Christoph Horn, Augustinus (München: Beck, 
1995); Carol Harrison, Augustine: Christian Truth and Fractured Humanity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000); Harald Hagendahl, Augustine and the Latin Classics (Göteborg: Acta 
Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1967).  
5 For instance, when facing the death of his mother, Monica, Augustine did not know how to 
control the overwhelming grief and he thought that his uncontrollable emotions reflected the 
weakness of his soul. He observes, “I closed her eyes and an overwhelming grief welled into my 
heart and was about to flow forth in floods of tears. But at the same time under a powerful act of 
mental control my eyes held back the flood and dried it up. The inward struggle put me into great 
agony”. [Conf. 9.12.29. Transl. Chadwick] 
6 See Praefatio (De suscepti operis consilio et argumento) of De civitate Dei and CD 14.28.  
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freedom from emotions?; Does he think it possible to renew and improve the 
passions in one’s personal life and liberate oneself from the libido dominandi (lust 
for power) in social life to achieve terrestrial peace?; And finally, does he believe 
that humans can become divine by participating in the divine spiritual life of the 
City of God? In order to understand Augustine’s insights into emotional 
phenomena, these questions will be studied from the perspective of various 
research areas such as moral psychology, political philosophy and theology, and 
theological anthropology along with its three dimensions: soteriology, 
eschatology, and the doctrine of theosis. These philosophical and theological 
domains form the context for explicating Augustine’s conception of freedom from 
earthly emotions. 
 To obtain an overall understanding of how Augustine’s conception of 
passions evolved, I shall focus on the works he produced during various periods 
of his life. Augustine’s  ideal of freedom from emotions was not only inspired by 
the philosophical sources in his early age, but were also remolded by theological 
considerations pertaining to his dispute with several polemists, especially the 
Donatists and the Pelagians, in his later years. While I shall not describe in detail 
the process from his early philosophical dialogues to the later theological disputes 
with schismatics and the heretics, I shall consider these stages in demonstrating 
how Augustine formulates his theological view of the nature and quality of 
passions. In his late polemics, a series of important theological concepts, such as 
love, will, justice, sin, and grace, as well as the model of Christ as God-man, are 
employed to re-evaluate passions and to readjust the previous philosophical 
paradigm of passions that had been influenced by Stoicism and Platonism. My 
analysis will trace this transformation of his position and explicate his systematic 
reflection in this context. In order to formulate a clearer picture of Augustine’s 
notion of the redemption from emotions in the divine economy of salvation and 
the spiritual sanctification in the City of God, I shall examine the role of passions 
in the four different conditions of life separated in Augustine’s theological 
framework: the emotional state of Paradise, the passions of this life, the sufferings 
of Hell, and the spiritual life of Heaven.  
 My general hypothesis regarding the stages of Augustine’s theory of 
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passions is that prior to his conversion, he is drawn to the Stoic and Platonic 
intellectual approach to the control and therapy of passions. The Stoic ideal of the 
extirpation of emotions, apatheia, and its positive counterpart, eupatheia, together 
with a Platonic view of the soul, all provided the primary foundation for 
Augustine’s understanding of how to deal with the agitations of the soul as well as 
a model for a peace of mind. After his baptism, Augustine continues to be 
concerned about the power of passions and he becomes gradually aware of the 
limitations of human power in achieving the ideal of an apathetic life. He doubts 
the possibility of eradicating passions and attempts to apply the Platonic notion of 
control (metriopatheia) in adjusting one’s emotions. At this time, he also becomes 
acquainted with a Christian mode of emotional therapy. In his later years, 
especially during his polemic with the Pelagians, Augustine becomes increasingly 
pessimistic about human abilities, emphasising the role of grace in the therapy of 
passions. His position shifts towards the theological domain of grace and 
predestination.  
 The main thesis of this study is that Augustine deviates from his earlier 
Stoic and Platonic paradigms related to the therapy of emotion, adopting in his 
late theology a soteriological view of passions in which the deification of 
emotions is taken to fulfil his ideal of freedom from passions and function as a 
hallmark of redemption. This subject has not yet been as systematically studied as 
it is in the present work.  
 
1.2. Sources  
 
In order to examine the formative process of Augustine’s view of freedom from 
passions, the scope of this study’s primary sources must cover his entire oeuvre. 
Apart from his discussions on passions, his sources for doctrinal connections with 
philosophical predecessors as well as his polemics against the Donatists, the 
Pelagians and Julian of Eclanum are naturally important here. I shall divide 
Augustine’s writings into three time periods, adopting the years 395 and 410 as 
approximate dividing points. The first group consists of Augustine’s early 
writings (before the mid-390s) such as De musica, De quantitate animae, De 
moribus ecclesiae Catholicae, De ordine, Contra Academicos, De beata uita, De 
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immortalitate animae, and De libero arbitrio. Augustine’s middle period works 
(written approximately 395–410) include De Genesi ad litteram, De Trinitate, 
Confessiones, De baptismo, Contra Faustum Manichaeum, De bono coniugali, De 
sancta uirginitate. The main sources from Augustine’s last period (411–430) are 
comprised of De civitate Dei, Quaestiones in Heptateuchum, and his polemical 
treatises De peccatorum meritis et remissione, De natura et gratia, De nuptiis et 
concupiscientia, De gratia et libero arbitrio, De correptione et gratia, and Contra 
Iulianum, among others. In addition, his sermons, letters, and monastic Rules 
(Regulae) will also be taken into consideration.7 
 
1.3. Previous Research  
 
Many studies have been conducted on Augustine’s understanding of passions and 
these represent different approaches to his theory. I shall introduce some of these 
studies pertaining to various areas of research, as they are useful for the purposes 
of this analysis.  
 
1. Intellectual biography. This line of research highlights Augustine’s individual 
experiences and the historical context in investigating his varying conceptions 
regarding sexuality and passions. Peter Brown has produced seminal works on 
this subject such as The Body and Society (1988)8 and Augustine of Hippo: A 
Biography (2000 [1967]). In his The Body and Society (especially in chapter 
nineteen, Augustine: Sexuality and Society), Brown surveys the ascetic movement 
                                                 
7 In my work, the Latin citations of Augustine and his predecessors are predominantly obtained 
from the CCL (Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina) and CSEL (Corpus Scriptorum 
Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum), which are available in the Brepolis database (for electronic version, 
see http://www.brepolis.net/). The old PL collection (Patrologiae cursus completes, Series Latina 
and the Supplementum) is also an important reference whenever a better text is not available. For 
Augustine’s De civitate Dei, De Trinitate and Confessiones, the English translations are, if not 
otherwise stated, from The City of God against the Pagans, ed. and transl. R.W. Dyson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); The Trinity (Books 1–7), transl. Stephen 
McKenna, in The Fathers of the Church, vol. 45 (Washington: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 1963); On the Trinity (Books 8–15), transl. Stephen McKenna and ed. Gareth B. 
Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Confessions, transl. Henry Chadwick 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). Furthermore, the Loeb series (Loeb Classical 
Library/LCL) will be used as a supplementary source. As for the English citations of the Scripture, 
I adopt the New King James Version (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1985).  
8 Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).  
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in the Mediterranean world and portrays a panoramic picture of Augustine’s 
experiences of sexuality and his intellectual association with various ascetic 
traditions. Based on a historical investigation of Augustine’s early sexual 
adventures and confessions, Brown argues that a motif in Augustine’s theology is 
how to free oneself from the bitter flood of sexuality in the earthly city to attain 
the fullness of peace in the Heavenly City.9 Brown’s biographical approach to 
Augustine’s reflection on passions is echoed by Henry Chadwick’s Augustine of 
Hippo: A Life (2009),10 Serge Lancel’s Saint Augustine (2002),11 and Robert J. 
O’Connell’s St. Augustine’s Confessions: The Odyssey of Soul (1969). 12 
Biographical studies on Augustine have their merits in tracing Augustine’s 
spiritual journey and providing the historical context for his social interaction and 
disputes, which lay the groundwork for accessing the inner logic of Augustine’s 
notion of passions.  
 
2. Research on the development of theological ideas. Distinct from the 
biographical approach, the historical and chronological research of ideas places 
emphasis on the development of arguments and the doctrinal connections between 
separate works. These types of studies are also relevant for my own research. For 
example, Timo Nisula adopts this approach in his elaborate treatise on 
Augustine’s conception of concupiscence, Augustine and the Functions of 
Concupiscence (2012).13 Nisula combines a chronological and systematic analysis 
to examine Augustine’s notion of concupiscentia and traces the uses of this 
concept during Augustine’s different periods. On this basis, he concludes that the 
renewal of sexual desires (concupiscentia carnis) is dependent on the efficacy of 
                                                 
9 “…all had been touched by the same bitter flood of a discordant sexuality. All mankind belonged 
to one single city of the doomed—they were all by birth citizens of Babylon. Only by baptism and 
by incorporation into the Catholic Church…would human beings be enabled to join the one city of 
which Glorious things might be spoken: the Heavenly Jerusalem, the City of God…so faithfully 
mirrored in the flesh by sexuality, give way to a pax plena, to a fullness of peace”. Brown 1988, 
426–427. 
10 Henry Chadwick, Augustine of Hippo: A Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
Chadwick also provides a brief survey on Augustine’s ideal of continence and the ascetic tradition 
in the early church, see Henry Chadwick, “The Ascetic Ideal in the History of the Church”, in 
Monks, Hermits and the Ascetic Tradition, ed., W. J. Sheils (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), 1–24.  
11 Serge Lancel, Saint Augustine, transl. Antonia Nevill (London: SCM, 2002). 
12 Robert J. O’Connell, St. Augustine’s Confessions: The Odyssey of Soul (Cambridge: Belknap 
Press, 1969). 
13 Timo Nisula, Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence (Leiden·Boston: Brill, 2012).  
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grace rather than human initiative.14 In her research on the role of grace in the 
therapy of desire, Grace and the Will according to Augustine (2012),15 Lenka 
Karfíková adopts a similar approach, arranging the sources according to three 
time periods divided by the years 395 and 410. Through a careful interpretation of 
each period, Karfíková presents a process of transformation in Augustine: 
“nothing else do I have but will” – “the grace of God conquered” – “the will is 
prepared by the Lord”.16 This scheme reveals the development of the concepts of 
grace and will. In his recent article, “Augustine’s Doctrine of Deification” 
(2014),17 David Vincent Meconi describes the patristic tradition of the doctrine of 
deification and traces the deification language that is used during Augustine’s 
different stages. Meconi has analysed Augustine’s letters and sermons to show 
how Augustine formulated his notion of deification as well as his position on this 
issue.  
 
3. Philosophical and psychological research. The notion of philosophy as 
psychotherapeutic and medicinal means to free the soul from emotions has had a 
long tradition in ancient philosophy. Many researchers have been interested in 
addressing the question of how this philosophical treatment of emotions was 
inherited and used in the Christian context (especially in the case of Augustine).  
Richard Sorabji offers new insight on the transmission of the Stoic idea of 
freedom from emotion (apatheia) to Christianity in his book entitled Emotion and 
Peace of Mind (2000).18 He examines various definitions of emotion in the Stoic 
and other Hellenistic schools and analyses how early Christian doctrines adopted 
the traditions of moderation and eradication. Sorabji states “the Stoic theory of 
how to avoid agitation was converted by early Christians into a theory of how to 
avoid temptation”,19 but this adaption by Augustine, Sorabji observes, is based on 
                                                 
14 Nisula 2012, 350–352.  
15 Lenka Karfíková, Grace and the Will according to Augustine (Leiden·Boston: Brill, 2012). 
16 Karfíková 2012, VII-X. 
17 David Vincent Meconi, S.J., “Augustine’s Doctrine of Deification”, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Augustine (second edition), ed. David Vincent Meconi and Eleonore Stump 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014a). 
18 Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
19 Sorabji 2000, 8. 
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misunderstandings.20 Sorabji argues that a series of misinterpretations on some 
Stoic conceptions, such as the first movement, apatheia and eupatheia, made 
Augustine blind to the Stoic ideal of freedom from emotion. 21  Sorabji’s 
interpretations have aroused controversy, which I shall address in Chapter 3.  
Simo Knuuttila’s Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (2004)22 
provides a detailed philosophical analysis of the psychology of passions by 
examining the relevant ancient and medieval theories of emotions. In discussing 
Augustine’s view of emotions, Knuuttila argues that although Augustine adopts 
the Stoic classification of passions and the definition of emotions as perturbations, 
he does not share the Stoic view of considering the soul as an entity without an 
emotional part, adopting instead the Platonic tripartite theory of soul involving 
emotional levels.23 According to Knuuttila, this account of the soul influences 
Augustine’s judgement that passions could not be forever eliminated in this life.24  
A useful introduction to perception and sensation and the inner life of the 
soul is provided by Gerard O’Daly in his Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind 
(1987).25 O’Daly offers a detailed analysis of Augustine’s view of the soul and 
mental acts, which aids in understanding the origin and formation of passions. 
O’Daly also refers to the doctrine of the soul and emotions in Cicero, Platonists 
and the Stoics and explicates their theoretical connections with Augustine; his 
examination focuses on Augustine’s early stage of philosophical dialogues.  
As for the sources of Augustine’s philosophy of passions, Marcia Colish 
provides a survey of his connections with philosophical traditions, especially 
those related to Stoicism, in her work entitled The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity 
to the Early Middle Ages (1985).26 Colish maintains that Augustine possesses a 
good knowledge of the Stoic rhetoric, psychology, ethics, physics, logic and 
epistemology, and she presents evidence of his being influenced by the Stoics in 
                                                 
20 Sorabji 2000, 10–11. 
21  See the sections “First Movements in Augustine: Adaption and Misunderstanding” and 
“Christians on Moderation versus Eradication” in particular. Sorabji 2000, 372–399; 471. 
22 Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004). 
23 Knuuttila 2004, 156–157.  
24 Knuuttila 2004, 153–155. 
25 Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind (London: Duckworth, 1987). 
26 Marcia Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to The Early Middle Ages (II) (Leiden: Brill, 
1985). 
  
9 
 
his intellectual life.27 For example, referring to the theory of passions in Stoic 
figures such as Zeno, Chrysippus, Epictetus and Seneca, Colish argues that 
Augustine adheres to the Stoic definition and classification of passions and 
advocates the Stoic position that virtues and correct moral judgments of passions 
all lie within the intellectual acts.28 Furthermore, additional related discussions of 
Augustine’s sources and his theory of emotions are found in Perception, 
Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine (2013) by Sarah Catherine Byers, 
Martha Nussbaum’s The Therapy of Desire (1994)29  as well as Upheavals of 
Thought (2001)30 by Martha Nussbaum, and The Development of Ethics (2007)31 
by Terence Irwin. 
In addition, I shall consider a number of articles about the psychology and 
therapy of passions in Augustine, such as Johannes Brachtendorf’s “Cicero and 
Augustine on the Passions” (1997),32 Gerd Van Riel’s “MENS INMOTA MOTA 
MANE: Neoplatonic Tendencies in Augustine’s Theology of the Passions” 
(2004), 33  Peter King’s “Emotions in Medieval Thought” (2010) 34  and 
“Dispassionate Passions” (2012),35 Sarah Byers’s “Augustine and the Cognitive 
Cause of Stoic ‘Preliminary Passions (Propatheiai)’” (2003), 36  and finally, 
Terence Irwin’s “Augustine’s Criticisms of The Stoic Theory of Passions” 
(2003).37 Other articles consulted in the present study are articles that reflect the 
trend of philosophical psychology in Augustinian studies that have been compiled 
                                                 
27 Colish 1985 (II), 142–153. 
28 Colish 1985 (II), 207–209. 
29 Martha Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994). 
30  Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
31  Terence Irwin, The Development of Ethics (Volume 1): From Socrates to the Reformation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
32  Johannes Brachtendorf, “Cicero and Augustine on the Passions”, Revue des Études 
Augustiniennes 43 (1997), 289–308. 
33 Gerd Van Riel, “MENS INMOTA MOTA MANE: Neoplatonic Tendencies in Augustine’s Theory 
of the Passions”, in Augustiniana 54 (2004), 507–531. 
34  Peter King, “Emotions in Medieval Thought”, in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of 
Emotion, ed. Peter Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 167–188. 
35 Peter King, “Dispassionate Passions”, in Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early 
Modern Philosophy, ed. Martin Pickavé and Lisa Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012a), 9–31. 
36  Sarah C. Byers, “Augustine and the Cognitive Cause of Stoic ‘Preliminary Passions 
(Propatheiai)’”, in Journal of the History of Philosophy (41: 4, 2003), 433–448. 
37 T. H. Irwin, “Augustine’s Criticisms of The Stoic Theory of Passions”, in Faith and Philosophy 
(20: 4, 2003), 430–447. 
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in the Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy of Mind (2014)38 as well as in 
The Cambridge Companion to Augustine (second edition, 2014).39  
 
4. Social and political research. Augustine’s insight into the passions that occur in 
social life has been studied by both Western and Chinese scholars. One influential 
work in this field is Miikka Ruokanen’s Theology of Social Life in Augustine’s De 
civitate Dei (1993).40 Ruokanen presents a systematic analysis of the doctrines of 
ordo, amor and civitas in Augustine’s De civitate Dei. Two types of passions, 
superbia (pride) and libido dominandi (the lust/passion for domination), are 
carefully addressed in his book.41 To Ruokanen, these two desires represent a 
perverted order of love directed to earthly things and the ego itself and show the 
power of sin.42 Moreover, the perversion of passion runs through human society 
and displays a common misery in the three circles of social life: the household or 
family, city and the world.43 By comparison to the future harmonious society in 
the City of God, Ruokanen notes that Augustine’s pessimistic interpretation of 
this present life is based on his theocentric view that emphasises the sovereignty 
of the supreme good, the Creator, in both social and political life.44 Ruokanen’s 
observations are echoed in Xia Dongqi’s treatise The Earthly Authority: Social 
and Political Thought in Augustine (2007).45  In this doctoral dissertation, Xia 
follows the line of family (domus) – city (civitas) – world (orbis terrae) to analyse 
the concept of authority in social life and to sketch a map of Augustine’s views on 
politics and society from the perspective of authority. Johannes Van Oort offers 
                                                 
38 Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy of Mind: Philosophical Psychology from Plato to 
Kant, ed. Simo Knuuttila and Juha Sihvola (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014). 
39 The Cambridge Companion to Augustine (second edition), ed. David Vincent Meconi, S.J and 
Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
40  Miikka Ruokanen, Theology of Social Life in Augustine’s De civitate Dei (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993). 
41 For the concepts of superbia and libido dominandi, see Ruokanen’s analysis in section 3.4 (“The 
Predominance of Love in the Constitution of the Soul”) and 4.4 (“Libido dominandi and the 
Perverse Structure of Social Power”). Ruokanen 1993, 59–69; 96–101. 
42 “Lust for domination is sin and is a punishment for sin. It is a basic characteristic of civitas 
terrena and its perversus ordo amoris. It is not only the worst of all social vices, but the worst of 
all the evils in human life”. Ruokanen 1993, 101. 
43 Ruokanen 1993, 108–111. 
44 “According to Augustine, God the Creator is not absent from any level or form of social life. He 
is always present as the good Creator of natura bona and as the just Judge of those who distorted 
the beautiful and harmonious order of the nature he created. Augustine’s thinking is thoroughly 
theocentric”. Ruokanen 1993, 159. 
45 For Xia’s work, see footnote 52 below. 
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new insight into Augustine’s concept of the two cities in his work entitled 
Jerusalem and Babylon (1991),46 focusing more on the sources and background of 
Augustine’s doctrine of the two cities. Apart from these monographs, some 
articles are also important in addressing Augustine’s view of moral virtues and 
social theory, such as John Parrish’s “Two Cities and Two Loves: Imitation in 
Augustine’s Moral Psychology and Political Theory” (2005) 47  and Paul 
Weithman’s “Augustine’s Political Philosophy” (2001).48 
 
1.4. Chinese Studies 
 
I would like to add that Augustinian research has currently gained a footing in 
China. Although the main secondary sources for my present work consist of 
Western studies, I would also like to briefly introduce the basic Chinese studies 
that have been conducted on Augustine. The earliest Chinese scholarly work on 
Augustine was written by J. Wang Tch’ang-Tche (王昌祉 ) who analysed 
Augustine’s conception of virtues in his French-language dissertation “Saint 
Augustin et les vertus des païens”49 in the 1930s. During this period, a translated 
biographical introduction to Augustine also appeared.50 However, these works did 
not generally attract attention from contemporary intellectuals, and there were no 
scholars in Augustinian studies during the subsequent half a century in Mainland 
China. However, a number of scholars became interested in the last decade of the 
twentieth century, producing introductions to Augustine, translations of his 
principal writings, and commentaries on his work. 51  Some important Chinese 
                                                 
46 Johannes Van Oort, Jerusalem and Babylon: A Study into Augustine’s City of God and the 
Sources of His Doctrine of the Two Cities (Leiden: Brill, 1991). 
47 John M. Parrish, “Two Cities and Two Loves: Imitation in Augustine’s Moral Psychology and 
Political Theology”, in History of Political Thought, 26 (2005), 209–235. 
48  Paul Weithman, “Augustine’s Political Philosophy”, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Augustine, ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 234–252. 
49  J. Wang Tch’ang-Tche (王昌祉 ), Saint Augustin et les vertus des païens (Paris: Gabriel 
Beauchesne, 1938).  
50 吳維亞(譯述):《聖奧古斯丁》(基督教學術推進會叢書: 小傳集二), 上海: 廣學會, 1937/A. 
Shirley: Augustine, Saint Bishop of Hippo, translated into Chinese by Wu Weiya (Shanghai: 
Guang Xue Hui, 1937). 
51 The main Chinese translation involves Augustine’s Confessiones, De Trinitate and De civitate 
Dei as well as De cathechizandis rudibus, De doctrina Christiana, De gratia et libero arbitrio, De 
natura et gratia, De anima et eius origine, etc. For the translation and the relevant Augustinian 
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monographs include 《神圣的呼唤：奥古斯丁宗教人类学研究》《记忆与光
照：奥古斯丁神哲学研究》《奥古斯丁的基督教思想》《意愿与自由：奥古
斯丁意愿概念的道德心理学解读》《尘世的权威：奥古斯丁的社会政治思
想》.52 In addition, some Chinese journals have launched columns and channels 
dedicated particularly to Augustinian discussions, such as《现代哲学》(Modern 
Philosophy), 《基督教思想评论》(Recent Review of Christian Thoughts) and
《西学研究》(Studies on Hellenic and Western Civilization).53 These studies and 
publications provide a perspective to the patristic studies in a Chinese context and 
attempt to establish a dialogue between Augustinian theology and Chinese 
traditional religions. This approach displays originality and value in comparative 
religious studies. Considering the focus of this study, I will not address 
Augustine’s theology in the context of these comparative Chinese studies, but I 
shall nevertheless occasionally refer to them as I examine Augustine’s conception 
of passions.  
 
1.5. The Outline of the Study  
 
This study begins with an analysis of Augustine’s language of passions. In 
Chapter 2, I shall provide an overview of Augustine’s conception of passions by 
examining his use of the term passio and related terms. Based on the lexical 
observations, I shall move to an analysis of the historical background of his theory 
of passions and investigate which doctrinal traditions influence his conceptions 
                                                                                                                                     
articles in Chinese, see Zhou Weichi, Augustine’s Christian Thought (Beijing: China Social 
Sciences Press, 2005), 371–380.  
52 张荣:《神圣的呼唤: 奥古斯丁宗教人类学研究》, 石家庄: 河北教育出版社, 1999/Zhang 
Rong, The Holy Call: A Study on Augustine’s Theological Anthropology (Shi Jia Zhuang: He Bei 
Education Press, 1999); 周伟驰:《记忆与光照: 奥古斯丁神哲学研究》, 北京: 社会科学文献出
版社, 2001/Zhou Weichi, Memory and Light: A Study on Augustine’s Theology (Beijing: Social 
Sciences Academic Press, 2001); 周伟驰:《奥古斯丁的基督教思想》, 北京: 中国社会科学出
版社, 2005/Zhou Weichi, Augustine’s Christian Thought (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 
2005); 吴天岳:《意愿与自由: 奥古斯丁意愿概念的道德心理学解读》, 北京: 北京大学出版
社, 2010/Wu Tianyue, Will and Freedom: A Moral Psychological Interpretation on Augustine’s 
Concept of Voluntas (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2010); 夏洞奇:《尘世的权威: 奥古斯丁
的社会政治思想》, 上海: 三联出版社, 2007/Xia Dongqi, The Earthly Authority: Social and 
Political Thought in Augustine (Shanghai: San Lian Press, 2007). These works are written in 
Chinese and the English titles added here are mine. 
53 See Xia Dongqi 2007, 21 and n. 7. 
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and to what extent he follows the predecessors’ teachings of the psychology of 
passions. I am also concerned with the questions of whether this usage is 
interchangeable with how the modern term “emotion” is used and whether this is 
an adequate translation for Augustine’s passions terminology.  
After analysing the semantics of passions and the doctrinal sources, I shall 
proceed to the therapy of passions and examine whether Augustine adopts the 
Stoic and the Platonic ideal of freedom from emotions. A series of conceptions 
pertinent to the control of emotions (propatheia, metriopatheia, apatheia, and 
eupatheia) will be studied to determine how Augustine formulated his position. 
An analysis of the argumentation associated with these concepts in his various 
stages is particularly importance in understanding his final attitude toward the 
philosophical ideal of freedom from emotions. Following an analysis of 
Augustine’s statements in different periods, I shall offer an outline of his position 
on emotions in his late theology. On this basis, in Chapters 4 and 5, I shall move 
on to discuss Augustine’s approach to the improvement of earthly passions and 
his position on the final spiritual status of the passionate soul in the Kingdom of 
God by virtue of divine salvation. 
Chapter 4 presents Augustine’s position on the renewal of passions in 
social life, which is divided into the three circles of human life: household, city, 
and the world. The background of Augustine’s theory of the two cities will be 
addressed through analysing his theological anthropology in terms of the origin of 
passions and the root of depravity. To explicate Augustine’s theological principle 
of the alignment of values of emotions and his approach to the renewal and 
improvement of passions in the world of temptations, I shall examine Augustine’s 
view on the three levels of passions in earthly life: concupiscence, pride, and 
libido dominandi.  
Chapter 5 explores the final orientation to the freedom from passions 
proposed by Augustine. I shall first discuss Augustine’s psychological Trinitarian 
metaphors and divine “emotions” that clarify his view of the inner spiritual life in 
the Trinity. Augustine argues that by the gift of grace, the pilgrimaging citizens of 
City of God will be elevated to participate in the Trinitarian life in Heaven. This 
involves a real deificatory transformation that is based on the redemption in the 
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person of Christ. I shall explore Christ’s emotions and Augustine’s view of the 
salvific transaction in which Christ takes on human emotions and offers 
deification to humans. I shall demonstrate that Augustine’s theological theory of 
eschatological theosis is not simply a matter of fulfilment of humanity without a 
genuine transformation. While grace improves the control of sinful impulses in 
the emotional life of believers who suffer the consequences of the damage of the 
soul through original sin, Augustine maintained that the new life in Heaven 
denotes freedom from this emotional condition as well as the non-apathetic 
peaceful love and joy of resurrected persons in their participation in the divine 
reality. 
Chapter 6 will offer a summary of this study. 
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CHAPTER TWO: AUGUSTINE’S CONCEPTION OF PASSIONS 
       
Quod, propinquante passione, tristis fuerit anima eius, non falso utique referuntur.  
(CD 14.9) 
  
Sed cum rectam rationem sequantur istae affectiones quando ubi oportet adhibentur, quis 
eas tunc morbos seu vitiosas passiones audeat dicere? (CD 14.9) 
  
Non tamen semper his proprietatibus locutio nostra frenanda est, sed interdum his 
utendum est. (CD 14.8)  
 
This chapter will address the question of how Augustine uses and understands the 
term passio and will further compare Augustine’s terminology and his 
predecessors’ terminology as well as their doctrines of passions. The first section 
presents an analysis of the usage and characteristics of the term passio as well as 
those of the other closely related terms used by Augustine, such as affectus, motus 
and perturbatio. In addition, I shall discuss the proposal by some scholars that 
Augustine tends to classify emotional terms into two groups: passio, which is 
negative, and affectio (affectus), which is positive. Furthermore, I shall explore 
whether these Latin words in Augustine’s usage could be translated by the term 
“emotion” as it is the current practise. In the second section, to evaluate the 
doctrinal relationship between Augustine and his predecessors, I shall present a 
general outline of the terminology and psychology of passions in both Stoicism and 
Platonism, inquiring whether Augustine is more inclined to the Neoplatonic theory 
of passions or the Stoic theory. This section is largely based on recent investigations 
of Augustine’s philosophical and theological sources. By focusing on the 
interrelated questions posed in these two sections, I shall provide general remarks 
on the term passio in Augustine’s works as well as an outline of Augustine’s 
conception of passions. It will be argued that Augustine adopts neither the Stoic 
characterisation of passions as diseases (morbi), nor the Platonic-Peripatetic1 ideal 
                                                          
1 Augustine did not distinguish between the Platonic and Aristotelian positions on the psychology of 
passions as strictly as we tend to do today. When he mentions either the “Platonic” or “Peripatetic” 
notion of passions, Augustine refers to their coinciding views as an eclectic alternative to Stoicism. 
As he explains in CD 9.4: Duae sunt sententiae philosophorum de his animi motibus, quae Graeci 
πάθη…Has ergo perturbationes sive affectiones sive passiones quidam philosophi dicunt etiam in 
sapientem cadere, sed moderatas rationique subiectas, ut eis leges quodam modo, quibus ad 
necessarium redigantur modum, dominatio mentis inponat. Hoc qui sentiunt, Platonici sunt sive 
Aristotelici, cum Aristoteles discipulus Platonis fuerit, qui sectam Peripateticam condidit. Aliis 
autem, sicut Stoicis, cadere ullas omnino huiusce modi passiones in sapientem non placet. In my 
work, I accordingly do not differentiate between the terms “Platonic”, “Neoplatonic” and 
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of unaffected heroes, but rather uses the terminology of passio in a flexible way, 
emphasizing the value of passions in a virtuous life and constructing his own theory 
of passions within a Christian semantic context. These results will serve as the basis 
for further discussion on the issues of moderating and controlling passions in the 
next chapter. 
 
2.1. The Terminology of Passio 
 
Some scholars claim that Augustine tends to classify emotions into two groups on 
the basis of whether he regards them as good or bad. I shall evaluate this argument 
and examine whether there is any textual support for this in Augustine.  
Thomas Dixon and Anastasia Scrutton maintain that most Latin words for 
“emotions” in Augustine’s work need to be classified into two groups, passio and 
affectio, with passio attributed a negative connotation and affectio a positive 
connotation.2 Dixon argues in From Passions to Emotions, that Augustine does not 
adopt the Stoic apathetic idea of excluding both affectiones and passiones, but 
instead expresses a positive attitude towards affectiones (which are obedient to 
reason), differentiating these voluntary affections from unruly passions that occur 
in a virtuous and healthy life.3 The distinction between affectio and passio, Dixon 
explains, is based on Augustine adopting the Peripatetic bipartite theory of the soul 
comprising a higher, intellective level as well as a lower, appetitive level.4 Dixon 
states the following: “For Augustine the most troubling passions, lusts, desires and 
appetites were involuntary movements of the lower parts of the soul, rather than 
voluntary judgments”.5 Consequently, affectio and passio (as well as other related 
terms) refer to two diametrical groups in Augustine: passio, perturbatio and libido 
                                                                                                                                                               
“Peripatetic” when referring to Augustine’s “(Neo)Platonic-Peripatetic position”. 
2 See Dixon 2003, 26–61; Thomas Dixon, “Revolting Passions”, in Modern Theology (27:2, 2011), 
299–302 (This article is also collected in Faith, Rationality and the Passions, ed. Sarah Coakley 
(Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 181–195); Anastasia Scrutton, “Emotion in Augustine of Hippo and 
Thomas Aquinas: A Way Forward for the Im/passibility Debate?”, in International Journal of 
Systematic Theology (7:2, 2005), 169–177. 
3 “Augustine poured scorn on the Stoic aspiration to attain apatheia, or complete impassivity, in this 
life…This forceful rejection of Stoic impassivity should be sufficient to illustrate that Augustine did 
not wish to exclude passions and affections altogether. It is worth noting, however, that the term he 
used here for proper affect is affectus rather than passiones. However, this provisionally positive 
stance on the necessity of human affections in this life was combined with a more negative attitude 
to the passions in Augustine’s other works”. Dixon 2003, 40–41. 
4 Dixon 2003, 46. 
5 Dixon 2003, 50–51. 
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are the movements of the lower part of the soul, whereas affectio, affectus and 
motus are related to the intellective part. 6  Dixon also notes that the 
affection/passion distinction is closely connected to the distinction between virtue 
and vice, with virtuous movements being cultivated by reason and will.7 This 
twofold moral axiom regarding affections and passions, Dixon explains, became a 
standard view in moral philosophy, lasting until the nineteenth century. 8 
Anastasia Scrutton also states that “there is a tendency in Augustine’s work to use 
passiones (and related words such as perturbationes, libido and morbos) in a 
pejorative sense, and to contrast these with virtuous affectus, motus and 
affectiones”.9  In line with Dixon, Scrutton explains that passions refer to the 
improper movements of the appetitive part of the soul, while affections are proper 
acts guided by the reason, will, and love of the higher intellective self.10 
Based on the above-mentioned distinction between affectio and passio as 
positive and negative phenomena, one could argue that there are no psychological 
Latin terms that would be equivalent to the modern term “emotion”.11 Indeed, 
Scrutton and Dixon maintain that pathē, passio and affectio cannot be regarded as 
“emotions” in the contemporary sense of the word. This is partly due to the 
aforementioned Greek and Latin terms having their own connotations as well as 
partly because the term “emotion” did not emerge in the English language until the 
                                                          
6 See the classification of emotional terms in Dixon 2003, 48. This classification is repeated in his 
article “Revolting Passions” in which he explains that “Augustine was suspicious of those 
movements of the appetite that he considered misdirected passiones, perturbationes, libidines or 
even, in Stoic vein, morbos; but he took a more positive stance towards higher movements of the 
will given milder designations such as motus, affectus, affectiones or simply voluntates, acts of 
will”. Dixon 2011, 300; Dixon 2012, 183. 
7 “To live according to one’s highest nature was to live as a rational animal, with libidinous passions 
subdued and godly and sympathetic affections cultivated (by reason, by the will, by habit). This 
twofold moral axiom—subdue passion, cultivate affection—assumed a division between reason and 
the passions. A governed and rational passion, properly educated and smartly dressed, could be 
deemed to have won the approval of the will and intellect, and to have gained entry into polite 
society in the form of sympathy, affection and sentiment”. Dixon 2012, 185. 
8 Dixon 2011, 301–302; Dixon 2012, 184–185. 
9 Scrutton 2005, 170. 
10 “In practice it is often the case that passions are sinful, because (as a consequence of the fall) the 
lower sensitive self is in rebellion against the higher intellective self, which should be its master 
and guiding principle. Whether a particular passion or affection is virtuous or vicious is dependent 
upon two factors: first, the agreement of the emotion with reason, and, second, the object of the 
emotion, which is closely related both to the direction of the will and to the orientation of the 
subject’s love…these two conditions which determine the moral status of an ‘emotion’ also incline 
passions to be sinful, and allow affections to be virtuous”. Scrutton 2005, 172. 
11  “Statements by pre-modern theologians and their early-modern successors about either the 
terrible tyranny of the passions or the value of moral sentiments and religious affections cannot be 
taken as evidence of any generalized attitude to the ‘emotions’”. Dixon 2011, 302; Dixon 2012, 185. 
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seventeenth century, acquiring its modern meaning only in the nineteenth century.12 
For example, the term “emotion” did not appear in the English translations of the 
Bible produced before the nineteenth century. 13  Dixon points out that the 
transition from the category of “passions” to the modern term “emotion” can be 
attributed to some neuroscientists and psychologists – Thomas Brown, Thomas 
Chalmers, Alexander Bain, Herbert Spencer, and Charles Darwin – who adopted 
“emotion” as a scientific cachet to replace the former multifarious terminology.14 
However, some scholars dissent from this distinction. For example, 
Johannes Brachtendorf notes that “Augustine treats the terms, perturbationes, 
affectiones, affectus and passiones as equivalent”.15 Brachtendorf supposes that 
this equivalence between different terms is based on Augustine’s deliberate aim to 
refute the Stoics and that Augustine uses these terms flexibly in his City of God.16 
In discussing ancient views of emotions, Martha Nussbaum does not differentiate 
between “emotion” and “passion”. She follows this approach not only when 
discussing the Stoics, but also when discussing Augustine:  
I shall use these two words more or less interchangeably, making no salient distinction 
between them. ‘Emotion’ is the more common modern generic term, while ‘passion’ is 
both etymologically closer to the most common Greek and Latin terms and more firmly 
entrenched in the Western philosophical tradition.17  
Like Nussbaum, Simo Knuuttila is also inclined to support the position 
that Augustine does maintain a strict distinction between these emotional terms: 
“Augustine sometimes calls emotions perturbations, as Cicero did, but he uses 
                                                          
12 Scrutton 2005, 170; Dixon 2003, 1–26. 
13 “‘Emotions’, unlike ‘affections’, ‘passions’, ‘desires’ and ‘lusts’ did not appear in any English 
translation of the Bible…One word that was not used in the classical Christian account of passions 
and affections was ‘emotions’. There was no such term in classical Latin or Greek, nor in the Bible 
(nor, incidentally, do the words ‘emotion’ or ‘emotions’ appear in any of the major English 
translations of the Bible)”. Dixon 2003, 4 and 39. 
14 See Dixon 2012, 186–187; Dixon 2003, 13–19. Dixon argues that with the employment of the 
word “emotion”, “previous distinctions between appetites, passions, affections and sentiments 
were gradually forgotten. Members of all these older categories could now be found masquerading 
as emotions”. Ibid., 187. Dixon credits this view to James Mark Baldwin and G. F. Stout by 
quoting their account of “emotion” in Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology: “The use of the 
word emotion in English psychology is comparatively modern. It is found in Hume, but even he 
speaks generally rather of passions or affections. When the word emotion did become current its 
application was very wide, covering all possible varieties of feeling, except those that are purely 
sensational in their origin”. See Dixon 2003, 1 and 17. 
15 Brachtendorf 1997, 299. 
16 Brachtendorf states that “Augustine is not interested in a positive evaluation of the passions”, 
adding that “although Augustine was well aware of these [terminological] differences, he 
deliberately omits them in his City of God”. See Brachtendorf 1997, 299–300. 
17 Nussbaum 1994, 319 (n. 4).  
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more neutral terms, such as affections (affectiones), affects (affectus), or passions 
(passiones)”.18 Furthermore, Gerard O’Daly emphasises that Augustine “adduces 
a series of scriptural and secular texts (the latter from Terence, Cicero and Virgil) 
to show that linguistic usage does not distinguish between good and bad when 
describing emotions”. 19  Timo Nisula agrees with O’Daly: “Augustine’s 
terminology of emotions is flexible. Terms occur such as adfectus, passiones, 
perturbationes, or even libidines in the general sense of ‘emotion’”.20 Richard 
Sorabji likewise states that he prefers to use the term “emotion” to express all the 
Hellenistic and early Christian usages of emotional terms in his book Emotion and 
Peace of Mind.21 It could also be mentioned that some translators of Book 9 in City 
of God, such as David Wiesen, Gerald Walsh and Grace Monahan, prefer to adopt 
a flexible approach by translating Augustine’s use of passio, affectus and motus as 
“emotion”.22 
With respect to these different perspectives on passio and affectus, it is 
evident that the main question concerns our understanding of the term passio. 
Those who maintain a dichotomic position predominantly posit passio (or 
perturbatio) as a movement of the lower part of the soul, or as a perturbation of the 
mind, often involving a strong impulse, such as appetite and sexual or evil desire. 
For this reason, they translate passio as “passion”. Affectus, on the other hand, is a 
movement of the higher part of the soul or a virtuous feeling in accordance with a 
person’s will and intellect, and scholars who posit a dichotomy translate it as 
“affection”. Thus, none of these terms could be regarded as equivalent to the 
modern term “emotion”. On the contrary, those who dissent from this distinction 
assert that passio cannot be confined to the same limited scope of meaning as the 
                                                          
18 Knuuttila 2004, 156. 
19 Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s City of God: A Reader’s Guide (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 
155. For a more detailed discussion, see also G. O’Daly and A. Zumkeller, “Affectus (passio, 
perturbatio)”, in Augustinus-Lexikon (vol. 1), ed. C. Mayer (Basel: Schwabe, 1986), 166–180. 
20 Nisula 2012, 193 (n. 2). 
21 “I shall speak of ‘emotions’ rather than ‘passions’ when rendering the Greek term pathē. This is 
for the reason given in the Introduction, that, in so far as there is a distinction nowadays, passion is 
thought of as a very strong type of emotion”. Sorabji 2000, 17. He prefers the term “emotion” in 
discussing ancient Latin psychology as well. 
22 See, for example, Wiesen’s Loeb Classical Library translation. In some instances, he translates 
passio and affectus as “emotion” and “turbulentus affectus” as “violent emotion” in CD 9.5. “Si 
enim mente ab his libera eisque dominante motus huiusce modi paterentur” in CD 9.6 is translated as 
follows: “The point is that if their minds remained free and in command of these emotions which 
they experience”. However, in many places, he also translates passio as passion, perturbatio as 
perturbation, affectus as affection. 
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modern term “passion” and that it is incorrect to translate passio simply as 
“passion”. I shall examine Augustine’s texts and his quotations from Hellenistic 
philosophers in order to analyse the use and characteristics of the term passio in 
Augustine’s works and to consider whether they contain a systematic 
terminological distinction. 
 
I. Cases for passio as a negative term and affectus as a positive term 
As mentioned earlier, those who argue that Augustine uses passio (perturbatio) as a 
negative term maintain that it refers a perturbation of the soul or a movement of the 
soul’s lower part. It seems that Augustine borrowed from23 the semantic views of 
the Stoics, Academics, and Cicero who regarded passio as a perturbation or mental 
agitation. Augustine equates Cicero’s term perturbatio with passio and pathos and 
interprets them to refer to mental agitation and perturbations of the soul that are 
contrary to reason:  
…for the Greek word pathos means ‘disturbance’; and this is what Apuleius means when 
he says that the demons are ‘passive in soul’, because the word passio, which is the same as 
pathos, signifies a commotion of the mind contrary to reason…when these disturbances 
occur in men, this is brought about by foolishness or misery; for we are not yet blessed by 
that perfection of wisdom which is promised to us at the end, when we shall be redeemed 
from this mortality.24  
Moreover, Augustine follows the Platonic and Stoic doctrines of passions, 
classifying the types of passions into four subspecies which he refers to as the four 
perturbations: “all four of the most notable disturbances of the mind: desire and 
fear, joy and grief, which are the origin, as it were, of all sins and vices”.25 
Furthermore, Augustine also refers to these as being so influenced by earthy limbs 
                                                          
23  Augustine presents similar arguments in De civitate Dei as Cicero does in Tusculanae 
disputationes, which cites examples from other philosophers before presenting his own different 
opinions.  
24 CD 8.17: …perturbatio est enim quae Graece πάθος dicitur; unde illa voluit vocare animo 
passiva, quia verbum de verbo πάθος passio diceretur motus animi contra rationem…In hominibus 
autem ut sint istae perturbationes, facit hoc stultitia vel miseria; nondum enim sumus in illa 
perfectione sapientiae beati quae nobis ab hac mortalitate liberates in fine promittiture. Similar 
statements can be found in Cicero’s Tusc. 3.4.7: Num reliquae quoque perturbationes animi, 
formidines, libidines, iracundiae? Haec enim fere sunt eius modi, quae Graeci πάθη appellant; 
ego poteram morbos et id verbum esset e verbo, sed in consuetudinem nostram non caderet: nam 
misereri, invidere, gestire, laetari, haec omnia morbos Graeci appellant, motus animi rationi non 
obtemperantes; nos autem hos eosdem motus concitati animi recte, ut opinor, perturbationes 
dixerimus, morbos autem non satis usitate, nisi quid aliud tibi videtur.  
25CD 14.3: …omnesque illas notissimas quattuor animi perturbationes, cupiditatem timorem, 
laetitiam tristitiam, quasi origines omnium peccatorum atque vitiorum.  
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and dying members, “that they derive from them their unwholesome desires and 
fears and joys and sorrows. And these four ‘perturbations’ (as Cicero calls them) or 
‘passions’ (which is the usual term, rendered exactly from the Greek), embrace all 
the vices of human conduct”.26 Augustine also quotes many similar views from the 
Platonists, Stoics and Peripatetics, which indicate that he possessed a considerable 
knowledge of his predecessors, often acquired through Cicero’s writings. 27 
Therefore, in some places, Augustine adopts the traditional Stoic approach by using 
passio or perturbatio in a negative context and contrasts this by using affectus in a 
positive one. For instance:  
(a) Hoc enim esse volunt in potestate idque interesse censent inter animun 
sapientis et stulti, quod stulti animus eisdem passionibus cedit atque adcommodat mentis 
adsensum; sapientis autem, quamvis eas necessitate patiatur, retinet tamen de his quae 
adpetere vel fugere rationabiliter debet veram et stabilem inconcussa mente sententiam.28 
(CD 9.4) 
(b)…perturbatio est enim quae Graece πάθος dicitur; unde illa voluit vocare 
animo passiva, quia verbum de verbo πάθος passio diceretur motus animi contra 
rationem.29 (CD 8.17) 
(c)…quibus quattuor vel perturbationibus, ut Cicero appellat, vel passionibus, ut 
plerique verbum e verbo Graeco exprimunt, omnis humanorum morum vitiositas 
continetur.30 (CD 14.5) 
(d)…confitens eorum mentem, qua rationales esse perhibuit, non saltem inbutam 
munitamque virtute passionibus animi inrationabilibus nequaquam cedere, sed ipsam 
quoque, sicut stultarum mentium mos est, procellosis quodam modo perturbationibus 
agitari.31 (CD 9.3) 
                                                          
26 CD 14.5: …hinc eis sint morbi cupiditatum et timorum et laetitiae sive tristitiae; quibus quattuor 
vel perturbationibus, ut Cicero appellat, vel passionibus, ut plerique verbum e verbo Graeco 
exprimunt, omnis humanorum morum vitiositas continetur.  
27 For Augustine, the main channel for acquainting himself with this tradition were Cicero’s 
writings. It has been stated that 750 out of the 1150 abstract nouns in De civitate Dei are from 
Cicero, which illustrates that Cicero had a significant influence on Augustine. See Ruokanen 1993, 
121. 
28 “For such consent, they hold, is within our power; and the difference between the mind of a wise 
man and that of a fool is that the fool’s mind yields to these same passions and adapts them through 
an assent, whereas the wise man, though he experiences them of necessity, nonetheless retains with 
mind unshaken a true and steadfast perception of those things which he ought rationally to seek or 
avoid”. [transl. Dyson, with changes] 
29 “For the Greek word pathos means ‘disturbance’; and this is what Apuleius means when he says 
that the demons are ‘passive in soul’, because the word passio, which is the same as pathos, signifies 
a commotion of the mind contrary to reason”. 
30 Translated above; see note 26. 
31 “For he confesses that their minds, in respect of which he has asserted that they are rational, are 
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(e) Hi motus, hi affectus de amore boni et de sancta caritate venientes si vitia 
vocanda sunt, sinamus ut ea quae vere vitia sunt virtutes vocentur. Sed cum rectam 
rationem sequantur istae affectiones quando ubi oportet adhibentur, quis eas tunc 
morbos seu vitiosas passiones audeat dicere?32 (CD 14.9) 
In (a), (b), (c), and (d), Augustine adopts, through Cicero, the Stoic 
orientation to passions (passiones) and interprets them as perturbations of the soul 
and the opposite of reason. Scrutton maintains that Augustine attaches affectus to 
voluntas and passio to concupiscentia or appetitivus, the lower sensitive part 
which is in rebellion against the higher part of the soul, and renders the term 
voluntas as a criterion to distinguish between affectiones and passiones. 33 
Referring to case (e), Scrutton emphasises that affections are movements of the 
rational soul and further that “what makes an emotion a passion or an affection is 
not its moral status, but what it relates to the sensitive or intellective self”.34 This 
argument involves two facets that occur in the Stoics and Cicero: 1. Passions are 
the psychological motions or perturbations of the soul (in Zeno).35 2. Passions as 
mistaken value judgments can be judged by good and bad (in Chrysippus).36 
Cicero adopts these two Stoics ideas in his works and uses the term perturbatio 
instead of passio to refer to a disturbance or a movement of the soul against 
reason. 37  These perturbations (gestiens et libido, metus et aegritudo) can be 
                                                                                                                                                               
not imbued and fortified even with sufficient virtue to resist to any degree the irrational passions of 
the soul. Rather, they are themselves agitated by storms and tempests, as it were, as is usually the 
case with stupid minds”. 
32 “If these emotions and affections, which come from love of the good and from holy charity, are 
to be called vices, then let us allow that real vices should be called virtues. But since, when they 
are exhibited in the proper circumstances, these affections are the consequences of right reason, 
who would then dare to say that they are unwholesome or vicious passions?” 
33 See Scrutton 2005, 171. 
34 Scrutton 2005, 172. 
35 This is a basic part of the Stoic doctrine of passions, widely known as πάθη. Zeno defined them as 
impulses or an instability in the movements of the soul. In Lives of Eminent Philosophers (Vol. II), 
Zeno 7.110, Diogenes Laertius comments on Zeno’s viewpoint of passions: “Passion, or emotion, 
is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in 
excess”. [transl. Hicks, LCL version] Cicero also points this out in Tusc. 4.6.11: Est igitur Zenonis 
haec definitio, ut perturbatio sit, quod πάθος ille dicit, aversa a recta ratione contra naturam 
animi commotio. Quidam brevius perturbationem esse appetitum vehementiorem, sed 
vehementiorem eum volunt esse, qui longius discesserit a naturae constantia.  
36 Chrysippus refers to emotions as judgments, as Diogenes Laertius explains in Lives of Eminent 
Philosophers (Vol. II), Zeno 7.111: “They hold the emotions to be judgments, as is stated by 
Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions: avarice being a supposition that money is a good, while 
the case is similar with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions [against reason]”. 
[transl. Hicks] 
37 See Cicero Tusc. 3.9.24: Nam cum omnis perturbatio sit animi motus vel rationis expers vel 
rationem aspernans vel rationi non obediens, isque motus aut boni aut mali opinione citetur 
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classified into four categories depending on whether the evaluations are about the 
present or the future, good or bad; they are all nevertheless obstacles to maintaining 
one’s mental peace and quiet. Augustine was well familiar with these doctrines, and 
case (e) might be construed as evidence by commentators who defend the 
dichotomous theory of passions and affections. 
However, these are merely preliminary examples that do not cover all cases 
and consequently do not provide a satisfactory account of Augustine’s semantics of 
emotions terminology. Augustine does not simply confine himself to this portrayal. 
While he does occasionally associate a negative value with passio and a positive 
one with affectus when discussing the views of the Stoics, Academics and Cicero, 
he also uses the terms passio, affectus, and perturbatio in a more complex way, 
highlighting their flexible characters. An important observation is that all of these 
terms are used both in a positive and in a negative sense. 
 
II. Cases for flexible uses of passio, affectus and other related terms 
Augustine displays a versatile use of the terms passio and affectus; in many 
instances, he even refers to a positive sense of passio and a negative sense of 
affectus. I shall demonstrate this semantic flexibility through examining the 
following four examples: 1. Cases in which Augustine uses passio in a positive 
sense and affectus in a negative sense, or both in a neutral sense; 2. Cases in 
which Augustine uses passio, perturbatio, affectio, pathē interchangeably and 
regards them as having the same meaning when used by different philosophers to 
describe the movement of the soul; 3. Cases in which Augustine discusses the four 
subspecies of passio, namely, cupiditas, timor, laetitia and tristitia, which he 
considers to be derived from the traditional division by the Stoics, and refers to 
them as being good or evil. Augustine unambiguously states that he disagrees 
with the Stoics on the issue of distinguishing the constantiae (εὐπαθεῖαι, with the 
three subtypes of voluntas, gaudium, cautio) from the perturbationes (passiones 
or πάθη, with the four subspecies of cupiditas, laetitia, metus, tristitia) and 
                                                                                                                                                               
bifariam, quattuor perturbationes aequaliter distributae sunt: nam duae sunt ex opinione boni, 
quarum altera, voluptas gestiens, id est, praeter modum elata laetitia, opinione praesentis magni 
alicuius boni, altera, quae est immoderata appetitio opinati magni boni rationi non obtemperans, 
vel cupiditas recte vel libido dici potest. Ergo haec duo genera, voluptas gestiens et libido, bonorum 
opinione turbantur, ut duo reliqua, metus et aegritudo, malorum. 
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establishing the members of the first group as being good, as the members of 
these two groups, constantiae and passiones, can be good and bad alike;38 4. 
Cases in which Augustine uses passio in a positive sense and equates affectus 
with passio in this context, referring to religious manners or the psychology of 
Jesus Christ. He stresses the importance of the emotion of “secundum Deum 
contristari” (grief after a godly manner) in CD 14.8, and suggests that we should 
distinguish secundum Deum contristari from mundi tristitia.39 By examining 
these four aspects of Augustine’s terminology, we will see that Augustine uses the 
terms passio (incl. subspecies of passio) and affectus in several ways and in 
opposite value contexts rather than according to a fixed dichotomy that some 
scholars have maintained. 
1. Using passio in a positive sense and affectus as having a negative 
connotation, or using these in a neutral sense in some occasions. 
(a) Quod passiones quae Christianos animos afficiunt non in vitium trahant, sed 
virtutem exerceant.40 (CD 9.5) 
(b) Deus secundum scripturas irascitur, nec tamen ulla passione turbatur. Hoc 
enim verbum vindictae usurpavit effectus, non illius turbulentus affectus.41 (CD 9.5) 
(c)…ut sine his affectionibus vivatur quae contra rationem accidunt mentemque 
perturbant.42 (CD 14.9) 
(d) Et omnino pro varietate rerum quae appetuntur atque fugiuntur, sicut allicitur 
vel offenditur voluntas hominis, ita in hos vel illos affectus mutatur et vertitur.43 (CD 14.6)  
(e)…iuvandam mentique passiones ita moderandas atque frenandas ut in usum 
                                                          
38 CD 14.8: Proinde volunt cavent gaudent et boni et mali; atque ut eadem aliis verbis enuntiemus, 
cupiunt timent laetantur et boni et mali. Sed illi bene, isti male, sicut hominibus seu recta seu 
perversa voluntas est. 
39 CD 14.8: Ita enim dicit: Video quod epistula illa, etsi ad horam, contristavit vos; nunc gaudeo, 
non quia contristati estis, sed quia contristati estis in paenitentiam. Contristati enim estis 
secundun Deum, ut in nullo detrimentum patiamini ex nobis. Quae enim secundum Deum est 
tristitia paenitentiam in salutem inpaenitendam operatur; mundi autem tristitia mortem operatur. 
Ecce enim id ipsum secundum Deum contristari quantam perfecit in vobis industriam. 
40 “That the passions which affect the minds of Christians do not drag them into vice but exercise 
their virtue”. [transl. Wiesen, LCL version] This is the title of CD 9.5. The chapter headings in the 
City of God may be by Augustine or later additions; they are included in the critical edition by B. 
Dombart and A. Kalb in a separate list (See CCL 47, V-XLV). 
41 “According to the Scriptures, God Himself is angered; yet He is not disturbed by any passion. For 
this word is used to indicate the effect of His vengeance, rather than any disturbance to which He is 
subject”. 
42 “…a life without those affections which come contrary to reason and agitate the mind”. [My 
translation] 
43 “And, universally, as a man’s will is attracted or repelled by the variety of things which are 
pursued or avoided, so it changes and turns into emotions of one kind or the other”. 
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iustitiae convertantur.44 (CD 9.5) 
Example (a) shows that for Christians, passions constitute good exercises 
in fostering virtues. Augustine explains that it is necessary for a right-minded 
person to have compassion to comfort the unfortunates and preserve 
righteousness.45 In this context, passions are regarded as being good because they 
follow the right reason. Examples (b) and (c) demonstrate a negative use of 
affectus, referring to that which takes place contrary to reason (ratio). Examples (d) 
and (e) show that affectus and passio are used as neutral terms referring to natural 
emotions or dispositions of the mind. 
2. Using passio, affectio, perturbatio, and pathē interchangeably. 
(a) Duae sunt sententiae philosophorum de his animi motibus, quae Graeci πάθη, 
nostri autem quidam, sicut Cicero, perturbationes, quidam affectiones vel affectus, quidam 
vero, sicut iste, de Graeco expressius passiones vocant.46 (CD 9.4) 
(b)…has autem quattuor perturbationes secundum Ciceronem, secundum autem 
plurimos passiones. Graece autem illae tres, sicut dici, appellantur εὐπαθεῖαι, istae autem 
quattuor πάθη.47 (CD 14.8) 
(c)…quibus quattuor vel perturbationibus, ut Cicero appellat, vei 
passionibus…Unde, etiam illis fatentibus, non ex carne tantum afficitur anima ut cupiat 
metuat, laetetur aegrescat, verum etiam ex se ipsa his potest motibus agitari.48 (CD 14.5) 
(d) Has ergo perturbationes sive affectiones sive passiones quidam philosophi 
dicunt etiam in sapientem cadere, sed moderatas rationique subiectas.49 (CD 9.4) 
In excerpt (a), Augustine assumes that all these terms can be used 
synonymously. The same is said to apply to the terms passio and perturbatio in 
excerpts (b) and (c) as well as the terms perturbatio and affectus in excerpt (d). 
                                                          
44 “…places the mind itself under the governance and help of God, and the passions under the mind, 
so that they may be moderated and bridled and turned to righteous use”. 
45 CD 9.5: Servit autem motus iste rationi quando ita praebetur misericordia ut iustitia conservetur, 
sive cum indigenti tribuitur, sive cum ignoscitur paenitenti. 
46 “There are two opinions among the philosophers about those motions of the mind which the 
Greeks call pathe. Some of our writers such as Cicero calls them disturbances, others call them 
affections or affects, and others again, [like Apuleius], call them passions, which expresses the 
Greek word more closely”. [transl. Dyson, with changes] 
47 “…the latter four are ‘disturbances’ according to Cicero, but ‘passions’ according to most other 
authors. In Greek, however, as I have said, the three former are called eupatheiai; and the four latter 
are called pathé”.  
48 “And these four perturbations, as Cicero calls them, or passions…Thus, even by their own 
admission, the soul is not only so affected by the flesh that it feels desire and fear, joy and grief, but 
it can also through itself be stirred by these emotion”.  
49 “Then, these perturbations or affections or passions are said by certain philosophers to assail even 
the wise man, though they are moderated and controlled by reason”. [My translation] 
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3. Commenting on the four subspecies of emotional terms, cupiditas, 
laetitia, metus and tristitia as well as on the ambiguity of the so-called constantiae. 
Quoting from the Holy Scripture (ex propheta et ex evangelio), Augustine argues 
that voluntas, gaudium, cautio, and the four subspecies of passio can be expressed 
in both a positive and a negative sense. 
(a) Laetitia in bono est: Laetamini in Domino et exultate iusti; et: Dedisti laetitiam 
in cor meum; et: Adimplebis me laetitia cum vultu tuo. Timor in bono est apud apostolum 
ubi ait: Cum timore et tremore vestram ipsorum salutem operamini; et: Noli altum sapere, 
sed time.50 (CD 14.7) 
(b) Locutione vero usitatiore, quam frequentat maxime consuetudo sermonis, non 
utique diceretur: Noli velle mentiri omne mendacium, nisi esset et voluntas mala…Nam 
ex abundanti additum est ‘bonae’ si esse non potest nisi bona.51 (CD 14.8) 
(c) Gaudium vero eos et in malo posuisse ille ipse Vergilianus testis est versus 
ubi has quattuor perturbationes summa brevitate complexus est: Hinc metuunt 
cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque. Dixit etiam idem auctor: Mala mentis gaudia.52 (CD 
14.8) 
(d) Proinde volunt cavent gaudent et boni et mali; atque ut eadem aliis verbis 
enuntiemus, cupiunt timent laetantur et boni et mali. Sed illi bene, isti male, sicut 
hominibus seu recta seu perversa voluntas est.53 (CD 14.8) 
These samples illustrate that Augustine prefers to use the same terms to 
refer to both good and bad psychological phenomena and does not differentiate 
these on the basis of value categories. Augustine states that “such an 
indiscriminate use of these terms is seen also among authors of secular 
literature”.54 Augustine disagrees with the Stoics who believed that passions are 
simply bad and cannot exist in a wise man. He maintains that passions (cupiditas, 
                                                          
50 “‘Joy’ has a good sense, as in, ‘Have joy in the Lord, and rejoice, ye righteous’, and ‘Thou hast 
put joy in my heart’; and ‘Thou wilt fill me with joy by Thy countenance.’ ‘Fear’ has a good sense in 
the place where the apostle says, ‘Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling’, and ‘Be not 
high-minded, but fear’”. 
51 “If there were no such thing as an evil will, there would not be the more familiar usage which is 
very frequently employed in ordinary speech, as in, ‘Let it not be thy will to make any manner of 
lie’…The addition of the word ‘good’ here is redundant if will can only be good”.  
52 “‘Gladness’ is used in a bad sense in that same line of Virgil which contains his most brief 
statement of the four things which disturb the mind: ‘Hence come desire and fear, gladness and 
sorrow.’ The same author also speaks of ‘The evil gladness of the mind’”. 
53 “Will, caution and gladness, then, are common to both good and evil men; and – to make the 
same point in different words – good and evil men alike feel desire, fear and joy. But the good feel 
these emotions in a good way, and the bad feel them in a bad way, just as the will of men may be 
righteous or perverse”.  
54 CD 14.8: Et apud auctores saecularium litterarum talis istorum verborum indifferentia reperitur. 
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laetitia, metus, tristitia) can also be good. For example, he states that “although 
the Stoics find nothing in the mind of the wise man corresponding to grief, we 
discover that even this is used in a good sense, and especially in our own 
Scriptures”.55 
4. Godly passions play an important role in Augustine’s works. They are 
based on human emotions. In the life of Christians or Christ, passio is referred to 
in a morally good sense, as are the four subspecies of passio (cupiditas, laetitia, 
metus, tristitia). Augustine asserts strongly that if a person were grieved in a 
godly manner (secundum Deum contristari), he or she would not suffer any loss,56 
because a godly grief affects repentance which in turn leads to salvation (CD 14.8: 
Quae enim secundum Deum est tristitia paenitentiam in salutem inpaenitendam 
operatur).57 Human passions are good in the person of Christ who experiences 
gladness, desire, grief and pain in a humble and righteous manner: 
Quod dixerit: Gaudeo propter vos ut credatis; quod Lazarum suscitaturus etiam 
lacrimas fuderit; quod concupiverit cum discipulis suis manducare pascha; quod, 
propinquante passione, tristis fuerit anima eius, non falso utique referuntur. 
Verum ille hos motus certae dispensationis gratia ita...58 (CD 14.9) 
Augustine continues to maintain that the passions of Christians are right in this 
life if they follow God’s will.59 Having godly passions, Christians are able to feel 
the joy of hope and defeat death. Thus, godly passions belong to the way of life 
that human beings in this world ought to pursue. From this perspective, passio is a 
positive term that is used to refer to all the emotions in the heart of Jesus as well as 
all the emotions that Christians will go through. On the basis of the above cases 
demonstrating the flexible use of emotions terminology, it is clear that the notion of 
a sharp division between the terms passio and affectus is false. 
 
                                                          
55 CD 14.8: Ipsa quoque tristitia, pro qua Stoici nihil in animo sapientis inveniri posse putaverunt, 
reperitur in bono et maxime apud nostros.  
56 CD 14.8: Contristati enim estis secundun Deum, ut in nullo detrimentum patiamini ex nobis. 
57 “For godly grief worketh repentance to salvation not to be repented of: but the grief of the world 
worketh death”. Cf. I Cor. 7:8ff. 
58 “That He said: ‘I am glad for your sakes, to the intent ye may believe’; that He even wept when He 
was about to raise Lazarus; that He desired to eat the Passover with His disciples; and that, as His 
passion drew nigh, His soul was grieved. Truly, He accepted these emotions into His human mind 
for the sake of His own assured purpose…” 
59 CD 14.9: Apud nos autem iuxta scripturas sanctas sanamque doctrinam cives sanctae civitatis 
Dei in huius vitae peregrinatione secundum Deum viventes metuunt cupiuntque, dolent 
gaudentque, et quia rectus est amor eorum, istas omnes affectiones rectas habent. 
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III. Cases for using passio, affectus and other terms to express all emotions  
Let us turn to the argument that one should not use the term “emotion” in the 
context of Augustinian studies because there is no relevant Latin word in 
Augustine’s works that could be rendered as “emotion”, as it is used today. Yet it 
can be observed that Augustine occasionally uses the terms affectus (affectiones), 
motus, or passio to express the felt movements of a human soul that do not occur 
by choice. In light of this general usage, I do not foresee a strong reason against 
referring to these movements as emotions. If one uses “passion” as a generic term 
similar to “emotion”, it can be likewise regarded as an abstract expression. In both 
instances, some contrastive uses of passio and affectus must be noted. 
(a) Quae cum ita sint, quoniam recta vita ducenda est qua perveniendum sit ad 
beatam, omnes affectus istos vita recta rectos habet, perversa perversos.60 (CD 14.9) 
(b) …vituperabat enim et detestabatur apostolus quosdam quos etiam esse dixit 
sine affectione.61 (CD 14.9) 
(c) Proinde, quod fatendum est, etiam cum rectas et secundum Deum habemus 
has affectiones, huius vitae sunt, non illius quam futuram speramus, et saepe illis etiam 
inviti cedimus.62 (CD 14.9) 
(d) Quam ob rem etiam ipse Dominus in forma servi agere vitam dignatus 
humanam, sed nullum habens ominino peccatum adhibuit eas ubi adhibendas esse 
iudicavit. Neque enim in quo verum erat hominis corpus et verus hominis animus, falsus 
erat humanus affectus.63 (CD 14.9)  
(e) Verum ille hos motus certae dispensationis gratia ita, cum voluit, suscepit 
animo humano ut, cum voluit, factus est homo.64 (CD 14.9)  
(f) Hi motus, hi affectus de amore boni et de sancta caritate venientes si vitia 
vocanda sunt, sinamus ut ea quae vere vitia sunt virtutes vocentur.65 (CD 14.9) 
                                                          
60 “We must, then, lead a righteous life if we are to attain a life of blessedness; and such a righteous 
life will exhibit all these emotions [affectus] righteously, whereas a perverse life exhibits them 
perversely”. 
61  “For the apostle condemned and denounced certain persons who, he said, were ‘without 
affection’”. [transl. Dyson, with changes] 
62 “We must, however, confess that the emotions [affectiones] which we have, even when they are 
righteous and according to God, belong to this life, and not to the life to come for which we hope; 
and that we often yield to them even against our will”.  
63 “Hence, when the Lord Himself deigned to live a human life in the form of a servant, though 
having no sin, He displayed these emotions in circumstances where He judged that they ought to 
be displayed. For human emotions [affectus] was not feigned in Him Who truly had the body of a 
man and the mind of a man”.  
64 “Truly, He accepted these emotions [motus] into His human mind for the sake of His own 
assured purpose, and when He so willed, just as He was made man when He so willed”.  
65 “If these emotions [motus] and affections [affectus], which come from love of the good and 
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(g) Has ergo perturbationes sive affectiones sive passiones quidam philosophi 
dicunt etiam in sapientem cadere, sed moderatas rationique subiectas.66 (CD 9.4) 
(h) Deo quippe illa ipsam mentem subicit regendam et iuvandam mentique 
passiones ita moderandas atque frenandas ut in usum iustitiae convertantur.67 (CD 9.5) 
(i) Deus secundum scripturas irascitur, nec tamen ulla passione turbatur. Hoc 
enim verbum vindictae usurpavit effectus, non illius turbulentus affectus.68 (CD 9.5) 
Excerpts (a), (b), (c), and (d) demonstrate that affectus (affectiones) may 
be used to refer to all the emotions that are present in human beings and also in 
Jesus. Affectus is not good or bad as such, but rather an emotion that can be either 
depending on the context. Likewise, excerpts (e) and (f) show the equalisation 
between motus and affectus, which can also be discerned in excerpt (g) between 
perturbatio, affectus and passio. In excerpt (h), the term passiones refers to all the 
emotions which should be moderated and controlled by the mind, while in excerpt 
(i), passio and affectus refer to all human emotions to which God is not subject. In 
summary, these examples show that there are no fixed distinctions between the 
uses of motus, perturbatio, passio and affectus when referring to the emotions that 
are shared by human beings. 
 
On the basis of the above considerations, we can observe that Augustine 
displays a good understanding of how Cicero and the Stoics use the term 
perturbatio (passio). He follows their doctrine that regards passions as the motion, 
turmoil or perturbation of the mind, but he examines the idea from a new 
perspective by focusing on the inevitable movements of the soul (motus animi) 
which are natural human emotions and also shared by Jesus. There is no strict 
distinction between emotions referred to as constantiae (εὐπαθεῖαι: voluntas, 
gaudium, cautio) and those referred to as perturbationes (passio or πάθη: 
cupiditas, laetitia, metus, tristitia) in Augustine’s works, and he also uses these 
terms in different ways. Therefore, the assertion that he differentiates between 
passio (perturbatio) and affectus as two opposite groups is not completely 
substantiated by evidence and is unconvincing.  
                                                                                                                                                               
from holy charity, are to be called vices, then let us allow that real vices should be called virtues”.  
66 Translated above; see note 49.  
67 “Scripture, indeed, places the mind itself under the governance and help of God, and the 
passions under the mind, so that they may be moderated and bridled and turned to righteous use”. 
68 Translated above; see note 41. 
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In addition, the flexible terminological use of the emotional terms passio 
(incl. its subspecies), affectus, motus, and perturbatio as well as the remarks on the 
godly passiones support the suggestion that these phenomena could well be 
referred to by the common term “emotion” that we often use today. Cicero 
translates the Stoic word for emotion, “pathos”, by the term perturbatio.69 
Augustine also assumes that the term perturbationes in Cicero and the Stoics 
refers to all passiones in the sense of πάθος, but he changes the unqualified 
negative connotation of the Stoic terminology. The discussion concerning passio in 
Augustine’s works reveal his complex doctrinal relationship with the Stoics, Cicero 
and other Hellenistic philosophers. Next, I shall explore the doctrinal background 
of Augustine’s psychology of passions, concentrating on the question of which 
theoretical sources Augustine consulted. 
 
2.2. Augustine and His Predecessors on the Psychology of Passions 
 
Stoicism and Neoplatonism are the two philosophical schools that served as major 
influences on Augustine’s understanding of the passions.70 Some scholars assert 
that Augustine primarily follows Neoplatonic theories of passions and that his 
viewpoint is more in line with Platonism than with Stoicism. On the other hand, 
other scholars insist that Augustine follows the Stoic tradition. By way of an 
example, I shall first explain the Platonist interpretation by Van Riel as well as the 
Stoic interpretation by Marcia Colish. 
Gerd Van Riel maintains that Augustine displays a clear adherence to the 
Neoplatonic creed of passions. In his article, “MENS INMOTA MOTA MANE: 
Neoplatonic Tendencies in Augustine’s Theology of the Passions”, Van Riel 
                                                          
69 Sorabji 2000, 208. Peter King also supports this viewpoint and believes that Augustine follows 
Cicero’s usage: “Cicero even proposes morbus as literal translation of πάθος, though in the end he 
adopts ‘disturbance’ (perturbatio), in which he is later followed by Augustine”. See King 2012a, 14 
and n. 15. 
70 Augustine’s knowledge of Stoicism is acquired predominately through Cicero, but the question 
of Augustine’s Platonic sources is somewhat more complicated. Although he mentioned Platonism 
at different stages, the time he spent in Milan and Rome was important in this respect. Peter Brown 
points out that some works of Christian Platonists such as Marius Victorinus (an African professor 
of rhetoric), Simplicianus (the teacher of Ambrose), Ambrose, and earlier pagan writers such as 
Plotinus (in the Latin translation by Marius Victorinus) and Porphyry (a lost work De Regressu 
Animae) influenced Augustine’s comprehension of Platonism during the year 386. See Brown 
2000, 83–85. However, Cicero’s comments on Platonism also influenced Augustine. Therefore, I 
shall also focus on Cicero’s influence on Augustine’s concept of emotions in this section. 
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maintains that Plato, Plotinus, Porphyry, Virgil, and Aristotle have a profound 
influence on Augustine’s conception of passions, which includes the function of 
the sensory soul, the physiological basis, and the operations of passions in both 
this life and the afterlife. He also argues that when Augustine absorbs some 
scattered points from Stoicism, they are interpreted from a Neoplatonic 
perspective.71 Van Riel points out that some Stoics (such as Posidonius) even 
abandon their standard theory and return to the Platonic camp, which serves to 
illustrate how Platonism tends to dominate in Augustine as well. In what follows, 
I shall list those Platonic-Aristotelian or Neoplatonic doctrines that Van Riel 
considers to have in one way or another influenced Augustine’s orientation on 
passions. It is important to note that when Van Riel argues for Augustine’s 
Neoplatonic tendency, he focuses more on the philosophical and doctrinal 
relationship between Augustine and his Platonic-Aristotelian predecessors than on 
their historical connection. Therefore, when Van Riel lists relevant documents for 
comparison, he primarily focuses on similarities instead of genetic connections, 
although he does occasionally comment on the historical connections as well. The 
similarities he points out are the following: 
(1) Plato (Philebus): There is a division between the body and the soul. 
The body is addicted to lust and material desires, and only the soul has the 
possibility to attain truth and perfection. When the corporeal movement is weak, 
the soul will not sense it and will be in a state of “neutral condition” or 
contentment without the perturbations of passions. In De quantitate animae and 
De musica 6.5.13 (and 15), Augustine accepts Plato’s view of this division and the 
“neutral state” (Philebus 42c–44a) and that the soul reacts to any sufficiently 
intensive affects (or passio) from the body.72 
(2) Plotinus (Enneades): There is not only a division between the body and 
the soul, but also between the sensible and the intelligible soul. Passions can only 
originate from the “ensouled body”, which is the combination of a sensible soul 
                                                          
71 “Augustine’s interpretation of Stoicism is mediated through Neo-Platonic doctrine”. Van Riel 
2004, 510 (n. 14).  
72 However, Augustine does not agree with Plato’s view that the intensity of the physiological 
movements determines the alterations of the soul. Some physiological movements or pains, such 
as cancer, will not be perceived, but they will nevertheless disturb the soul. Van Riel argues that 
Augustine considered Plato to have linked perception too closely to a bodily explanation and moved 
to Plotinus’ view of “consciousness”. See Van Riel 2004, 512 (n. 15)–513. 
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and body (in Enneades I 8, 15.14–18).73 The intelligible soul is the higher part of 
the soul which possesses cognition and knowledge of objects that are higher than 
sensible forms. In this “body-sensible-intelligible” structure, the soul’s descent 
towards the corporeal impulse is the principal source of passions that serve as a 
link between bodily suggestions and the psychic “consciousness”. In De musica 
6.5.10, Augustine accepts the above views and expresses his adherence to 
Plotinus’ notion of “consciousness” in Enneades IV, 4.20.18–20 and V, 
1.12.12–14.74 
(3) Porphyry (De abstinentia): Passions originate from the corporeal soul 
or sense perception which fixes the soul to bodily pleasures (De abstinentia I, 31 
and 38).75 The soul cannot reject these passions, but it can shift its attention to 
avoid them. The attentio is a pivotal function of the higher soul, a good faculty to 
prevent the soul from dropping into the body. By ignoring the sensible world and 
remaining impassive to it, the soul is able to avoid passions. Porphyry quotes 
Plato’s descriptions of this impassivity in Theaetetus (173c–174a) and explains it 
in De abstinentia I, 37.76 Van Riel thinks that Porphyry’s conception of attentio is 
based on Plotinus’ “consciousness” and that Augustine, in De musica 6.5.9–10, 
paraphrases this idea from Porphyry’s De abstinentia I, 38 and 39.77 
                                                          
73 Ibid., 520. 
74 Van Riel uses the following example from De musica 6.5.10 to illustrate how the soul directs 
attention to the influence that the sensory organs cause: “At the moment, it is said that the soul sees, 
hears, smells, tastes or feels by touching; by these activities, it gladly associates with things 
appropriate to it, and painfully resists to what is not appropriate. These, I think, are the operations 
which the soul exhibits over against affects of the body, when the soul senses, without, however, 
undergoing the passive states themselves”. Ibid., 511. This description shows similarities to the 
passages in Plotinus’ Enneades quoted above, as Van Riel demonstrates on p. 514. 
75 Van Riel points out that Porphyry inherits Plotinus’ conclusion that passions are originated from 
the combination of the lower soul and the body, namely, the soul “nailed” to the body as Phaedo 
(83d) described it. Ibid., 520 and n. 38. 
76 De abstinentia I, 37: “In these words Plato says that one remains impassive to these things [i.e., 
the sensible world] and out of their reach, not by descending to them, but by not lowering oneself to 
any of them”. Van Riel links this argumentation and Plato’s Phaedrus (246c–d) to Augustine’s 
Soliloquiae I, 14: Unum est quod tibi possum praecipere; nihil plus novi: penitus esse ista sensibilia 
fugienda, cavendumque magnopere, dum hoc corpus agimus, ne quo eorum visco pennae nostrae 
impediantur, quibus integris perfectisque opus est, ut ad illum lucem ab his tenebris evolemus: quae 
se ne ostendere quidem dignatur in hac cavea inclusis, nisi tales fuerint ut ista vel effracta vel 
dissoluta possint in auras suas evadere. Van Riel 2004, 517–518 (n. 30). 
77 De musica 6.5.9–10: Et ne longe faciam, videtur mihi anima cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo 
aliquid pati, sed in eius passionibus attentius agere, et has actiones sive faciles propter 
convenientiam, sive difficiles propter inconvenientiam, non eam latere: et hoc totum est quod sentire 
dicitur. Referring to Porphyry’s De abstinentia I, 38–39, Van Riel writes: “This Porphyrian 
προσοχή, or attentio, is literally taken over by Augustine in his De musica”. Van Riel 2004, 
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(4) Virgil (Aeneid): Heroes may have emotional reactions that are manifest 
in the body (for example, shedding tears), but their soul can nevertheless remain 
unmoved and without passions. Van Riel draws attention to Virgil’s sentence 
“mens inmota mota manet, lacrimae volvuntur inanes” (Aeneid IV, 449), quoted 
by Augustine in CD 9.4.3, which in his opinion shows that whether due to 
moderation or eradication, there is no difference between Platonists and Stoics on 
the notion that the mind of heroes is not afflicted by passions.78 He maintains that 
while Augustine is more inclined to Virgil and Cicero’s view regarding the 
bipartition of the soul than the Stoic view of the soul as a united whole, they all 
suggest eliminating the disturbance of passions. 
(5) Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics): μετριοπάθεια (metriopatheia) and 
gaudium. Augustine uses the Aristotelian concept of μετριοπάθεια or “tempering 
the passions” to interpret the Stoic notion of εὐπάθεια. Van Riel notes that in CD 
14.8, Augustine uses the Aristotelian idea of moderation and right reason 
introduced in Nicomachean Ethics 2.4 to explain the Stoic εὐπάθεια. 79 
Furthermore, Augustine postulates two passions in the afterlife, joy (gaudium) and 
love (amor), which indicates that “he follows Aristotle rather than Plato. The 
notion of gaudium rests on the Aristotelian definition of pleasure as the 
supplementary effect of an unimpeded activity, namely, of the perfect activity of 
the will that has attained its final goal”.80 
(6) Posidonius (135–51 BC). Posidonius advocated a threefold division of 
the soul, dividing between the impulses of the soul as either irrational or rational; 
the irrational impulse produces passions, whereas the rational leads to εὐπάθεια.81 
Van Riel regards this as evidence of some Stoics rejecting their traditional view 
                                                                                                                                                               
514–515. 
78 Ibid., 518 (n. 33). 
79 “As a matter of fact, Augustine’s reinterpretation is not Stoic at all any more. Rather, Augustine’s 
viewpoint is in line with that of Aristotle, though expressed in a Stoic terminology”. Ibid., 522. 
Metriopatheia (moderation of passions), which Cicero and Seneca refer to as a Peripatetic view, is 
often recommended by Platonic authors. See Knuuttila 2004, 88. 
80 Ibid., 530–531. 
81 “Posidonius strongly disagreed with the standard Stoic doctrine. He rejected Chrysippus’ unitary 
view of the soul, and returned to the Platonic, threefold division of the psyche. He thus drew an 
opposition between reason and the irrational parts of the soul, which had important repercussions for 
the theory of passions…This was the version of Stoicism that was the most influential in the Platonic 
schools, and the Neo-Platonic reformulation rests on this Posidonian theory”. Van Riel 2004, 
523–524. This Platonic tendency of the Stoic Posidonius was rehashed by Galen and Plutarch who 
argued for a rejection of the classical Stoic theory of a unitary soul without a passionate part. 
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and transferring to the Platonic idea of the bipartition of the soul, which influences 
Augustine deeply. Augustine applies this idea to reinterpret the Stoic terminology 
of εὐπάθεια, arguing that both εὐπαθεῖαι and passions can be good as well as bad. 
Peter King agrees with Van Riel’s judgment that “Augustine’s opposition 
to the Stoics stemmed from his deeper commitment to a ‘Neoplatonic’ account of 
the passions”.82 King also draws attention to Augustine’s comments on anger (ira) 
and lust (libido) in CD 14.19 to demonstrate that Augustine accepts the 
Platonic-Peripatetic theory of the bipartition of the soul and their view that 
turbulent passions (such as anger and lust) are the turmoil of the lower, irrational 
part of the soul: “those philosophers who have come closer to the truth than others 
have acknowledged that anger and lust are the vice-ridden parts of the soul, in that 
they are turbulent and disorderly emotions, inciting us to acts which reason 
forbids”.83 King points out that the notion of the bipartition of soul that Augustine 
approves is derived from Plato (Republic 436a–441c) and Aristotle (Nicomachean 
Ethics 1.13 and Rhetoric 1.10).84 
Some researchers, however, refer to other sources in order to demonstrate 
that Augustine’s approach to passions is, in fact, rooted in the Stoic tradition.85 
For example, Marcia Colish, Johannes Brachtendorf and Richard Sorabji 
emphasise this connection by foregrounding the doctrines of the structures and 
stages of passions. Marcia Colish maintains that Augustine is “the single most 
important figure in the history of the Stoic tradition in the Latin West between the 
third and the sixth centuries”.86 According to Colish, Augustine adheres to many 
                                                          
82 King 2012a, 17 (n. 24). King believes that even though Augustine criticises some Neoplatonic 
notions, his Neoplatonic tendency is obvious. For detailed discussion, see King 2012a, 17–22. 
83 CD 14.19: Hinc est quod et illi philosophi qui veritati propius accesserunt iram atque libidinem 
vitiosas animi partes esse confessi sunt, eo quod turbide atque inordinate moverentur ad ea etiam 
quae sapientia perpetrari vetat, ac per hoc opus habere moderatrice mente atque ratione. 
84 King 2010, 171. 
85 Gérard Verbeke, Charles Baguette and Michel Spanneut present detailed surveys on Stoic 
passages and themes in Augustine. They believe that Augustine displays a strong attachment to the 
Stoic position in relation to semantics, epistemology, ethics, psychology and philosophy, among 
others, especially in his early works. See Gérard Verbeke, “Augusin et le stoїcisme”, Recherches 
augustiniennes, I (1958), 67–89; Charles Baguette, Le stoїcisme dans la formation de saint 
Augustin (Université de Louvain, Ph.D. diss. 1968), 256–260; Michel Spanneut, “Le stoїcisme et 
saint Augustin”, Forma Futuri: Studi in onore del Cardinale Michele Pellerino (Torino, Bottega 
d’Erasmo, 1975), 896–914. For the studies, see Colish 1985 (II), 145–146. 
86  Colish 1985 (II), 142. Colish argues that Stoicism had a profound impact on Augustine 
throughout his life and that he employed their doctrines in his discussions on Christian dogma, 
ethics and other fields. “Augustine applies his consistent uses of Stoicism to a host of different types 
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Stoic principles familiar to him, even though he occasionally criticises the Stoic 
philosophy. Colish lists the main Stoic predecessors that Augustine mentions or 
quotes. These influential Stoic thinkers are Zeno, Chrysippus, Aulus Gellius, 
Seneca, Epictetus, Persius, Cornutus, Lucan, Cincinnatus and Cato of Utica,87 of 
which the former five figures are the most relevant sources to Augustine’s 
understanding of passions. Focusing on the different aspects of passions 
(perception, intellectual acts, and psychological state), Colish concludes that 
Augustine displays a clear adherence to the Stoic theory of passions. As evidence, 
the first point by Colish is that Augustine agrees with the Stoics that passions 
originate from the irrational, intellectual judgement of the mind which is located 
in the soul rather than in the body.88 In other words, Colish maintains that 
Augustine adopts the Stoic doctrine that a passion can only originate when the 
judgment of the mind is involved. This means that involuntary stimuli or first 
movements are not regarded as passions. The second point by Colish is that after 
the formation of passions, Augustine emphasises the importance of intellectual 
acts in the process of passions, especially a correct, intellectual control that 
promotes moral acts and virtues. This is also an important part of Stoicism.89 The 
third and final evidence that Colish mentions is that Augustine adopts the Stoic 
view of removing passions (or triumph over the passions) through correct 
judgement and will, which allows the soul tranquility and happiness (tranquillitas 
animi).90 In other words, Colish’s position is very different from that of Van Riel. 
As regards passions, Colish argues that Augustine adheres to Stoic psychology 
                                                                                                                                                               
of works in a wide range of contexts…In some respects, also, his fidelity to Stoic positions is so 
thorough and is elaborated so repeatedly in this category of his thought as to make him their fullest 
expositor and transmitter to Latin readers in the later Middle Ages”. Ibid., 169, 152 and 213. 
87 Ibid., 166–167. Colish also emphasises the indirect connection between Augustine and the early 
Stoics such as Zeno, Chrysippus and Epictetus. She argues that Augustine’s most detailed 
discussions on these early Stoics are presented in his early works such as Contra Academicos (for 
instance, in Contra Academicos 2.5.11–12, 2.6.14, Augustine supports Zeno’s theory of phantasia). 
See Colish 1985 (II), 177–179. 
88 “Augustine endorses their [the Stoic’] insistence that the passions arise from false intellectual 
judgments, similarly locating the passions in man’s mind and will, not in his body”. Ibid., 236. 
89 “His [Augustine] endorsement of the idea that moral acts are primarily intellectual acts, not 
consequences of infrarational functions or material aspects of the human personality, informs his 
assent to the Stoic principle that virtues lies within, in the good conscience of the individual who 
possesses a correct moral intention”. Ibid., 209. 
90 “The definition of summum bonum as virtue alone, as an end in itself, as attainable by correct 
intellectual judgments and the exercise of a rationally instructed will, as the sole and sufficient 
possession of the sage…is a constellation of Stoic ideas which Augustine expressly attributes to that 
school and toward which he shows a marked partiality in his earliest work”. Ibid., 213. 
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and further emphasises the following points: 
(1) The Stoic theory of perception and the role of pneuma in psychology 
have a strong influence on Augustine.91 I shall not enter into the details of this 
notion; a more comprehensive account of the Stoic elements in Augustine’s 
doctrines can be found in O’Daly 1987. 
(2) Zeno of Citium (fl. 300 BC). The mind or intellect judges the sense 
information it receives. Adopting the theory of pneuma, Zeno asserts that the 
cognitive sequence of truth-mind-phantasia (sensible image) eliminates false data: 
“Truth is impressed on the mind so accurately that the phantasia, or sensible 
image, bears the marks of such certitude as to rule out completely the possibility 
that it is false”.92  Colish notes that Augustine gives an authentically Stoic 
description of this rational assessment in his Contra Academicos (2.5.11–12; 
2.6.14; 3.9.18–3.11.26) and De musica.93 
(3) Chrysippus (280–206 BC). Passions originate from the judgement of 
the intellect (they are false judgements), but if one relies on the capacity of reason 
when it functions without mistakes, it is possible to attain the optimal 
psychological state, summum bonum. Colish argues that Augustine consistently 
adheres to the Stoic creed that passions (laetitia, tristitia, cupiditas, metus) 
originate from the mind. This adherence is apparent in Augustine’s De sermone 
Domine in monte 1.9.24 and De immortalitate animae 5.7.94 Furthermore, Colish 
points out that Augustine related this psychology to summum bonum (or finem 
boni) by intellectual contemplation, which is reflected in his early works such as 
Contra Academicos (1.2.5; 1.5.15; 1.8.22–23; 3.7.16–3.8.18) and De beata uita 
2.4. Augustine accepts the assertion by Chrysippus that the mind serves a crucial 
function in generating passions as a type of judgement.95 
                                                          
91 See Colish 1985 (II), 170. 
92 Ibid., 178. 
93 In Contra Academicos (2.5.11–12; 2.6.14; 3.9.18–3.11.26), Colish notes that Augustine accepts 
this cognitive sequence and makes the intellectual judgment as a primitive criterion for the 
perception. Ibid., 178. 
94 “…he [Augustine] insists over and over again that they [passions] originate not in the body but in 
the mind”. Ibid., 207 and n. 168. Colish repeats this view on p. 236: “Augustine endorses their 
insistence that the passions arise from false intellectual judgments, similarly locating the passions in 
man’s mind and will, not in his body”. 
95 “…on the nature of the summum bonum for the first time in his Contra Academicos Augustine 
clearly prefers the views of Zeno and Chrysippus…that man’s capacity to know the truth with 
certainty is necessary for his understanding of the nature of the good life and of how to attain it”. 
Ibid., 213. 
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(4) Epictetus (AD 55–135) retailed by Aulus Gellius (Noctes Atticae). In 
CD 9.4, Augustine cites the story of “Stoic fear in the storm” from the 
philosophical journalist Aulus Gellius. This story refers to the reflection lag 
between the arrival of the suggestions of phantasia and intellectual assessment.96 
Noctes Atticae (19.1.14–20) paraphrases the argument from Epictetus’ lost fifth 
book of Discourses that influences Augustine’s comments in CD 9.4. 
On the basis of these doctrinal connections, Colish concludes that during 
his career, Augustine exhibits a clear orientation toward Stoicism. In other words, 
Augustine incorporated a large number of the Stoic categories, themes and 
doctrines of psychology in his works and these are all central and integrally 
connected to Augustine’s concerns.97 Therefore, to Colish, Augustine displays a 
strong Stoic orientation in his psychology of passions, especially in certain aspects 
of his sense perception theory, intellectual functions (elevating the intellect over 
passions), and in the moral judgment of passions.98 
According to Brachtendorf, Cicero follows the Stoic orthodoxy on the 
subject of the definition and character of passions99 and that his Tusculanae 
disputationes serves as a significant source for Augustine.100 Cicero sharply 
refutes the Platonic-Peripatetic doctrine that passions belong to the irrational part 
of the soul that could be beneficial to virtues, and he regards this approach 
involving moderation as a scandal. Cicero supports the orientations proposed by 
Zeno and Chrysippus, criticising each of the passions as a disease, and argues for 
                                                          
96 “…he [Augustine] agrees wholeheartedly in the passage just noted that intellectual judgment and 
assent to the data that the senses supply is needed to ascertain the truth and to govern one’s moral 
responses to that truth”. Ibid., 179.  
97  “…This category encompasses the largest number of Stoic doctrines found anywhere in 
Augustine’s oeuvre and includes physics, logic, epistemology, psychology, rhetoric, and ethics. 
Here, his treatment of his Stoic materials remains constant across his career although he may 
emphasize one aspect of a particular doctrine or another depending on the situation in which he uses 
it”. Colish 1985 (II), 152–153. 
98 Ibid., 208–209. Colish presents a detailed survey of Augustine and the Stoics’ views on passions, 
but her assertion that Augustine adheres to the Stoic position and is “their fullest expositor and 
transmitter to Latin readers in the later Middle Ages” appears problematic. Colish focuses 
predominately on Augustine’s early works (before the mid-390s), arguing that while Augustine was 
faithful to the Stoic intellectual tradition throughout his life, he also deviated from some particular 
Stoic doctrines in his later ideas. For example, he gave up the Stoic view on apatheia (see Colish 
1985 (II), 221–225). I shall return to this issue in Chapter 3.4. 
99 “Nonetheless Cicero abides by Stoic orthodoxy when he defines πάθος, or perturbatio. Quoting 
Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, he says: A perturbatio is a motion of the soul averted from 
right reason and against the nature of soul. It is too strong a desire and too far from the constancy 
of nature”. Brachtendorf 1997, 292. 
100 For Tusculanae disputationes as a main source for Augustine’s knowledge of the Stoic theory 
of emotions, see Hagendahl 1967 (vol. 2), 511–514; O’Daly 1987, 50–52. 
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apatheia as tranquility of the soul.101 Brachtendorf cites the following examples 
of the influence of Cicero’s Stoic theory of passions on Augustine: 
(i) The terminology of emotions in Tusculanae disputationes (3.11.24–25; 
4.6.11) such as πάθη, perturbatio, affectio, and affectus as well as Zeno’s 
definition and quartation theory of πάθος (libido, laetitia, metus, aegritudo). 
Augustine mentions these words and adds Apuleius’ neologism, passiones, in CD 
9.4.102 
(ii) Passions are illnesses. Cicero maintains that passions are perturbations 
of the soul that are neither natural nor necessary.103 Augustine describes the 
condition of his soul in Confessiones (8.11.25; 8.6.13; 8.10.24; 8.7.17) as an 
illness (morbus concupiscentiae) that should be healed; this conception has been 
influenced by Cicero’s discussion on Alcibiades’ passion in Tusc. 3 and 4.104 The 
characterisation of passions as illnesses is also introduced by Augustine in his CD 
(9.3–6; 14.5–24) and De nuptiis et concupiscentia 1.23, making a connection 
between passions and sin.105 
(iii) All passions are “directions of will”. Cicero believes that the four 
subtypes of pathos are consents of a person’s will (voluntas), each reflecting 
different passions. Moreover, the emotional movements of the soul are derived 
from wrong judgements about things according to the will. This idea is also 
adopted by Augustine in CD 14.6.106 
(iv) Apatheia. Augustine does not claim that apatheia could be attained in 
this life, but that it “was real in the earthly paradise, and it will be real again in the 
afterlife with God”.107 The Stoic ideal of apatheia as a freedom from passions 
                                                          
101 Tusc. 4.6.11: Est igitur Zenonis haec definitio, ut perturbatio sit, quod ille dicit, aversa a recta 
ratione contra naturam animi commotio. Tusc. 4.9.23: Hoc loco nimium operae consumitur a 
Stoicis, maxime a Chrysippo, dum morbis corporum comparatur morborum animi similitudo. 
Brachtendorf 1997, 292–293.  
102 Brachtendorf 1997, 296. 
103  Tusc. 3.80: …non naturale esse, sed voluntario iudicio et opinionis errore contractum. 
Brachtendorf 1997, 295. 
104 Ibid., 295. 
105 Ibid., 306. 
106 Ibid., 300. Sed cum consentimus appetendo ea quae volumus, cupiditas, cum autem consentimus 
fruendo his quae volumus, laetitia vocatur. Itemque cum dissentimus ab eo quod accidere nolumus, 
talis voluntas metus est, cum autem dissentimus ab eo quod nolentibus accidit, talis voluntas tristitia 
est. Et omnino pro varietate rerum quae appetuntur atque fugiuntur, sicut allicitur vel offenditur 
voluntas hominis, ita in hos vel illos affectus mutatur et vertitur. (CD 14.6) 
107 Ibid., 296. Brachtendorf evaluates Augustine’s ideal of freedom from passions, apatheia, as 
being similar to the Stoics’ position. 
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and tranquility in the eternal life is present in Augustine’s works. For example, 
tractatus LX (In Iohannis Euangelium tractatus) describes a state of perfection and 
eternal happiness.108 
Furthermore, Brachtendorf mentions as significant that Augustine adopts 
the concept of primus motus109 from Aulus Gellius’ Noctes Atticae, which reports 
the view of the Stoic Epictetus. Brachtendorf argues that Augustine regards 
primus motus as a type of passion, illustrating that Augustine does not follow the 
theory of either Cicero or Seneca.110 Augustine uses this doctrine extensively and 
mentions Gellius’ report in his Quaestiones in Heptateuchum 1.30 and CD 9.4.111 
In Emotion and Peace of Mind, Richard Sorabji underscores the influence 
of the Stoic terminology and psychology of passions on Augustine,112 such as 
Zeno’s four emotions, eupatheia and even apatheia, particularly in Augustine’s 
early works (On the Catholic and the Manichaean Ways of Life).113 On the other 
hand, the Neoplatonists also borrowed from the Stoic terminology of passions 
(plēgai, primus motus, eupatheia, etc.) and being acquainted with their writings, 
Augustine might have also been indirectly influenced by the Stoics.114 Thus, 
these three concepts, primus motus, eupatheia and apatheia, became a significant 
theoretical source for Augustine. Firstly, referring to primus motus, Sorabji states 
that while Augustine adapts this doctrine from Stoicism, he misunderstands it.115 
                                                          
108  Brachtendorf argues that Augustine, similarly to Cicero, seeks the state of freedom from 
passions in the realm of perfection, “Augustine’s reflection on Christ’s passions is not an attack on 
Stoic moral psychology”. Brachtendorf 1997, 305. 
109 Brachtendorf, Sorabji and Irwin maintain that Augustine does not receive this doctrine from 
Seneca (De ira 2.3.1–4), but from Gellius (19.1.14–20). Sorabji suggests that Augustine uses the 
text of Aulus Gellius rather than that of Seneca, which leads him to misunderstand the real Stoic 
position on primus motus. Sorabji 2000, 11. 
110 “With the help of Gellius’ report in his own interpretation Augustine employs a new conception 
of passion, which differs from Cicero’s ideas in several respects”. Brachtendorf provides three 
points to argue that Cicero’s conception is based on the Stoic idea that a passion is a judgment of the 
mind; therefore primus motus as a bodily impulse should not be regarded as a passion. Augustine, 
however, assumes a contrary position. See Brachtendorf 1997, 299. 
111 Brachtendorf 1997, 298 (n. 33). 
112 Sorabji emphasises a number of these continuities and adaptations in his Emotion and Peace of 
Mind. For instance, in Chapter IV, “From Stoic Agitations to Christian Temptations”, he uses the 
case of first movements to illustrate this connection. See Sorabji 2000, 341–356. 
113 Sorabji maintains that in Augustine’s early works, such as On the Catholic and the Manichaean 
Ways of Life (1.27.53–54), he stands on the Stoic point asking “who does not allow that the wise man 
should be free from all such miseria?” Meanwhile, in the afterlife, he insists on the Stoic eupatheiai 
that joy and gladness will persist. Sorabji 2000, 397–398. 
114 Some Stoic terminology and psychological views on passions were selected and interpreted by 
Platonists, such as Zeno’s four emotions, physical shocks, primus motus and eupatheia, which had 
an indirect influence on Augustine. Sorabji 2000, 203–204 and 65, (n. 47). 
115  Sorabji believes that Augustine was misled by the report of Aulus Gellius on this Stoic 
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Secondly, referring to eupatheia and apatheia, Sorabji concludes, unlike Van Riel, 
that Augustine uses them in a Stoic way, insisting on these psychological states in 
the next life and before the Fall, even though he does not believe them to be 
realisable in this life.116 Thirdly, Sorabji proposes that Augustine follows the 
Stoics in rejecting pride and lust, highlighting the function of the will. However, 
Sorabji also observes that Augustine has some non-Stoic views on passions, 
which makes his relation to the Stoics complicated. 117  Despite these 
misunderstandings and incoherencies, Sorabji emphasises the role of adaptation 
and continuity in the progression from Stoic agitations to Christian temptations. I 
shall return to Sorabji’s interpretation in the next chapter. 
Unlike Van Riel and Marcia Colish, Sarah Catherine Byers regards 
Augustine’s theory of emotions as a synthesis of Stoicism and Neoplatonism in 
her book entitled Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine. 
Byers maintains that Augustine adopts various additives (such as cognitivism and 
the theory of sensibility) from both Stoicism and Neoplatonism in addressing his 
doctrine of motivation and emotions, so that both of these schools are equally 
important to him.118 Byers also argues that Augustine adheres to some core Stoic 
and Platonic psychological principles, and that on this basis, he develops his own 
theory.119 Byers explains this synthesis from the viewpoint of her interpretation 
of propatheia, apatheia and eupatheia in Augustine: 1. Augustine adopts the Stoic 
view that preliminary passions (propatheiai) are impressions of the mind, and he 
                                                                                                                                                               
conception, since he had not read Seneca. Sorabji points out that it was, in fact, Seneca who 
established the three cases that Augustine introduces. 1. The first movement [pallor] of the Stoic 
philosopher in a ship; 2. The uncontrolled rise of the reproductive organs; 3. Flashing eyes and 
involuntary quickening breath. See Sorabji 2000, 11 and 355.  
116 Based on CD 14.9–10, Sorabji writes, “Rather, it [apatheia] is to be hoped for in the next, and it 
was attained before the Fall…Augustine calls it by the name of one of the Stoic eupatheiai…that it is 
due to love (caritas)”. Sorabji 2000, 398. This argument is also echoed by Peter King who does not 
believe Augustine to have abandoned the ideal of dispassionate passions. 
117 See Sorabji 2000, 399. 
118 “Which is the dominant note in Augustine’s theory, Stoicism or Platonism? It is clear that the 
Stoicism is primary for describing the genesis of a concrete action, because an action is provoked by 
an impression having sayable content and consent. Nevertheless, given that the discursive part of the 
mind is the least excellent part, in Augustine’s view, and given that the psychological underpinning, 
attraction for objects, is conceived of in Platonic terms, the Stoicism and Platonism are equally 
important…what is intriguing about this synthesis is the way that it coherently combines 
cognitivism and sensibility in motivation…Our recovery of Augustine’s well-integrated account 
thus looks rather timely”. Byers 2013, 53–54. 
119 See the section “Augustine’s adherence to core Stoic psychological principles” in Byers 2013, 
60–69. 
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identifies such impressions as dubitative cognitions;120 2. Augustine advocates 
the Stoic ideal of apatheia and transposes it into Heaven;121 and 3. Augustine 
adheres to the Ciceronian and Stoic dichotomy between pathē and eupatheiai in 
referring to the distinction between good and bad emotions and combines the 
Stoic eupatheia with the Platonic-Peripatetic goodness.122 Byers thus concludes 
that Augustine “coherently combines cognitivism and sensibility in motivation” 
and “the resulting synthesis should be considered a coherent position developed 
from these two earlier [Stoic and Neoplatonic] schools”.123 
The above arguments concerning the Neoplatonic and Stoic influence on 
Augustine are focused predominantly on these three points pertaining to the 
different stages of passions: origination (primus motus), control or elimination 
(metriopatheia and apatheia), and the good emotional state (eupatheia). Focusing 
on these aspects, I will introduce some early Christian predecessors124 whose 
views are doctrinally relevant in this context: 
(a) Clement of Alexandria. Clement follows Chrysippus’ description of 
passions as uncontrollable or irrational impulses that are against reason (Strom. 
2.13 (59.6)). He also recommends the Platonic therapy strategy of metriopatheia 
(using one’s reason to control the epithumetikon and the thumoeides, in Strom. 2.8 
(39.4)),125 adopting the Platonic partition of the soul in a way similar to Philo. As 
for metriopatheia and apatheia, he believes that metriopatheia as moderation 
therapy is the basic level that Christians should attain, but that it is difficult for 
them to realise apatheia. His view of apatheia (the Christian perfect state that is 
                                                          
120 “…the notion of a motivating impression and the syntactic forms Augustine attributes to his 
suggestiones are inspired by Stoicism…it is clear in the Stoic sources that preliminary passions are 
changes in the rational soul (animus) caused by impressions made on the mind…He [Augustine] 
developed the implications of Stoic cognitivism by identifying the cause of preliminary passions as 
doubt, meaning a dubitative sayable subsisting in an impression”. Byers 2013, 45, 100 and 101. 
121 “Augustine advocates a kind of passionlessness (apatheia) that is in keeping with the general 
definition of this state offered by the Stoics…He actually endorses the Stoic definition, saying that it 
is characteristic of the saints in heaven”. Byers 2013, 68–69. 
122 “He does not deny that the pathē-eupatheiai dichotomy is a good conceptual distinction…a good 
natural temperament (eupatheia) is valuable…The category relevant to the comparison with 
Platonic and Peripatetic ontological goodness”. Byers 2013, 60, 63 and 70. 
123 Byers 2013, 52–53. Byers’s thesis of Augustine’s close adherence to the Stoic doctrines of 
propatheia, apatheia and eupatheia is not quite convincing, particularly because she does not take 
into account the historical development of Augustine’s views. I shall evaluate her view of 
propatheia and discuss Augustine’s notion of apatheia and eupatheia in the next chapter. 
124 For an introduction to the relations between early Christians and the Hellenistic tradition, see H. 
Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966).  
125 Knuuttila 2004, 117. 
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connected with agape, in Strom. 6.9 (74.2)), is similar to the Stoic eupatheia, but 
as distinct from the Stoics, Clement states that it is associated with supernatural 
love. Clement’s position on the bipartition of the soul (Strom. 2.21 (129.1–5)), 
metriopatheia (Strom. 2.8 (39.4)) and the Christian perfect state without caution, 
are also found in Augustine’s CD 14.19 and De Trin. 10.10.13.126 Although 
Clement’s works were not familiar to Augustine, they represent Christian 
eclecticism with respect to the philosophical discussions on emotions found in 
many authors. 
(b) Origen. Origen employs the Stoic concepts of apatheia and propatheia 
(first movement, primus motus). He associates propatheia with the Christian 
conception of incipient sins and treats the former as the psychological state of 
freedom from passions as a preparation for the divine love (agapē) and “apathetic 
philanthropy” as parts of a deificatory union with God.127 In Comm. in Matth. 
15.16–17, Origen points out that a virtuous man should be free from emotions 
such as distress, fear, pleasure, appetite and sexual desires, because they are 
disturbances that should be extirpated in order to attain the perfection of the soul, 
apatheia and theosis.128 Origen also applies the concept of sin to propatheia and 
maintains that the involuntary first movements are bad suggestions (in De 
principiis 3.1.2–4), but not considered as indicating culpability if resisted. 
Origen’s interpretation of the origin of passions illustrates a clear Stoic influence. 
Origen’s version of propatheia displays similarities with that of Augustine, for 
example, his distinction between suggestio, delectatio, and consentio (De sermone 
Domini in monte 12.34–5).129 
                                                          
126 CD 14.19: Hinc est quod et illi philosophi qui veritati propius accesserunt iram atque libidinem 
vitiosas animi partes esse confessi sunt, eo quod turbide atque inordinate moverentur ad ea etiam 
quae sapientia perpetrari vetat, ac per hoc opus habere moderatrice mente atque ratione…Hae, 
inquam, partes in paradiso ante peccatum vitiosae non errant. Non enim contra rectam voluntatem 
ad aliquid movebantur unde necesse esset eas rationis tamquam frenis regentibus abstinere. De 
Trin.10.10.13: fruimur cogmitis, in quibus voluntas ipsis propter se ipsa delectata conquiescit.  
127 “Clement and Origen did not believe that natural emotions are necessary. The Christian version 
of apatheia is detachment from the values which are embedded in human emotions. This is 
combined with a new conception of oneself without self-will based on deificatory participation in 
God, who is apathēs and agapē”. Knuuttila 2004, 127. 
128 Origen refers to an example of apatheia in Comm. in Matth. 13.16, claiming that the wise can be 
emotionally unmoved when faced with the death of their parents. See Knuuttila 2004, 122. 
129 Knuuttila 2004, 170. For Augustine’s knowledge of Origen, see Joseph W. Trigg, “Origen”, in 
Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Michigan/Cambridge: 
Eerdmans, 1999), 603–605; György Heidl, Origen’s Influence on the Young Augustine: A Chapter 
of the History of Origenism (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2003). 
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(c) Cappadocian Fathers. Basil, Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of 
Nazianzus, the main representatives of the Cappadocian Fathers, were influenced 
by Alexandrian theologians’ (especially Origen’s) 130  and Platonic authors’ 
doctrines of passions. The Cappadocians follow the Origenean view of the first 
movements toward evil as prepassions (Gregory of Nyssa, De vita Moysis 
2.89–101 (60.1–64.5)). At the same time, they all agree with the theory of a 
tripartite soul and maintain that the irrational parts of the soul must be moderated 
and made obedient to reason by loving God and following the humility of Christ. 
Referring to metriopatheia and apatheia, the Cappadocians argue that there is a 
distinction between less perfect and perfect Christians (the former practicing 
metriopatheia and the latter representing love and apatheia). Similarly to Origen, 
the Cappadocians recommend an ascetic way of life to support spiritual progress 
and virtuous thoughts.131 
(d) St Antony the Egyptian hermit. Antony (c. 250–350) is regarded as one 
of the founders of the Egyptian ascetic monasticism.132 He considers passions to 
be demonic temptations and pursues an ascetic spirituality to resist the attacks.133 
He suggests the use of shame to repel desires and sinful thoughts in seeking 
spiritual freedom and perfection.134 His story inspired Augustine’s ascetic ideal 
through the Latin translation (by Evagrius of Antioch) of Athanasius’ work, Life 
of Antony.135 
(e) Evagrius of Pontus. Evagrius (c. 345–399) is the Father of the Egyptian 
desert who follows the Origenist tradition as a Greek theorist of monasticism. He 
develops the idea of controlling propatheia, contemplation, and apatheia under 
the influence of Alexandrian teachers. He introduces a scheme of eight types of 
                                                          
130 For example, Basil and Gregory of Nazianzus collected the writings from Origen in their 
Philocalia. See Knuuttila 2004, 127 (n. 62).  
131 For the therapy of passions, see Basil’s Ascetical Works (455–6), Gregory of Nazianzus’ 
Adversus iram (PG 37, 813–51, which also borrows from Plutarch’s On Freedom from Anger), 
Gregory of Nyssa’s De vita Moysis (2.18 (38.23–5)) and De anima et resurrectione (PG 46, 61B). 
See Knuuttila 2004, 129–132. The question of the Cappadocian influence on Augustine is 
complicated, see Lewis Ayres, “The Cappadocians”, in Augustine through the Ages: An 
Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Michigan/Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1999), 121–124. 
132 Another coetaneous leader is said to be Pachomius (292–346). For Antony and the Egyptian 
monastic movement, see Knuuttila 2004, 136–139. 
133 Knuuttila 2004, 139. 
134 Athanasius, Life of Antony 55 (PG 26, 835–976). See Sorabji 2000, 220 and Knuuttila 2004, 
138–139. 
135 See Conf. 8.6.13–15 and Chadwick 1991, 143 (n. 11). Cf. Knuuttila 2004, 139 (n. 97). 
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disturbing thoughts (logismoi) that one should expel as first movements: gluttony 
(gastrimargia), fornication (porneia), avarice (philarguria), distress (lupē), anger 
(orgē), depression (akēdia), vainglory (kenodoxia), and pride (huperēphania).136 
These are evil thoughts and temptations (peirasmoi) that move the emotional part 
of the soul and obscure the rational part.137 In order to conquer these incipient 
passions, one should live ascetically and expel evil thoughts by thinking of 
something else—this is the standard tool for learning self-control. Evagrius 
employs the Origenist conception of apatheia as the pursuit of freedom from 
incipient and other passions. His model for monastic life is divided into three 
elements, praktikē, physikē and theologia.138 From praktikē (fighting against the 
first movements) one should proceed to physikē and theologia (contemplating 
natural order and divine nature respectively). Evagrius presents a ladder 
comprising of a psychological and therapeutic process, and establishes a relation 
between apatheia, the contemplation of God, and theosis.139 This contemplative, 
apathetic method (Practical Treatise 49, 56, 78) is also mentioned in Augustine’s 
CD 19.19,140 even though Augustine was not familiar with Evagrius’ works. 
(f) Jerome. Jerome distinguishes prepassion (propatheia, propassio) from 
passion (pathos, passio) on the basis of whether assent (consentire) or judgment 
(iudicium) is involved.141 An evil prepassion is the first stimulus of thought 
(cogitatio) that tends to proceed into an evil passion, which involves assent and is 
a sin (vitium). Prepassions should not be condemned even though they may 
potentially be harmful. Indeed, even Christ was assailed by involuntary stimuli. 
However, he did not allow emotion to dominate his mind.142 Jerome claims that 
Christ was beginning to be sad because of prepassions, distinguishing between the 
                                                          
136 Evagrius Practical Treatise ch. 6. See Sorabji 2000, 358 and Knuuttila 2004, 141. 
137  “For a monk temptation (peirasmos) is a thought rising through the emotional part (to 
pathētikon) of the soul and darkening the intellect. For a monk sin (hamartia) is assent 
(sunkatathesis) to the forbidden pleasure of the thought”. (Evagrius Practical Treatise 74–75). See 
Sorabji 2000, 360. 
138 For Evagrius’ view of apatheia, see Mette Sophia Bocher Rasmussen, “Like a Rock or like God? 
The Concept of apatheia in the Monastic Theology of Evagrius of Pontus”, in Studia Theologica 59 
(2005), 147–162. Cf. Knuuttila 2004, 140-144. 
139 Rasmussen 2005, 150–152 and Knuuttila 2004, 140–142. 
140 CD 19.19: Nec sic esse quisque debet otiosus ut in eodem otio utilitatem non cogitet proximi, nec 
sic actuosus ut contemplationem non requirat Dei. In otio non iners vacation delectare debet, sed 
aut inquisitio aut inventio veritatis, ut in ea quisque proficiat et quod invenerit ne alteri invideat. 
141 See Sorabji 2000, 352–353. 
142 Sorabji 2000, 353. 
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condition of “being sad (a case of passiones)” and “beginning to be sad (a case of 
propatheiai)”.143 Furthermore, Jerome attacks Evagrius and Origenism on the 
issue of apatheia. He maintains that apatheia is impossible to attain in this life; if 
humans could indeed achieve a state apatheia or imperturbability, they would 
either be a rock or a God.144 This criticism is also found in Augustine.145 
(g) Ambrose. Ambrose follows the tradition of controlling one’s passions 
by the faculty of reason. He hierarchically designates passions into two categories: 
avarice, pride, ambition, envy, and strife refer to the soul, whereas luxury and 
gluttony pertain to the body.146 In his De officiis, Ambrose cautions that any 
mundane movement of the soul should be avoided and that one must remain alert 
like a good watchman (bonus speculator).147 One should control one’s passions 
by avoiding whatever might give rise to sudden impulses averse to the control of 
reason, and eradicate these impulses at an early stage; otherwise, once the mind is 
assailed, these impulses will become increasingly unchecked and harmful.148 This 
precaution and control of one’s mind also maintains the constancy and purity of 
one’s heart.149 Thus, in the coming world, there will be peaceful perfection in the 
                                                          
143 “There is this difference between pathos and propatheia, that is between passion (passio) and 
pre-passion (propassio): passion is counted as a sin (vitium); pre-passion, though it involves the fault 
(culpa) of something beginning, is not treated as a matter for accusation (in crimine)…But if he once 
assents, and makes a thought (cogitatio) into an emotion (affectus)…he has passed from pre-passion 
to passion”. Sorabji 2000, 354. 
144 Jerome’s Letter 133 to Ctesiphon (CSEL 56. 246): “Evagrius Ponticus of Ibora, who writes to the 
virgins, writes to the monks, writes to that woman whose name of blackness attests the shades of 
faithlessness, published a book and sentences On Apatheia, which we can call impassibility or 
imperturbability, when the mind is never disturbed by any thought or vice, and is, to put it plainly, 
either a rock or a God”. Sorabji 2000, 397. For the relationship between Jerome and Augustine, see 
Carolinne White, The Correspondence (394–419) between Jerome and Augustine of Hippo 
(Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990). 
145 CD 14.9: Porro, si ἀπάθεια illa dicenda est cum animum contingere omnino non potest ullus 
affectus, quis hunc stuporem non omnibus vitiis iudicet esse peiorem?...Si autem ἀπάθεια illa est ubi 
nec metus ullus exterret nec angit dolor, aversanda est in hac vita si recte, hoc est secundum Deum, 
vivere volumus.  
146 Colish 1985 (II), 55–56. 
147 Ambrose De officiis 1.47.228: Caveat etiam motus animi sui: ipse enim sibi et observandus et 
circumspiciendus est et, ut adversum se cavendus, ita etiam de se tuendus. Sunt enim motus in 
quibus est appetitus ille qui quasi quodam prorumpit impetu…Unde boni speculatoris est ita 
praetendere animo ut appetitus neque praecurrat rationem neque deserat, ne praecurrendo 
perturbet atque excludat, eam deserendo destituat. Ivor J. Davidson (transl. and ed.), Ambrose: De 
officiis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 248–251. 
148 De officiis 1.47.229: Perturbata enim mente latius se ac longius fundit appetitus et tamquam 
efferato impetu frenos rationis non suscipit nec ulla sentit aurigae moderamina quibus possit 
reflecti.  
149 De officiis 1.47.229–230: Perturbatio tollit constantiam, destitutio prodit ignauiam, accusat 
pigritiam…consiliis sola potest auctoritatem suam atque illud quod deceat tenere, constantia. 
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vision of God.150 This eclectic, Christianised, Stoic-Platonic position had a direct 
influence on Augustine,151 who also sought a tranquil and contemplative life in 
this earthly city and the perfect apatheia without sin in the future City of God.152 
Even though these early Christian Fathers suggest various ways of 
combining philosophical and Christian ideas, certain themes are recurrent: 1. The 
Fathers share the Platonic idea of the bipartition of the soul, arguing that the lower 
part should be submissive to reason; 2. The first movement (primus motus, 
impetus) is the beginning of passion and often an evil suggestion, which is a sign 
of humanity’s weakness following the Fall;153 3. Freeing oneself from one’s 
passions (apatheia) or being able to strictly control them prepares one for a close 
relationship with God; 4. The relationship between the rational and the emotional 
part of the soul was believed to be different in paradise, in the present life and in 
Heaven. These early Christian Fathers were influenced by Platonic and Stoic 
traditions and, as a consequence, their Christian doctrines of passions continue to 
reflect the eclectic influence of these two traditions. 
As he discusses philosophical opinions, Augustine states in CD 9.4: “the 
Stoics, disagree with the Platonists and Peripatetics verbally rather than 
essentially”.154 From Augustine’s point of view, there are no radical differences 
                                                          
150 De officiis 1.48.239: Hic ergo in imagine ambulamus, in imagine videmus; illic facie ad faciem, 
ubi plena perfectio, quia perfectio omnis in veritate est. 
151  In his early works (approximately between the years 386 and 392), such as De musica 
(6.16.51–55), De moribus ecclesiae catholicae (1.27.53–54), De ordine (2.6.18), and Contra 
Academicos (1.4.11) among others, Augustine understands impassibility as a psychological state 
avoiding the perturbations of emotions (occasionally even good emotions such as compassions) and 
fixing one’s attention on God, attaining the harmonious tranquility of mind and fostering the four 
virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice. This account, Colish notes, is influenced by 
Ambrose’s view of apatheia. “He [Augustine] begins to explore the positive answer to this question, 
recasting it in Christian terms, as early as his De moribus, in a series of observations paralleling 
Ambrose’s view that apatheia is desirable and possible for the Christian, but only with the help of 
God’s grace”. Colish 1985 (II), 222. 
152 Augustine shows his reluctance towards yielding to passions in this life. CD 14.9: Proinde, 
quod fatendum est, etiam cum rectas et secundum Deum habemus has affectiones, huius vitae sunt, 
non illius quam futuram speramus, et saepe illis etiam inviti cedimus. 
153 These Christian Fathers (that is, Ambrose, Clement Alexandria, Origen, Cappadocian Fathers) 
share the view that before the Fall, the emotions of Adam and Eve were completely controlled by 
their reason and that they operated only when their will allowed them to, in a happy and 
harmonious state; however, after the Fall, Adam and Eve were condemned to concupiscence and 
death, their will weakened so that they were unable to fully control their emotions. In this sense, a 
first movement or involuntary passion as a sort of uncontrollable state is a sign of the original sin. 
For the relations between original sin and emotions, see J.N.D Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines 
(5th ed.) (London: A & C Black, 1977), 353–366; 508. 
154 CD 9.4: Hos autem, id est Stoicos, Cicero in libris de finibus bonorum et malorum verbis magis 
quam rebus adversus Platonicos seu Peripateticos certare convincit. Cf. Cicero, Defini. Books 3 
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between these schools on the issue of passions. He makes the following 
observations: 
For I consider that, as far as the pith of the matter is concerned, rather than the mere 
sound of words, the view which the Stoics hold is not different from that of the Platonists 
and Peripatetics…In view of these things, then, there is no difference, or almost none, 
between the opinion of the Stoics and that of the other philosophers concerning the 
passions and disturbances of the mind.155  
After these remarks, Augustine further explains:  
…for both sides maintain that the mind and reason of the wise man are not under the 
dominion of the passions…The mind in which this belief is firmly established, then, 
permits no disturbances to prevail in it contrary to reason, even though these assail the 
baser parts of the soul. On the contrary, the mind itself is master of all such disturbances, 
and, by withholding its consent from them and resisting them, exercises a reign of 
virtue.156  
Thus, Augustine argues that both the Stoics and the Platonic-Peripatetics highlight 
the function of intellectual acts and the serenity of a mind that is not dominated by 
passions.  
Augustine was well aware of the differences between these two doctrines 
of passions, and his philosophical considerations pertaining to passions were 
largely derived from them. However, he criticises both doctrines and shifts the 
discussion to theological matters, applying the concepts of will (voluntas), love 
(amor), sin (peccatum), justice (iustitia), and redemption (redemptio) in CD 9.5, 
where he comments on the three stages of passions (origination, control, and 
emotional state): (1) The first stage is a movement of the soul and the beginning 
of a passion. This involuntary movement frequently takes place in the soul and is 
regarded as a sign of the original sin when directed towards illicit things. Even 
then, however, it is not considered to be a sin if it is repelled as soon as possible. 
Yet, Augustine also mentions compassion (compassio) as a type of first 
                                                                                                                                                               
and 4. 
155 CD 9.4: Nam et ipsos nihil hinc aliud quam Platonicos et Peripateticos sentire existimo, 
quantum ad vim rerum adtinet, non ad vocabulorum sonum…Quae si ita sunt, aut nihil aut paene 
nihil distat inter Stoicorum aliorumque philosophorum opinionem de passionibus et 
perturbationibus animorum. 
156 CD 9.4: Utrique enim mentem rationemque sapientis ab earum dominatione defendunt…Ita 
mens ubi fixa est ista sententia nullas perturbationes, etiamsi accidunt inferioribus animi partibus, 
in se contra rationem praevalere permittit: quin immo eis ipsa dominatur eisque non consentiendo 
et potius resistendo regnum virtutis exercet.  
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movement that is good, since compassion is just and free from all vice.157 He 
cites this example to criticise the Stoic view that all passions are evil and cannot 
move the soul of the wise.158 (2) God governs and helps the mind that controls or 
moderates passions in the service of righteousness.159 Passions therefore represent 
a type of weakness and cannot be avoided in this life. However, if we maintain a 
good will and love in a godly manner, our passions will be right.160 Moreover, 
some emotions may be regarded as good in themselves, for example, the delight 
of truth, friendship, and pity, as Augustine states in Confessiones 1.20.31.161 (3) 
Freedom from passions is an ideal to Augustine, who believes that God and good 
angels are not disturbed by any emotions.162 After the redemption, the redeemed 
people will assume the place left by fallen angels in the City of God and enjoy 
God’s presence.163 Enjoying the everlasting good (bona), joy (gaudium) and love 
                                                          
157 Augustine does not use the term primus motus (first movement), but rather expressions such as 
“a kind of fellow feeling in our hearts…which compels us” (alienae miseriae quaedam in nostro 
corde…compellimur) and “impulse” (motus) to refer to compassion as a first movement and a 
passion which should not be condemned, as shown in CD 9.5: Quid est autem misericordia nisi 
alienae miseriae quaedam in nostro corde compassio qua utique si possumus subvenire 
compellimur? Servit autem motus iste rationi quando ita praebetur misericordia ut iustitia 
conservetur, sive cum indigenti tribuitur, sive cum ignoscitur paenitenti. Hanc Cicero locutor 
egregius non dubitavit appellare virtutem, quam Stoicos inter vitia numerare non pudet, qui tamen, 
ut docuit liber Epicteti, nobilissimi Stoici, ex decretis Zenonis et Chrysippi, qui huius sectae primas 
habuerunt, huiusce modi passiones in animum sapientis admittunt quem vitiis omnibus liberum 
volunt.  
158 Augustine argues that compassion as a type of first movement is better than the fear of shipwreck 
that the Stoics feel. CD 9.5: Nam et misericordiam Stoicorum est solere culpare; sed quanto 
honestius ille Stoicus misericordia perturbaretur hominis liberandi quam timore naufragii.  
159 CD 9.5: Deo quippe illa ipsam mentem subicit regendam et iuvandam mentique passiones ita 
moderandas atque frenandas ut in usum iustitiae convertantur. 
160 CD 9.5: Sed adhuc merito quaeri potest utrum ad vitae praesentis pertineat infirmitatem etiam in 
quibusque bonis officiis huiusce modi perpeti affectus. In CD 14.9, Augustine argues that the 
passions of the citizens of the holy City of God can be virtuous and praiseworthy: Hi motus, hi 
affectus de amore boni et de sancta caritate venientes si vitia vocanda sunt, sinamus ut ea quae vere 
vitia sunt virtutes vocentur…Habemus ergo eas ex humanae condicionis infirmitas; non autem ita 
Dominus Iesus, cuius et infirmitas fuit ex potestate. 
161 Conf. 1.20.31:…custodiebam interiore sensu integritatem sensuum meorum, inque ipsis parvis 
parvarumque rerum cogitationibus veritate delectabar. Falli nolebam, memoria vigebam, locutione 
instruebar, amicitia mulcebar, fugiebam dolorem, abiectionem, ignorantiam. Quid in tali animante 
non mirabile atque laudabile? At ista omnia dei mei dona sunt. (“An inward instinct told me to take 
care of the integrity of my senses, and even in my little thoughts about little matters I took delight in 
the truth. I hated to be deceived, I developed a good memory, I acquired the armoury of being skilled 
with words, friendship softened me, I avoided pain, despondency, ignorance. In such a person what 
was not worthy of admiration and praise? But every one of these qualities are gifts of my God”.) 
162 CD 9.5: Sancti vero angeli et sine ira puniant quos accipiunt aeterna Dei lege puniendos, et 
miseris sine miseriae compassione subveniant, et periclitantibus eis quos diligunt, sine timore 
opitulentur; et tamen istarum nomina passionum consuetudine locutionis humanae etiam in eos 
usurpentur propter quandam operum similitudinem, non propter affectionum infirmitatem, sicut 
ipse Deus secundum scipturas irascitur, nec tamen ulla passione turbatur. 
163 CD 22.1: Qui de mortali progenie merito iusteque damnata tantum populum gratia sua colligit 
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(amor), is the spiritual state of the elected when they see and praise God in the 
Heavenly City.164 This spiritual fulfilment includes the perfection of the human 
image of God in the vision of God, the feeling of contentment with nothing 
lacking, and redemption from all evil. 
Comparing Augustine’s understanding of the different stages of passions 
to those of Neoplatonic and Stoic doctrines, we may observe that the latter two 
sources are more similar than Augustine’s views in many places, and that 
Augustine modifies many of the ideas that he receives from them. Christian 
conceptions of passions form another source, but they are also essentially 
influenced by Neoplatonism and Stoicism, their only original contribution being a 
reference to supranatural grace. Augustine does not simply settle for following 
any of these predecessors, even though their thoughts did influence him in various 
ways. As we proceed to discuss the issue of controlling and moderating passions, 
we will see how Augustine receives and transforms the traditional approaches 
familiar to him. 
                                                                                                                                                               
ut inde suppleat et instauret partem quae lapsa est angelorum. 
164 CD 22.30: Erit ergo illius civitatis et una in omnibus et inseparabilis in singulis voluntas libera, 
ab omni malo liberata et impleta omni bono, fruens indeficienter aeternorum iucunditate 
gaudiorum, oblita culparum, oblita poenarum…Ibi vacabimus et videbimus, videbimus et 
amabimus, amabimus et laudabimus… 
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CHAPTER THREE: CONTROL AND MODERATION OF PASSIONS 
       
Nam et misericordiam Stoicorum est solere culpare; sed quanto honestius ille Stoicus 
misericordia perturbaretur hominis liberandi quam timore naufragii…Servit autem motus 
iste rationi quando ita praebetur misericordia ut iustitia conservetur, sive cum indigenti 
tribuitur, sive cum ignoscitur paenitenti. (CD 9.5) 
 
Deo quippe illa ipsam mentem subicit regendam et iuvandam mentique passiones ita 
moderandas atque frenandas ut in usum iustitiae convertantur. (CD 9.5) 
 
Hos autem, id est Stoicos, Cicero in libris de finibus bonorum et malorum verbis magis 
quam rebus adversus Platonicos seu Peripateticos certare convincit. (CD 9.4) 
 
This chapter examines how Augustine transforms his predecessors’ conception of 
the therapy of passions into his own theory, with particular focus on whether 
Augustine misinterprets his predecessor’s doctrines in his approach. As mentioned 
previously, during his early years, Augustine was influenced by Stoicism and 
Neoplatonism and he often pondered whether passions were indeed evil and how to 
address them.1 After the mid-390s, Augustine presented his views in a series of 
middle period writings (around 395-410) and later codified his mature 
understanding in De civitate Dei (413-427). When discussing Augustine’s position 
in these writings, some scholars maintain that Augustine misunderstands the Stoics, 
whereas some others argue that he grasps their works rather well and his accounts 
are consistent with Stoic teaching. These discussions mainly concern four concepts: 
propatheia (propassio or primus motus),2 metriopatheia, apatheia and eupatheia. I 
shall examine these concepts in the following sections from the perspective of 
whether Augustine’s interpretation of these reflects some misunderstanding of the 
Stoic position. In section one, I shall compare Augustine’s opinions in his early, 
middle and late writings to determine whether changes occur in his interpretation of 
the doctrine of propatheia. In section two, I shall focus on Augustine’s comments 
                                                          
1 Augustine accepted the Stoic ideas of passions in his early years and blamed himself for his 
uncontrollable emotions on the death of his mother, Monica. In conf. 9.12, he asks, “did I blame the 
weakness of my passion, and refrain my flood of grieving?” (increpabam mollitiam affectus mei, et 
constringebam fluxum maeroris, cedebatque mini paululum). At last, Augustine “has offended” 
(weeping) in bewailing his mother for some time (flevisse me matrem exigua parte horae). 
2 Different writers use various terms to express the concept of involuntary prepassions, not only in 
Augustine’s era, but also among contemporary commentators. While propassio, propatheia and 
primus motus were common usages, Augustine did not adopt them, preferring expressions such as 
suggestio (De sermone Domini in monte 12.34–5), passio praeveniens mentis (CD 9.4–5) or 
perturbatio (Quaestiones in Heptateuchum 1.30). Commentators today also use various terms 
such as “preliminary passions”, “first movements”, “prepassions”, “pre-emotions”, “preliminary 
reactions” and “preliminary impulses”. 
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on the relationship between apatheia and metriopatheia and examine how they 
compare to the Stoic position. In section three, I shall inquire as to whether or not 
indifference is a connotation of the Stoic concept of eupatheia and further analyse 
whether Augustine’s equating of eupatheia with ordinary passions and interpreting 
the Stoic ideal of eupatheia as stupor are based on his misunderstandings. Next, 
section four contains a survey of Augustine’s new scheme of the therapy of 
passions to determine if his theology has deviated from philosophical traditions. 
Section five provides the main line of Augustine’s view of the will and passions and 
then proceeds to theological discussions in Chapters 4 and 5. Focusing on these 
conceptions and discussions, I shall argue that Augustine is familiar with the Stoic 
doctrine, but in his later works, he deliberately deviates from some of their concepts 
(such as propatheia and eupatheia). I shall also demonstrate that Augustine 
deviates in order to refute their “pride” and to defend his Christian position on the 
psychology of passions. On the basis of this background, Augustine makes the bold 
observation that no substantial distinctions exist between apatheia and 
metriopatheia in the Stoic and Peripatetic contexts and suggests that the dispute 
between them on these terms is of no consequence. In short, I shall propose that 
these deliberate new uses of terms by Augustine do not derive from a 
misunderstanding, but rather follow from his attempt during his late theological 
thinking at constructing his own means of dealing with passions. 
 
3.1. Disputation on Augustine’s Misunderstanding of Propatheia 
 
Some researchers contend that Augustine misunderstands the Stoic conception of 
propatheia (first movement or preliminary passion) because he incorrectly assumes 
that propatheia is a passion in the Stoics. In contrast, other scholars insist that 
Augustine’s interpretation is in line with the doctrine of the Stoics, arguing that 
propatheia is merely an involuntary impulse or a first movement of the soul before 
the assent of reason that is required for passion. By discussing the arguments of 
Sorabji and Sarah Byers, I shall explain these two different positions. 
Sorabji argues that in reading Aulus Gellius’ report of the Stoic position in 
Noctes Atticae, which is elaborated on in CD 9.4 and Quaestiones in 
Heptateuchum 1.30, Augustine misinterprets the Stoics’ conception of primus 
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motus and mistakenly claims that the Stoic philosophers actually accept that they 
are agitated by the involuntary first movement.3 Sorabji suggests that Augustine’s 
misinterpretation is due the following factors:  
(1) Augustine does not adopt Seneca’s account of the first movement;4 
Augustine’s main textual source of the first movement is Aulus Gellius. Augustine 
is misled by Gellius’ use of the verb jitter (pavescere) in explicating the verb pale 
(pallescere). 5  This minute literary change leads Augustine to the incorrect 
interpretation that the Stoics cannot avoid the sudden agitation of fear. 
(2) The Latin translation of Origen transforms the Stoic first movements 
into bad thoughts and sins and this serves as the main doctrinal source for 
Augustine. According to Sorabji, Augustine’s approach is not in line with Seneca’s 
thinking that first movements are distinct from emotions because Augustine is not 
familiar with Seneca’s account of this point.6 This is an important factor that 
transforms Augustine’s understanding into something closer to Origen’s 
interpretation that has obscured the distinction between involuntary first 
movements and willed emotion.7  
(3) To Augustine, it is impossible to avoid emotion. He connects the 
involuntary first movement with original sin, which attests to his traditional 
Christian standpoint on the issue of first movements.8  
                                                          
3 “He [Augustine] cites the Stoics’ acceptance of first movements as if it proved that they really 
accepted emotion itself”. Sorabji 2000, 10. Sorabji usually uses the term “first movement” (primus 
motus) to refer to propatheia in his works. 
4 After a discussion of Seneca’s three cases of first movement, which Augustine also coincidently 
discusses, Sorabji states that Augustine did not actually read Seneca’s account of it. “If Augustine 
had read Seneca, instead of Aulus Gellius, would he have seen that he did not here have a sufficient 
reason to downgrade lust in comparison with anger?” Sorabji 2000, 11. 
5 “I shall argue that Augustine is partly misled by Gellius’ change of the letters ‘ll’ to ‘v’. The Stoic 
is allowed to grow pale (pallescere), but Gellius adds that he is allowed to have the jitters 
(pavescere), a nice literary word which hovers ambiguously between merely trembling and having 
real fear”. Sorabji 2000, 10. He maintains that Gellius’ mistaken paraphrasis of pallescere in 
pavescere changes the conception of merely physical movement into a psychological term that 
misled Augustine’s judgments. Ibid., 375–384. 
6 “Augustine has not noticed Seneca’s point that involuntary first movements are common to all the 
emotions”. Sorabji 2000, 11. 
7 “Why is Augustine so blind to the Stoic distinction between involuntary first movements and 
willed emotion? There is more than one reason. First, by turning first movements into thoughts and 
suggestions, Origen obscured the distinction between them and emotions, which the Stoics saw as 
thoughts. Consequently, the description of first movements as the preliminaries (principia) of 
emotion, which had left the distinction quite clear in Seneca, leaves it unclear in Origen and 
subsequent Church Fathers”. Sorabji 2000, 382. A similar argument is also emphasized in his 
Introduction part (Ibid., 8). For Origen’s influence on Augustine, see note 129 in Chapter 2 above.  
8 “Augustine connects our inability to avoid fear and grief with original sin”. Sorabji 2000, 166. 
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(4) Augustine accepts the Platonic position on the bipartition of the soul that 
claims that an involuntary emotion is the movement of the irrational part of the soul 
before the assent of intellect. Nonetheless, the Stoics suppose that emotion is only a 
type of judgment. Augustine defends the Platonic notion of the soul, which is the 
psychological reason for his misinterpretation of the Stoic doctrine.9 
(5) Augustine’s objective is to defend the Platonic moderate therapy of 
passions. 10  This is yet a further reason to refute the Stoic doctrine of either 
eradicating or avoiding passions. Augustine is of the opinion that the Stoics could 
not resist first movements, but he misinterprets the Stoic supposition that a first 
movement cannot be a passion because no reason is involved. This means that 
Augustine’s discussion of whether the Stoics could avoid sudden “passions” is 
meaningless, because he has already misrepresented the Stoic first movement as a 
passion.11 
Peter King agrees with the above-mentioned argument and reasons that 
Augustine mistakenly interprets the Stoic propatheia as a passion. King reiterates 
Sorabji’s account that Augustine’s source is a second-hand anecdote from Gellius 
who has paraphrased Epictetus.12 Moreover, King states that the deeper reason 
for Augustine’s misunderstanding of the Stoic position is that he was influenced 
by the Biblical teachings and was impressed by Jesus’s passions (first 
movements); as a consequence, Augustine was dissatisfied with the Stoic position 
of extirpating some good prepassions, such as the emotion of mercy.13 
Contrary to Richard Sorabji and Peter King, Sarah Byers proposes that both 
the Stoics and Augustine argue that although passions are judgments of the mind, a 
first movement is not a passion and is therefore not a sin. In her article “Augustine 
                                                          
9 “He [Augustine] is steeped in a Platonic view of the soul, which, in contrast with the Stoic view, 
holds that emotion is the product of irrational forces in the soul and does not have to await the assent 
of reason, as the Stoics suppose”. Ibid., 10. 
10 “In defending moderate emotion, he cites the Stoics’ acceptance of first movements as if it proved 
that they really accepted emotion itself”. Ibid., 10. 
11 Sorabji maintains that the Stoics certainly admit that they could experience first movements, but 
they do not consider them to be passions. Augustine’s claim that the Stoics could not resist such 
“passions” is based on his misunderstanding that a first movement is a passion in the Stoic doctrine. 
Ibid., 10. 
12 “Augustine takes the anecdote from Aulus Gellius, noct. 19.1, paraphrasing Epictetus; Augustine 
cites it again in hept.1.30 to prove the same point. But Augustine is mistaken. The original anecdote 
seems to have concerned not the passions but the ‘prepassions’ and to have been garbled by Gellius 
in transmission”. King 2012a, 17 (n. 26). 
13 See King 2012a, 17–18. 
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and the Cognitive Cause of Stoic ‘Preliminary Passions’ (Propatheiai)”,14 Byers 
emphasises that Augustine does not misinterpret the Stoics and that his 
interpretation is in accordance with the Stoic tenet. Byers cites the episode of Aulus 
Gellius’ Noctes Atticae in CD 9.4 and also examines passages from Augustine’s 
sermons (spanning twenty-seven years from 392 AD). She notes that Augustine’s 
descriptions of preliminary passions (such as preliminary forms of jealousy, 
cupidity, anger, fear and some metaphor cases: a foot slipping, an irritated eye, and 
a speck in the eye) are consistent with the thinking of Seneca and the Stoics.15 They 
all contend that propatheia is merely a preparation period of passion without the 
mind’s relevant judgment. Thus, this preliminary movement is by no means a 
passion. Byers offers the following supporting evidence, which is in sharp contrast 
to the accounts by both Sorabji and King: 
(a) Augustine was familiar with the interpretations of Seneca and Gellius, 
and this explains his familiarity with the cognitive component of passions.16 
Seneca claims that preliminary reactions are merely impressions (species, opinio) 
without the involvement of reason.17 Gellius also uses phantasiai and visa to 
describe this preliminary impression in his similar interpretation, which is found in 
Noctes Atticae 19.1.15–2118. Byers states that Augustine was familiar with the Stoic 
                                                          
14 This article is echoed in the chapter of “Preliminary Passions” in Byers 2013, 100–126. 
15 Byers 2003, 437, 438 and 441; Byers 2013, 102, 103 and 106. 
16 “What evidence do we have that Augustine knew and was influenced by these (Seneca’s) 
accounts of preliminary passions? Although he does not mention Seneca by name when he directly 
addresses the topic of affectivity, he indicates that he had more than average knowledge of Seneca in 
the Confessiones…he makes use of the same metaphors and identifies the same causes of anger as 
Seneca does”. Byers 2003, 436; Byers 2013, 102. 
17 Seneca, De ira 2.1.4: Nobis placet nihil illam per se audere sed animo adprobante; nam speciem 
capere acceptae iniuriae et ultionem eius concupiscere et utrumque coniungere, nec laedi se 
debuisse et vindicari debere, non est eius impetus qui sine voluntate nostra concitatur. De ira 2.3.5: 
Ergo prima illa agitatio animi quam species iniuriae incussit non magis ira est quam ipsa iniuriae 
species; ille sequens impetus, qui speciem iniuriae non tantum accepit sed adprobavit, ira est, 
concitatio animi ad ultionem voluntate et iudicio pergentis. Numquam dubium est quin timor fugam 
habeat, ira impetum. vide ergo an putes aliquid sine adsensu mentis aut peti posse aut caveri. “In 
Seneca we find the claim that preliminaries to anger are caused by the reception of an impression 
(species, opinio) that one has been injured, without approval or acceptance (adprobare, capere) of 
the impression as true”. Byers 2003, 436; Byers 2013, 102. 
18 Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 19.1.15–21:Visa animi, quas фαντασίας (phantasias) philosophi 
appellant, quibus mens hominis prima statim specie accidentis ad animum rei pellitur, non 
voluntatis sunt neque arbitraria, sed vi quadam sua inferunt sese hominibus noscitanda…et in eo 
tamen brevi motu naturali magis infirmitati cedamus, quam quod esse ea, qualia visa sunt, 
censeamus. Margaret Graver also maintains that Seneca, Epictetus, Gellius and Cicero have nearly 
the same accounts on propatheiai in their works (e.g., De ira 2.1–4, Noctes Atticae 19.1, Tusculanae 
disputationes 3.83). M. Graver, “Philo of Alexandria and the Origins of the Stoic propatheiai”, 
Phronesis (44:4, 1999), 301 (This article also appears in Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian 
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position of Seneca, as Augustine mentions Seneca once in Confessiones 5.6.11 and 
three times in De civitate Dei (CD 5.8 and CD 6.10).19 
(b) Augustine follows Seneca in making a distinction between the soul 
(animus) and reason (mens) to distinguish preliminary passions from passions.20 
They both argue that emotions involve a judgment of reason (mens), but 
preliminary passions occur in the soul (animus) rather than in reason (mens). Thus, 
the involuntary movements of the soul without the assent of reason cannot be 
considered as passions. 
(c) Augustine does not regard preliminary passions as sins. Byers argues 
that in an early sermon, Augustine describes preliminary passions as wavering 
reactions toward impressions, which reflects a person’s momentary weakness 
rather than a sin.21 Byers argues that this notion of Augustine (also in CD 14.12 and 
14.15) is consistent with Seneca’s De ira 1.16.7 and Cicero’s Tusc. 3.83.22 
(d) Augustine holds that preliminary passions involve a doubt, waiting for 
the mind’s judgments to decide whether this involuntary process is in accordance 
with the value of eternal good.23 Byers contends that Augustine makes a special 
contribution to the concept of propatheia in referring the preliminary passions to an 
uncertainty and state of doubt with a lack of confidence in God.24 
From the above arguments, it is evident that all these commentators 
underline the importance of the reference to Gellius’ Noctes Atticae in CD 9.4, but 
they nevertheless draw opposite conclusions. In order to clarify whether Augustine 
makes the incorrect claim that the Stoics “really” accept the first movements as 
                                                                                                                                                               
Philosophy, ed. Francesca Alesse (Leiden·Boston: Brill, 2008), 197–222). 
19 Byers 2003, 436; Byers 2013, 61 (n. 22). 
20 Byers points out that the mens-animus distinction is presented in Seneca’s De ira 1.16.7; 2.2.2; 
2.3.5; 2.4.2, Gellius’ Noctes Atticae 19.1.17–18 and Augustine’s CD 9.4–5, which illustrates their 
inner connections. “Since Seneca regularly attributes superficial changes and preliminary passions 
to the animus, but judgment that constitutes a passion to the mens…Augustine is in line with his 
Stoic sources when he invokes a mens-animus distinction”. Byers 2003, 437–438; Byers 2013, 104. 
21 “Reflecting on those accounts of preliminary passions with which he [Augustine] was familiar, he 
argues that a reflex reaction of panic fear to a surprise event cannot be explained except as a 
wavering in (though not a loss of) the virtue of the impressed person, which must be due to a 
momentary weakness in said person’s apprehension of the truth (“light”)”. Byers 2003, 438; Byers 
2013, 104–105. I think that the reference Byers has in mind is not a sermon, but En. Ps. 37.15. 
22 “…he [Augustine] denies that preliminary passions are sins. Augustine thinks they are evidence 
of a damaged, weakened state of soul”. Byers 2003, 438 (n. 37); Byers 2013, 104 and 111 (n. 73). 
23 “Augustine said that a passion is caused by a false judgment that a temporal good has the value of 
the eternal goods. And he held that in a preliminary passion, one doubts whether a particular 
temporal good has the value of eternal goods”. See Byers 2003, 440; Byers 2013, 108. 
24 Byers 2003, 442–444; Byers 2013, 104–110. 
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passions, I shall return to the original texts and compare Augustine’s report and 
Gellius’ own text to determine Augustine’s statement and his actual attitude: 
In eo libro se legisse dicit A. Gellius hoc Stoicis placuisse, quod animi visa, quas 
appellant phantasias nec in potestate est utrum et quando incidant animo, cum 
veniunt ex terribilibus et formidabilibus rebus, necesse est etiam sapientis 
animum moveant, ita ut paulisper vel pavescat metu, vel tristitia contrahatur, 
tamquam his passionibus praevenientibus mentis et rationis officium; nec ideo 
tamen in mente fieri opinionem mali, nec adprobari ista eisque consentiri. Hoc 
enim esse volunt in potestate idque interesse censent inter animum sapientis et 
stulti, quod stulti animus eisdem passionibus cedit atque adcommodat mentis 
adsensum; sapientis autem, quamvis eas necessitate patiatur, retinet tamen de his, 
quae adpetere vel fugere rationabiliter debet, veram et stabilem inconcussa mente 
sententiam.25 (CD 9.4) 
This paragraph contains a slight change that appears rather strange: Augustine first 
presents the Stoic concept of first movements as experiences of certain “mental 
images” (animi visa, which they call phantasias), and these phantasias as well as 
the movements they cause are beyond our control. Referring to Gellius having read 
“in eo libro” that “necesse est etiam sapientis animum moveant” (they of necessity 
move even the wise man’s soul), Augustine’s interpretation of the Stoic proposition 
is rather exact. Nonetheless, Augustine’s next paraphrasing appears to be different, 
since he uses the words “his passionibus” (these passions) to replace the previous 
“animi visa”, and states, “these passions running ahead of the function of the mind 
and reason” (tamquam his passionibus praevenientibus mentis et rationis officium). 
Thus, the Stoic “mental images” that occur before the judgements of mind become 
“passions” in Augustine. However, using passiones in this manner is obviously not 
                                                          
25 “Aulus Gellius says that, in this book, he read that the Stoics believe that the soul experiences 
certain mental images, which they call phantasiae, and that it is not in our power to determine 
whether and when these shall strike the soul. When these images come about as a result of terrifying 
and awesome things, they of necessity move the soul even of the wise man. Thus, he grows pale with 
fear for a little while, or he is oppressed by sadness, these passions running ahead (passionibus 
praevenientibus) of the function of the mind and reason; but it does not follow that a belief that there 
is something bad will arise in the mind, or that the mind will accept (adprobare) them and consent 
(consentiri) to them. For such consent, they hold, is within our power; and the difference between 
the mind of a wise man and that of a fool is that the fool’s mind yields to these same passions and 
adapts itself to them, whereas the wise man, though he experiences them of necessity, nonetheless 
retains with mind unshaken a true and steadfast perception of those things which he ought rationally 
to seek or avoid”. I adopt Dyson’s translation, making some modifications on the basis of T.H. 
Irwin’s translation when that seems more exact. See Irwin 2003, 435. See also Quaestiones in 
Heptateuchum 1.30, where Augustine discusses the same passage from Aulus Gellius, using the 
terms perturbatio and affectio instead of passio.  
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in accordance with Gellius’ original version: 
Visa animi, quas фαντασίας (phantasias) philosophi appellant…non voluntatis 
sunt neque arbitraria…probationes autem, quas συγκαταθέσεις (sugkatatheseis) 
vocant, quibus eadem visa noscuntur, voluntariae sunt fiuntque hominum arbitratu. 
Propterea cum sonus aliquis formidabilis aut caelo aut ex ruina…sapientis quoque 
animum paulisper moveri et contrahi et pallescere necessum est, non opinione 
alicuius mali praecepta, sed quibusdam motibus rapidis et inconsultis officium 
mentis atque rationis praevertentibus. Mox tamen ille sapiens ibidem τάς τοιαύτας 
фαντασίας (id est visa istaec animi sui terrifica), non adprobat (hoc est οὐ 
συγκαταθέται οὐδέ προσεπιδοξάζει), sed abicit respuitque, nec ei metuendum esse 
in his quicquam videtur. Atque hoc inter insipientis sapientisque animum differre 
dicunt, quod insipiens, qualia sibi esse primo animi sui pulsu visa sunt saeva et 
aspera, talia esse vero putat et eadem incepta, tamquam si iure metuenda 
sint…sapiens autem, cum breviter et strictim colore atque vultu motus est, οὐ 
συγκαταθέται, sed statum vigorem que sententiae suae retinet...26 (Gellius, Noctes 
Atticae 19.1.15–20) 
Gellius consistently interprets first movements as reactions to visa animi, “rapid 
and unpredictable movements that run ahead of the function of the mind and 
reason” (motibus rapidis et inconsultis officium mentis atque rationis 
praevertentibus). In addition, Gellius states that the Stoics also admit that neither 
the fool nor the sage are able to avoid such involuntary movements of the soul (for 
example, turning pale), but these are not based on any accepted beliefs in evil (non 
opinione alicuius mali praecepta). Indeed, the first movements become passions 
only when the voluntary assent follows and phantasiai are turned into 
sunkatatheseis. 
                                                          
26 “Mental images (visa animi), which the philosophers call phantasiai…do not belong to the will 
and are not in one’s control…but approvals (probationes), which they call sunkatatheseis, by which 
these images are recognized, are voluntary and come about by a human being’s control. Therefore, 
when some frightening sound comes from the sky or from a falling building…it is necessary for 
even the mind of the sage to be for a moment moved and to shrink and to grow pale, not because any 
belief in any evil has been accepted, but because of some rapid and unpremeditated movements that 
run ahead of the function of mind and reason. Soon, however, that sage does not endorse – that is to 
say, does not assent to, and does not add his belief to – such phantasiai – namely these frightening 
images (visa) – but he rejects and repudiates them, and nothing in these images seems (videtur) to 
him to be something to be feared (metuendum). And this, the Stoics say, is the difference between 
the fool and the sage, that the fool supposes things to be really as harsh and severe as they appeared 
to him to be when his mind was first struck, and once he has received them, also endorses them with 
his assent and adds his belief to them, as though they were rightly to be feared…The sage, however, 
while he is changed in complexion and facial expression for a short time and to a limited degree, 
does not assent, but at once holds on to the strength of his opinion”. Apart from a minor revision, this 
translation is quoted from Irwin. Irwin 2003, 435.  
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A comparison of these two paragraphs reveals a clear change in Augustine. 
At the beginning, he adopts Gellius’ interpretation, but soon replaces the concept of 
“unpremeditated movements” (motibus inconsultis) by “passions running ahead of 
the function of the mind and reason” (his passionibus praevenientibus mentis et 
rationis officium). This is his deliberated choice. Moreover, it seems that he also 
follows Gellius when he substitutes “pavescat” (jitters) for “pallescere” (pale) by 
merely changing the letters “ll” to “v”.27 The Stoics would probably not accept this 
minor adaptation, since it could be interpreted as altering their basic position. 
However, the question arises as to why Augustine uses the word “passion” rather 
than other terms. Does he really misunderstand the Stoics, or are there other reasons 
for using this word? To analyse Augustine’s position, let us turn to compare some 
of his early and middle period writings (ca.395–410) as well as his late work, De 
civitate Dei. 
In his early works, such as De musica (6.5; 6.9; 6.10), De quantitate animae 
(23.41; 28.54), Contra Academicos (3.18; 3.21; 3.26), Epistulae (7.1–7; 9.4–5), 
Augustine states that judgements cause emotions. He proposes that judgements are 
based on the close connection between corporeal sensory suggestions and mental 
awareness. However, Augustine clarifies this by stating that merely sensory 
reactions that assail the soul on the first touch, such as sensual rhythms 
(numerositates sensibilium), impulses (appetitus), or sensory stimuli, do not 
represent passions. These sensual reactions make the soul produce the images of 
bodies (imagines corporum) or impressions (phantasia). Furthermore, a time-span 
exists between the first touch of the soul and the assents (συγκαταθέσεις) of 
“attention” (or “awareness”). Sensory affections are common to both animals and 
men; the assent distinguishes animal affection and rational perception. Augustine 
emphasises that significant conditions for perception are “attention” (attentio), 
“mental concentration” (cogitationis intentio) and “awareness” (non latere) and 
these, together with “judgements”, form the origin of emotions. 28  Augustine 
illustrates the course from the sensual rhythms and bodily affection, which both 
animals and men share, to the perception and emotional evaluation of the mind as 
follows: 
                                                          
27 See note 5 in this chapter and CD 9.4. 
28 See O’Daly 1987, 84–87. 
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(1) Deinde uidit in motibus corporum aliud esse, quod breuitate et productione 
temporis uariaretur, in quantum magis esset minusue diuturnum, aliud localium spatiorum 
percussione in quibusdam gradibus celetiratis et tarditatis. Qua diuisione facta illud, quod 
in temporis mora esset, modestis interuallis et humano sensui adcommodatis articulatim 
uarios efficere numeros eorumque genera…Postremo adtendit, quid in his moderandis, 
operandis, sentiendis, retinendis ageret anima, cuius caput ipsa esset…quid est, quod in 
sensibili numerositate diligimus? (mus. 6.10.25–26)29 
(2) sicut aliud est ad ea, quae corpus patitur, moueri, quod fit in sentiendo, aliud 
mouere se ad corpus, quod fit in operando, aliud quod ex his motibus in anima factum 
est continere, quod est meminisse, ita est aliud adnuere uel renuere his motibus, aut cum 
primitus exeruntur, aut cum recordatione resuscitantur, quod fit in delectatione 
conuenientiae et offensione absurditatis talium motionum siue adfectionum, et aliud est 
aestimare, utrum recte an secus ista delectent, quod fit ratiocinando. (mus. 6.9.24)30 
(3) nam sensum puto esse, non latere animam quod patitur corpus. Placet mihi 
haec definitio. (quant. anim. 23.41)31 
(4) sensu enim nos multae bestiae superant…mente autem, ratione, scientia, nos 
illis deus praeposuit. Sed ille sensus ea quibus tales animae delectantur, accedente 
consuetudine cuius magna uis est, potest discernere; atque eo facilius, quod anima 
belluarum magis corpori affixa est, cuius sunt illi sensus quibus utitur ad uictum 
uoluptatem que quam ex eodem illo corpore capit. (quant. anim. 28.54)32 
                                                          
29 “Then it noticed that there was one thing in the movements of bodies, which varied with respect to 
shortness or length of time, inasmuch as it was of longer or shorter duration, and another thing that 
varied with respect to the beating of local spaces with respect to certain degrees of speed and 
slowness. Having made this division, it continued to turn that which was in the time-span, properly 
divided with well-measured intervals that were adapted to the human perception, into various 
rhythms…Finally, it directed its attention to the way in which the soul, of which it was the head, was 
active in moderating, activating, perceiving and retaining these rhythms…what is it that we enjoy in 
the sensual rhythmicality?” Martin Jacobsson, AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS.DE MUSICA VI: A 
Critical Edition with a Translation and an Introduction (Institutionen för klassiska språk, 
Stockholm 2002), 61. For a similar clarification, see De musica 6.10.27–33. 
30 “As it is one thing to be moved towards the reactions of the body, which occurs in perceiving, 
another to move oneself towards the body, which occurs in an activity, yet another thing to retain 
what has been produced in the soul as a result of these motions, which is to remember, so it is one 
thing to approve or disapprove of these motions, either when they are first set in motion or when they 
are revived by remembrance, which occurs in the pleasure of that which is convenient and in the 
dismay of that which is inappropriate in such motions or reactions, and another thing to evaluate 
whether it is right or not to enjoy these things, which is done by reasoning”. (mus. 6.9.24). Ibid., 59. 
31 “I hold perception to be the soul’s awareness of that which the body experiences”. [transl. 
O’Daly] (O’Daly 1987, 86). O’Daly argues that Augustine’s definition of perception (or “under 
awareness”, non latere) is influenced by the Stoic concept of sunaisthesis (awareness). O’Daly 
1987, 86 and n. 15. 
32 “For many animals surpass us in their perceptive power…God has, however, made us superior to 
them in mind, reason, and knowledge. But the aforementioned faculty of perception can, together 
with habit, whose power is great, discern what gives pleasure to such souls; and all the more readily, 
as the soul of animals is more attached to their body, whose senses are used by it with a view to 
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(5) Omnes has imagines, quas phantasias cum multis uocas, in tria genera 
commodissime ac uerissime distribui uideo: quorum est unum sensis rebus impressum, 
alterum putatis, tertium ratis…In hac tota imaginum silua credo tibi non uideri primum 
illud genus ad animam, priusquam inhaereat sensibus, pertinere…Quo fit, ut nullo pacto 
animam credam nondum corpore sentientem, nondum per sensus uanissimos mortali et 
fugaci substantia uerberatam in tanta falsitatis ignominia iacuisse. (Ep. 7.4–5)33 
(6) si cupiditas nostra non mouebitur ad peccandum, excludetur serpentis astutia; 
si autem mota fuerit, quasi mulieri iam persuasum erit. Sed aliquando ratio uiriliter etiam 
commotam cupiditatem refrenat atque compescit. Quod cum fit, non labimur in 
peccatum, sed cum aliquanta luctatione coronamur. (Gn. adv. Man. 2.14.21)34 
These earlier views can also be detected in Augustine’s middle period 
writings of De Trinitate 9.6.10 and De Genesi ad litteram 12.12.25 (and 12.15.31), 
in which he describes the images of bodies (phantasias corporalium) before the 
approval or rejection of the mind (approbamus aut improbamus).35 Augustine 
makes the following observation:  
…when we are awake, and our minds not alienated from the senses of the body, we are then 
in a state of bodily vision, and able to distinguish from it the spiritual kind, in which we 
think about absent bodies in images…From all of these we easily distinguish the bodily 
realities we do see with our bodily sense of sight fixed on them there in front of us. (Gn. litt. 
12.12.25)36  
Augustine adds that if one is sleeping and reacts to affective representations 
                                                                                                                                                               
sustenance and the pleasure which derives from that same body”. O’Daly 1987, 98. 
33 “All these mental images, which you, like many others, call fantasies, I think can be most 
conveniently and most correctly divided into three classes: the first comprises true sense 
impressions; the second, images of things supposed; the third, of things thought…In this whole 
forest of images, you do not, I suppose, claim that the first class refers to the mind before it has the 
use of the senses…Consequently, I do not believe that the soul, before it has the use of a body, 
before it is beaten upon by the vain senses in a mortal and perishable substance, lies in such 
degradation of error”. [transl. Parsons]  
34 “When our cupidity is not moved toward a sin by the suggestion, the intrigues of the serpent are 
baffled. If it is moved, the woman is already persuaded, but sometimes the reason manly stops the 
movement of cupidity and destroys it and so we do not slide into sin but win it by fighting”. [transl. 
Teske] (See Knuuttila 2004, 170). 
35 De Trin. 9.6.10: unde etiam phantasias rerum corporalium per corporis sensum haustas et 
quodam modo infusas memoriae, ex quibus etiam ea quae non uisa sunt ficto phantasmate 
cogitantur siue aliter quam sunt siue fortuito sicuti sunt, aliis omnino regulis supra mentem nostram 
incommutabiliter manentibus uel approbare apud nosmetipsos uel improbare conuincimur cum 
recte aliquid approbamus aut improbamus. Nam et cum recolo carthaginis moenia quae uidi et 
cum fingo alexandriae quae non uidi easdem que imaginarias formas quasdam quibusdam 
praeferens, rationabiliter praefero. 
36 Gn. litt. 12.12.25: Sed cum vigilantes, neque mente a sensibus corporis alienata, in visione 
corporali sumus, discernimus ab ea visionem spiritalem, qua corpora absentia imaginaliter 
cogitamus…Ab his omnibus ita discernimus illa corporalia quae videmus, et in quibus praesentibus 
sunt sensus corporis nostri. Translations of Augustine’s De Genesi ad litteram in this chapter are 
taken from Edmund Hill’s edition (Hill 2002). 
  
62 
 
in his dream, he is without sin: 
…when the mental pictures that occur in his thoughts while he is speaking are also 
imprinted on his vision while he is dreaming in such a way that he cannot distinguish 
between them and the real coupling of bodies, the flesh is at once stirred into movements, 
and the result is what usually follows upon this movement; and this happens without sin, 
just as when he was awake he said without sin what he undoubtedly thought about in order 
to say it. (Gn. litt.12.15.31)37 
In short, concupiscence is the inherited weakness for sinful things, which 
we have endured as a punishment for original sin, and this makes us experience evil 
desires. Involuntary disobedience is also a sign of original sin, but if it is controlled 
immediately, it is not a new personal sin: “We do not sin in having an evil desire but 
in consenting to it”. 38  Here Augustine is borrowing from the Stoic moral 
psychology and the distinction between a first movement and an assent to it. By 
employing the terms suggestio, delectatio and consentio, Augustine applies this 
analysis to the biblical story of Adam, Eve, and the serpent.39 To Augustine, a sin is 
neither a suggestion derived from one’s attention to an object of carnal 
concupiscence or another evil inclination, nor is it the spontaneous incipient 
delectation of cogitation, provided that the higher part of the soul destroys it 
immediately when it is aroused (See also De Trin. 12.12). 40  In these texts, 
Augustine considers the first movement as being spontaneous reactions to visions 
(visa) or images (phantasiai) without regarding them as sins. In fact, Augustine’s 
interpretation corresponds to the Stoic doctrine of propatheia. For this reason, the 
arguments proposed by Sorabji and Peter King’s that Augustine misunderstands the 
Stoics are unconvincing. 
                                                          
37 Gn. litt. 12.15.31: porro ipsa phantasia, quae fit in cogitatione sermocinantis, cum ita expressa 
fuerit in uisione somniantis, ut inter illam et ueram conmixtionem corporum non discernatur, 
continuo mouetur caro et sequitur, quod eum motum sequi solet, cum hoc tam sine peccato fiat, 
quam sine peccato a uigilante dicitur, quod ut diceretur sine dubio cogitatum est. 
38  Expositio quarumdam propositionum ex epistula apostoli ad Romanos, PL 35, 2066. See 
Knuuttila 2004, 169. 
39 Knuuttila 2004, 170. 
40  Knuuttila 2004, 170. For a discussion regarding the inherited evil inclinations and their 
involuntary activations remaining sinful in Augustine, see Wu Tianyue, “Augustine on Involuntary 
Sin: A Philosophical Defense”, in Augustiniana 59 (2009), 45–78; “Did Augustine Lose the 
Philosophical Battle in the Debate with Julian of Eclanum on Concupiscentia Carnis and Voluntas?” 
in Augustiniana 57 (2007), 7–30; “Rethinking Augustine’s Adaptation of ‘First Movements’ of 
Affection”, in The Modern Schoolman 87 (2010), 95–115; “Shame in the Context of Sin: Augustine 
on the Feeling of Shame in De civitate Dei” in Les Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie 
Médiévales 74 (2007), 1–31. Cf. Simo Knuuttila, “The Emotion of Shame in Medieval Philosophy”, 
in Spazio Filosofico 5 (2012), 243–249; Nisula 2012, 254–262. 
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However, in his later works, Augustine presents another picture, as in De 
civitate Dei and in some Sermones. At this stage, he is inclined to refer to first 
movements as “passions” rather than as “visions” or “images” or unpremeditated 
reactions to them, which differs from his previous formulations. For instance, in 
CD 1.25, he paraphrases the case of the first movement of the sleeper in Gn. litt. 
12.15.31 and argues that unconscious lusts (concupiscentialis inoboedientia) as 
first movements are passions and these passions are not sins: “To be sure, that 
lustful disobedience which still dwells in our dying members sometimes moves 
itself as if by its own law, apart from the law of our will: when we are asleep, for 
instance. In this case also, however, there is still no guilt in the body of one who 
does not consent”.41 On that condition, Augustine defends his position that it is 
impossible to avoid the sudden perturbations of preliminary passions and it is also 
absurd for the Stoics to refuse good preliminary passions, such as compassion.42 
Thus, Augustine tends to alter his previous position and turns to refute the Stoics by 
transforming the meaning of several terms and by using some metaphors. This 
transformation is present in the following changes:  
1. Changing the concept of motibus inconsultis into passionibus 
praevenientibus and using pavescat instead of pallescere, as was evident in the case 
of Noctes Atticae in CD 9.4. 
2. Modifying the connotation of bodily affection or reaction (passio 
corporis) in his early works (such as De musica and De quantitate animae)43 to an 
emotional term (cupidity) in CD 1.25. Augustine often uses the expression of 
                                                          
41 CD 1.25: Quod si illa concupiscentialis inoboedientia, quae adhuc in membris moribundis 
habitat, praeter nostrae uoluntatis legem quasi lege sua mouetur, quanto magis absque culpa est in 
corpore non consentientis, si absque culpa est in corpore dormientis! Although Augustine does not 
use the word passio here, he mentions concupiscentia and refers lustful disobedience 
(concupiscentialis inoboedientia) to an involuntary passion as a sort of first movement. 
42 Augustine criticizes the Stoics for arguing that it is evil and inhuman to blame some preliminary 
passions such as compassions; it would be more honourable for them to experience compassion 
rather than the fear of shipwrecks. See CD 9.5: Nam et misericordiam Stoicorum est solere culpare; 
sed quanto honestius ille Stoicus misericordia perturbaretur hominis liberandi quam timore 
naufragii…Nulla de virtutibus tuis nec admirabilior nec gratior misericordia est. 
43 Augustine incorporates the term passio corporis in De musica and De quantitate many times, but 
these terms do not convey the meaning of emotional “passion”. See mus. 6.5.10: videtur mihi anima 
cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo aliquid pati, sed in ejus passionibus attentius agere…et exerit 
adtentiores actiones suis quibusque locis atque instrumentis adcommodatas, tunc uidere, uel audire, 
uel olfacere, uel gustare, uel tangendo sentire dicitur, quibus actionibus congrua libenter adsociat 
et moleste obsistit incongruis. Has operationes passionibus corporis puto animam exhibere cum 
sentit, non easdem passiones recipere; Cf. quant. anim. 25.48: passio corporis per se ipsam non 
latens animam. 
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passio corporis, but this passio does not have the meaning of emotional “passion”, 
but rather refers to the “suffering” or “reaction” of the body. Thus far, by combining 
this notion with first movements, he is in line with the Stoics. But passio has the 
double meaning of both “suffering” and emotional “passion” in his era, which 
provides a basis for him to move from the “affection of the body” (passio corporis) 
terminology to the emotional use of “passion” as a means of refuting the Stoic 
position on the first movement.  
3. Transforming the stage of the first movement into an emotion 
(perturbatio), such as fear, desire, or anger, which is associated with a 
psychological state of momentary doubt (dubitans) as a symptom of the human 
weakness and disobedience of those who do not have sufficient faith in God. 
Augustine explains this by citing the example of Peter’s staggering with fear and 
desire in sinking into water in Serm. 80.6: “Peter too…staggered…he began to 
tremble…And yet when he grew afraid he cried out…Then the Lord took him by 
the hand and said…‘Why did you doubt?’…This fulfilled what was said in the 
psalm: ‘If’, I said, ‘my foot has slipped, your mercy, Lord, came to my help’”.44 
Augustine insists that such sudden attacks on the mind (first movements) are due to 
a lack of confidence in God.45 In addition, to refer to temptations that are actually 
passions, Augustine also uses “being tossed about by storms of desires”.46 
In these three cases, Augustine clearly changes his attitude and no longer 
follows the Stoic doctrine. Instead, he prefers to refer to the first movements as 
passions because he realises that they follow from hesitating (haesitans) and 
doubting (dubitans), a psychological state of infirmity (infirmitas) and desire 
                                                          
44  Serm. 80.6: Et Petrus praesumpsit, et titubavit…Tamen quando trepidavit, ad illum 
exclamavit…Tunc Dominus tenuit illi manum, et dixit: Modicae fidei, quare dubitasti?…ut 
impleretur quod dictum est in Psalmo: Si dicebam, Motus est pes meus; misericordia tua, Domine, 
adiuvabat me. Cf. Matthew 14:29–31. In Serm. 76.1, 76.8–9, 75.10, 19.4; Ep. 30, 2, 3.10–12, there 
are similar examples about Peter’s doubts and hesitations with fear in the stormy sea. See also Byers 
2003, 443–444. 
45 Serm. 75.4: Tamen, fratres, maxima perturbatio in ista navi non est, nisi in absentia Domini. 
46 Serm. 75.4: Sic et in ista navi, cum absens est Christus, suis quisque tempestatibus quatitur et 
iniquitatibus et cupiditatibus suis. Byers maintains that Augustine adheres to the Stoic view that a 
first movement is not yet a passion, but she has to admit that this case (Serm. 75.4–5) makes her 
confused because it seems that Augustine indeed uses such storms of desires (as first movements) to 
refer to passions. This demonstrates that Byers’s argument is not without problems. “Somewhat 
confusingly, elsewhere in this sermon (Serm. 75.4–5), Augustine switches back and forth between 
using ‘being tossed about by storms of desires’ to signify temptations, as he does here, and using it to 
signify desires which are actually passions”. Byers 2003, 444 (n. 82). See also “[being] tossed upon 
a sea of passions” in CD 9.6. 
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(fluctuat cupiditate).47 Augustine argues that these types of preliminary passions 
are due to an insufficient confidence in God.48 In other words, the feeling of sudden 
emotional insecurity or involuntary cupidity reflects the weakness of the human 
soul. These involuntary passions are due to the original sin, but they are not 
personal sins or evils. The case of Peter sinking into water illustrates how the first 
movement of fear derives from not having sufficient faith. Only by fully trusting in 
the Lord and by accepting the grace of God will he be made strong and overcome 
the insecurity of the perturbations of passions. In this way, Augustine shifts the 
discussion of first movements to a theological context and associates it with faith 
(fides).  
When discussing these cases, Sarah Byers contends that Augustine 
consistently adheres to the Stoic doctrine of the first movement and that he does not 
alter his position of a first movement being merely a reaction to an image rather 
than a passion. Byers does not specify the reason for Augustine initially clarifying 
the Stoic interpretation of the first movement, but then substituting the movement 
triggered by phantasia with passio praeveniens officium rationis in CD 9.4. 
Furthermore, Augustine’s later remarks in De civitate Dei as well as some of his 
Sermones maintain that some first movements involve cupidity or fear with 
infirmity and doubt, and some are good passions (i.e., compassion). Yet Byers does 
not pay attention to the real intention of this type of argumentation by 
Augustine—his aim is to refute the Stoic “arrogant” claim that the wise 
philosophers can avoid the agitations of preliminary passions and that it is also 
inhuman for them to refute some good first movements. Sorabji and King notice 
this non-Stoic usage in CD 9.4, but they ignore Augustine’s theological argument 
and draw the wrong conclusion that Augustine misunderstands the Stoics. While 
the Stoics regard the first movements as morally neutral, Augustine takes them as 
incitements that often reveal the sinful inclination of the fallen soul. The Stoics do 
not recognise the inherent sinfulness of the soul, which makes many of the first 
movements evil even before the involvement of the reason and will. 
We can therefore recognise that Augustine’s insight into the issue of first 
                                                          
47 Serm. 76.9: Sed cum fluctuat cupiditate cor tuum, ut vincas tuam cupiditatem, invoca Christi 
divinitatem. 
48 Serm. 76.6: Ergo ambulavit Petrus super aquas in iussu Domini, sciens hoc se a se habere non 
posse. Fide valuit quod humana infirmitas non valeret. 
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movements involves a complex process of adjustment and modification and there 
are significant differences between his early, middle and late works. In an 
overview on his account of the first movements in various stages, I do not think 
that Augustine misunderstands the Stoics. On the contrary, there is ample 
evidence that Augustine deviated from the Stoic position, attempting to evaluate 
involuntary passions from a theological orientation and endeavouring to find 
suitable measures to control and moderate those passions. This is closely related 
to his understanding of the two pivotal concepts, metriopatheia and apatheia, 
which will be analysed in the next section. 
               
3.2. Disputation on Augustine’s Misunderstanding of Metriopatheia and 
Apatheia  
      
A similar controversy pertains to Augustine’s comments on metriopatheia and 
apatheia. In CD 9.4, Augustine claims that the difference between the Stoics and 
the Peripatetics regarding the therapy that aims at metriopatheia or apatheia is 
verbal. 49  Sorabji argues that this statement demonstrates Augustine’s 
misunderstanding of the distinction between metriopatheia and apatheia. 
According to Sorabji, there are substantial differences between these concepts in 
Stoicism and Peripateticism that cannot be referred to as a simple verbal dispute.50 
However, some opponents, such as Irwin, maintain that there is no 
misunderstanding and that Augustine is justified in pointing out that the doctrines 
of his predecessors are essentially the same.  
Sorabji asserts that Augustine misunderstands the Stoic doctrine of 
apatheia and erroneously obscures it with the Platonic-Peripatetic notion of 
metriopatheia. Sorabji explains that according to the Stoics, a wise man is able to 
                                                          
49 Augustine says, “It seems to me, therefore, that here also, when it is asked whether the passions of 
the mind affect the wise man or whether he is entirely a stranger to them, the controversy arises out 
of words rather than things. For I consider that, as far as the pith of the matter is concerned, rather 
than the mere sound of words, the view which the Stoics hold is no different from that of the 
Platonists and Peripatetics”. (CD 9.4: Videtur ergo mihi etiam in hoc, ubi quaeritur utrum accidant 
sapienti passiones animi, an ab eis sit prorsus alienus, de verbis eos potius quam de rebus facere 
controversiam. Nam et ipsos nihil hinc aliud quam Platonicos et Peripateticos sentire existimo, 
quantum ad vim rerum adtinet, non ad vocabulorum sonum.) 
50 “It has often been said that the dispute on apatheia and the other disputes…are merely verbal. On 
the whole, I believe the opposite is the case…sometimes the idea that the dispute is merely verbal 
rests, I believe, on misunderstanding the distinctions that I have been analyzing…what is going on 
here, I think, is not a verbal dispute at all, but an attempt to disguise a substantive dispute as if it 
were merely verbal”. Sorabji 2000, 207 and 209. 
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maintain apatheia and defend himself against the perturbations of passions. 
However, the Stoics do not consider the first movements assailing the wise to be 
emotions, since they regard emotions as judgements of the mind and first 
movements as mere impulses. Augustine, on the other hand, maintains that the 
Stoic first movements are emotions. Thus, Augustine incorrectly assumes that it is 
impossible for Stoic philosophers to maintain apatheia and withstand the sudden 
disturbance of involuntary passions (first movements). In other words, what they 
refer to as apatheia is, in fact, equivalent to the Platonic-Peripatetic 
metriopatheia.51 Sorabji considers it to be important to recognise that there are 
clearly substantial disagreements between the Stoic and the Platonic-Peripatetic 
philosophers on the issue of the moderation and extirpation of emotions. Firstly, 
the Stoics refer to emotions as diseases, which essentially differs from the 
Peripatetic doctrine.52 To the Stoics, moderating emotions is basically tantamount 
to moderating perturbations (moderatae perturbationes), diseases (morbi), evils 
(mala), or vice (vitium). Moderation is a near scandal for Seneca, Cicero and the 
classical Stoics such as Chrysippus.53 Second, the concepts of metriopatheia and 
apatheia are based on two different theories regarding the soul: The Stoics defend 
the doctrine of apatheia, arguing that the soul is a unitary whole that has no 
naturally existing emotional part. Thus, they regard emotions as perturbations or 
diseases that should be eliminated from the soul in order to keep one’s peace of 
mind and to foster virtues. The Peripatetics, on the other hand, defend the notion 
of metriopatheia because they believe that the soul is tripartite and that emotions 
are a function of the lower parts of the soul and cannot be extirpated. Therefore, 
Augustine’s claim that “metriopatheia and apatheia are only verbally different 
                                                          
51 Sorabji contends that the reason for Augustine misunderstanding the Stoic apatheia is that he first 
misinterprets their concept of first movements and then falsely argues that the Stoics cannot attain 
apatheia because they have first movements. “We saw him in the City of God defending his belief in 
moderate emotion for humans in this life by claiming (erroneously) that even the Stoics would allow 
a little fear in a storm at sea. That was how he (mis)-interpreted the Stoic recognition of first 
movements…If we take Stoic apatheia to involve freedom from love and gladness, he says, it is not 
desirable at any time” (Sorabji 2000, 397–398); “emotions are not seen in the Stoic way as 
necessarily having the permission of reason. This can help to explain how in City of God 9.4 
Augustine can so ignore the Stoic position as to claim that the wise man has emotions”. (Ibid., 383) 
52 “But their [Stoic] seeing emotions in terms of disease represents a substantive disagreement”. 
Ibid., 207. 
53 Sorabji supposes that Chrysippus is the main establisher of the Stoic view of freedom from 
pathos, rather than Zeno, Panaetius, or Posidonius. Chrysippus is a classical representative of the 
Stoics, who contends apatheia and regards emotions as false judgements. Ibid., 206–207 and 181. 
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rather than things” (de verbis eos potius quam de rebus facere controversiam) 
disregards the above substantial doctrinal distinctions. Furthermore, by examining 
the history of Christian predecessors’ (such as the Alexandrians, Cappadocians, 
Evagrius, and Jerome) attitudes towards the Stoic ideal of apatheia, Sorabji 
argues that the following reasons led Augustine to his misinterpretation and 
blurred the distinction between metriopatheia and apatheia: 
(1) Augustine was misled by his Christian predecessors. Augustine was 
influenced by the Latin translations of works by Origen and some other Christian 
Fathers and this obscured the distinction between first movements and emotions, 
mistaking propatheia as a reference to emotions.54 Augustine adheres to this 
perspective and presupposes the Stoics to be false in claiming that they could keep 
apatheia and resist such sudden passions. 
(2) Cicero misguided Augustine. Cicero assumes a Stoic position and 
characterises the Peripatetic way of moderating emotions as moderating 
perturbations or moderating evils. Sorabji argues that Cicero translating pathos as 
“perturbation” lead Augustine to the misconception that the Stoic impassibility 
and the Peripatetic moderation are similar since both pertain to resisting emotions 
as perturbations or diseases.55 
(3) Galen mislead Augustine, inducing him to make the assumption of a 
“verbal distinction”. Sorabji refers to Galen’s On the Diagnosis and Therapy of 
the Distinctive Passions of the Individual’s Soul, in which Galen asks whether 
moderation assumes a similarity between strong passions and minor passions.56 
Irwin dissents from the above argument and maintains that Augustine’s 
notion of a mere verbal distinction between the concepts of metriopatheia and 
apatheia is reasonable and defensible. Irwin argues that Augustine understands 
the Stoics very well, and that there is indeed no essential difference between the 
Stoic and Peripatetic positions regarding these two conceptions. Irwin’s reasoning 
is introduced below. 
Firstly, both the Stoics and the Peripatetics acknowledge the existence of 
                                                          
54 Ibid., 382. 
55 Ibid., 208–209.  
56 “The wittiest verbal legislation along these lines is that of Galen, who says: It is no longer so clear 
whether being moderately disturbed in mind at a great loss of money or esteem belongs to the class 
of pathē, and similarly for being rather out of control in eating cakes”. Ibid., 209. 
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the state of propatheia. The Stoics, however, describe this a stage of “suggestive 
appearances”, whereas the Peripatetics understand it as a stage of “passions”. 
Augustine concludes that the two philosophies merely employ different terms to 
describe the same thing, propatheia. According to Augustine, the only problem is 
that the Stoics will not acknowledge that a propatheia is a passion.57 Thus, the 
Stoic apatheia does not exist, and instead its essence lies in the Peripatetic 
metriopatheia.  
Secondly, both the Stoics and the Peripatetics emphasise the function of 
the judgement of one’s mind upon passions, believing that people often go wrong 
in living by their passions alone and neglecting the analysis of their mind.58 Thus, 
passions are regarded as the object of rational adjustments, whether through 
moderation or elimination. Both metriopatheia and apatheia foreground the 
controlling of passions by the moral judgments of the mind, in order to realise the 
moral assessment of appropriate human actions.59 
Thirdly, on this basis, “the same distinctions between responsible and 
non-responsible actions will be marked in different terms, and the same agents 
will count as responsible because of the same features”.60 Consequently, Irwin 
argues that the Aristotelian position is close to the substance of the Stoic position, 
and that Augustine’s remarks demonstrate the same feature.61 
Even though Sorabji and Irwin present contrary arguments and evidence, 
they both appear to be defensible and persuasive. In order to evaluate the thesis of 
Augustine’s alleged misinterpretation, and to consider other possible reasons for 
arguing that there is no essential distinction between apatheia and metriopatheia, I 
shall first analyse Augustine’s accounts in his early, middle, and late works.  
Augustine refers to the Stoic apatheia (impassibilitas) in his early works 
(before the mid-390s), such as De musica (6.16.51–55), De moribus ecclesiae 
                                                          
57 Irwin 2003. 437. 
58 “Both Peripatetics and Stoics believe that passions explain actions; people go wrong because they 
live in accordance with their passions”. Irwin 2003, 438. 
59 “The Stoics can strengthen their case by appealing to another feature of human action on passions 
that the Peripatetics also recognize…Aristotle insists on this point, and sharply criticizes people who 
try to evade moral judgments on their actions by pleading that they acted on their non-rational 
desires”. Ibid., 439. 
60 Ibid., 439. 
61 “Augustine’s claim about the merely verbal difference between Stoics and Peripathetics on 
passions is defensible, since one might reasonably claim that the second interpretation of Aristotle 
brings him close to the substance of the Stoic position”. Ibid., 440. 
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Catholicae et De moribus Manichaeorum (1.27.53–54), De ordine (2.6.18), and 
Contra Academicos (1.4.11). 62  These works indicate that he was profoundly 
influenced by the Stoic conception of impassibilitas and pursued the contemplative 
state of a fully controlled soul with no suffering or disturbances. Augustine 
appreciated this type of impassibility as well as the related four virtues of the 
perfect soul: prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice. He observes the 
following:  
(1)…tu negabis in illa perfectione ac beatitate animam constitutam, et conspicere 
ueritatem, et immaculatam manere, et nihil molestiae pati posse, et uni Deo subdi, caeteris 
uero supereminere naturis?...Haec ergo contemplatio, sanctificatio, impassibilitas, 
ordinatio eius, aut illae sunt quattuor uirtutes perfectae atque consummatae, aut, ne de 
nominibus, cum res conueniant, frustra laboremus, pro istis uirtutibus, quibus constituta in 
laboribus utitur anima, tales quaedam potentiae in aeterna ei uita sperandae sunt. (De 
musica 6.16.55)63 
(2) Magister: Cum ergo id agit, ne ulterius id delectet aliquando, nonne tibi 
uidetur amorem suum figere in Deo, et ab omni inquinamento temperatissime et 
cautissime et securissime uiuere? Discipulus: Videtur sane. (De musica 6.16.53)64 
(3) Nam definitionem meam tu probasti, qua dictum est, quid sit esse cum Deo, 
cum quo mentem sapientis manere immobilem me, quantum assequi ualeo, docere 
uoluistis... fortasse enim, quia ubique deus est, quoquo ierit sapiens, inuenit deum, cum quo 
esse possit...Fateor, inquit, corpus illud de loco in locum transitum facere, sed mentem 
ipsam nego, cui nomen sapientis inpositum est. (De ordine 2.5.17–2.6.19)65 
                                                          
62 These works date from the period between 386 and 391: De moribus ecclesiae catholicae (written 
in 388 and revised in 390), De musica (387–391), De ordine (Nov. 386–Mar. 387), and Contra 
Academicos (Nov.386–Mar.387). 
63 “will you deny that the soul, dwelling in this perfection and beatitude, is capable of seeing the 
truth and of remaining without stain and of suffering no trouble and of being subject to the one 
God but superior to all other natures?...Thus, this contemplation, sanctification, impassibility and 
ordering of the soul, it is either those four virtues in a perfect and fulfilled state, or – not to waste 
energy on words, since there is agreement with respect to the things – some such faculties instead 
of the virtues, which the soul uses while laboring here, that are to be hoped for by the soul in the 
eternal life”. [transl. Martin Jacobsson] 
64 “M: So, when the soul is active with the purpose of never again taking pleasure in this, does it 
not seem to you to fix its love in God and live in complete temperance and caution and security 
from all impurity? D: Yes, it does”. [transl. Martin Jacobsson] 
65 “‘You indeed accepted my definition, in which it was declared what ‘to be with God’ means, 
and, as far as I can get your meaning, you wished to teach that the mind of a wise man remains 
immovable with Him’...Perhaps, because God is everywhere, then, wheresoever the wise man 
goes, there he finds God, with whom he can be...‘I admit’, he said, ‘that the body makes a 
transition from place to place, but I deny that the mind itself, to which the name of wisdom is 
given, makes such transition’”. [transl. Robert Russell] 
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(4) …quis non concedat ab omni miseria liberum esse debere sapientem…etiamsi 
id faciat mente tranquilla, nullis aculeis doloris instinctus, sed adductus officio bonitatis, 
misericors tamen uocandus est. huic enim nihil obest nomen, cum absit miseria. (De 
moribus ecclesiae 1.27.53)66 
(5) Uiximus enim magna mentis tranquillitate ab omni corporis labe animum 
uindicantes et a cupiditatium facibus longissime remoti, dantes, quantum homini licet, 
operam rationi, hoc est secundum diuinam illam partem animi uiuentes, quam beatam 
esse uitam hesterna inter nos definitione conuenit. (Contra Academicos 1.4.11)67 
In excerpts (1), (2) and (3), Augustine emphasises the significance of 
keeping the mind immovable (mens immobilis) in order to be free from the 
emotional disturbance and to attain tranquility of the soul (tranquillitas animi). He 
adheres to the Stoic domination of reason, suggesting that the wise should beware 
all types of perturbations and develop impassibility (impassibilitas) and control 
(temperatissimus, cautissimus, securissimus). In this state, even virtuous emotions, 
such as compassion, should also be removed, retaining only compassionate acts 
without a feeling of pain, as explained in excerpt (4).68 In excerpt (5), Augustine 
highlights the constant mastering of one’s soul, by which he intends to achieve two 
objectives, freedom from the flames of passions and contemplation with tranquility 
of the mind (in other words, impassibility). His arguments in these works (dating 
approximately from 386–392) display typical Stoic features, while also resembling 
Ambrose’s notion of apatheia as fixing the focus of one’s meditation on God and 
keeping one’s mind unified with Him in a state of harmony. This indicates that at 
the beginning of his Christian life, Augustine was familiar with the Stoic concept of 
apatheia and that he was also influenced by its Platonist interpretation in 
Ambrose.69 It is therefore unlikely that Augustine did not know the Stoic doctrine 
                                                          
66 “Who does not allow that the wise man should be free from all such pain?...Although he 
performs these [compassionate] acts with a serene mind, impelled by the duty of kindness rather 
than the sting of pain, he ought still to be called merciful, for the word does not lose all meaning 
when the feeling of pain is absent”. [transl. Martin Jacobsson, with a change] 
67 “We lived in great mental tranquility, keeping the spirit free from every stain of the body; and, 
far removed from the raging flames of desire, we were taking pains, as far as man is allowed, to 
cultivate reason – that is, to live according to the divine part of the spirit – and this we agreed 
yesterday was by definition the happy life”. [transl. Peter King]. See Peter King (transl.), 
Augustine, Against the academicians; The teacher (Indiana: Hackett, 1995).  
68 Augustine’s view of compassion (or pity) in case (4) is in accordance with the Stoics, who believe 
that compassion is a form of mental pain and mistaken judgment of the mind which should be 
extirpated as well. For the Stoic teaching of compassion, see Brad Inwood, “Why do fools fall in 
love?” in Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 41 (1997), 63 (n. 22). 
69 See Ambrose’s De officiis 1.47.228–232; 1.48.233–239. Both Ambrose and Augustine refer to 
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of apatheia or that he misunderstood it. 
In his middle-period works such as Confessiones, Augustine expresses 
more pessimism concerning the human ability to remain apathetic in this life with 
respect to emotional experiences and the evil inclination of the soul. Rethinking the 
Stoic classification of emotions as appetite (cupiditas), pleasure (laetitia), distress 
(tristitia), and fear (metus), Augustine became convinced that due to the original 
sin, these emotions are necessarily included in the uncontrollable concupiscible and 
irascible movements. While Augustine had, in fact, familiarised himself with some 
Neoplatonic works around the time of his conversion to Christianity in 386,70 
having been influenced by Cicero and the Stoic psychological doctrines, 71 
Augustine did not emphasise the Platonic notion moderation in his early works 
during the years 386–390. It was only later in his Confessiones that he began to 
question the Stoic notion of impassibility and revise his perspective, particularly in 
reference to his weeping for a fraction of an hour (flevisse me matrem exigua parte 
horae) when faced with his mother’s death in Conf. 9.12.33: 
I was glad to weep before you about her and for her, about myself and for myself. Now I let 
flow the tears which I had held back so that they ran as freely as they wished. My heart 
rested upon them, and it reclined upon them because it was your ears that were there, not 
those of some human critic who would put a proud interpretation on my weeping.72 
When referring to a proud criticism of weeping, Augustine seems to have in mind 
                                                                                                                                                               
emotions as perturbations and harmful phenomena, stressing that the reason should supervise the 
soul like a watchman in order to avoid any harassment (boni speculatoris est ita praetendere animo). 
In addition, both Ambrose and Augustine state emphatically that impassibility may help to attain 
mental tranquility and happiness when the focus of one’s contemplation is fixed on God. Ambrose 
and Augustine also share many significant concepts, such as the four virtues (iustitia, prudentia, 
temperantia, and fortitudo) as well as the theory of emotional impulses (motus animi or impetu). 
Colish also maintains that in mor. 1.8.13–1.11.19; 1.26.48–1.28.58, Augustine parallels Ambrose’s 
view on apatheia. See Colish 1985 (II), 222. 
70 In Conf. 7.9.13–14, Augustine mentions that he obtained some Neoplatonic books from a man 
who puffed up with pride. Conf. 7.9.13: procurasti mihi per quendam hominem, inmanissimo typho 
turgidum, quosdam Platonicorum libros ex graeca lingua in latinum versos. Peter Brown states that 
“they [these books] seem to have included many treatises of Plotinus, in the Latin translation of 
Marius Victorinus, and, possibly, one work at least, now lost, by Porphyry”. Brown 2000, 85. 
71 In Conf. 3.4.7–8, Augustine mentions that when he read Cicero’s Hortensius at the age of 18, his 
feelings were changed and he was deeply influenced by its teachings of happiness, immortality, and 
wisdom. He realised the vanity of the lower desires. Conf. 3.4.7: …liber ille ipsius exhortationem 
continet ad philosophiam et uocatur Hortensius. Ille uero liber mutauit affectum meum et ad te 
ipsum…uiluit mihi repente omnis uana spes et immortalitatem sapientiae concupiscebam aestu 
cordis incredibili et surgere coeperam, ut ad te redirem. See comments in Chadwick 1991, 38–39; 
Knuuttila 2004, 164. 
72 Conf. 9.12.33: …et libuit flere in conspectu tuo de illa et pro illa, de me et pro me. et dimisi 
lacrimas, quas continebam, ut effluerent quantum uellent, substernens eas cordi meo: et requieuit in 
eis, quoniam ibi erant aures tuae, non cuiusquam hominis superbe interpretantis ploratum meum. 
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the Stoic conception of impassibility and their virtue of fortitude. As for 
maintaining impassibility or displaying passions at the death of his mother, he 
admits that it was impossible for him to bear the bitterness of grief and that weeping 
was a relief: 
…so that you [Lord] can explain to me why weeping is a relief to us when unhappy? ...I 
merely grieved and wept. I was in misery and had lost the source of my joy. Or is 
weeping really a bitter thing which gives relief only when we cannot bear to think of the 
things which formerly we enjoyed, and which is pleasurable at the moments when we 
shrink from the memory of them?73 
Augustine concludes that emotions are often supported by voluntarily formed 
habits that tend to take a direction different than that of pursuing righteousness, 
even though he attempts to struggle: “I was responsible for the fact that habit had 
become so embattled against me; for it was with my consent that I came to the place 
in which I did not wish to be”.74 This descending tendency reveals the weakness of 
the human will and the sinful conditions generated by original sin. Thus, Augustine 
argues that emotions should be moderated because our weakened will does not have 
complete capabilities to eliminate them on the condition of being a sinner:  
In this kind of way I was sure it was better for me to render myself up to your love than to 
surrender to my own cupidity. But while the former course was pleasant to think about and 
had my notional assent, the latter was more pleasant and overcame me…The law of sin is 
the violence of habit by which even the unwilling mind is dragged down and held, as it 
deserves to be, since by its own choice it slipped into the habit.75 
However, in his late writings, such as De civitate Dei, Augustine makes the 
puzzling statement that metriopatheia and apatheia are essentially the same. This 
does not necessarily imply that he disregards the distinction between the Stoic and 
Platonic notions, as they both influenced him profoundly in his earlier years. Irwin 
argues that metriopatheia and apatheia indeed share many features and that 
Augustine merely reveals them. Sorabji, on the other hand, reasons that there are 
also many differences between them pertaining to different theories of the soul. I 
                                                          
73 Conf. 4.5.10: …ut dicas mihi, cur fletus dulcis sit miseris?…sed tantum dolebam et flebam. miser 
enim eram et amiseram gaudium meum. an et fletus res amara est et prae fastidio rerum, quibus 
prius fruebamur, et tunc ab eis abhorremus, delectat? 
74 Conf. 8.5.11: sed tamen consuetudo adversus me pugnacior ex me facta erat, quoniam volens quo 
nollem perveneram. Cf. De sermone Domini in monte 12.34. See Knuuttila 2004, 169. For the power 
of habit in Augustine, see Rist 1994, 175–186. 
75 Conf. 8.5.12: Ita certum habebam esse melius tuae caritati me dedere quam meae cupiditati 
cedere; sed illud placebat et uincebat, hoc libebat et uinciebat…lex enim peccati est uiolentia 
consuetudinis, qua trahitur et tenetur etiam inuitus animus eo merito, quo in eam uolens inlabitur. 
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propose that while both of these arguments reflect certain aspects of Augustine’s 
perspective, they illustrate neither Augustine’s true intentions, nor the crux of the 
matter. Augustine’s remark reflects his mature considerations after long reflection. 
The main reason for Augustine making such a remark is that he addresses these 
philosophical conceptions from a theological perspective. When we return to the 
original context in CD 9.4–5 and the related discussions in CD 14.5–9, we will find 
that Augustine interprets the alleged “virtues” and “goods” differently from the 
Stoics and Platonists:  
Certain philosophers, then, say that these disturbances or affections or passions assail even 
the wise man, though moderated and controlled by reason in that he imposes laws upon 
them by the mastery of his mind, by which they are reduced to their necessary limits. This 
is what the Platonists think, and the Aristotelians also, since Aristotle, who founded the 
Peripatetic school, was a pupil of Plato. Others, however, like the Stoics, believe that the 
wise man is not subject to passions of this kind…The other philosophers simply use the 
language of ordinary speech and call these things ‘goods’; but they hold that, in 
comparison with virtue, which consists in living well, they are little things and of 
small value…For I consider that, as far as the pith of the matter is concerned, rather than 
the mere sound of words, the view which the Stoics hold is not different from that of the 
Platonists and Peripatetics.76 
In this quote, Augustine argues that there is a similar core in the 
Platonic-Peripatetic model of moderation (metriopatheia) and the Stoic way of 
impassibility (apatheia), as they both emphasise the mastery of a mind that is not 
dominated by passions77as well as the corresponding virtues (virtutes) without the 
disturbance of turbulent passions. Augustine also claims that with respect to virtue 
and justice, their disputations on whether to moderate or eliminate passions are 
completely unimportant.78 In Books 9 and 14 of the City of God, Augustine argues 
                                                          
76 CD 9.4: Has ergo perturbationes sive affectiones sive passiones quidam philosophi dicunt etiam 
in sapientem cadere, sed moderatas rationique subiectas, ut eis leges quodam modo, quibus ad 
necessarium redigantur modum, dominatio mentis inponat. Hoc qui sentiunt, Platonici sunt sive 
Aristotelici, cum Aristoteles discipulus Platonis fuerit, qui sectam Peripateticam condidit. Aliis 
autem, sicut Stoicis, cadere ullas omnino huiusce modi passiones in sapientem non placet…Haec 
autem isti simpliciter et ex communi loquendi consuetudine appellant bona; sed in comparatione 
virtutis, qua recte vivitur, parva et exigua…Nam et ipsos nihil hinc aliud quam Platonicos et 
Peripateticos sentire existimo, quantum ad vim rerum adtinet, non ad vocabulorum sonum. 
77  CD 9.4: Quae si ita sunt, aut nihil aut paene nihil distat inter Stoicorum aliorumque 
philosophorum opinionem de passionibus et perturbationibus animorum; utrique enim mentem 
rationemque sapientis ab earum dominatione defendunt. 
78 Augustine asserts that the Stoic philosophers’ trembling and growing pale with fear should be 
regarded as passions, just as they are among the Peripatetics. Their dispute is concerned with mere 
terminology rather than fact, since they both pursue virtue and justice, arguing that passions should 
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that for Christians, the factors that are most crucial for judging the quality of 
passions are virtues, justice, will, love, the grace of God, and salvation through 
Jesus Christ. In a theological context, philosophical conceptions are transformed 
and attributed new connotations, and as a consequence, the distinction between 
metriopatheia and apatheia loses its meaning. Thus, Augustine shifts the centre of 
the disputation and provides new criteria for evaluating the quality of passions.  
  
(I) Virtue (virtus) as a new criterion  
Augustine points out that the different attitudes toward passions in the 
philosophical schools and Christians are based on their different understandings of 
virtues. From Augustine’s perspective, what the Stoics and Peripatetics refer to as 
virtues are, in a certain sense, cool and even inhuman. As Augustine remarks in CD 
9.4–5, both the Stoics and the Peripatetics attempt to control the fluctuation of 
turbulent passions, so as to direct the unfettered reason toward virtues and wisdom. 
The objective of both metriopatheia and apatheia is to pursue an unshaken mind 
without the perturbation of passions. To describe the Peripatetic control of passions, 
Augustine’s cites from Virgil in CD 9.4: “His mind remains unmoved; tears flow in 
vain” (Mens inmota manet, lacrimae volvuntur inanes). At this point, Augustine is 
emphasising that Peripatetics pursue the virtue of fortitude by controlling the 
non-rational part of the soul (passions) through the work of reason. This is not 
substantially different from the Stoic position that passions cannot assail the 
fortitude of a wise man’s mind. 
As for Christians, Augustine argues that passions genuinely affect and 
touch their minds in the course of their exercise of virtues, rather than dragging 
them into vice (CD 9.5: Quod passiones quae Christianos animos afficiunt non in 
vitium trahant, sed virtutem exerceant). In other words, their virtues involve 
                                                                                                                                                               
yield to reason and the mind. CD 9.4: Quod autem aiunt ea nec bona appellanda esse, sed 
commoda, verborum certamini, non rerum examini deputandum est. Quid enim interest utrum 
aptius bona vocentur an commoda, dum tamen ne his privetur non minus Stoicus quam 
Peripateticus pavescat et palleat, ea non aequaliter appellando, sed aequaliter aestimando? Ambo 
sane, si bonorum istorum seu commodorum periculis ad flagitium vel facinus urgeantur, ut aliter ea 
retinere non possint, malle se dicunt haec amittere, quibus natura corporis salva et incolumis 
habetur, quam illa committere, quibus iustitia violatur… quin immo eis ipsa dominatur eisque non 
consentiendo et potius resistendo regnum virtutis exercet. The Stoics do not refer to the objects of 
the affects as good, but as advantages. In Augustine’s opinion, this is merely playing with words. 
See R. Dodaro, Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine (Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 58–59.  
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passions. Augustine considers it to be impossible to withstand all emotions in this 
life; in some situations, it is vicious to have no emotions. Therefore, Augustine 
asserts that the question is not whether we can eliminate passions in this life, but 
rather which type of passions we should have and why: 
We do not so much ask whether a pious soul is angry, as why he is angry; not whether he is 
sad, but whence comes his sadness; not whether he is afraid, but what he fears. For I do not 
think that any right-minded person would condemn anger directed at a sinner in order to 
correct him; or sadness on behalf of one who is afflicted, in order to comfort him, or hear 
for one in peril, lest he perish. The Stoics, indeed, are wont to reproach even compassion. 
But how much more honorable it would have been if the Stoic in Aulus Gellius’ story had 
been disturbed by compassion for a fellow man, in order to comfort him, rather than by fear 
of shipwreck!79 
For Augustine, in situations such as a shipwreck, what the Stoics refer to as 
apatheia without compassion for others is tantamount to a scandal. This is not a 
virtue, but a vice.80 Therefore, the concept of virtue has been transformed into 
Augustine’s own context; it is not blameworthy to have passions, but honourable; 
on the contrary, virtues with human kindness also become the criterion that attests 
to Christian passions being honourable and praiseworthy. 
 
(II) The new concept of justice (iustitia)  
This does not imply that the Stoics or Peripatetics do not pursue justice; it is only 
that according to Augustine, their alleged justice is associated with insensitivity and 
negligence of human sociability. Referring to Gellius’ story of the shipwreck, 
Augustine argues that compassionate people are those who indeed feel another 
person’s misery in their heart and this compels them to offer aid. The emergence of 
these compassions involves three stages: firstly, one encounters someone’s misery 
and this moves the soul suddenly as a first movement; secondly, this first movement 
yields to right reasoning; thirdly, just action follows: 
And what is compassion but a kind of fellow feeling in our hearts for the misery of another 
which compels us to help him if we can? This impulse is the servant of right reason when 
                                                          
79 CD 9.5: Denique in disciplina nostra non tam quaeritur utrum pius animus irascatur, sed quare 
irascatur; nec utrum sit tristis, sed unde sit tristis; nec utrum timeat, sed quid timeat. Irasci enim 
peccanti ut corrigatur, contristari pro adflicto ut liberetur, timere periclitanti ne pereat nescio 
utrum quisquam sana consideratione reprehendat. Nam et misericordiam Stoicorum est solere 
culpare; sed quanto honestius ille Stoicus misericordia perturbaretur hominis liberandi quam 
timore naufragii. 
80 For Augustine’s objections to the Stoic values of compassion, see Irwin 2007, 405–406. 
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compassion is displayed in such a way as to preserve righteousness, as when alms are 
distributed to the needy or forgiveness extended to the penitent.81  
It is evident that Augustine has modified his previous interpretation of compassion 
in De moribus ecclesiae 1.27.53 and Contra Academicos 1.4.11 and he no longer 
adheres to the Stoic teachings. To Augustine, compassion is admirable when it is in 
accordance with justice; however, the Stoic argumentation on compassion is 
superficial, without involving real personal care or feelings. Augustine mentions 
that Cicero disagreed with the Stoic view that compassion is vicious82 and adds that 
some Stoics seem to accept compassion in a Stoic sage.83 According to Augustine, 
compassion is required by God’s justice and this becomes the criterion to evaluate 
the character of passions. If emotions and passions are called for by God’s justice, 
then they are righteous and blessed; if they are derived from mundane matters and a 
sinful life, they are evil, as Augustine emphasized in CD 14.9: “We must, then, lead 
a righteous life if we are to attain a life of blessedness; and such a righteous life will 
exhibit all these emotions righteously, whereas a perverse life exhibits them 
perversely”.84 
 
(III) The quality of the will (voluntas) as a new indicator 
Augustine distinguishes between the concept of will that is advanced by these 
philosophers from the concept of will advocated by Christians because these two 
groups have rather different understandings of human conduct.85 The Stoics and 
Peripatetics advocate that emotions should yield to reason and will, but Augustine 
states that human evaluation of reason is blurred and the human will has been 
                                                          
81 CD 9.5: Quid est autem misericordia nisi alienae miseriae quaedam in nostro corde compassio, 
qua utique si possumus subvenire compellimur? Servit autem motus iste rationi, quando ita 
praebetur misericordia, ut iustitia conservetur, sive cum indigenti tribuitur, sive cum ignoscitur 
paenitenti. 
82 CD 9.5: Hanc Cicero locutor egregius non dubitavit appellare virtutem, quam Stoicos inter vitia 
numerare non pudet. 
83 CD 9.5: …qui tamen, ut docuit liber Epicteti, nobilissimi Stoici, ex decretis Zenonis et Chrysippi, 
qui huius sectae primas habuerunt, huiusce modi passiones in animum sapientis admittunt, quem 
vitiis omnibus liberum volunt. 
84 CD 14.9: Quae cum ita sint, quoniam recta vita ducenda est, qua perveniendum sit ad beatam, 
omnes affectus istos vita recta rectos habet, perversa perversos. 
85 In commenting on the Stoic eupatheia of will, Augustine states: “But a distinction is to be made 
between the depravity of an evil will and the will of which the angels spoke when they proclaimed 
‘On earth peace, good will toward men.’ The addition of the word ‘good’ here is redundant if will 
can only be good…Such an indiscriminate use of these terms is seen also among secular literature 
authors”. CD 14.8: a cuius pravitate illa distinguitur, quam praedicaverunt angeli dicentes: Pax in 
terra hominibus bonae voluntatis. Nam ex abundanti additum est “bonae”, si esse non potest nisi 
bona…Et apud auctores saecularium litterarum talis istorum verborum indifferentia reperitur. 
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weakened after the Fall; for this reason, it is impossible to fully trust such an 
unsound reason or to rely on this distorted will. Due to original sin, the human will 
and passions are led by worldly temptations, and humans follow concupiscence and 
pride instead of pursuing genuine good. Under these conditions, the fundamental 
powers of reason and will that these philosophers based their views on 
metriopatheia or apatheia are, according to Augustine, not to be trusted.  
Augustine maintains that the will of Christians should be governed and 
aided by God. This is the only way that passions may become righteous and 
virtuous. He emphasises this point in CD 9.5: 
Scripture, indeed, places the mind itself under the governance and help of God, and the 
passions under the mind, so that they may be moderated and bridled and turned to righteous 
use.86 
For Augustine, when the philosophers argue for metriopatheia or apatheia, they are 
overconfident in their own will and power, which attests to their arrogance and 
conceit. On the contrary, the Christian understanding of will is pious and modest, as 
Christians are aware of their weakened position in this life as members of fallen 
humanity. They know that only through the grace of God the will may help in 
directing passions towards the good instead of the bad. Augustine transforms the 
discussion on reason and will into a theological consideration of the defect of the 
human will and the power of grace. This becomes the premise for evaluating 
passions, as Augustine explains in CD 14.6: 
What is important here is the quality of a man’s will. For if the will is perverse, the 
emotions will be perverse; but if it is righteous, the emotions will be not only blameless, but 
praiseworthy. The will is engaged in all of them; indeed, they are all no more than acts of 
the will…And, universally, as a man’s will is attracted or repelled by the variety of things 
which are pursued or avoided, so it changes and turns into emotions of one kind or the other. 
Therefore, the man who lives according to God and not according to man must be a lover of 
the good; and it follows from this that he must hate what is evil.87 
The will is considered here as a person’s basic motivational centre. Love is another 
                                                          
86 CD 9.5: Deo quippe illa ipsam mentem subicit regendam et iuvandam mentique passiones ita 
moderandas atque frenandas, ut in usum iustitiae convertantur. 
87 CD 14.6: Interest autem qualis sit voluntas hominis; quia si perversa est, perversos habebit hos 
motus; si autem recta est, non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles erunt. Voluntas est 
quippe in omnibus; immo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt…Et omnino pro varietate rerum, 
quae appetuntur atque fugiuntur, sicut allicitur vel offenditur voluntas hominis, ita in hos vel illos 
affectus mutatur et vertitur. Quapropter homo, qui secundum Deum, non secundum hominem vivit, 
oportet ut sit amator boni; unde fit consequens ut malum oderit. 
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term that Augustine uses in the same manner; both are used in systematising the 
Stoic taxonomy of passions.88 
  
(IV) Love (amor) as a new measure  
Augustine maintains that the Stoic and Platonic-Peripatetic love is, in fact, 
disordered love that is replete with pride and disobedience. He suggests that we 
need to distinguish between the love (amor) that these philosophers harbour and the 
love of Christian believers. Even though the will is free in its basic orientation, it is 
not able to change its distorted orientation without supranatural causation (grace). 
The same holds true of love.89 The original sin is evident in the tendency that 
human love has to choose evil and sinful objects. This manifests itself in “the 
weight of will and love” (pondus voluntatis et amoris).90 In this state, the people’s 
love is always directed towards themselves and their own honour rather than to the 
supreme and immutable good. This fallen tendency in people is pride (superbia) 
and is regarded as a defect, because they love the wrong object in the reverse order. 
Thus, to Augustine, Stoic and Peripatetic love is actually self-love and pride that 
displays human sinfulness. Furthermore, Augustine argues that it is inappropriate to 
evaluate the quality of a passion in terms of such a distorted and disordered love.  
                                                          
88 CD 14.7: Amor ergo inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est, id autem habens eoque fruens 
laetitia; fugiens quod ei adversatur, timor est, idque si acciderit sentiens tristitia est. Proinde mala 
sunt ista, si malus amor est; bona, si bonus. (“Love striving to possess what it loves is desire; love 
possessing and enjoying what it loves is joy; love fleeing what is adverse to it is fear; and love 
undergoing such adversity when it occurs is grief. Accordingly, these feelings are bad if the love is 
bad, and good if it is good”.) 
89 Conf. 13.9.10: Corpus pondere suo nititur ad locum suum…Pondus meum amor meus; eo feror, 
quocumque feror. Dono tuo accendimur et sursum ferimur; inardescimus et imus…Igne tuo, igne 
tuo bono inardescimus et imus, quoniam sursum imus ad pacem Hierusalem. (“A body by its weight 
tends to move towards its proper place…My weight is my love. Wherever I am carried, my love is 
carrying me. By your gift we are set on fire and carried upwards: we grow red hot and ascend…Lit 
by your fire, your good fire, we grow red-hot and ascend, as we move upwards ‘to the peace of 
Jerusalem.’”) Cf. CD 13.5: Ut autem diligatur et delectet uera iustitia, non nisi diuina subuenit 
gratia. (“we cannot love or take delight in true righteousness unless with the aid of divine grace”.) 
Augustine does not make an essential distinction between amor and dilectio, see CD 14.7. 
90 Augustine applies the notion of pondus voluntatis et amoris in many places in City of God, such 
as CD 11.16; 13.18; 19.12; 22.11, etc. He also mentions it in his earlier writings such as mus. 
6.11.29, Gn. litt. 4.3.7–4.5.12; 4.4.8; 4.18.34, De Trin. 6.10.12; 11.11.18, Conf. 13.9.10; 4.15.27; 
7.17.23. Miikka Ruokanen points out that Augustine establishes his concept of ordo amoris on the 
dynamic principle of love. In the fallen state, the weight of the will and love (pondus voluntatis et 
amoris) has broken the good order and hierarchic harmony between rational beings and the Creator. 
Ruokanen notes that in Augustine’s later years, he increasingly emphasised the disturbed and 
down-weighed reality of love in the state of sin, presenting pride and disobedience. This is not the 
proper order of love that is based on the correct orientation of life, but a perverted love that the 
source of all evils in human life. See Ruokanen 1993, 48–50.  
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For it is a perverse kind of elevation indeed to forsake the foundation upon which the mind 
should rest, and to become and remain, as it were, one’s own foundation. This occurs when 
a man is too well pleased with himself; and he is too well pleased with himself when he 
falls away from that immutable good with which he ought rather to have been pleased than 
with himself...For if the will had remained unshaken in its love of that higher and 
immutable Good by Which is bestowed upon it the light by which it can see and the fire by 
which it can love, it would not have turned aside from this Good to follow its own 
pleasure...This is why, according to Holy Scripture, the proud are called by another name: 
they are called ‘self-willed’. For it is good to lift up your hearts; not to self, however, which 
is pride, but to the Lord. This is obedience, which can belong only to the humble.91  
Augustine defends his idea as being based on Christian teaching and maintains that 
genuine love is from the Holy Spirit which pours love into our hearts. This principle 
of love is distinguished from that proposed by the Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines 
because it attributes the root of love to the highest point in the hierarchical order, 
the immutable love and good. This reflects modesty and in contrast to philosophers 
who establish the principle of love in themselves. In other words, Augustine argues 
that whether or not passions are good is based on the criterion of love that is derived 
from holy charity and God rather than from the pride of philosophers: “If these 
emotions and affections, which come from love of the good and from holy charity, 
are to be called vices, then let us allow that real vices should be called virtues”.92  
 
(V) The mediator, Jesus Christ, as an example and the Saviour  
Augustine concludes that the central criterion is the mediator between humans and 
God, Jesus Christ, and He possesses all of the above virtues and represents a perfect 
unity between divinity and humanity. Christ’s incarnation and emotional life reveal 
the profound mystery in the context of the issue of metriopatheia and apatheia. At 
this point, the disputation on metriopatheia and apatheia between these 
philosophers has lost its meaning. For Augustine, Christ’s passions express 
                                                          
91 CD 14.13: Perversa enim est celsitudo deserto eo, cui debet animus inhaerere, principio sibi 
quodam modo fieri atque esse principium. Hoc fit, cum sibi nimis placet. Sibi vero ita placet, cum ab 
illo bono inmutabili deficit, quod ei magis placere debuit quam ipse sibi…si voluntas in amore 
superioris inmutabilis boni, a quo inlustrabatur ut videret et accendebatur ut amaret, stabilis 
permaneret, non inde ad sibi placendum averteretur…Unde superbi secundum scripturas sanctas 
alio nomine appellantur sibi placentes. Bonum est enim sursum habere cor; non tamen ad se ipsum, 
quod est superbiae, sed ad Dominum, quod est oboedientiae, quae nisi humilium non potest esse.  
92 CD 14.9: Hi motus, hi affectus de amore boni et de sancta caritate venientes si vitia vocanda sunt, 
sinamus, ut ea, quae vere vitia sunt, virtutes vocentur. For the pride of philosophers, see Irwin 2007, 
418–427. 
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humility and love, offering an ideal for humankind. Moreover, His suffering is a 
vital part of the divine economy of salvation that delivers sinners from suffering 
and sin and allows them to take part in His immortality and divine nature.93 In CD 
9.6, Augustine argues that according to Platonists, demons can become mediators 
and keep apatheia in front of the assailing of passions, since they possess the 
capability to use the superior part of the soul (reason) to govern and moderate the 
turbulent movements of lower part (passions). Augustine refutes this as impossible, 
as the demons’ minds are also subject to the passions of fear and lust and unable to 
show true virtues and love. 94  Augustine proposes three principles as the 
fundamental conditions for judging who is suitable as a mediator to save humans 
from passions: 1. In order for this mediator to understand true human passions, he 
must have as weak and mortal a body as humans do; 2. This mediator must have 
an immortal and just spirit and a soul that is free of disease; 3. This mediator does 
not lust for the temporal world and has the power of God to clean and redeem 
us.95 However, the demons, whom these philosophers attribute the fundamental 
criterion of passions to, are always contaminated by bad passions and are unable to 
save even themselves. Although these demons possess immortal bodies, they are 
worse than human beings. Certainly no one implies that they are better than humans, 
as they are regarded as wretched and thought to suffer from passions forever in 
eternal misery. 
This, however, is the very reason for the eternal misery or miserable eternality of the 
demons. For he who said that they are ‘passive in soul’ would have called them ‘miserable’ 
had he not feared to offend their worshippers. Moreover, since the world is ruled not by the 
accidents of fortune, but by the providence of the supreme God – as even the Platonists 
themselves admit – the misery of the demons would not be eternal unless their wickedness 
were great.96 
                                                          
93 In addition, see my discussion on “The Grace of Christ and the therapy of passions” in section 3.4. 
For the function of Christ as the mediator and Saviour, see Kelly 1977, 386–394. 
94 CD 9.6: sicut iste Platonicus confitetur, salo perturbationum fluctuat. Subiecta est ergo mens 
daemonum passionibus libidinum formidinum irarum atque huiusmodi ceteris…cum eorum mens 
passionum vitiis subiugata et oppressa, quidquid rationis naturaliter habet, ad fallendum et 
decipiendum tanto acrius intendat, quanto eam magis possidet nocendi cupiditas? 
95 Augustine demonstrates these three principles in CD 9.17: sed tali, qui nobis infimis ex corporis 
mortalitate coaptatus inmortali spiritus iustitia, per quam non locorum distantia, sed similitudinis 
excellentia mansit in summis, mundandis liberandisque nobis vere divinum praebeat adiutorium. 
Qui profecto incontaminabilis Deus absit ut contaminationem timeret ex homine quo indutus est, aut 
ex hominibus inter quos in homine conversatus est. 
96 CD 9.13: Ipsa est autem illa daemonum misera aeternitas vel aeterna miseria. Qui enim ait 
“animo passiva”, etiam “misera” dixisset, nisi eorum cultoribus erubuisset. Porro quia providentia 
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Therefore, Augustine holds that referring to demons as examples and criterions of 
freedom from passions by metriopatheia or apatheia is foolish because their 
passions reflect eternal misery and deceit and consequently indicate their 
unrighteousness, pride, disobedience, and inhumanity. In brief, to Augustine, 
demons cannot be true mediators, while Jesus Christ, by comparison, has real 
human passions (both voluntary and involuntary) as well as the divine “emotion” 
(immutable and transcendent), which reflect His perfect unity of divinity and 
humanity. Thus, Augustine states that Christ, as the form of God and the servant, 
indicates the road toward freedom from the domination of passions and eternal 
happiness. As regards metriopatheia or apatheia and the correct attitude toward 
passions, Augustine argues that Jesus Christ offers us a good example, although 
humans cannot achieve Christ’s sinlessness in their present life.  
In the light of the above analysis, it is clear that Augustine presents various 
views of the doctrines of metriopatheia and apatheia, instead of adhering to any of 
them consistently. In his early period from the year 386 to the mid-390s, he 
followed the Stoic teachings and his concept of apatheia was influenced by the 
interpretations of Cicero and some Christian Fathers, such as Ambrose and possibly 
Origen. Later, in Augustine’s middle works, he realises the significance of 
metriopatheia and adopts a position on moderation that is influenced by 
Neoplatonism. These two periods reflect his rather clear understanding of the two 
conceptions. This also suggests that his later remarks regarding the lack of any 
essential distinction between metriopatheia and apatheia constitutes a deliberate 
formulation rather than something pertaining to ignorance or a misunderstanding. 
In his De civitate Dei, Augustine transforms many significant categories, such as 
virtue, justice, will, and love, into theological language and distinguishes them 
from their philosophical usage. To Augustine, demons, which are recommended as 
mediators by some Platonists, would not make good mediators to help humans free 
themselves from passions, because in terms of the model of Jesus Christ, their 
alleged virtues are in fact vice and their love is pride. Thus, Augustine suggests a 
new interpretation of metriopatheia and apatheia, arguing that it is not important to 
make this distinction between philosophical positions as a theological guide. 
                                                                                                                                                               
summi Dei, sicut etiam ipsi fatentur, non fortuita temeritate regitur mundus, numquam esset istorum 
aeterna miseria, nisi esset magna malitia. 
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Adopting a new model of a mediator that incorporates the union between divinity 
and humanity, Augustine demonstrates that Jesus sets an example of controlling 
and moderating passions, in contrast to the proud philosophers who claim to be able 
to maintain apatheia or to moderate their passions with an unshaken mind 
(metriopatheia). It is in this context that he deliberately states that the doctrines of 
metriopatheia and apatheia are essentially the same; both are misleading without 
the grace. 
From this perspective, it can be observed that Sorabji and Irwin do not 
take into account Augustine’s true intentions, even though they offer insight into 
certain aspects of Augustine’s terminology and ideas. As for Sorabji’s argument 
that Augustine is misled by some predecessors’ formulations of metriopatheia and 
apatheia, I conclude that it might be partially correct since Augustine was indeed 
once influenced by the Stoics and Cicero. However, Sorabji’s conclusion that 
Augustine misrepresents the Stoic apatheia as metriopatheia seems hasty. Irwin 
correctly points out that Augustine had a rather sound understanding of 
philosophical positions, but Irwin does not reveal Augustine’s real stance on the 
controversy. Both Sorabji and Irwin fail to consider Augustine’s complicated shifts 
in positions during his life. Irwin might be correct in arguing that the notions of 
metriopatheia and apatheia share many common elements, but Augustine’s interest 
does not lie here. Augustine is familiar with these two philosophical doctrines, and 
he deliberately remarks that there are no differences between them because he 
interprets the issue from a theological perspective. In this sense, Augustine’s 
remark is reasonable and reveals the doctrinal weakness of both the Stoics and 
Platonists from his perspective. 
      
3.3. The Disputation about Augustine’s Misunderstanding of Eupatheia  
 
After examining Augustine’s understanding of propatheia, metriopatheia, and 
apatheia, scholars extend their considerations to another central Stoic concept 
associated with the freedom from passions, eupatheia (εὐπάθεια or constantia). 
There is a controversy concerning whether or not Augustine misunderstands this 
concept. According to certain scholars, Augustine did misunderstand it, since he 
incorrectly claimed that the Stoic eupatheia is merely terminologically different 
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from common passions, which is obviously not in accordance with the Stoic 
teaching. These scholars maintain that eupatheiai refer to correct value judgments 
and attitudes and belong only to the Stoic sage, but Augustine confuses these 
genuinely good judgments with the ordinary passions that are usually regarded as 
false value judgments. It is true, but not relevant, that the Stoic eupatheia indeed 
may include some ordinary passions and rational impulses.97 Furthermore, scholars 
report that Augustine reveals an even deeper misunderstanding of the Stoic ideal of 
freedom from passions when he interprets this emotional state as stupor, which 
obviously does not recognise the Stoic eupatheia as an ideal rational state 
concerning the genuine good rather than indifference. On the contrary, some other 
scholars maintain that Augustine understands the essence of the Stoic ideal of 
freedom from emotion, and his equating the Stoic ideal state of eupatheia with 
indifference is evidence of reinterpretation rather than misinterpretation. I shall 
explain this controversy and the competing positions pertaining to it. 
Sorabji argues that Augustine displays a substantial misunderstanding of 
the Stoic term eupatheia and the ideal state of eradicating emotions. These 
misunderstandings are reflected on two levels: (1) As for the term eupatheia, 
Augustine blindly equates the sage’s good judgments (eupatheia) with the fool’s 
false value judgments (pathos), which obscures the boundaries between eupatheia 
and pathos. He incorrectly includes all eupatheiai as common passions and is 
misguided in his claim that there are merely verbal differences between them;98 
and (2) Regarding the Stoic ideal of freedom from emotions, rather than grasping 
the Stoic original sense of the good ideal, Augustine mistakenly interprets the Stoic 
                                                          
97 There are different descriptions among these commentators of eupatheia as follows: 1. Eupatheia 
is an impulse of fully rational man and “apatheia is eupatheia” (Brad Inwood). 2. Eupatheia is a 
fully rational attitude (Margaret Graver, Gerd Van Riel and Martha Nussbaum). 3. Eupatheia is a 
good state towards genuine good rather than indifference (Tad Brennan). 4. Eupatheia is largely an 
ideal, including a few types of ordinary passions as well (Sorabji). I am inclined to accept both Tad 
Brennan’s account that eupatheiai are directed towards genuine goods and Martha Nussbaum’s 
position that eupatheiai are correct impulses to external indifferents (See Tad Brennan, “The Old 
Stoic Theory of Emotions”, in The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. J. Sihvola and T. 
Engberg-Pedersen (Dordrecht: Kluwer 1998), 21–70; Nussbaum 1994, 379–399). I interpret this to 
mean that apart the value commitment, eupatheia is accompanied by an indifference to everything 
else. In this sense, it refers to a good judgement of the mind, reflecting an indifferent attitude 
towards external matters. 
98 Sorabji states that Augustine mispresents a series of Stoic psychological concepts one after 
another. He claims that the reason that Augustine misunderstands the term eupatheia is due to his 
first misconception of the Stoic belief of propatheia and apatheia. In the Index of Emotion and 
Peace of Mind, Sorabji maintains that Augustine “misrepresents Stoic belief in apatheia as verbal 
difference. Similarly for eupatheia. Similarly for indifferents”. See Sorabji 2000, 471.  
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state of eradicating emotions as stupor and confuses it with indifference and 
mercilessness.99 Sorabji adopts an intermediary position in interpreting the Stoic 
concept of eupatheia.  On the one hand, he contends that eupatheiai are ideal 
“good emotions” with a set of ordinary persons’ emotions; on the other, he states 
that many emotions of eupatheiai belong to an ideal state.100 Sorabji argues further 
that Augustine does not grasp the essence of this term because the term eupatheia 
has complicated connotations in the Stoic doctrine, including ordinary emotions 
and ideal feelings at the same time. This means that Augustine’s comprehension of 
the term is one-sided. Sorabji first lists the Stoic species of eupatheia in order to 
present that it is true that some eupatheiai could be counted as ordinary emotions in 
Stoicism:101  
 
                                      Eupatheia 
Will (βούλησις, voluntas)     Joy (χαρά, gaudium) Caution(εὐλάβεια, cautio) 
Good will (eunoia) is wishing 
good things for others for their 
own sake 
Delight (terpsis) is a fitting 
joy at one’s advantages.  
Modesty (aidōs) is caution 
about due blame. 
Kindness (eumeneia) is lasting 
eunoia. 
Gladness (euphrosunē) is joy 
at the deeds of the temperate. 
 
Piety (hagneia) is caution 
about sins towards the 
gods. 
 
 
Welcoming (aspasmos) is 
uninterrupted eunoia.                      
Cheerfulness (euthumia) is 
joy at the conduct of the 
universe. Love (agapēsis) 
     
Sorabji explains that whereas joy is obviously an emotion, caution is not 
necessarily so. He supposes that these three species are good judgments with 
reasonableness involved:102 whether expansion (joy) or contraction (caution), they 
                                                          
99 “Augustine drew attention to the ambiguity of freedom from emotion as between a mere stupor, 
as he puts it, and a freedom from disturbing emotions that oppose reason, like fear and grief, as 
opposed to love and gladness. Many have suggested that the debate on freedom from pathos turned 
on an ambiguity in pathos”. Sorabji 2000, 206.  
100 “I shall risk calling these [εὐπαθεῖαι] ‘good emotions’, because they involve exactly the same 
type of evaluative judgments as the ordinary person’s emotions, but differ in including to false 
evaluations”, Richard Sorabji, “Did the stoics value emotion and feeling?” in The Philosophical 
Quarterly (Vol. 59, 2009), 155–156. Sorabji also argues that eupatheia is to a large extent an ideal. 
“Because only a sage would have eupatheiai, and it is unclear whether the Stoics believe that 
anyone has yet attained to sagehood. It is to a large extent an ideal”. Sorabji 2000, 47. 
101 Sorabji summaries the list of eupatheia from Andronicus’ On Emotions 6 (the three generic 
kinds), Diogenes Laertius Vitae. 7.116, and Cicero Tusc. 4.12–13 and adds the definition of agapēsis 
from Clement of Alexandria Stromateis 2, ch. 9, sec. 42. He also relates this in his article “Did the 
Stoics value emotion and feeling?” See Sorabji 2000, 48 and Sorabji 2009, 156. Similar forms and 
relevant discussions are found in King 2012a, 15; Brennan 1998, 35. 
102  “Reasonableness (eulogon) enters the definition of all three kinds of eupatheia. Joy is a 
reasonable expansion, will is a reasonable desire (orexis), in other words a reasonable impulse or 
assent, and caution a reasonable disinclination (ekklisis, Latin declinatio)”. Sorabji 2000, 48. 
  
86 
 
are all reasonable, appropriate and stable, which also explains why Cicero uses the 
Latin word constantiae for the Greek eupatheiai.103 Sorabji adds that Plutarch 
states that caution is merely an ordinary emotion of fear; therefore, there are some 
eupatheiai that we could call emotions. In addition, Augustine is influenced by 
Cicero’s usage of constantiae and some Stoic accounts that several eupatheiai are 
emotions because they are rational judgements as well as ordinary passions. Thus, 
he is easily led to make an incorrect evaluation that no substantial differences exist 
between eupatheiai and ordinary passions. To Sorabji, it is true that both eupatheia 
and pathos may be rational judgements, but Augustine formulates a blind equation. 
In fact, eupatheiai are true and good judgements that only belong to the sage, 
whereas pathos are false judgments that the fool always share.104 Even though 
eupatheia and pathos are both value judgements of the mind, their characters and 
inclinations are radically distinguished. Augustine mistakes the good judgements of 
eupatheia as false judgments such as ordinary passions, which obscures the essence 
between them and leads to misunderstanding. Secondly, Sorabji argues that 
Augustine mistakenly extends all eupatheiai to common emotions, while not 
considering that many eupatheiai are good states and feelings.105 Referring to the 
Stoic list of eupatheiai, Sorabji explains that some of them are ordinary emotions, 
but there are not many of them, because for the Stoics, eupatheiai are ideal.106 A 
part of Augustine’s misinterpretation involves his increasing the proportion of 
ordinary emotions in eupatheiai. 
More to the point, Sorabji argues, is that Augustine misrepresents the Stoic 
eupatheia as indifference. Sorabji defends his argument by interpreting the 
meaning of eupatheia: Firstly, eupatheia includes some impulses, but not 
necessarily the fully controlled state of apatheia.107 Rather than stupor, they are 
                                                          
103 Sorabji 2000, 49. 
104 After introducing the reasonable character of three species of eupatheia, Sorabji adds: “In 
Chrysippus’ view, I think a still more basic difference will have been that the judgements 
[eupatheia] are true, whereas, for reasons I shall explain in Chapter 12, the judgements involved in 
emotion are thought to be false”. Moreover, eupatheia as true rational judgements can also avoid the 
disobedience assailing the reason. See Sorabji 2000, 49. 
105 “First and foremost are the good states of feeling (eupatheiai) which only the sage has”. Ibid., 47. 
106 “But I believe these exceptions are few, first because the two fullest Stoic lists of eupatheiai, 
which very nearly agree with each other, recognize only a very few types, and secondly, because 
only a sage would have eupatheiai, and it is unclear whether the Stoics believe that anyone has yet 
attained to sagehood. It is to a large extent an ideal”. Ibid., 47. 
107 “Moreover, the Stoic sage not only welcomes good character in others, but also wishes it for 
others, and so wishes something not under his control”. Ibid., 51. Sorabji accepts Inwood’s account 
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natural psychological reactions. Secondly, eupatheia is closely connected to 
virtuous actions, not only to an ideal mentality. Eupatheia develop from genuine 
good action rather than indifference.108 Therefore, Sorabji surmises that Augustine 
does not grasp the good character of the Stoic eupatheia, which is connected to 
virtues and good actions rather than bad emotions or actions. As a consequence, 
Sorabji believes that Augustine substantially misunderstands the term of eupatheia 
as well as the Stoic ideal of freedom from emotions. 
Sorabji credits his position on eupatheia to Brad Inwood and Tad Brennan, 
scholars who both hold that eupatheia by no means implies indifference in the 
Stoics. Inwood suggests the slogan of “apatheia is eupatheia” with eupatheia not 
only referring to rational impulses, but also to the ideal psychology of action.109 
Inwood considers both eupatheia and apatheia to be closely connected to virtuous 
behaviour. 110  Brennan supports Inwood’s argument and states the following: 
“Inwood correctly draws the line; the eupatheia is only for genuine goods. An 
impulse towards an indifferent, whether accompanied by reservation or not, cannot 
be a eupatheia”.111 Brennan therefore firmly concludes that the Stoic notion of 
eupatheia cannot be directed to an indifferent attitude, but it is a calm pleasure 
about the good state of the cosmos and the virtues of oneself and others, a calm 
volition for these, and a calm disinclination to vice.112 Inwood and Brennan also 
share the interpretation that eupatheia is about genuine good things, which could be 
expressed as impulses, emotional states or virtuous actions, but it cannot refer to 
indifferent things. In other words, interpreting eupatheia as stupor or indifference, 
as Augustine does, is not in accordance with Stoic teachings. 
                                                                                                                                                               
on this point, who presupposes that eupatheia is the impulse of the wise. “For the proper 
understanding of the Stoic ideal of the freedom from passions…makes it clear that an eupatheia is 
simply the impulse of a fully rational man”. Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early 
Stoicism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 173. 
108 Sorabji maintains that eupatheia has good character and the wise will benefit from each other 
through it. “Eupatheia may play a role in another context, because the Stoics say that all wise people 
benefit (ōphelein) each other, even if they do not know each other at all…he welcomes it merely in 
so far as he believes it exists, and wishes it merely with the reservation ‘if nothing prevents’, a 
reservation more frequently applied to preferred indifferents”. Sorabji 2000, 50–51. 
109 “Freedom from passions is, I have argued, closely linked to consistency in one’s assents and 
actions…both apatheia and eupatheia as ideals for living the life of a naturally rational animal”. 
Inwood 1985, 173.  
110 “The identity of apatheia and eupatheia is also reinforced by the close connection of both to 
virtuous activity”. Ibid., 173. 
111 Brennan 1998, 56. 
112 Brennan 1998, 57 and 69 (n. 98). 
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In contrast to the above-mentioned argument, Peter King and Gerd Van Riel 
interpret Augustine’s deviation from the Stoic doctrine as “reinterpretation” rather 
than “misinterpretation”, but they defend this position differently. Peter King 
maintains that Augustine reconstructs the Stoic idea of eupatheia to some degree, 
even though he does not provide precise descriptions. 113  King argues that 
Augustine’s accounts of apatheia represent a misreading,114 but he retains the Stoic 
ideal state of dispassionate passions and attaches that emotional state to the afterlife 
in Heaven rather than to this life. King further describes the characters of these 
types of dispassionate passions in Heaven as follows: a) they are not disorderly 
passions; b) they cannot be attained in this life; c) elation and love are radically 
different from those in this life, as they are towards eternal and reliable object.115 
These features serve as evidence that Augustine’s own eupatheia is a 
reinterpretation that shifts the Stoic account of this life’s eupatheia to the afterlife 
because Augustine realises that the suffering and transient happiness of this world 
are not relevant to an eternal ethical ideal. 
Van Riel defends this “reinterpretation” from another angle. He points out 
that Augustine’s conception of eupatheia echoes Aristotelian views rather than the 
Stoic doctrine, but that Augustine only adopts the Stoic terminology.116 Van Riel 
maintains that Augustine’s “reinterpretation” is based on his “Aristotelian” position 
and not on a misunderstanding. Van Riel cites several reasons for his position: 1) 
Augustine’s psychology of passions is based on the Aristotelian threefold division 
of the soul rather than Chrysippus’ theory of unitary soul, this being the rational for 
Augustine equating eupatheia with pathos;117 2) Augustine prefers the therapy of 
moderation because he considers the Stoic ideal of apatheia and eupatheia to be 
unattainable in this life owing to our sinful state;118 and 3) Two passions remain for 
                                                          
113 “Assessing the degree to which Augustine is successful in forging a theory of dispassionate 
passions isn’t easy, since he does not usually give precise accounts or technical details”. King 2012a, 
21. 
114 King 2012a, 14 (n. 18). 
115 “Augustine insists that the presence of an assured eternal loving relationship would in fact 
transform the emotions into something that is calm and settled, or, in a word, dispassionate; he is 
arguably correct”. Ibid., 21. 
116  “It is important to note that Augustine here actually departs from the Stoic doctrine of 
εὐπάθεια…As a matter of fact, Augustine’s reinterpretation is not Stoic at all any more. Rather, 
Augustine’s viewpoint is in line with that of Aristotle, though expressed in a Stoic terminology”. 
Van Riel 2004, 522. 
117 Van Riel 2004, 523–524. 
118 Ibid., 524. 
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the afterlife, gaudium and amor, which confirms that Augustine accepts the 
Aristotelian definition of pleasure.119 Thus, Van Riel maintains that Augustine 
departs from the Stoic idea of eupatheia and adopts120 the Aristotelian definition of 
gaudium with slight modifications. This is not only reflected on the psychological 
level in this life, but also on the redemptive level in the afterlife. 
Although Sorabji, Inwood and Brennan propose different explications of 
the term eupatheia, such as an impulse of a fully rational man, a rational affect, a 
good state towards what is genuinely good, or an ideal state with a proportion of 
ordinary passions, they concur that indifference should be entirely excluded from 
the Stoic eupatheia. Thus, Augustine makes a radical error in equating eupatheia 
with stupor. However, King and Van Riel argue that Augustine retains the Stoic 
ideal of eupatheia as a type of dispassionate passion or freedom from emotions on 
another level and that his interpretation is reinterpretation instead of 
misinterpretation. I shall now turn to the Stoic definition of eupatheia in order to 
ascertain whether eupatheia is strictly separated from pathos and whether the Stoic 
eupatheia could be regarded as being indifference. 
The above Stoic list of eupatheia consists of three generic forms with 
subspecies: joy (χαρά, gaudium), will (βούλησις, voluntas) and caution (εὐλάβεια, 
cautio). In Tusc. 4.6.11–14, Cicero provides a general account of Zeno’s definition 
of pathos and the Stoic eupatheiai as well as their subspecies. Cicero considers 
pathos to be an agitation of the soul that is alien to reason and contrary to 
nature,121 whereas eupatheia is a rational state representing a tranquil and equable 
                                                          
119 “We can conclude that when Augustine transposes pleasure to the state of the redeemed body, he 
is doing the same as the pagan Neo-Platonists: he follows Aristotle rather than Plato. The notion of 
gaudium rests on the Aristotelian definition of pleasure as the supplementary effect of an unimpeded 
activity, namely, of the perfect activity of the will that has attained its final goal”. Ibid., 530–531. 
120  Van Riel uses the term “takes over” in order to emphasize Augustine’s close doctrinal 
relationship to Neoplatonism and he maintains that Augustine follows the Aristotelian definition of 
contentment in forming his theological concept of eupatheia, namely, frui Deo. It is noteworthy 
that when Van Riel claims that Augustine is in line with the “Platonic-Peripatetic” position rather 
than the Stoic one, he does not strictly distinguish between the terms “Neo-Platonic” and 
“Platonic-Peripatetic”. He refers to the general frame of “Platonic-Peripatetic position” using the 
term “Neo-Platonic”: “when Augustine takes over the Neo-Platonic definition of pleasure…This is 
in line with the overall definition of pleasure as the transition towards a state of contentment”, “he 
[Augustine] follows Aristotle rather than Plato…That is what makes voluptas different in kind 
from gaudium, or from frui Deo”. See Van Riel 2004, 529 and 531. 
121 Cicero, Tusc. 4.6.11: Est igitur Zenonis haec definitio, ut perturbatio sit, quod πάθος ille dicit, 
aversa a recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio. Quidam brevius perturbationem esse 
appetitum vehementiorem, sed vehementiorem eum volunt esse, qui longius discesserit a naturae 
constantia. Similar thoughts can be found in Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum 7.110; 
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way of life that only the wise enjoy. The passions are divided according to 
whether the object, good or evil, occurs in the present or future: delight (laetitia: 
present good), desire (libido: future good), distress (aegritudo: present evil) and 
fear (metus: future evil). Eupatheia can be divided in an analogous way, but 
without an analogue to distress: joy (gaudium: present good), wish (voluntas: 
future good), and caution (cautio: future evil).122 Similar statements are also 
made in Pseudo-Andronicus (Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta 3.391; 3.432), 
Diogenes Laertius (Vitae. 7.111–116), and Stobaeus (Eclogae 2.90.7–8). 123 
Cicero summarizes the classical Stoic theory of pathos and eupatheia and outlines 
their subspecies in his Tusc. 4.6.11–14 as follows: 
 
Eupatheia Pathos 
Wish 
(will) 
Wish is a rational longing for good 
things124 
Desire Alien from reason, too violently 
aroused and unbridled125 
Joy Joy is a rational satisfaction of the 
soul that is tranquil and equable126 
Delight Exuberant, irrational excitement 
of the soul127 
Caution Rational desire for good in avoidance 
from evil128 
Fear Alien from reason and associated 
with abject timidity129 
___ ______ Distress Being downcast and shrunken in 
disobedience to reason130 
 
It is not difficult to determine that eupatheia refers to a rational contraction or 
expansion of the soul in accordance with virtues, whereas pathos refers to an 
                                                                                                                                                               
Stobaeus, Eclogae 2 (88.8–11); Galen, De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis 4.2.8. For the irrationality 
of the passions in Stoicism, see Sorabji 2000, 29–54. 
122 Cicero explains that distress is a contraction of the soul that is in conflict with reason; therefore, 
there is no rational counterpart to this present evil in a sage’s soul. Tusc. 4.6.14: Itaque haec prima 
definitio est, ut aegritudo sit animi adversante ratione contractio. Sic quattuor perturbationes sunt, 
tres constantiae, quoniam aegritudini nulla constantia opponitur. 
123 See King 2012a, 11 (n. 7) and 15 (n. 20). 
124 Tusc. 4.6.12: quod bonum videatur, ad id adipiscendum impellit ipsa natura. Id cum constanter 
prudenterque fit, eius modi appetitionem Stoici βούλησιν appellant, nos appellemus voluntatem, 
eam illi putant in solo esse sapiente; quam sic definiunt: voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione 
desiderat. A similar definition in Diogenes Laertius Vitae. 7.116. 
125 Tusc. 4.6.12: Quae autem a ratione adversa incitata est vehementius, ea libido est vel cupiditas 
effrenata, quae in omnibus stultis invenitur. 
126 Tusc. 4.6.13: Itemque cum ita movemur, ut in bono simus aliquo, dupliciter id contingit: nam 
cum ratione animus movetur placide atque constanter, tum illud gaudium dicitur. 
127 Tusc. 4.6.13: Cum autem inaniter et effuse animus exsultat, tum illa laetitia gestiens vel nimia 
dici potest, quam ita definiunt: sine ratione animi elationem. 
128 Tusc. 4.6.13: Quoniamque, ut bona natura appetimus, sic a malis natura declinamus, quae 
declinatio cum ratione fiet, cautio appelletur, eaque intellegatur in solo esse sapiente. 
129 Tusc. 4.6.13–14: Quae autem sine ratione et cum exanimatione humili atque fracta, nominetur 
metus: est igitur metus a ratione aversa cautio. 
130 Tusc. 4.6.14: Stultorum aegritudo est, eaque adficiuntur in malis opinatis animosque demittunt 
et contrahunt rationi non obtemperantes. 
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irrational agitation of the soul and appears as an excessive and disobedient 
psychic movement. In addition to this, some noteworthy similarities and 
dissimilarities are evident between eupatheia and pathos, which could be 
summarised as follows: 
1. Some eupatheiai and pathe might pertain to the same object and share 
some characteristics. For example, joy (gaudium) and delight (laetitia) both 
constitute an expansion of the soul, but it is difficult to evaluate the boundary 
between them from this vantage point, even though they remain distinct in 
Stoicism. Their difference is that joy is a rational impulse that leads to a tranquil 
satisfaction based on the knowledge that assuming this attitude is good, whereas 
delight is an excessive impulse that is alien to reasonableness and based on a false 
opinion of the value of the object and action. If both are happy in obtaining food 
when they are hungry, the joy of those who are wise includes an evaluative 
thinking regarding the goodness of the natural order and that of the fool involves 
the fulfillment of his self-centred desire. It seems that the same object is 
conceptualised in different ways. If an emotional person also feels happy because 
nature is good in offering food, that reaction may also be a passion in the sense 
that the evaluation is not derived from the Stoic worldview, even though it 
overlaps to some extent, but this means nonetheless that it is not rational. This 
suggests that the difference is less clear than it might seem to be. 
2. A significant standard for judging whether something constitutes a 
eupatheia is reasonableness. Reasonableness implies that all the impulses of the 
soul direct one toward the good within the framework of right reason. As long as 
the impulse is reasonable, the action is not “excessive” or improper. However, if 
the evaluation is false and unreasonable, the resulting action is typically excessive 
and unhealthy. Yet this line of reasoning is not very convincing. Even though the 
Stoics contend that only the first thought is rational, the question remains as to 
why the Stoics’ joy for the good order in the world should be calmer than the 
Christians’ joy of it as a work of Creation.  
3. In the above list, all three types of eupatheia are associated with a 
tranquil and constant mind without excessive reactions; viewed from the outside, 
these people may appear to be indifferent to events that occur in everyday life. In 
this sense, the word “indifference” can be a slanderous or negative description of 
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a tranquil state of mind. The Stoics explain that the eupatheiai are directed to the 
good and support activities in accordance with the good and those who avoid evil. 
What is not included in these categories is the ethically indifferent, but the 
behaviour regarding indifferent matters can also be based on choices and 
preferences. These are not morally relevant and are indifferent in this sense, but 
they are not indifferent as part of everyday life.131 The sages’ attitudes are 
focused on the genuine good, which is defined as virtues in accordance with the 
divine reason guiding reality. This involves a correct attitude towards indifferent 
things. 132  While Nussbaum envisions the eupatheiai as correct impulses to 
external indifferents, Brennan maintains that they are only directed to genuine 
good and evil and these do not include indifferents.133 What is the difference here? 
Nussbaum asserts that the Stoic wise correctly differentiate what is indifferent and 
this is part of the eupatheia attitude, whereas Brennan argues that eupatheia is 
directed at virtuous behaviour involving a correct attitude toward indifferent 
matters. I do not discern any profound difference here. The Stoics emphasise that 
it is a mistake to regard indifferent things as being very valuable and the Stoics 
recognise them as indifferent due to their correct value orientation. It is part of the 
Stoic theory that passions are false beliefs that interpret indifferent things as being 
highly important to the subject. It is this self-centred evaluation that the Stoics 
reject, claiming that the objects of passions are indifferent. This detachment does 
not mean that in some cases, a wise choice that is based on moral knowledge 
could not be the same as an emotional choice. The argument is that a wise choice 
is made without having emotional commitments to particular things.  
It is noteworthy that the sage bases his indifference on good judgements of 
the mind and this leads to virtuous actions. This does not imply that the sage 
would not have preferences between morally indifferent things, such as choosing 
foods. However, in contrast, the fool’s choices are based on false judgements that 
are evident in his having unbalanced passions and evil behaviours. They may also 
                                                          
131 See Brennan 1998, 61–62. 
132 Nussbaum 1994, 399; Brennan 1998, 55–56. 
133  Brennan argues that “unfortunately, her [Nussbaum] comments about the eupatheiai are 
incorrect. She rightly observes that they ‘are not passions and are not identified with any high 
evaluation of externals.’ But she takes them instead to be correct, non-excessive, impulses to 
external indifferents…That is not correct…In no case is a eupatheia directed towards an indifferent, 
and in several cases it is directed towards a genuine good…The eupatheiai are thus all directed at 
genuine goods and evils”. See Brennan 1998, 54–57. Cf. Nussbaum 1994, 379, 380 and 399.  
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be indifferent when they should not, expressing moral stupor. In this sense, 
indifference as a connotation of the Stoic eupatheia should be distinguished from 
that of indifferent fools. The former connotation is in agreement with the rational 
worldview,134 whereas the fool is merely conveying an irrational attitude. 
Let us now turn to Augustine’s texts to review his description of the Stoic 
eupatheia. In his early works, such as De beata uita, Contra Academicos, De 
ordine, De quantitate animae and De immortalitate animae, Augustine prefers to 
interpret constantia135 as immutability (immutabilis), as the changelessness of 
supreme reason. This immutability makes one achieve a state of tranquility and 
attain a happy life (beata vita). Augustine regards constantia as a stable and 
unchangeable state and holds that the human mind could be immortal if it would 
follow supreme good without separating from it. Furthermore, in De immortalitate 
animae 11.18, De beata uita 4.28 and De utilitate credendi 12.27, Augustine 
assents to the Stoic theory of dividing people into two groups of sages and fools, 
and argues that the wise enjoys a more stable and fuller being, whereas the foolish 
mind turns away from the supreme good and binds itself to some state of defect. 
In De libero arbitrio 1.13, he supports the Stoic virtues of caution, fortitude, 
temperance, and justice based on the contemplation of transcendent and eternal 
good:  
(1) Quaedam constantiae uirtus est, et omnis constantia immutabilis est, et omnis 
uirtus potest aliquid agere, nec cum agit aliquid, uirtus non est. (De immortalitate animae 
3.3)136 
(2) Est enim maxime ipsa ratio, ubi summa etiam incommutabilitas intellegitur. Ita 
quaecumque ex se afficit, cogit esse quodammodo. Non ergo exstingui animus potest, nisi a 
ratione separatus; separari autem non potest, ut supra ratiocinati sumus: non potest igitur 
interire. At enim aversio ipsa a ratione per quam stultitia contingit animo, sine defectu eius 
fieri non potest. (De immortalitate animae 6.11–7.12)137 
                                                          
134 I combine the Stoic indifference with the “rational worldview”. The Stoic eupatheia represents 
impassibility and tranquility with respect to particular things. Because eupatheia means that one 
does not have passions, it may give rise to a behaviour similar to that of ordinary people without 
emotions in particular situations. 
135  In Brepols database (Library of Latin Texts), the word constantia occurs 36 times and 
constantiae 10 times in Augustine’s works, and constantias twice in De civitate Dei. 
136 “Constancy possesses some power, and all that is constant is not subject to change. Every 
power is able to perform some act, being a power even when not in action”. [transl. Ludwig 
Schopp]  
137 “And reason [the true] itself is there in the highest degree where changelessness is conceived in 
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(3) Tamen etiam hoc attendendum est, non esse aliam causam huius formidinis, 
nisi quia fatendum est in defectu quodam esse animum stultum, et in essentia certiore atque 
pleniore sapientem. Sed si, quod nemini dubium est, tunc est animus sapientissimus, cum 
veritatem, quae semper eodem modo est, intuetur, eique immobilis inhaeret divino amore 
coniunctus. (De immortalitate animae 11.18)138  
(4) Uiximus enim magna mentis tranquillitate ab omni corporis labe animum 
uindicantes et a cupiditatium facibus longissime remoti, dantes, quantum homini licet, 
operam rationi, hoc est secundum diuinam illam partem animi uiuentes, quam beatam esse 
uitam hesterna inter nos definitione conuenit. (Contra Academicos 1.4.11)139 
(5) Est ergo animi egestas, inquam, nihil aliud, quam stultitia. Haec est enim 
contraria sapientiae…ut beata uita miserae, hoc est sine aliquo medio…sic omnem non 
stultum manifestum est esse sapientem. (De beata uita 4.28)140 
(6) …esse prudentia adpetendarum et uitandarum rerum scientia…fortitudo nonne 
illa est animae adfectio, qua omnia incommoda et damna rerum non in nostra potestate 
constitutarum contemnimus…porro temperantia est adfectio coercens et cohibens 
adpetitum ab his rebus quae turpiter adpetuntur…iustitiam quid dicamus esse nisi 
uirtutem, qua sua cuique tribuuntur? (De libero arbitrio 1.13)141 
In (1), Augustine explains that the literal meaning of the word constantia 
is immutability (immutabilis). Thus, constantia is not subject to change, but 
possesses power even when not acting. Augustine continues to interpret constantia 
                                                                                                                                                               
the highest degree. Therefore, reason [the true] forces the mind somehow to be, which it, from its 
own being, affects. Thus, without separation from reason [the true], the mind cannot be 
extinguished. But, a separation is impossible, as we have reasoned above. Therefore, the mind 
cannot perish. On the other hand, the mind cannot turn away from reason [the true]—in doing so it 
falls into foolishness—without suffering a defect”. [transl. Ludwig Schopp] 
138 “Nevertheless, attention should be paid to the point that the only cause for fear lies in the 
undeniable fact that a foolish mind is in some state of defect, while the wise enjoys a more stable 
and fuller being. But if, as cannot be doubted, the mind is then most wise when it sees the truth 
that is always and without change, and, joined by a divine love, inheres in the truth immovably”. 
[transl. Ludwig Schopp] 
139 “We lived in great mental tranquility, keeping the spirit free from every stain of the body; and, 
far removed from the raging flames of desire, we were taking pains, as far as man is allowed, to 
cultivate reason – that is, to live according to the divine part of the spirit – and this we agreed 
yesterday was by definition the happy life”. [transl. Peter King] 
140 “Consequently, the want of the soul is nothing but foolishness, I said, it is the opposite of 
wisdom…a happy life is the opposite of a miserable one, that is, without a middle state…every 
man who is not foolish is wise”. [transl. Ludwig Schopp] For a similar statement see also util. cred. 
12.27: porro recta ratio est ipsa uirtus… Solus igitur sapiens non peccat. Stultus ergo omnis peccat, 
nisi in iis factis, in quibus sapienti obtemperauerit. 
141 “[Prudence] is the knowledge of what we should seek and avoid…Fortitude is a disposition of 
the soul by which we shun all inappropriate and miserable things that are not in our 
power…Temperance is the disposition that constrains or impedes our desire for those things which 
are wrongfully desired…Justice is the virtue which renders to each his own”. [transl. Colish] 
Colish 1985 (II), 215. 
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as the changelessness (incommutabilitas) of reason that is not affected by the 
outside and it is imperishable (2). Thus, the soul will be in a stable state and cannot 
be extinguished if it is united with the immutable reason without separation, and a 
separation is impossible. Augustine emphasises that only when the principle of 
constantia connects with the mind will the wise enjoy a stable and full being, being 
inherent in the truth immovably. Furthermore, turning away from reason is 
foolishness and a self-imposed defect (3). Augustine attempts to connect the value 
of constantia to a happy life and to regard it as the standard for distinguishing 
between the sage and the fool, keeping to the nature of the mind, or being defective 
in this respect (3, 5). To Augustine, it is important that the wise enjoy a tranquil and 
stable life without the disturbance created by emotions, while fools are emotionally 
upset, there being no middle condition between the sage and the fool. It is essential 
to note here that Augustine’s argument is consistent with the Stoic cosmic view of 
the immutable reason and natural order.142 The non-rational motion of the mind 
breaks the static and balanced structure of the soul and makes it uncertain and 
disordered, far from the perfect state of constantia. This is the cause of the fool’s 
miserable life. Therefore, in (4) and (6) Augustine highlights the state of tranquility 
in terms of the Stoic four virtues derived from an understanding of the genuine 
good. Augustine’s interpretation of the Stoic doctrine stresses two points, genuine 
good and impassibility, which is obviously in line with the Stoic teaching of 
eupatheia.  
However, in City of God 14.8, Augustine changes his previous tone and 
some of his illustrations appear different: 
Quas enim Graeci appellant εὐπάθειας, Latine autem Cicero constantias 
nominauit, Stoici tres esse uoluerunt pro tribus perturbationibus in animo 
sapientis, pro cupiditate uoluntatem, pro laetitia gaudium, pro metu cautionem; 
pro aegritudine uero uel dolore, quam nos uitandae ambiguitatis gratia tristitiam 
maluimus dicere, negauerunt esse posse aliquid in animo sapientis. Uoluntas 
quippe, inquiunt, appetit bonum, quod facit sapiens; gaudium de bono adepto est, 
                                                          
142 Miikka Ruokanen provides evidence that Augustine’s doctrine of ordo naturae is in line with the 
Platonic concept of the eternal and immutable reason, lex aeterna or lex naturalis. (Ruokanen 1993, 
29–31). This might well be so, but I would like to add that, from the point of the constantia that 
Augustine discusses in his early works, he is also inclined to the Stoic teaching of nature in dealing 
with the correlation between the tranquil mind and the constantia nature of the supreme good in the 
cosmos. 
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quod ubique adipiscitur sapiens; cautio deuitat malum, quod debet sapiens 
deuitare; tristitia porro quia de malo est, quod iam accidit, nullum autem malum 
existimant posse accidere sapienti, nihil in eius animo pro illa esse posse dixerunt. 
Sic ergo illi loquuntur, ut uelle gaudere cauere negent nisi sapientem; stultum 
autem non nisi cupere laetari, metuere contristari; et illas tres esse constantias, 
has autem quattuor perturbationes secundum Ciceronem, secundum autem 
plurimos passiones. Graece autem illae tres, sicut dixi, appellantur εὐπαθεῖαι, 
istae autem quattuor πάθη.143 
This description by Augustine closely follows Cicero’s account and correctly 
presents the Stoic teaching of eupatheia. Augustine repeats his earlier account that 
the three subspecies of eupatheia are directed towards the genuine good, which 
only the wise possesses, whereas passions are perturbations that only belong to the 
fool. In the next text, Augustine begins to doubt the above argument by citing the 
Bible: “There is no gladness, saith my God, to the wicked” (Non est gaudere impiis, 
dicit Dominus), “On earth peace, good will toward men” (Pax in terra hominibus 
bonae voluntatis). He inquires here that if the will (voluntas) only refers to “good” 
will, why add the redundant word “good”? (Nam ex abundanti additum est 
“bonae”, si esse non potest nisi bona).144 Augustine also refers to some secular 
authors who offer examples, in which some apparent eupatheiai (such as gaudium) 
are associated with an evil sense and passions (for example, cupio) with a good 
sense: 
                                                          
143 CD 14.8: “In place of three of the disturbances of the mind discussed above, the Stoics wish to 
find in the mind of the wise man three dispositions, called eupatheiai in Greek, and in Latin, by 
Cicero, constantiae. Instead of desire they find will; instead of joy, gladness; instead of fear, caution. 
They deny, however, that there can exist in the wise man’s mind anything corresponding to distress 
or pain, which, to avoid ambiguity, I have preferred to call grief. The will, say the Stoics, certainly 
pursues the good, and this is what the wise man does; gladness arises from the attainment of the 
good, which the wise man attains wherever he may be; and caution avoids evil, which is what the 
wise man ought to avoid. Grief, however, is occasioned by an evil which has already happened; and 
since, as they think, no evil can befall a wise man, they say that there can be nothing corresponding 
to grief in the wise man’s mind. What they say, then, amounts to this: that only the wise man can 
have will, gladness and caution, whereas the fool can experience nothing save desire, joy, fear and 
grief. The three former are constantiae, while the latter four are ‘disturbances’ according to Cicero, 
but ‘passions’ according to most other authors. In Greek, however, as I have said, the three former 
are called eupatheiai; and the four latter are called pathé”.  
144  CD 14.8: Haec locutio utrum scripturis sanctis congruat, cum quaererem quantum potui 
diligenter, illud inueni quod ait propheta: Non est gaudere impiis, dicit Dominus…Locutione uero 
usitatiore, quam frequentat maxime consuetudo sermonis, non utique diceretur: Noli uelle mentiri 
omne mendacium, nisi esset et uoluntas mala, a cuius prauitate illa distinguitur, quam 
praedicauerunt angeli dicentes: Pax in terra hominibus bonae uoluntatis. Nam ex abundanti 
additum est "bonae", si esse non potest nisi bona. 
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Et apud auctores saecularium litterarum talis istorum uerborum indifferentia 
reperitur. Ait enim Cicero orator amplissimus:“Cupio, patres conscripti, me esse 
clementem”. Quia id uerbum in bono posuit…Porro apud Terentium flagitiosus 
adulescens insana flagrans cupidine: Nihil uolo aliud, inquit, nisi philumenam. 
Quam uoluntatem fuisse libidinem responsio…Gaudium uero eos et in malo 
posuisse ille ipse Uergilianus testis est uersus, ubi has quattuor perturbationes 
summa breuitate complexus est: Hinc metuunt cupiuntque, dolent gaudentque. 
Dixit etiam idem auctor: Mala mentis gaudia.145 
After listing the evil sense of the eupatheia terms in Cicero, Virgil and other secular 
authors, Augustine concludes as follows: 
Proinde uolunt cauent gaudent et boni et mali; atque ut eadem aliis uerbis 
enuntiemus, cupiunt timent laetantur et boni et mali; Sed illi bene, isti male, sicut 
hominibus seu recta seu peruersa uoluntas est. Ipsa quoque tristitia, pro qua Stoici 
nihil in animo sapientis inueniri posse putauerunt, reperitur in bono et maxime 
apud nostros.146 
This claim is no longer in accordance with the Stoics. Augustine therefore offers the 
following arguments: 
(1) Three types of eupatheia (will, caution and gladness) as well as four 
forms of passio can be either good or bad and can belong to a good or evil man.  
(2) Grief, as a type of passion, can also be found in the mind of the wise. 
(3) Passions of the soul in Christians are righteous and good; whereas the 
true tranquility of the Stoics is inhuman, pride, stupor and unhealthy.147  
                                                          
145 CD 14.8: “Such an indiscriminate use of these terms is seen also among authors of secular 
literature. For Cicero, a most distinguished orator, says, ‘I desire, conscript fathers, to be merciful.’ 
He here uses the word ‘desire’ in a good sense…On the other hand, in Terence’s play, there is the 
disgraceful young man who, mad with the heat of his own lust, says, ‘I have a will for naught but 
Philumena.’ But his ‘will’ was his desire…‘gladness’ is used in a bad sense in that same line of 
Virgil which contains his most brief statement of the four things which disturb the mind: ‘Hence 
come desire and fear, gladness and sorrow.’ The same author also speaks of ‘The evil gladness of the 
mind’”. 
146 CD 14.8: “Will, caution and gladness, then, are common to both good and evil men; and – to 
make the same point in different words – good and evil men alike feel desire, fear and joy. But the 
good feel these emotions in a good way, and the bad feel them in a bad way, just as the will of men 
may be righteous or perverse. Also, although the Stoics find nothing in the mind of the wise man 
corresponding to grief, we discover that even this is used in a good sense, and especially in our own 
Scriptures”.  
147 CD 14.9: …ciues sanctae ciuitatis Dei in huius uitae peregrinatione secundum Deum uiuentes 
metuunt cupiunt que dolent gaudent que et quia rectus est amor eorum, istas omnes affectiones 
rectas habent…Et si nonnulli tanto inmaniore, quanto rariore uanitate hoc in se ipsis adamauerint, 
ut nullo prorsus erigantur et excitentur, nullo flectantur atque inclinentur affectu: humanitatem 
totam potius amittunt, quam ueram adsequuntur tranquillitatem. Non enim quia durum aliquid, ideo 
rectum, aut quia stupidum est, ideo sanum. (“…citizens of the Holy City of God live according to 
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The first point (1) obviously violates the basic Stoic principle as we have 
observed: a eupatheia is only directed to the genuine good and an avoidance of evil 
things; a eupatheia can neither be bad nor can it belong to an evil man. Equating 
eupatheia with passio, Augustine counters his own previous interpretation. Grief is 
a passion (2) that breaks the perfect and balanced order of the soul and even makes 
life miserable and bad. This, of course, is not attributed to the wise in the Stoic 
doctrine, but Augustine states that grief can occur in the mind of the wise. In 
addition, in (3), Augustine refers to the Stoic tranquility of the mind as inhuman and 
stupor, which contradicts his previous proposition. Hence, if we are limited to this 
pericope here, it seems correct to suppose that Augustine actually misinterprets the 
Stoic eupatheia, as Sorabji does. However, Augustine adds the following points in 
CD 14.9 to delve deeper into the concept of eupatheia and attempts to make the 
above arguments reasonable and thought-provoking:  
1. Both the wise and the fool have the same psychological structure and the 
controlling instance of their soul is the same, the will (voluntas), which decides 
about the behavioural impulses of the soul; in other words, the deciding power with 
respect to eupatheiai and passions is the will (voluntas). Therefore, a eupatheia or a 
pathos can be either good or bad and can belong to good or to an evil man.  
2. If passions derive from the love of the good or from the holy charity, in 
proper time and occasions, they are good and reasonable rather than evil. 148 
Therefore, an eligible grief can be found in the mind of the wise.  
3. Impassibility is good and worthy to be willed. If we want to live a happy 
life, an everlasting, tranquil and immutable mind is desirable and necessary. This 
happy condition has been promised to the citizens of the City of God who are living 
in this pilgrimage towards the eternal blessed tranquility of love, but this true 
tranquility and impassibility cannot be completely attained in the fallen state. What 
                                                                                                                                                               
God during the pilgrimage of this present life. Such citizens feel fear and desire, pain and gladness, 
but in a manner consistent with the Holy Scriptures and wholesome doctrine; and because their love 
is righteous, all these emotions are righteous in them…Some of these [like the Stoics], with a vanity 
as monstrous as it is rare, are so entranced by their own self-restraint that they are not stirred or 
excited or swayed or influenced by any emotions at all. But these rather suffer an entire loss of their 
humanity than achieve a true tranquility. For a thing is not right merely because it is harsh, nor is 
stolidity the same thing as health”.) 
148 CD 14.9: Hi motus, hi affectus de amore boni et de sancta caritate uenientes si uitia uocanda 
sunt, sinamus, ut ea, quae uere uitia sunt, uirtutes uocentur. Sed cum rectam rationem sequantur 
istae affectiones, quando ubi oportet adhibentur, quis eas tunc morbos seu uitiosas passiones audeat 
dicere? 
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is more, on specific occasions, impassibility without caritas is stupor, inhuman and 
vicious and should be avoided.149 
It is evident that Augustine’s additional remarks remain connected to the 
Stoic features of eupatheia, clinging to genuine good and reasonableness, but he 
emphasises that the key factor in determining the character of eupatheia and pathos 
is the human will. For this reason, the Stoic eupatheia is an ideal condition that will 
be attained not in this life, but in the future after the redemption. Augustine 
appreciates the Stoic impassibility and tranquility of mind in his early years, but 
later he turns to presuppose that such a perfect state cannot be attained under the 
conditions of the present life and maintains that the essence of the Stoic doctrine of 
eupatheia is a mistaken attempt to locate perfection in the fallen world. Augustine 
suggests that it is better for the earthly citizens to have righteous passions during 
this pilgrimage life and then to progress to the eternal immortality of eupatheia in 
the blessed future. His additions indicate that he understands the Stoic definition of 
eupatheia and wants to point out the weakness of their argumentation on this 
concept. Augustine evaluates the Stoic ideal in a theological domain. Thus, once 
again his controversial arguments in CD 14.8–9 are considered, representing his 
mature thinking on the issue of the Stoic eupatheia. 
 
3.4. Augustine’s Consideration of the Therapy of Passions 
 
Thus far I have traced Augustine’s thoughts in his early, middle, and late works on 
a series of concepts related to his moderation and control of passions, and have 
noticed that he has controversial formulations in his late pivotal work De civitate 
Dei, and that the controversy is linked to his attempt to shift the scope of 
discussions to a theological context. Besides those critics who argue that these 
problems are based on Augustine’s misunderstandings, there is an alternative 
interpretation of them. Some scholars maintain that in Augustine’s theological 
                                                          
149 CD 14.9: …quae si Latine posset inpassibilitas diceretur…bona plane et maxime optanda est, 
sed nec ipsa huius est uitae… cum animum contingere omnino non potest ullus affectus, quis hunc 
stuporem non omnibus uitiis iudicet esse peiorem?...auersanda est in hac uita, si recte, hoc est 
secundum Deum, uiuere uolumus; in illa uero beata, quae sempiterna promittitur, plane speranda 
est. Augustine displays a complicated attitude toward impassibilitas in the mundane life, rather than 
simply refuting it on all occasions. What he does not accept is the impassibility without caritas as 
well as the perpetual apatheia, which he considers to be impossible. I will analyse the details at the 
level of social life in the next chapter.  
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context, some “inconsistencies” confirm that he has deviated from the Stoic 
doctrine entirely. Others propose the contrary view that Augustine’s aim is in line 
with the Stoics or the Platonists since he retains their goal of freedom from passions 
(apatheia and eupatheia) without leaving their doctrinal frameworks completely. I 
shall evaluate the different positions on the issue of whether philosophical 
traditions have been retained in Augustine’s new treatment of the passions.  
Gerard O’Daly argues that in Augustine’s late work De civitate Dei, he does 
not accept the Stoic ideal of freedom from passions (apatheia) neither in the earthly 
city nor in the Heavenly City.150 As for the earthly city, O’Daly maintains that 
Augustine does not distinguish passions from constantiae (O’Daly uses the term 
“the stable states”) nor does he differentiate good emotions themselves from bad, 
since they may be either good or bad according to whether the will is good or bad. 
Moreover, Christians should have appropriate passions and “fear eternal 
punishment, desire eternal life, fear to commit sin, and to feel pain over sins 
committed”, the emotion of “fear” and “desire” showing a righteous and 
appropriate sense.151 Augustine does not adopt the Stoic doctrine of passions that 
associates emotions with diseases or evils, but thinks that freedom from emotion in 
the mundane life is inhumanity and insensitivity. At the level of the Heavenly City, 
O’Daly observes, humans can also feel some emotions, such as love and gladness, 
and “some emotions are not peculiar to our earthly condition”.152 O’Daly states that 
Augustine provides a positive account of emotions and the emotions in the City of 
God are approved.153  Thus, Augustine also does not adopt the Stoic ideal of 
freedom from emotions (apatheia) at this level. On this basis, O’Daly notes that 
Augustine’s theory is obviously distinguished from the Stoic doctrine of passions 
and that in his interpretation of passions, Augustine does not retain the Stoic ideal 
of freedom from emotion.  
                                                          
150 “Augustine is unimpressed by the Stoic ideal of freedom from passions (‘apatheia’). He quotes 
Crantor from Cicero (Tusc. 3.12) in calling it mental inhumanity and bodily insensitivity. Augustine 
also finds it an unattainable ideal in this life. Moreover, in their heavenly state, the good will feel 
love and gladness. Some emotions are not peculiar to our earthly condition”. O’Daly 1999, 156. 
151 O’Daly 1999, 155. 
152 Ibid., 156. 
153 “Having given such a positive account of emotions, Augustine feels obliged to add a postscript 
stressing the wrecking potential of emotions misused. The emotions of the denizens of the city of 
God may be approved…” Ibid., 156. Gerd Van Riel also advocates the view that Augustine retains 
some passions (e.g., joy and love) in the afterlife and he thinks that Augustine is in line with the 
Neo-Platonic definition of pleasure. See Van Riel 2004, 524–531. 
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Marcia Colish also advocates the position that Augustine does not adopt the 
Stoic view of apatheia in his late works, whereas during his early years, Augustine 
adheres to the Stoic position and appreciates the state of immovability and 
tranquility of the mind. He nonetheless revises his position on the basis of both 
theological and psychological grounds during the late 380s and early 390s.154 
Colish contends that in Augustine’s late thought, he harbours the negative belief 
that the Stoic goal of impassibilitas was neither present in Adam and Eve, nor is it 
attained in the present life.155 Colish states that Augustine presumes that Adam and 
Eve did not possess apatheia before the Fall; otherwise they could not have desired 
for the forbidden fruit.156 While apatheia is impossible in the present life, some of 
the passions, such a love and joy, will be also possessed eternally in the next life.157 
Colish therefore concludes that the Stoic ideal of freedom from passion has been 
wholly removed from Augustine’s late thought of passions. 
Peter King makes some modifications to Colish’s observations, arguing that 
                                                          
154 “He [Augustine] defends the possibility and desirability of apatheia in his earliest works but 
subsequently modifies or rejects this position on both theological and psychological grounds. This 
process of revision had begun by the late 380s and early 390s”. Colish 1985 (II), 221. 
155 “The goal of apatheia or impassibilitas…is unattainable in this life…Not even Adam and Eve 
before the Fall possessed apatheia, Augustine maintains, otherwise they could not have felt the 
desire for the forbidden fruit”. Colish 1985 (II), 225. 
156 Ibid., 225. Colish’s statement that the first human beings did not have the psychology of apatheia 
before the transgression is not exact. In CD 14.10, Augustine states that before sin, there was no sin 
in paradise and Adam and Eve were living an entirely tranquil and happy life in Eden without 
perturbations nor temptations. This is a psychology of contentment toward the genuine good that is 
in accordance with the Stoic description of apatheia. Augustine makes his point as follows: firstly, 
in paradise, Man lived in the enjoyment of God with an entire tranquility of soul, no want, no desire, 
nor the corruption of body. He lived in the genuine good (CD 14.26: Uiuebat itaque homo in 
paradiso sicut uolebat, quamdiu hoc uolebat quod Deus iusserat; Uiuebat fruens Deo, ex quo bono 
erat bonus;Uiuebat sine ulla egestate, ita semper uiuere habens in potestate…Nihil corruptionis in 
corpore uel ex corpore ullas molestias ullis eius sensibus ingerebat. Nullus intrinsecus morbus, 
nullus ictus metuebatur extrinsecus. Summa in carne sanitas, in animo tota tranquillitas). Secondly, 
in the process of sexual intercourse, there was no excitement of passion aroused; the first man 
poured seeds into his wife’s womb in tranquility of mind without any corruption of her body’s 
integrity (CD 14.26:…et sine ardoris inlecebroso stimulo cum tranquillitate animi et corporis nulla 
corruptione integritatis infunderetur gremio maritus uxoris). These two points illustrate that Adam 
and Eve had the life of apatheia in Eden before the temptation and sinful desire. Augustine notes 
that only when Eve was enticed to taste the forbidden fruit, the desire aroused shows the origin of 
sin. See CD 14.10: Si enim habebant, quo modo erant beati in illo memorabili beatitudinis loco, id 
est paradiso?... Amor erat inperturbatus in Deum atque inter se coniugum fida et sincera societate 
uiuentium…Erat deuitatio tranquilla peccati, qua manente, nullum omnino alicunde malum quod 
contristaret inruebat… Absit, inquam, ut ante omne peccatum iam ibi fuerit tale peccatum, ut hoc de 
ligno admitterent, quod de muliere Dominus ait: Si quis uiderit mulierem ad concupiscendum eam, 
iam moechatus est eam in corde suo. 
157 “Augustine adds that, even in the state of blessedness, some of the passions, such as love and joy, 
will not only be retained but will also be consummated, enjoyed and possessed eternally in a perfect 
and perpetual security”. Colish 1985 (II), 225. 
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Augustine rejects the Stoic doctrine of passions except for their ideal of 
dispassionate passions (apatheia). However, when commenting on this notion in 
Augustine’s late theological schema, King proposes that Augustine formulates it 
without adhering to the Stoics.158 King disagrees with Colish’s position that after 
his early period, Augustine eliminates the doctrine of freedom from passions, and 
King states that such an ideal has been retained in Augustine for a longer time.159 
But when referring to the new structure of passions in Augustine’s late writings, 
King claims that it is difficult to estimate the degree of success in Augustine’s 
formulation of a new theory of dispassionate passions, since Augustine has 
abandoned the Stoic arguments. In other words, Augustine’s new theory has 
completely deviated from the Stoic doctrine of freedom from passions. 
Contrary to the above-mentioned positions, Johannes Brachtendorf argues 
that Augustine is in line with the Stoic ideal of freedom from passions (apatheia) 
without deviation, even though Augustine and the Stoics assume different 
approaches to it. Brachtendorf maintains that in adopting the model of Christ’s 
passions, Augustine is not criticising the Stoic moral psychology, but echoing their 
ideal of apatheia and reaching for the goal of freedom from passions. Brachtendorf 
states the following:  
The Stoic ideal of apatheia has to be compared with what Augustine says about the state of 
perfection. To criticize this ideal by reference to Jesus Christ makes no sense…Through 
Christ’s perturbationes we can regain tranquility, and through his infirmitas we become 
firm again. Christ’s evocation of passions aims at deliberating humans from their 
passions.160  
Brachtendorf believes that for Augustine, a necessary condition for salvation is 
freedom from negative passions. No one can attain Christ’s degree of confronting 
passions in meditating and imitating Him because Christ is both a man and God 
who decides to deliberately experience passions as a way of therapy. Christ’s life 
provides an unattainable therapeutic model, as does the Stoic ideal of apatheia, but 
                                                          
158 “Augustine rejects the Stoic account of the passions, but he retains their ideal of a state in which 
there are only dispassionate passions…Assessing the degree to which Augustine is successful in 
forging a theory of dispassionate passions isn’t easy, since he does not usually give precise accounts 
or technical details…No need to engage the Stoic arguments; Augustine has disposed of them. And 
it became a part of Christian dogma that human nature, prior to Original Sin, is free of desire and 
fear; that in Heaven there are dispassionate passions, which, even more paradoxically than anything 
the Stoics came up with”. King 2012a, 21–22.  
159  “Colish…maintains that Augustine abandoned the ideal of passionlessness after this early 
period. I disagree, as will be evident shortly”. King 2012a, 20 (n. 34). 
160 Brachtendorf 1997, 304. 
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Christ’s model is embedded in a different salvific narrative. 161  Thus, these 
approaches concur on the point of establishing an ideal and unattainable model in 
reality. Secondly, Brachtendorf maintains that for Christ, suffering is to realise the 
aim of saving humans from passions and helping them regain the state of tranquility 
without perturbations. This does not deviate from the Stoic goal.162 Brachtendorf 
explains that Augustine’s aim is not to attack the ideal of apatheia, but to criticise 
the dropping of the group of positive passions.163 Both the Stoics and Augustine are 
directed to the state of firmness and perfection, sharing the same ideal of freedom 
from passions. 164  Brachtendorf’s opinion is that Augustine’s formulation of 
apatheia and eupatheia does not differ from the Stoic position in theory; it is only 
Augustine’s religious therapy model for achieving these ends that is different.  
According to Gerd Van Riel, Augustine incorporates philosophical ideas in 
his late thought rather than deviating from them, but he argues that Augustine 
adopts the Neoplatonic scheme of pleasure. Van Riel mentions that Augustine’s 
account of eupatheia is to a certain extent “reinterpretation” instead 
“misinterpretation”, as has been stated in the previous section. As for the passions 
in the afterlife, Van Riel emphatically points out that Augustine does not deviate 
                                                          
161 “Christ’s state of mind is different from that of a human mind, because in us the rulership of 
reason is always endangered, whereas he due to his Deity has full command over his passions and 
even produces them deliberately…To criticize this ideal [apatheia] by reference to Jesus Christ 
makes no sense, because Christ’s state of mind can not be reached by humans, neither on earth nor in 
heaven”. See Brachtendorf 1997, 304. 
162 “Augustine’s reflection on Christ’s passions is not an attack on Stoic moral psychology. Instead, 
Augustine uses Cicero’s analysis of the passions to explain Christ’s way of therapy…In fact, 
freedom from passions is a necessary condition of salvation as far as negative second-order passions 
are concerned; there is no way to heaven for somebody who despairs of the chance of rescue. But 
since Christ deliberately suffered from passions, the Christian’s fear of death does not prevent him 
from reaching the goal of goals”. Brachtendorf 1997, 305–306. When interpreting the Stoic theory 
of passions and apatheia, Brachtendorf borrows Cicero’s view and underscores its Stoic nature.  
163 Brachtendorf concludes that there is a distinction between first-order passions and second-order 
passions in the Stoics, Cicero and Augustine. First-order passions are perturbations and motions of 
the mind, whereas second-order passions are always about first-order value judgments of good or 
evil, that is, emotions. Brachtendorf argues that the main difference between the Stoics and 
Augustine is the second-order passions, since the Stoics regard them as bad, but Augustine believes 
that some of them are positive and good. “Augustine harshly criticizes the Stoics for not allowing for 
these positive versions of passions. He polemically calls apatheia dullness (stupor). His objection 
against Stoic ethics in the tractatus LX [In Iohannis Euangelium tractatus] is not aimed at the ideal 
of apatheia as such but at the missing of a positive evaluation of second-order passions”. 
Brachtendorf 1997, 304. 
164 “In order to avoid falling victim to Augustine’s polemics, it is important to compare the 
descriptions of the state of perfection…In his polemics Augustine likes to make his doctrine appear 
very different from the Stoic theory by emphasizing this point [passions in this life] and by 
concealing that his ideal of freedom from passions is the same as the Stoic one”. Brachtendorf 1997, 
296 (n. 24). 
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from the Platonic framework.165 Van Riel concludes that Augustine accepts the 
passions of love and joy in the redeemed life, summarising his position in the 
following way, “Augustine points out that our will is accomplished or perfected 
(perficitur) when it attains what is was tending to, and when it takes rest in this 
attainment. The result of this is that the desire of the one who was seeking 
(appetitus quaerentis) is modified into the love of the one who feels joy (amor 
fruentis)”.166 Van Riel further asserts that there are two conditions for this type of 
pleasure in Augustine, one is the satiation of the body and the other is the 
everlasting rest of the will in the harbour of God. Van Riel observes that in his 
theology, Augustine unites both the redeemed body and the will to the everlasting 
good without any deficiency and so that it is in line with the Aristotelian definition 
of pleasure (gaudium).167 Thus, Van Riel argues that Augustine retains the passions 
of joy and love in his theology of salvation without leaving the overall Platonic 
framework.  
Concerning the debate of whether Augustine deviates from his 
philosophical predecessors on the issue of freedom from passions, it seems that 
both opposite interpretations have some correct insights, but they do not explore the 
underlying reason for Augustine changing his previous account of philosophical 
concepts, such as will, love, justice, propatheia, apatheia, eupatheia, nor do they 
explain his preference for a provocative writing style that some contemporary 
critics construe as his misunderstanding. I think that in his late thought, Augustine 
examines the Stoic and the Platonic teachings from the perspective of theological 
anthropology, providing a pessimistic perspective, using the lenses of original sin 
to interpret the human condition; at the same time, he is optimistic about the 
redemptive state of the citizens in the City of God by the grace of Christ. He 
therefore adopts a theological vantage point to evaluate philosophical values and 
terminology.  
                                                          
165 “…pleasure is worthwhile in itself. As we have seen, the gaudium in the redeemed life is a 
pleasure without any possible distress. This is in line with his acceptance of the passions in the good 
life. But this does not mean that he is leaving the overall Platonic framework. For the question of 
how to say that this gaudium can be called a pleasure is addressed by taking over peculiar 
Neo-Platonic schemes”. Van Riel 2004, 530. 
166 Van Riel 2004, 530. 
167 “Thus, we can conclude that when Augustine transposes pleasure to the state of the redeemed 
body, he is doing the same as the pagan Neo-Platonists: he follows Aristotle rather than Plato”. Van 
Riel 2004, 530. 
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As distinct from the Stoic and the Platonic doctrines, Augustine employs 
two pivotal theological concepts, original sin and grace, which allow his worldview 
to include various levels. At the mundane world level, Augustine espouses a 
pessimistic orientation that is associated with the doctrine of original sin and he 
criticizes philosophers who “overrate” their personal powers and virtues, living in a 
state of “pride” (superbia) and egocentricity. On the one hand, Augustine argues 
that in the fallen condition, there is a weakening and distortion of the human will, 
love, and rational power. That condition also reveals a perverted tendency 
(pondus).168 On the other hand, the model of Christ established a righteous and 
undeflected value system and it offers new criteria for evaluating human conduct. 
To Augustine, philosophers themselves cannot become aware of their moral defect 
(for example, their arrogance) and depraved nature without an awareness of the 
uncontaminated values in Christ. At the eschatological level, Augustine believes 
that two cities of men will be differentiated. One will be saved by the grace of 
Christ and enter the City of God with corrected values and recovered cognitive 
abilities, receiving gifts of grace and participating in God with eternal rejoicing. 
The other (without redemption) will remain in the sinful state together with the 
Devil and receive eternal punishment from God. 169  Augustine’s theological 
doctrine consists of five crucial points: 1.The overwhelming power of original sin 
leads to a condition of misery; 2. Humans cannot save themselves through their 
own powers because their values and thinking are corrupted; 3. The Saviour is not 
infected by original sin and provides a correct value model; 4. In order to rectify the 
depraved condition, the Saviour voluntarily enters human reality and participates in 
human life as a sign of divine love and as a gift of grace; 5. The Saviour has 
sufficient power to deliver fallen humans from both their suffering and perverted 
condition. In comparison to the Stoics, it is evident that Augustine displays a 
pessimistic view towards mundane life, and he believes that an external power is 
                                                          
168 Miikka Ruokanen presents a systematic analysis of Augustine’s concept of pondus voluntatis et 
amoris. He states, “The principle of pondus consists of the tendency of the will and love of the 
rational beings either to conform to or to diverge from the primitive order of nature. Because of the 
Fall, in Augustine’s terminology the word pondus, i.e. the weight, signifies basically the tendency of 
the vitiated rational beings to turn from being oriented upwards to downwards, i.e. from the Creator 
to the created”. Ruokanen 1993, 39. 
169 CD 15.1: …quod in duo genera distribuimus, unum eorum, qui secundum hominem, alterum 
eorum, qui secundum Deum uiuunt; quas etiam mystice appellamus ciuitates duas, hoc est duas 
societates hominum, quarum est una quae praedestinata est in aeternum regnare cum Deo, altera 
aeternum supplicium subire cum diabolo.Cf. CD 14.1. 
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required to change a depraved nature into a better state. Furthermore, Augustine has 
complete confidence in supranatural grace and concludes that divine love will 
generously bestow gifts not limited to restoring the human distorted condition. 
These supranatural gifts are certainly limited to the elected, with the majority 
remaining under the righteous wrath of God towards our fallen humanity. Thus, the 
theoretical foundation for his theological doctrine of passions is formed by the 
assumption of a perverted human living pattern and a faith in a divine equitable 
value system as well as an eschatological fulfillment. 
 
Original sin and the embarrassing condition of passions 
Augustine observes the world through the lenses of original sin, describing the 
world as a distorted and miserable reality, one that involves turbulences of the soul. 
He cites various cases as evidence (for example, the force of natural punishments, 
diseases, starvation, deceptions of men, temptations of demons, and the 
disturbances in dreams and when awake)170  to demonstrate that depravity and 
punishment are not fictitious, but a genuine condition. Augustine poses the 
following question:   
Who can describe in any discourse, who can comprehend in any process of thought, the 
number and severity of the punishments which disturb the human race in general? These 
punishments do not merely befall the malice and iniquity of the wicked, but belong to the 
condition of misery common to us all.171  
Augustine continues to emphasize that no matter which state we are in, asleep or 
awake, false visions and terrors will always assail our wretched soul. Indeed, 
temptations from demons confuse our senses and seduce us to partake of a variety 
of evils without tranquility.172 For these reasons, we cannot avoid emotions in the 
mundane world, and they often lead us to pain and unhappiness.  
                                                          
170  CD 22.22: Quantus est metus, quanta calamitas ab orbitatibus atque luctu, a damnis et 
damnationibus, a deceptionibus et mendaciis hominum, a suspicionibus falsis, ab omnibus uiolentis 
facinoribus et sceleribus alienis! Quando quidem ab eis et depraedatio et captiuitas…Ipse postremo 
somnus, qui proprie quietis nomen accepit, quis uerbis explicet, saepe somniorum uisis quam sit 
inquietus et quam magnis, licet falsarum rerum, terroribus, quas ita exhibet et quodam modo 
exprimit, ut a ueris eas discernere nequeamus, animam miseram sensus que perturbet? Qua falsitate 
uisorum etiam uigilantes in quibusdam morbis et uenenis miserabilius agitantur.       
171  CD 22.22: …quot et quantis poenis genus agitetur humanum, quae non ad malitiam 
nequitiamque iniquorum, sed ad condicionem pertinent miseriamque communem, quis ullo sermone 
digerit? quis ulla cogitatione conprehendit? 
172 CD 22.22: …quamuis multimoda uarietate fallaciae homines etiam sanos maligni daemones 
nonnumquam decipiant talibus uisis, ut, etiamsi eos per haec ad sua traducere non potuerint, sensus 
tamen eorum solo appetitu qualitercumque persuadendae falsitatis inludant. 
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In referring to the overwhelming power of original sin, Augustine addresses 
passions from the standpoint of the deprived soul and offers the following 
contending characterisations of passions in a theological context: (1) Passions are 
signs of a miserable and sinful condition; they disturb our soul and make the mind 
continuously unquiet. (2) Passions reflect weakness, but without them, life is not 
righteous.173 (3) Passions are right feelings in the lives of righteous men.174 (4) We 
do not hope for a passionate condition in our future life.175 (5) Passions are good 
when love and will are directed towards good; otherwise, they are bad. (6) The state 
of impassibilitas as a condition of a peace of mind is desirable, but it may manifest 
itself as a numbness in this life. (7) Tranquil contemplation toward God without 
distractions should not be neglected. 176  These characterisations reflect an 
embarrassing condition of passions in the terrestrial city that is portrayed by 
Augustine from the vantage point of his theological anthropology. The departure 
point for Augustine to evaluate the role and nature of passions is his conception of 
the perverted order of nature resulting from original sin. In his theological view of 
values, the notion of eliminating passions through rational powers reflects 
arrogance.  
 
The weight of will and the vice of impassibility in the earthly city 
Compared to the Stoics and the Platonists, Augustine places more emphasis on the 
role of the will in discussing passions because he believes that it is the decisive 
factor in the conflict between rational and non-rational impulses.177 Nevertheless, 
Augustine’s attitude toward the human will is ambiguous, as is conveyed by his 
discussion of the principle of the weight (pondus) of the human will. In the theology 
                                                          
173  CD 14.9: Habemus ergo eas ex humanae condicionis infirmitate…Sed dum uitae huius 
infirmitatem gerimus, si eas omnino nullas habeamus, tunc potius non recte uiuimus. 
174 CD 14.9: …et quia rectus est amor eorum, istas omnes affectiones rectas habent…Hilarem 
datorem diligit Deus. 
175 CD 14.9: …etiam cum rectas et secundum Deum habemus has affectiones, huius uitae sunt, non 
illius, quam futuram speramus, et saepe illis etiam inuiti cedimus. 
176 CD 19.19: Nec sic actuosus ut contemplationem non requirat Dei. 
177 Irwin maintains that as distinct from the rationalism in Peripatetics and the Stoics, Augustine 
endorses the role of the will and inspires medieval voluntarists: “Aristotle does not recognize the self 
and its power of choice (arbitrium) as a further thing besides the rational and the non-rational parts. 
The Stoics give assent a more central role than Aristotle gives it, but in doing this they do not 
abandon rationalism…they reaffirm Socratic rationalism even more strongly. Augustine, however, 
appears to recognize the self that chooses as something apart from rational desire and passion, and 
therefore identifies the self especially with the will”. See Irwin 2007, 401. 
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of the perverted order, a significant concept is the weight of the will and love 
(pondus voluntatis et amoris). The incorrectly directed pondus is a structural 
feature of the fallen state, which expresses the perverted values that derive from 
original sin. This concept does not exist in the Stoic and Platonic doctrines. From 
Augustine’s perspective, the Stoic arguments for impassibility (impassibilitas) 
cannot be relied on because the rational ability to understand values is weakened 
and the will, having lost its original balance, is guided by the wrong tendency. 
Thus, the perfect state of impassibilitas might appear to be possible and virtuous in 
terms of Stoic values, but it becomes impossible and vicious in Augustine’s 
understanding of the earthly world. 
Notwithstanding, Augustine recognises the value of impassibilitas. He 
differentiates its sinful and sinless aspects based on his theological interpretation of 
the human conditions in different periods. In Eden before the Fall, the first humans 
were in a fully controlled state of mind and body without mental disturbances. This 
type of impassibilitas is therefore an obvious manifestation of their happiness 
before the disobedience brought on by their will.178 By contrast, in the earthly city 
after the Fall, humans have a will with an evil self-centred pondus. In this condition, 
apatheia displays vice and distorted behaviour; passions are unavoidable and while 
many of them are sinful, some are required in a righteous life.179 Lastly, after the 
depraved will is restored in the Heavenly City, the elected will be redeemed from 
all sins and filled with constant and unsurpassable enjoyment without defect and 
mental disturbance.180 In other words, impassibilitas itself is a desirable state, but 
whether it is good or vice depends in which domain it is located in and how it is 
understood. Augustine reminds us that temptations from demons occur throughout 
a depraved life, but it is the evil will that leads humans to the city of death and, if 
they are not saved, transforms the limited miserable condition of their present life 
into eternal suffering. To avoid this fate, another external power is needed to save 
the depraved human will. The only restorer is the one who is a unity of both God 
                                                          
178 CD 14.10: Amor erat inperturbatus in Deum atque inter se coniugum fida et sincera societate 
uiuentium, et ex hoc amore grande gaudium, non desistente quod amabatur ad fruendum. Erat 
deuitatio tranquilla peccati, qua manente nullum omnino alicunde malum quod contristaret 
inruebat. CD 14.13: In occulto autem mali esse coeperunt, ut in apertam inoboedientiam laberentur. 
Non enim ad malum opus perueniretur, nisi praecessisset uoluntas mala. 
179 See CD 14.9;14.11. 
180 See CD 22.30. Cf. CD 14.11. 
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and man.181 Thus, Augustine argues that the crux of the matter of losing the 
goodness of impassibilitas is the disobedience of the will and its perverted tendency 
in the earthly city. He anchors his hope for correcting the twisted human pattern on 
the just Saviour, Christ. 
        
Grace of Christ and the therapy of passions 
Augustine appears to be ambivalent about the role of the Saviour. On the one hand, 
He should not be contaminated by human passions because they are an indication of 
the original sin and reveal the weak and embarrassing human condition. On the 
other hand, He has to subject Himself to human weakness and express the right 
emotions for the purpose of helping humans to become free from their emotional 
turbulence. Moreover, His redemption is a voluntary (voluntaria) act showing 
divine mercy and charity. Augustine emphasises that Christ’s therapy of passions 
should be based on His real humanity and real divinity and show a perfect unity of 
divine and human emotions.182 Christ’s shares in our mortality in order to let us 
participate in His immortality, as Augustine argues in De Trin. 13.9.12: 
For if the Son of God by nature became the Son of man out of compassion for the sons of 
men…how much more credible it is that the sons of man by nature become the sons of God 
by grace, and dwell in God in whom alone and from whom alone the blessed can be made 
sharers of His immortality; and that we might be convinced of this, the Son of God was 
made a sharer of our mortality?183  
In this way, the corrupted human soul will be restored to the condition of the good 
natural order for which it had been created.184 The redemption is called “the grace 
                                                          
181 CD 14.11: Arbitrium igitur uoluntatis tunc est uere liberum, cum uitiis peccatis que non seruit. 
Tale datum est a Deo; Quod amissum proprio uitio, nisi a quo dari potuit, reddi non potest. Unde 
Ueritas dicit: Si uos Filius liberauerit, tunc uere liberi eritis. Id ipsum est autem, ac si diceret: “Si 
uos Filius saluos fecerit, tunc uere salui eritis”. Inde quippe liberator, unde saluator. 
182 For Augustine’s view of redemption, see Kelly 1977, 390–395. I shall proceed to the issue of 
divine “emotions” and human passions in the Passion of Christ in Chapter 5.3. 
183 De Trin. 13.9.12: Si enim natura Dei filius propter filios hominum misericordia factus est 
hominis filius…quanto est credibilius natura filios hominis gratia Dei fieri Dei filios et habitare in 
Deo in quo solo et de quo solo esse possint beati participes immortalitatis eius effecti, propter quod 
persuadendum Dei filius particeps nostrae mortalitatis effectus est? Lenka Karfíková notes that 
“Grace (gratia) is given gratis, for it is not given according to previous merits. It is bestowed by God 
not because some are worthy of it, but because he himself wants it so”. See Karfíková 2012, 246. 
184 Augustine interprets the good natural order and the corresponding tranquility of mind in CD 
19.13: Pax itaque corporis est ordinata temperatura partium, pax animae inrationalis ordinata 
requies appetitionum…pax omnium rerum tranquillitas ordinis. Ordo est parium dispariumque 
rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio. For Augustine’s view of the cure of the soul, see Paul 
Kolbet, Augustine and the Cure of Souls: Revising a Classical Ideal (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2010). 
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of Jesus Christ” (gratia Salvatoris Christi).185 His grace is not confined to healing; 
redeemed humans will have more freedom from passions in the future, owing to 
their not being able to sin in Heaven. They will consequently be free from emotions 
of the sinful state and will be in constant delight. God will bestow upon them more 
abundant gifts of grace and make the citizens of the City of God participate in Him 
(quo [Deo] faciente dii essemus eius participatione)186 with an eternal happiness. 
Augustine describes the state of the will in the last chapter of De civitate Dei as 
follows: 
In the divine gift of free will there was to be observed a gradation such that man should first 
receive a free will by which he was able not to sin, and finally a free will by which he was 
not able to sin: the former being given to man in a state of probation, and the latter to him in 
a state of reward. But because human nature sinned when it had the power to sin, it is 
redeemed by a more abundant gift of grace so that it may be led to that state of freedom in 
which it cannot sin…In the Heavenly City, then, there will be freedom of will: one freedom 
for all, and indivisible in each. That city will be redeemed from all evil and filled with every 
good thing; constant in its enjoyment of the happiness of eternal rejoicing; forgetting 
offences and forgetting punishments.187  
In Augustine, the citizens of the Heavenly City are not only free from mundane 
passions, but they also enjoy the freedom of being unable to sin and they regain 
their eternal peace of mind. This impassibilitas with respect to negative things is 
compatible with constant enjoyment in rejoicing (iucunditate gaudiorum) in 
participating in God. By participating in God, the impassibilitas is associated with 
                                                          
185 CD 22.22: Ab huius tam miserae quasi quibusdam inferis uitae non liberat nisi gratia Saluatoris 
Christi, Dei ac Domini nostri (hoc enim nomen est ipse Iesus; interpretatur quippe Saluator), 
maxime ne post hanc miserior ac sempiterna suscipiat, non uita, sed mors. Cf. CD 14.11: Detrahitur 
porro malum non aliqua natura, quae accesserat, uel ulla eius parte sublata, sed ea, quae uitiata ac 
deprauata fuerat, sanata atque correcta. Arbitrium igitur uoluntatis tunc est uere liberum, cum 
uitiis peccatisque non seruit. Tale datum est a Deo, quod amissum proprio uitio nisi a quo dari 
potuit reddi non potest. Unde Ueritas dicit: Si uos Filius liberauerit, tunc uere liberi eritis. Id ipsum 
est autem ac si diceret: “Si uos Filius saluos fecerit, tunc uere salui eritis”. Inde quippe liberator 
unde saluator. 
186 CD 22.30: Dies enim septimus etiam nos ipsi erimus, quando eius fuerimus benedictione et 
sanctificatione pleni atque refecti. Ibi uacantes uidebimus quoniam ipse est Deus; quod nobis nos 
ipsi esse uoluimus, quando ab illo cecidimus, audientes a seductore: Eritis sicut dii et recedentes a 
uero Deo, quo faciente dii essemus eius participatione, non desertione. Cf. De Trin. 14.14.20. 
187 CD 22.30: Seruandi autem gradus erant diuini muneris, ut primum daretur liberum arbitrium, 
quo non peccare homo posset, nouissimum, quo peccare non posset, atque illud ad comparandum 
meritum, hoc ad recipiendum praemium pertineret. Sed quia peccauit ista natura cum peccare 
potuit, largiore gratia liberatur, ut ad eam perducatur libertatem, in qua peccare non possit…Erit 
ergo illius ciuitatis et una in omnibus et inseparabilis in singulis uoluntas libera, ab omni malo 
liberata et impleta omni bono, fruens indeficienter aeternorum iucunditate gaudiorum, oblita 
culparum, oblita poenarum; nec ideo tamen suae liberationis oblita, ut liberatori suo non sit 
ingrata. 
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divine love (caritas). In this respect, Augustine’s definition of freedom from 
passions has developed beyond the Stoic and Platonic doctrines in combining 
impassibilitas with the supranatural love. 
 It is evident that in his Christian belief, Augustine is dissatisfied with the 
Stoic or the Platonic framework. However he reinterprets their values on the basis 
of his pessimistic view of the human condition as a consequence of original sin and 
his eschatological views. Augustine does not believe that the Stoic ideal state of 
impassibilitas could be attained by humans, as the decisive motivational source of 
passions (voluntas) is corrupted. Departing from the Stoics, he approves certain 
appropriate and moderated emotions, providing they are controlled by the right will 
and love. Augustine believes that Christ provides the correct criteria for emotions. 
In eschatology, Augustine insists on the supranatural improvement of the life of the 
elected who will be harmoniously united in Heaven through divine love. This 
spiritual life surpasses the Stoic and the Platonic impassibilitas as well as the 
emotional state of the first human beings in Eden. Thus, Augustine develops a 
compound theological doctrine of passions that incorporates both pessimistic and 
optimistic aspects. This is partly based on his considerations on the therapy of 
passions in philosophical traditions.  
Gerard O’Daly, Marcia Colish and Peter King observe correctly that 
Augustine’s deviates from philosophical views in constructing his theological 
theory. However, what they do not state is that Augustine’s theology also contains 
traces of the Stoic and Platonic ideal of freedom from passions. This is detected by 
Johannes Brachtendorf and Gerd Van Riel, but they do not pay attention to 
Augustine’s having changed the connotation of freedom from passions, for he 
abandons the philosophical framework, even though he adopts the same 
terminology. This means that Augustine attempts to reach a balance between 
deviation and inheritance with respect to philosophical traditions in his late 
theological construction concerning the theme of freedom from passions. From this 
perspective, Augustine’s alleged “misunderstandings” are not misinterpretations, 
but are his considered deviations from his predecessors’ teachings, achieved 
through examining their doctrines from different angles and transforming their 
terminology and doctrine. 
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I have argued in the previous sections of this chapter that in dealing with the 
philosophical conceptions of propatheia, metriopatheia, apatheia and eupatheia, 
Augustine does not completely follow any of his philosophical predecessors, but 
offers instead a compound vision and synthetic evaluation from the perspective of 
theological anthropology. He presents both pessimistic and supranaturally 
optimistic views on human conditions in the different stages of history. In his 
theological doctrine of values, some pivotal philosophical concepts (for example, 
voluntas, amor, and ratio) are assigned theological connotations that reflect more 
the transformation process in Augustine rather than a misunderstanding. In 
referring to the two realms, the city of men and the City of God, Augustine 
deliberately uses the pessimistic lenses of original sin and the optimistic vision of 
divine grace in presenting his belief in the freedom from self-love (amor sui) of 
believers and in their eternal happiness in Heaven.  
 
3.5. The Main Lines of Augustine’s Understanding of the Will and 
Passions  
 
Before I proceed to a more detailed discussion on the theological context of 
passions in Augustine, I would like to provide a general overview of how he 
addresses emotions on the basis of his framing of philosophical theories. Regarding 
the issue of the will and passions, Augustine can use the notion of will rather 
broadly, as the source of all behavioural movements in humans and animals alike. 
In a more narrow sense, the term refers to the basic motivational attitude in the 
highest part of the soul (will or love) that can reject the activities of the lower parts 
as well as the movements caused by these activities. Owing to the nature of the will 
as the centre of motivation, Augustine occasionally refers to all passions as 
volitions. From the viewpoint of the controlling power of the will, the 
non-prevented actual passions and their behavioural impulses can also be regarded 
as being voluntary, after the spontaneous initial stage. This hierarchy between the 
will and the passions is manifested in Augustine applying the Stoic classification of 
the different types of passions as forms of will or love, the passions being good or 
evil according to whether the controlling the will or love is regarded as either good 
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or evil.188 
 While the will as a general motivational centre or love is dispositional,189 its 
controlling function is seen in its actual assent or dissent with respect to particular 
suggestions. Augustine addresses the difference between the controlling power and 
spontaneous emotional movements in his discussion of first movements where he 
applies the Stoic analysis. He diverges from the Stoics, however, by referring to the 
spontaneous first movements as passions and instead of prepassions, as the Stoics 
did (see section 3.1 above). While the Stoics regarded the first movements without 
an assent as being morally neutral, but nonetheless potentially disturbing mental 
acts and something that one should eradicate, Augustine concluded that they are 
often evil and should be rejected as soon as possible, as they are regarded as 
voluntary if not expelled. Augustine holds that their being immediately passions is 
evidence that the soul is not able to fully control itself, being spontaneously moved 
by the lower part. This, in Augustine’s theological anthropology, reveals the 
damage of the fallen soul. The soul suffers from the relative autonomy of the 
passions with respect to the controlling power. Moreover, spontaneous passions are 
often evil, which indicates this damage even more clearly. Christians who are 
motivated to avoid sinful movements realise that they occur before an opportunity 
to prevent them. Owing to their pride and self-satisfaction, the Stoics do not refer to 
first movements as passions. The Christians are more humble and confess their lack 
of full control, resulting from the disturbing domination of the emotional powers as 
well as the impurity of the first movements as spontaneous temptations to sins. 
According to Augustine, what occurred in the Fall was that the will of the 
intellectual part of the soul turned away from loving God to loving itself instead as 
the ruler and authority. This turn of love is pride (superbia), the source of all sins.190 
Even though the first pride is a free choice by the will and the continuous attitude of 
the fallen souls without the medicine of grace, Augustine also regards pride as a 
passion. When Adam fell away from the love of God and the ordered social love, 
the self-chosen sinful order became the constitution of the soul. Its damaged mode 
of functioning is the burden of the original sin which manifests itself in egoism, 
disordered spontaneous passions, and emotional disturbances. This negative 
                                                          
188 See CD 14.6–7. For the notion of will, see Knuuttila 2004, 152–172.  
189 See also Byers 2013, 92–94. 
190 CD 12.1; 12.6; 14.13; De Trin. 12.14; 13.23. 
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experiential reality demonstrates the consequences of pride, the misguided attempt 
to become the Lord of one’s life. Furthermore, the emotional part of the soul 
functions autonomously and without order, being changed by original sin to the 
extent that it produces desires, fears, and sufferings. These passions, which did not 
belong to it before the Fall, are triggered by the sinful evaluation of sensory things 
and imaginations in accordance with the perverse self-love of persons turned into 
themselves (incurvatus in se). This is particularly clear in the case of 
psychosomatic sexual passions (concupiscentia) and the inclination to social 
dominance (libido dominandi). (See Chapter 4 below).  
Due to the impact of Stoicism on Augustine’s thought, he occasionally 
refers to emotional movements of the soul as disturbances, particularly in the 
context of sinful mental phenomena. However, Augustine also operates with the 
Platonic notion of the divisions of the soul and argues that its destroyed hierarchic 
structure explains the experienced disturbances. He also differs from the Stoic 
position that all emotions are evil. According to Augustine, even fallen, disturbed 
souls may show compassion as well as adequate fear and sorrow, which derive from 
human sociability and are not evil as such, even though the general human 
motivation is not as good as it was before the Fall and people are ultimately 
dominated by sinful self-love.191 
Concerning the freedom from passions, Augustine distinguishes between 
three different uses of apatheia (impassibilitas) in CD 14.9: Firstly, apatheia refers 
to freedom from disturbing thoughts that give rise to sins if not expelled as soon as 
possible. This theological apatheia is not possible in the present life. It pertains to 
Adam and Eve before the Fall and is also a characteristic of Heavenly life. 
Secondly, if apatheia refers to the ability to restrain oneself and remain immune to 
any emotions in this life as the Stoics claim, it becomes a form of pride and 
insensitivity. Thirdly, if apatheia is used to describe a condition in which there is no 
fear, pain, or other negative experiences, it is the apatheia that Adam and Eve 
experienced in paradise and the blessed ones experience in Heaven. None of these 
three types of freedom from emotions describes the present condition of human 
beings, whether Christians or not. Theological apatheia with respect to freedom 
                                                          
191 CD 9.5; 14.8; 14.13–15. For Augustine’s view of volitions and the virtues of some emotions, see 
also James Wetzel, Augustine and the Limits of Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), 45–111; 219–235.  
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from sinful movements is something the Christians hope for, and their will and 
emotions are improved in this respect through the supernatural influence of grace. 
The impact of grace is the only efficacious therapy of emotions, and not even that 
can make humans completely free from evil movements until the substantial 
transformation of the damaged soul in Heaven. (See Chapter 5 below). 
Augustine does not develop a nuanced theory on the psychology of 
passions, but he is nevertheless very interested in the emotional aspects of both 
internal and external human behaviour. While Augustine occasionally employs the 
notion of will when discussing passions, he also maintains that occurrent passions 
often suggest things that are against the preferences of one’s will. The issue of how 
to free oneself from sinful passions will be addressed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE RENEWAL AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF 
PASSIONS IN SOCIAL LIFE 
       
Nec sic esse quisque debet otiosus, ut in eodem otio utilitatem non cogitet proximi, nec sic 
actuosus, ut contemplationem non requirat Dei…Itaque ab studio cognoscendae ueritatis 
nemo prohibetur, quod ad laudabile pertinet otium. (CD 19.19) 
  
Quam ob rem otium sanctum quaerit caritas ueritatis; negotium iustum suscipit 
necessitas caritatis. Quam sarcinam si nullus inponit, percipiendae atque intuendae 
uacandum est ueritati; si autem inponitur, suscipienda est propter caritatis necessitatem; 
sed nec sic omni modo ueritatis delectatio deserenda est, ne subtrahatur illa suauitas et 
opprimat ista necessitas. (CD 19.19) 
 
Transibo ergo et istam naturae meae, gradibus ascendens ad eum, qui fecit me. (Conf. 
10.8.12) 
 
In this chapter, I shall present a survey of Augustine’s view of passions that occur 
in social life as well as his attitude towards the freedom from passions in the 
earthly city (terrena ciuitas). As mentioned earlier, many scholars contend that 
Augustine does not advocate freedom from passions in this life. Their main 
argument is that Augustine warns that to live righteously, impassibilitas should be 
avoided. Furthermore, he also characterises impassibilitas as an unhealthy and 
numb state, something worse than vices. However, it is also evident that 
throughout the different phases of his life, Augustine followed various sectarian 
ascetic ideals.1 In fact, his interest in asceticism preceded his conversion in Milan. 
Beginning in 395, he spent his continent life as a bishop in a monastery. There he 
established monastic communities for practitioners and wrote treatises to advocate 
continence.2 Augustine offers a rather controversial picture of whether one can 
justify adopting an ascetic tradition without maintaining emotional commitments 
to an earthly life. 
Scholars often discuss Augustine’s argumentation on passions in three 
contexts formed by his classification of human society based on the household 
                                                 
1 For various ascetic traditions that influenced Augustine, such as Manichaeanism, Neoplatonism 
and some Christian ascetics represented by St Antony, Jerome, Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of 
Nyssa, see George Lawless, “Augustine’s Decentring of Asceticism”, in Augustine and his Critics, 
ed. Robert Dodaro and George Lawless (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 142–145. 
2 In Retractationes 2.21–25, Augustine summarises the theme of marriage and monastic life in a 
series of treatises (De opere monachorum, De bono coniugali, De sancta uirginitate, De Genesi ad 
litteram, Contra litteras Petiliani, among others) to respond to the debate between Jovinian 
(Iouiniani haeresis) and Jerome. See P. G. Walsh, Augustine: De bono coniugali; De sancta 
uirginitate (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), xxix; 148–151. 
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(domus), city (ciuitas) and world (orbis terrae). 3  I shall evaluate various 
observations by these authors and analyse Augustine’s attitudes in these contexts. 
In the first section, I shall describe the main lines of Augustine’s social theory and 
trace the historical background of his conception of the two cities as well as its 
relevance to his perspective on passions. In the second section, I shall explore 
Augustine’s views on sexuality, marriage (connubium) and abstinence 
(continentia), ascertaining whether these are aligned in terms of the merits among 
them and then determine Augustine’s vision of concupiscence and continence. In 
section three, I shall examine Augustine’s attitude towards ecclesiastical elitism 
and secularism, inquiring whether life in a monastery or the church ranks higher 
than living a secular life. In section four, I shall discuss Augustine’s view on the 
“just war” and explore whether he is a pacifist, focusing on the concept of war and 
peace in his thought. On the basis of these analyses, I shall argue that Augustine 
shifts the issue of lifestyles into the field of spiritual life as well as the moral 
improvement of emotions. He therefore emphasises the gradual ascent (gradibus 
ascendens) of renewed passions as a realistic scenario of the aspired perfectionism 
that occurs through grace in the Heavenly City. In this sense, human merits, such 
as martyrdom, monastic asceticism or secular conjugal chastity, are envisioned as 
being different gifts from God for improvement. Augustine’s notion of the 
improvement of emotions is supported by his faith in divine grace and the 
doctrine of perfect spirituality and happiness in the Kingdom of Heaven. 
 
4.1. The Main Lines of Augustine’s Social Theory 
 
The horizontal and vertical lines in Augustine’s theory of saeculum are composed 
of the themes of two cities (ciuitates duae) and pilgrimage (peregrinatio).4 In 
                                                 
3 CD 19.7: Post ciuitatem uel urbem sequitur orbis terrae, in quo tertium gradum ponunt societatis 
humanae, incipientes a domo atque inde ad urbem, deinde ad orbem progrediendo uenientes. CD 
19.3: Hanc uitam beatam etiam socialem perhibent esse, quae amicorum bona propter se ipsa 
diligat sicut sua eisque propter ipsos hoc uelit quod sibi; siue in domo sint, sicut coniux et liberi et 
quicumque domestici, siue in loco, ubi domus est eius, sicuti est urbs, ut sunt hi qui ciues uocantur, 
siue in orbe toto, ut sunt gentes quas ei societas humana coniungit, siue in ipso mundo, qui 
censetur nomine caeli et terrae. 
4 Xia Dongqi suggests that the notion of “two cities” and the three periods of sacra historia 
(paradise, saeculum, and heaven) are closely related in Augustine. He distinguishes horizontal and 
vertical perspectives in Augustine’s theory of saeculum, emphasising the notion of peregrinatio in 
analysing the doctrine of saeculum. See Xia Dongqi 2007, 65–82; 111. For the distinction between 
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relation to this picture, Augustine outlines a human society consisting of 
inhabitants who intermingle and possess two different loves, caritas and 
cupiditas. These two loves coexist in the earthly city, but due to their opposite 
tendencies with respect to the pursuit of dominion, they lead to contrasting results 
in the anticipated future. The two cities as well as the corresponding loves 
represent the basic train of thought in Augustine’s social theory, especially in his 
late work De civitate Dei. I shall trace the background of these ideas as well as 
their content. 
Augustine’s position on the conception of the two cities undergoes a 
process of development. The notion of two classes of humans (duo genera) first 
appears in Augustine’s early writing De uera religione (389–391). 5  In 
Enarrationes in Psalmos (392–395), he compares the future church to Jerusalem 
and refers to the image of two opposite symbolic cities, Jerusalem and Babylon.6 
By dividing humans into two classes and by referring to symbolic cities, 
Augustine’s tendency to formulate antithetically opposing forms of life becomes 
apparent. Beginning in the year 400, he continues to frequently mention the 
antithesis between Jerusalem and Babylon in some of his writings, such as De 
catechizandis rudibus and sermons (for example, see Mainz 9). 7  However, 
Augustine is inclined to explain the “intermingled” nature of these two cities, 
                                                                                                                                     
sacra historia and saecula historia in Augustine’s theology, see R. A. Markus, Saeculum: History 
and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 
[1970]), 1–21; Sacred and Secular: Studies on Augustine and Latin Christianity (Aldershot: 
Variorum, 1994), 84–85.  
5 Augustine developed the conception of “two classes” (duo genera) in De uera religione prior to 
using the terminology of “two cities”. See uera rel. 27.50: …cuius tamquam unius hominis uita est 
ab Adam usque ad finem huius saeculi, ita sub diuinae prouidentiae legibus administratur, ut in 
duo genera distributum appareat. Many scholars take De uera religione as the earliest source for 
the idea of two cities, even though he does not use the term “duae ciuitates”. See Van Oort 1991, 
108; O’Daly 1999, 63. 
6 Augustine equates the church with Jerusalem with an angelic life distinguished from secularity in 
a sermon on Psalm 9, which probably was written in 392; En. Ps. 9.12: Ipse habitat in Zion, quod 
interpretatur speculatio, et gestat imaginem ecclesiae quae nunc est; sicut Ierusalem gestat 
imaginem ecclesiae quae futura est, id est ciuitatis sanctorum iam angelica uita fruentium, quia 
Ierusalem interpretatur uisio pacis. Praecedit autem speculatio uisionem, sicut ista ecclesia 
praecedit eam quae promittitur, ciuitatem immortalem et aeternam. A short time later, he orients 
to Jerusalem (or Zion) as the life to come, whereas Babylon represents the imprisonment in the 
present life (or the city of “confusion”). These are regarded as being opposites. See En. Ps. 148.4; 
145.20. For the theme of Jerusalem and Babylon in Augustine, see Van Oort 1991, 118. 
7 O’Daly underscores the significance of the recently discovered sermon Mainz 9 (dated to 403–
405/6) as witnessing development of the theme of two cities, arguing that the contrasting image of 
Jerusalem and Babylon is frequently used to symbolise the earthly city and the City of God. See 
O’Daly 1999, 63. 
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arguing that they are intermingled in the bodies, but separated by will. 8  At 
approximately the same time, Augustine develops the account of the two loves (in 
angels and humans) as well as his conception of earthly pilgrimage (peregrinatio) 
of the city of God in De Genesi ad litteram (ca.401–415).9 This was a significant 
preparation for Augustine to further advance his cardinal doctrine of two cities 
from the perspective of love in De civitate Dei. Later, the eschatological vision of 
the two cities is adumbrated in Enchiridion (421/422), which parallels the closing 
books of De civitate Dei.10 This late work presents Augustine’s thoughts on the 
doctrine of two cities, presenting a series of antithetical categories such as ciuitas 
caelestis versus terrena, ciuitas superna versus mundi, ciuitas aeterna versus 
temporalis, ciuitas sancta versus iniqua, ciuitas Dei versus Diaboli, ciuitas 
piorum versus impiorum, ciuitas immortalis versus mortalis, domus Dei (templum 
Dei) versus hominum, and ciuitas dilecta versus priuata, among others. 11 
Furthermore, the difference between “Jerusalem and Babylon” is mentioned in 
many places in the City of God as well, especially in Books 16 to 18.12 At the 
same time, the theme of love is further exploited in the sense of the two loves that 
construct these two cities.13 It is evident that Augustine’s doctrine of the two cities 
in De civitate Dei encompasses most of the themes of his previous writings that 
                                                 
8  Augustine uses the terminology of “two cities” (duae ciuitates) for the first time in De 
catechizandis rudibus and stresses that these two cities are mixed with respect to bodies but not 
with respect to wills. See cat. rud. 19.31: duae itaque ciuitates, una iniquorum, altera sanctorum, 
ab initio generis humani usque in finem saeculi perducuntur, nunc permixtae corporibus, sed 
uoluntatibus separatae, in die iudicii uero etiam corpore separandae. He continues the symbolic 
use of Jerusalem and Babylon to refer to the two cities in cat. rud. 21.37: sicut autem Ierusalem 
significat ciuitatem societatem que sanctorum, sic Babylonia significat ciuitatem societatem que 
iniquorum, quoniam dicitur interpretari confusio.  
9 Gn. litt. 11.15.20: Hi duo amores, quorum alter sanctus est, alter inmundus; alter socialis, alter 
priuatus; alter communi utilitati consulens propter supernam societatem, alter etiam rem 
communem in potestatem propriam redigens propter adrogantem dominationem…quarum etiam 
quadam temporali conmixtione peragitur saeculum, donec ultimo iudicio separentur, et altera 
coniuncta angelis bonis in rege suo uitam consequatur aeternam, altera coniuncta angelis malis in 
ignem cum rege suo mittatur aeternum. Cf. Gn. litt. 12.28.56. These opposites are repeated in CD 
(especially Books 11–22). See O’Daly 1999, 64–65. 
10 En. Ps. 64.2 and ench. 111, see O’Daly 1999, 65–66. 
11 On the expressions for the two cities as well as their distributions in De civitate Dei, see Xia 
Dongqi 2007, 88–89. Cf. Van Oort 1991, 115–116. 
12 E.g., CD 15.20; 16.10; 17.3–4; 17.12; 17.16; 18.2; 18.18; 18.22; 20.21; 22.6. See Xia Dongqi 
2007, 89 (n. 6). Cf. Van Oort 1991, 119. 
13 En. Ps. 64.2: Duas istas ciuitates faciunt duo amores: Ierusalem facit amor Dei; Babyloniam 
facit amor saeculi. Interroget ergo se quisque quid amet, et inueniet unde sit ciuis. Cf. CD 14.28. 
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have been mentioned above.14 However, this does not imply that the theme of the 
two cities in De civitate Dei is merely a repetition of Augustine’s previous 
position. Parrish argues that even though there are similarities with his earlier 
works, Augustine deepens his conceptions of the mixture of the cities and two 
loves (duo amores) and presents a thematic complexity in De civitate Dei.15 In 
other words, Augustine’s understanding of the theory of two cities undergoes a 
long formulation process that constitutes a synthesis rather than a simple iteration.  
While the relationship between the two cities can be characterised as an 
antithesis, this division does not represent an absolute dualism in this world. This 
is because Augustine’s discussion is based on the theological tradition that 
postulates a complex whole of the citizens of terrena ciuitas and the ciuitas 
peregrina Dei.16 The citizen of the latter is a peregrinus in the historical world as 
well as an alien, not having a home here, but only in the eternal and better city in 
the prospective future. Thus, the concept of peregrinatio embeds the theme of the 
City of God in a dynamic historical perspective involving an origin (exortus), 
process (procursus) and merited ends (fines debiti). This pilgrimage is associated 
with the reality of the two cities in hoc saeculo, but it can also be traced to the life 
in Paradise before the Fall and extended forward to the heavenly life after the 
resurrection, thus forming a tripartite continuum. 17  Augustine mentions this 
sequence several times in his De civitate Dei, not only as a significant historical 
line of the City of God, but also as the basis for the structure of the latter part of 
                                                 
14 For the connections between these earlier works and the City of God on the exegesis of two 
cities, see O’Daly 1999, 265–267. 
15 John M. Parrish maintains that there is a “moral opacity” in Augustine’s vision of the two cities 
associated with an imitative relationship and even “mutual reflection” between pride and charity 
(or the earthly city and the Heavenly City). Although the two cities (or two loves) are different in 
nature, it is difficult to differentiate them in this world, the earthly city being a sort of shadowy 
imitation of the Heavenly City, and pride as a self-centred love erroneously imitating charity. 
Parrish argues that Augustine’s account of the two cities as an opaque and complex relationship is 
a deepening of his previous understanding. See Parrish 2005, 209–235. O’Donovan also notes that 
there is an important change in the conception of the two loves in Augustine’s writings prior to his 
De civitate Dei. See Oliver O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine (Eugene: Wipf 
and Stock Publishers, 2006), Chapter 3. 
16 At the level of saeculum, it is neither right to exaggerate the bipolarity of the two cities as an 
absolute dualism nor to emphasise that there is a third ciuitas, an independent and neutral area. For 
a discussion of the sources pertaining to Augustine’s doctrine of the two cities, see Van Oort 1991, 
235–254; Xia Dongqi 2007, 107–110; O’Daly 1999, 53–66. 
17 CD 1.35: Perplexae quippe sunt istae duae ciuitates in hoc saeculo inuicem que permixtae, 
donec ultimo iudicio dirimantur; De quarum exortu et procursu et debitis finibus quod dicendum 
arbitror, quantum diuinitus adiuuabor, expediam propter gloriam ciuitatis Dei, quae alienis a 
contrario comparatis clarius eminebit. 
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the work (four books per part from Book 11 to 22).18 According to this writing 
scheme, Augustine does not separate the pilgrimaging city of God (ciuitas 
peregrina Dei) from history, but rather emphasises the different origin and ending 
of the two cities to better understand the mundane political and social life. 
Let us now examine this tripartite division of history. The original 
providential design has all rational beings forming a sancta ciuitas, enjoying their 
supreme good, the Creator. 19  They lived a beatific life (beata uita) in a 
harmonious society and they obeyed the natural law (lex naturae).20 To Augustine, 
this ciuitas was part of divine providence (diuina prouidentia)21 and it obeyed the 
natural order (ordo naturae) because the order and hierarchy of the cosmos was 
essential in the creation, displaying goodness and beauty.22 Augustine regards the 
natural order as the structuring principle of the prelapsarian ciuitas: “the peace of 
the Heavenly City is a perfectly ordered and perfectly harmonious fellowship in 
the enjoyment of God, and of one another in God. The peace of all things lies in 
the tranquility of order; and order is the disposition of equal and unequal things in 
                                                 
18 Augustine repeats the tripartite division several times in CD (for example, 1.35; 10.32; 11.1; 
17.24) to indicate the direction of his work. In his letter to Firmus, Augustine stresses the 
significance of this type of division for formulating the symmetrical structure of the Books 11–22. 
Epistulae nuper in lucem prolatae 1A. 1:…sic enim a nobis pars eadem distributa est, ut quattuor 
ostenderent exortum illius ciuitatis totidem que procursum, siue dicere malumus, excursum, 
quattuor uero ultimi debitos fines. See O’Daly 1999, 71–73. 
19 Angels are the first citizens in the holy city (sancta ciuitas). Augustine argues that angels shared 
the immutable light when the light was created and became citizens in the holy city. CD 11.7: 
…aut lucis nomine significata est sancta ciuitas in sanctis angelis et spiritibus beatis.  CD 11.9: 
Nunc, quoniam de sanctae ciuitatis exortu dicere institui et prius quod ad sanctos angelos adtinet 
dicendum putaui, quae huius ciuitatis et magna pars est et eo beatior, quod numquam peregrinata, 
quae hinc diuina testimonia suppetant, quantum satis uidebitur, Deo largiente explicare 
curabo…Cum enim dixit Deus: fiat lux, et facta est lux, si recte in hac luce creatio intellegitur 
angelorum, profecto facti sunt participes lucis aeternae, quod est ipsa incommutabilis sapientia 
Dei…ut ea luce inluminati, qua creati, fierent lux et uocarentur dies participatione incommutabilis 
lucis et diei. Cf. Conf. 12.15; Gn. litt. 1.32; 4.45. 
20 For lex naturae, see De sermone Domini in monte 11.32. 
21 CD 14.11: Sed quia Deus cuncta praesciuit et ideo quoque hominem peccaturum ignorare non 
potuit: secundum id, quod praesciuit atque disposuit, ciuitatem sanctam debemus adserere, non 
secundum illud, quod in nostram cognitionem peruenire non potuit, quia in Dei dispositione non 
fuit. CD 11.10: Quoniam Deus non aliquid nesciens fecit, quod nec de quolibet homine artifice 
recte dici potest; Porro si sciens fecit omnia, ea utique fecit quae nouerat. 
22 En. Ps. 144.13: Ista contextio creaturae, ista ordinatissima pulchritudo, ab imis ad summa 
conscendens, a summis ad ima descendens, nusquam interrupta, sed dissimilibus temperata, tota 
laudat Deum. For the doctrine of ordo and ciuitas, Miikka Ruokanen provides a nuanced 
discussion in his book Theology of Social Life in Augustine’s De civitate Dei, especially in 
Chapters 2–4, see Ruokanen 1993, 29–42; 77–111. 
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such a way as to give to each its proper place”.23 In this ordo, created things are 
classified in a hierarchy, with living things ranking above inanimate objects, the 
sentient above the insentient, rational beings above irrational ones, and immortals 
above mortals. As God’s works, all these creations and the natural order are 
good. 24  Nonetheless, Augustine elaborates that while rational beings have 
dominion over irrational beings, they are not created to rule over their equals: “He 
did not intend that His rational creature, made in His own image, should have 
lordship over any but irrational creatures”.25 It is evident that in the initial ciuitas, 
these rational citizens formed a unified society, obedient to God’s authority 
(auctoritas) and living in the light of the natural law and order. This created a 
centralised model for society—God’s love as dominion over rational beings. 
However, the two cities originated from the depravity of some angels who refused 
to obey the mastery of God; they fell in love with their own power as if true 
authority belonged to themselves.26 As a consequence, they ceased praising the 
glory of God and turned their will against the higher dominus, indulging in the 
pursuit of their own glory with an appetite or desire (appetitus or concupiscentia). 
These angels thus violated the natural order and lapsed into an illusory state of 
self-expansion. As a result, rather than directing their love and concupiscence to 
the supreme good, they wrongly directed them to the created being (res creatum). 
This perverse direction of the angels’ will and love is the fundamental cause of 
their sin (peccatum), as is as their pride (superbia) in their quest for ownership of 
                                                 
23 CD 19.13: …pax caelestis ciuitatis ordinatissima et concordissima societas fruendi Deo et 
inuicem in Deo, pax omnium rerum tranquillitas ordinis. Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum 
sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio. 
24 CD 11.16: In his enim, quae quoquo modo sunt et non sunt quod Deus est a quo facta sunt, 
praeponuntur uiuentia non uiuentibus, sicut ea, quae habent uim gignendi uel etiam appetendi, 
his, quae isto motu carent; et in his, quae uiuunt, praeponuntur sentientia non sentientibus, sicut 
arboribus animalia; et in his, quae sentiunt, praeponuntur intellegentia non intellegentibus, sicut 
homines pecoribus; et in his, quae intellegunt, praeponuntur inmortalia mortalibus, sicut angeli 
hominibus. CD 11.15: Non enim est ulla natura etiam in extremis infimis que bestiolis, quam non 
ille constituit, a quo est omnis modus, omnis species, omnis ordo, sine quibus nihil rerum inueniri 
uel cogitari potest; quanto magis angelica creatura, quae omnia cetera, quae Deus condidit! Cf. 
CD 11.22; 11.23.  
25 CD 19.15: Rationalem factum ad imaginem suam noluit nisi inrationabilibus dominari. 
26 CD 11.13: …suo recusans esse subditus creatori et sua per superbiam uelut priuata potestate 
laetatus, ac per hoc falsus et fallax, quia nec quisquam potestatem omnipotentis euadit, et qui per 
piam subiectionem noluit tenere quod uere est, adfectat per superbam elationem simulare quod 
non est. CD 14.11: Postea uero quam superbus ille angelus ac per hoc inuidus per eandem 
superbiam a Deo ad semet ipsum conuersus et quodam quasi tyrannico fastu gaudere subditis 
quam esse subditus eligens de spiritali paradiso cecidit. 
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power: 
For the defections of the will are not towards evil things, but are themselves evil: that is, 
they are not defections towards things which are evil by nature and in themselves; rather, 
it is the defection of the will itself which is evil, because against the order of nature. It is a 
turning away from that which has supreme being and towards that which has less…Nor is 
pride the fault of him who gives power, or of power itself, but of the soul which 
perversely loves its own power, and despises a more righteous higher Power. Hence, he 
who perversely loves the good of any nature whatsoever is made evil through this very 
good even as he attains it, and is made wretched because deprived of a greater good.27 
Augustine states that the depravity of these angels is due to their free choice, that 
of their will. This was a fall from an immutable good to a mutable good, from 
plenitude to deficiency, and from security to infirmity,28 but it all occurred due to 
the misguided direction of their will and love. Thus, the angels are divided into 
those who are good and the bad, constituting two cities distinguished by two loves 
(devoted to different objects), amor Dei (usque ad contemptum sui) and amor sui 
(usque ad contemptum Dei): “Even though angels rank above men in the natural 
order, good men are nonetheless placed above the wicked angels according to the 
law of righteousness”. 29  Afterwards, out of envy (inuidus), the fallen angel 
seduced Eve to yield her desire to sin and for Eve to seduce Adam. They were 
both disobedient to the commandment and authority of God. In other words, the 
formation of the two cities among the angels occurred prior to the Fall of the first 
humans and they were deceived by those envious angels who sought to share their 
depravity (such as inoboedientia, superbia, amor sui) with men.  
Although the fallen angels and men could violate the natural order, they 
                                                 
27 CD 12.8: Deficitur enim non ad mala, sed male, id est non ad malas naturas, sed ideo male, 
quia contra ordinem naturarum ab eo quod summe est ad id quod minus est…Nec superbia uitium 
est dantis potestatem uel ipsius etiam potestatis, sed animae peruerse amantis potestatem suam 
potentioris iustiore contempta. Ac per hoc qui peruerse amat cuiuslibet naturae bonum, etiamsi 
adipiscatur, ipse fit in bono malus et miser meliore priuatus. 
28 Timo Nisula presents a concise survey on the development of the notion of the “Fall” and the 
“punishment” in Augustine’s works during various periods, such as De Genesi adversus 
Manichaeos, De uera religione, De libero arbitro, arguing that rational beings have genuine free 
choice of will and the corresponding voluntary actions before the Fall, but they fell into sin due to 
their own fault rather than necessity and received the just divine punishment (iusta diuina 
supplicia). This is obviously different from the Manichaean dualism. “Opposing the Manichaean, 
radically dualistic and materialistic view of evil, Augustine stresses that sin is not an involuntary 
event that could only be said to occur or happen in us without our own doing…On the contrary, sin 
is a result of the free choice of the will, and therefore it is appropriate that it should be punished”. 
Nisula 2012, 68. 
29 CD 11.16:…cum ordine naturae angeli hominibus, tamen lege iustitiae boni homines malis 
angelis praeferantur. 
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were not able to escape the juridical function of the eternal law of righteousness 
(lex iustitiae). In an eschatological sense, a judgement that is just and deserved 
will be passed by the Lord (dominus) to distinguish the City of God from the city 
of the devil.30 Augustine believes that the citizens of the City of God will enjoy 
the state of ordered obedience to God, whereas the evil angels and all who belong 
to them will receive the subsequent just punishment as a result of their refusing 
the authority of God and choosing to love themselves rather than God.31 In the 
end, there is a sharp division between the two groups of citizens through the 
punishment of everlasting unhappiness and the eternal reward in the happy world; 
this implies some type of dualism.32 Augustine uses various opposite expressions 
to indicate the reasons for this differentiation, such as oboedientia-inoboedientia, 
pietas-impietas, superbia-humilis, fruitur-non fruitur Deo, and in Domino 
gloriatur-gloria in se ipsa.33 But the primary cause leading to a just punishment 
(iustum supplicium) is “the proud desire for their own power” (superba 
concupiscentia propriae potestatis). 34  This means that Augustine ultimately 
attributes the origin and end of the fallen city to self-love (amor sui)35 that is 
                                                 
30 CD 21.1: Cum per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum, iudicem uiuorum atque mortuorum, ad 
debitos fines ambae peruenerint ciuitates, quarum est una Dei, altera diaboli, cuius modi 
supplicium sit futurum diaboli et omnium ad eum pertinentium. 
31 CD 22.1: Ita natura, quae fruebatur Deo, optimam se institutam docet etiam ipso uitio, quo ideo 
misera est quia non fruitur Deo; qui casum angelorum uoluntarium iustissima poena sempiternae 
infelicitatis obstrinxit atque in eo summo bono permanentibus ceteris, ut de sua sine fine 
permansione certi essent, tamquam ipsius praemium permansionis dedit; qui fecit hominem etiam 
ipsum rectum cum eodem libero arbitrio, terrenum quidem animal, sed caelo dignum, si suo 
cohaereret auctori, miseria similiter, si eum desereret, secutura, qualis naturae huius modi 
conueniret.        
32 Augustine believes that according to lex iustitiae, there will be an adjustment based on the 
original natural order, that is, the mundane pilgrimaging citizens of the City of God will assume 
the places left in the Heavenly City by the fallen angels, forming an antithesis to the group of bad 
angels and their followers in Hell. CD 22.1: Qui de mortali progenie merito iusteque damnata 
tantum populum gratia sua colligit, ut inde suppleat et instauret partem, quae lapsa est 
angelorum.  
33 See CD 14.28. 
34 Gn. litt. 11.11.15: Magna opera domini, exquisita in omnes uoluntates eius…Cur ergo non 
permitteret temtari hominem illa temtatione prodendum, conuincendum, puniendum, cum superba 
concupiscentia propriae potestatis quod conceperat pareret suoque fetu confunderetur iustoque 
subplicio a superbiae atque inoboedientiae malo posteros deterreret, quibus ea conscribenda et 
adnuntianda parabantur? Cf. Gn. litt. 11.13.17; 11.30.39; De Trin. 12.16. Timo Nisula maintains 
that concupiscentia potestatis, as a peruersus sui amor, plays a fundamental role in the chain of 
events of the Fall, which comprises the contra-position of the two loves as well as the consequent 
two cities. Nisula 2012, 99–100; Cf. Ruokanen 1993, 79–80.  
35 Augustine contrasts two types of love in Gn. litt. 11.15.20 (Hi duo amores, quorum alter sanctus 
est, alter inmundus; alter socialis, alter priuatus…), as an opposition between amor sui and amor 
Dei, or between cupiditas and caritas. In this context, Augustine is stressing the connotation of 
  
126 
 
portrayed as a striving of its citizens for their own dominion without piety. Self-
love therefore becomes a central notion in Augustine’s social theory.  
Augustine does not fully juxtapose the two citizens at the intermediate 
mundane stage. In addition, when he considers the complexity of the concept of 
self-love, Augustine uses an opaque image of the earthly city. Firstly, self-love is 
a mark of original sin and it is common to all men. As a desire for power of one’s 
own, self-love reflects a degraded tendency of the will to orient towards inferior 
good rather than supreme good. The citizens of the Heavenly City and the earthly 
city, in the sinful state, cannot rid themselves of this tendency. As for the 
pilgrimage citizens (ciuitas caelestis peregrina in terra), their realistic mission is 
not to completely eliminate the desire for self-love, but to search for the right love 
to avoid being bound by evil desire. This grace-based pursuit of right love, 
available to humans but not fallen angels, is an expedient device to counter the 
negative effects brought on by depravation instead of eradicating the egoistic 
desires once for all, which indicates the complex situation of fallen humans.36 
Augustine is not interested in providing a positive orientation for the concept of 
self-love, but reveals its embarrassing nature and inevitability in the saeculum, 
since no one can completely break away from it in this life. Thus, the mixed state 
of the citizens of the two cities in one society is an inherited punishment as 
evidenced by a deprived inclination to self-love.  
Secondly, the desire for dominion that is subjected to self-love is 
transformed into the political and social life as libido dominandi. A significant 
manifestation of evil self-love is the tendency to imitate the authority of God and 
citizens of both cities are guilty of this. If one’s desire for self-love is not 
                                                                                                                                     
priuatus amor and the downward movement of cupiditas as amor peruersus as hallmarks of self-
love. Moreover, he refers it to the slipping from the universal community to the private as “the 
beginning of sin” and “the root of all evil”. See De Trin. 12.9.14: potestatem quippe suam diligens 
anima a communi uniuerso ad priuatam partem prolabitur, et apostatica illa superbia quod 
initium peccati dicitur, cum in uniuersitate creaturae deum rectorem secuta legibus eius optime 
gubernari potuisset, plus aliquid uniuerso appetens atque id sua lege gubernare molita, quia nihil 
est amplius uniuersitate, in curam partilem truditur et sic aliquid amplius concupiscendo minuitur, 
unde et auaritia dicitur radix omnium malorum. On the idea of self-love as a fall and the related 
division of two cities, see Markus 1994, 245–254.  
36  O’Donovan lists three quotations from Augustine to demonstrate that Augustine’s attitude 
toward the concept of “self-love” looks dilemmatic: 1. “The primal destruction of man was self-
love”. 2. “There is no one who does not love himself; but one must search for the right love and 
avoid the warped”. 3. “Indeed you did not love yourself when you did not love the God who made 
you”. See O’Donovan 2006, 1. 
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redirected toward the right object (God and neighbours), one is isolated from the 
community and turned to a self-centered pursuit of the perverse dominion. If those 
who imitate authority are seeking the love of their community as well as God, this 
will manifest itself as caritas rather than as cupiditas. We see that the imitation of 
authority constitutes yet another shared feature of two citizens in human society. 
Augustine presents these two features, the mixed body (corpus permixtum) and 
the desire for domination, at three levels: household, city, and world.  
 
(1) Household (domus) 
For an ancient Roman family, the household was subjected to the authority of 
paterfamilias, which established a patriarchal foundation for the community and 
society. This paterfamilias has dominion (dominium or potestas) over family 
members (wife, children, relatives or adopted children), as well as servants, slaves 
and property. Even though there are some differences between the concepts of 
familia and domus,37 the most important household relationships that are anchored 
in the power of paterfamilias are the husband-wife, father-children, master-slaves, 
and owner-properties, and these form the microcosmic part of the social web. The 
paterfamilias has the patria potestas to punish family members who disturb 
domestic peace (pax domestica). This domestic discipline reflects the 
transcendental authority of God in Augustine. This imitation of dominion is 
mainly evident in the following relationships: 
(a) Husband over wife. The primal family unit that represents a servile 
dependence is the conjugal relation. If a wife is subdued to her husband’s 
dominion, this is a pax recta; if the reverse occurs, this is a pax peruersa.38 As an 
                                                 
37 The concept of familia refers to all agnati, the kin-core, dependants, and other related persons 
(personae) including slaves and servants, whereas the terminology of domus covers a wider 
semantic range that includes property, physical house, estate, kinship group, slaves, etc. Within a 
family, there are also different stereotypes of wife are possible, which depend on the contract. If 
the marriage is sine manu, the wife is still reserved in her father’s familia, not in her husband’s 
potestas; whereas in the case of manus marriage, she enters into the familia of her husband and his 
potestas. After the second century AD, the sine manu marriage became common and women’s 
family status was somewhat enhanced. See Richard P. Saller, Patriarchy, Property and Death in 
the Roman Family (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 74–88. For an examination of 
the usage of paterfamilias and the form of the Roman family see also Saller, “Pater Familias, 
Mater Familias, and the Gendered Semantics of the Roman Household”, in Classical Philology 94 
(1999), 182–193. 
38 Brent D. Shaw, “The Family in Late Antiquity: The Experience of Augustine”, Past &Present 
115 (1987), 28. 
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example, consider Augustine’s account of his own family, where Monica was 
obedient to her husband, serving him as her lord (tradita uiro seruiuit ueluti 
domino). She even tolerated his infidelities without starting a quarrel. Monica also 
advised her peers who suffered from domestic violence to serve their angry 
husbands as a master; otherwise, they would receive more maltreatment.39  In 
Augustine’s time, the paterfamilias could maintain other sexual relationships as 
well (such as adulterous liaisons, concubines, and prostitutes). In a certain sense, 
sex was a property-dominated act for the master of the household.40  
(b) Father over children. A delicate bilateral relationship existed between 
a father and his son(s). While the father expected sons to inherit his property and 
estate, his children were completely subjected to their father’s authority and they 
often suffered from his beatings. The death of a father meant that the power of 
materfamilias was often increased. 41  The schoolmasters (magistri) served as 
disciplinarian substitutes for parents, and these schoolmasters also imposed their 
auctoritas upon young children through using different corporal punishments, 
such as the rod, the strap, and the cane.42 Augustine harboured painful memories 
of the beatings that he received as a boy and he regarded them as “a great and 
                                                 
39 Conf. 9.9.19: Ubi plenis annis nubilis facta est, tradita uiro seruiuit ueluti domino et sategit 
eum lucrari tibi loquens te illi moribus suis, quibus eam pulchram faciebas et reuerenter 
amabilem atque mirabilem uiro…Denique cum matronae multae, quarum uiri mansuetiores erant, 
plagarum uestigia etiam dehonestata facie gererent, inter amica conloquia illae arguebant 
maritorum uitam, haec earum linguam, ueluti per iocum grauiter admonens, ex quo illas tabulas, 
quae matrimoniales uocantur, recitari audissent, tamquam instrumenta, quibus ancillae factae 
essent, deputare debuisse; proinde memores conditionis superbire aduersus dominos non 
oportere. 
40 For instance, Augustine himself maintained a sexual relationship with a concubine for many 
years (from 372 to 385) and subsequently abandoned her. Before marrying his 10-year-old child-
bride, Augustine took another concubine as his sexual object. (Conf. 6.13.23; 6.15.25) It was 
certainly common for men to have concubines in their own household (in domo suis), but 
Augustine was against this habit. Augustine warned in Serm. 224.3: “Are you saying that I am not 
permitted to do what I want in my own house? I say to you, ‘It is not permitted. Men who do this 
go to hell, and will burn in eternal fire’”. (Cf. Conf. 2.3.7.) See Shaw 1987, 16, 30 and 45. 
41 After the death of Augustine’s father, Patricius, Monica managed and controlled the property of 
the family and it was only after her death in the spring of 387 that Augustine succeeded her 
completely in the management of the paternal house and property. In Ep. 130.2.5–3.8, Augustine 
also mentions a case in which a materfamilias (a noble widow) had full dominion over the 
property of her family, even though she had sons and grandsons. See Shaw 1987, 33.  
42  CD 22.22: Quid enim sibi uolunt multimodae formidines, quae cohibendis paruulorum 
uanitatibus adhibentur? Quid paedagogi, quid magistri, quid ferulae, quid lora, quid uirgae… Cf. 
Conf. 1.9.14. See also Chadwick 2009, 6; Brown 2000, 23–28. 
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painful evil” (magnum tunc et graue malum).43 Augustine compared the servile 
dependence inherent in the patriarchal dominion over children to that between a 
domesticator and his cattle (iumenta).44  
(c) Master over slaves. The ownership of paterfamilias included slaves 
who served as a type of property. The central feature of slavery was the complete 
control of slaves (body, labour, relatives, etc.) under a master’s extreme authority. 
Augustine mentions that a common relationship in a domus is the one between the 
master and his slaves; nearly every household has this ownership.45 This master-
slave structure was a legal part of the ancient Roman family representing the 
honour and authority of the paterfamilias. 
(d) Owner over properties. The basic semantic meaning of paterfamilias is 
that he is the proprietor of an estate, which indicates the owner’s economic power 
and his corresponding social status. This property was an embodiment of the 
master’s dominium, and his social rank was reflected in how many slaves and 
servers he could dominate in his domus. The fundamental part of a man’s property 
consisted of other subjected persons along with the means of production, 
manifesting the potestas patri.46  
These four overlapping relationships represent the authority of the 
paterfamilias, which resembles the hierarchical natural order and God’s 
transcendental authority. This family structure involves either good or bad 
paterfamilias, which means expressing caritas or cupiditas by treating their 
property and their family members kindly or badly. However, these two loves 
within a household are often interwoven at the practical level, with good or bad 
                                                 
43 Conf. 1.9.14: Deus, Deus meus, quas ibi miserias expertus sum et ludificationes, quandoquidem 
recte mihi uiuere puero id proponebatur, obtemperare monentibus…et cum me non exaudiebas, 
quod non erat ad insipientiam mihi, ridebantur a maioribus hominibus usque ab ipsis parentibus, 
qui mihi accidere mali nihil uolebant, plagae meae, magnum tunc et graue malum meum. 
44 En. Ps. 31.2.23; Serm. 55.4.4; Serm. 13.8.9; Ep. 133.2. See Shaw 1987, 23.   
45 En. Ps. 124.7: Prima et quotidiana potestas hominis in hominem domini est in seruum. Prope 
omnes domus habent huiusmodi potestatem. For Augustine’s position on slavery, see Peter 
Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 206–219; John M. Rist, Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 236–242; Gervase Corcoran, Saint Augustine on Slavery (Roma: 
Institutum Patristicum “Augustinianum”, 1985); Aaron D. Conley, “Augustine and Slavery: 
Freedom for the Free”, in Augustine and Social Justice, ed. Teresa Delgado, John Doody and Kim 
Paffenroth (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015), 131–144. 
46 For the ownership of paterfamilias, see Kevin Hughes, “Local Politics: The Political Place of 
the Household in Augustine’s City of God”, in Augustine and Politics, ed. John Doody, Kevin 
Hughes and Kim Paffenroth (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005), 145–164. 
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paterfamilias occurring in most social groups. Augustine emphasises that both the 
owners and the owned should maintain domestic peace, obeying the natural and 
social order. Charity (caritas) and obedience are bilateral obligations that need to 
be embodied in daily family life. This is because good paterfamilias and the 
servants, who strive to orient their self-love toward the higher good, are both 
pilgrimaging in the temporal mundane world toward the holy heavenly city, even 
though they are intermingled with those who abuse their cupiditas in the domus.  
           
(2) City (ciuitas)  
The concept of the city is an extension of the concept of the household. There are 
two cities or communities, the ecclesia (church) and the state, and each imitate the 
authority of God differently. 
Of these communities, the ecclesia represents the power and body of the 
Kingdom of God on earth. Augustine refers to the ecclesia as a figura of the 
heavenly city in the mundane pilgrimage.47 The ecclesia mirrors the honour and 
caritas of the City of God, but it cannot be equal to the Heavenly City because the 
ecclesia approaches the transcendental-eschatological city as a ciuitas peregrina. 
During this process, it contains true and false members who are intermixed and 
will be differentiated at the end of time; as a historical and empirical reality, the 
ecclesia is a corpus permixtum. At the level of faith (fides), the ecclesia is the 
pilgrimaging heavenly city (ciuitas caelestis peregrina).48  
The state (civil society) embodies the ciuitas terrena, but these are also not 
the same. The state mirrors God’ authority and implements a rule upon the 
citizens on earth, but the notion of ciuitas terrena, being a theological concept, 
does not refer to any specific secular organisation or state in the empirical sphere. 
                                                 
47 CD 15.26: Procul dubio figura est peregrinantis in hoc saeculo ciuitatis Dei, hoc est ecclesiae. 
CD 16.2:…eius ecclesiam, quae ciuitas Dei est… CD 17.4:…ecclesia Christi, ciuitas regis 
magni… En. Ps. 98.4:…quae est ciuitas Dei, nisi sancta Ecclesia? For the issue of whether the 
ecclesia could be equated with the heavenly city and the state with the earthly city, see the 
discussion in Ruokanen 1993, 83–96; Xia Dongqi 2007, 232–248; Weithman 2001, 234–237; 
Deane 1963, 172–175. 
48 As Miikka Ruokanen suggests, “Augustine identifies the true church, the object of faith, with 
civitas Dei whose king is Christ himself. As a prefigure of the city of God, the church is an 
eschatological reality. As an empirical, historical reality the pilgrim church, ecclesia peregrina, is 
corpus permixtum…Augustine discusses the mixed body of ecclesia nunc, ‘the church now,’ as 
distinct from ecclesia tunc, ‘the church then,’ which no longer contains any wicked persons”. 
Ruokanen 1993, 87–88. 
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In the fallen state, Cain established the first terrestrial city (condiderit ciuitatem), 
focusing the love downward to the earth and sliding into a libido dominandi; due 
to his cupiditas gloriae, Cain killed his brother Abel who did not establish a 
mundane city, but awaited the arrival of the Kingdom of God.49 In other words, 
while the terrestrial city imitates the authority of God, it is dominated by evil 
desire. Augustine states further that there were some just people in the early days, 
such as Seth and Noah, but their societies were still overwhelmed by the fallen 
power and displayed an earthborn characteristic.50 Moreover, Augustine uses the 
Roman Empire as an example of the ciuitas terrena, arguing that it is dominated 
by libido dominandi and has brought great misery and pain upon people. The 
Romans are proud of their achievements and have raised several heroes who have 
been inspired by glory. These honours have received a reward from the justice of 
God at the level of earthly life and their good moral characters (not genuine 
virtues) may be beneficial even for Christians.51 In this sense, libido dominandi 
may have a certain positive role in producing human glory. However, these 
honours or glories, Augustine observes, display pride and vice and are necessarily 
false when compared to the true virtues of God.52 While Augustine considered the 
Romans to have exhibited some civic virtue, from a Christian perspective, their 
political practice was vicious because it was driven by avidity for praise and by a 
passion for glory and domination. 
 
(3) World (orbis terrae) 
                                                 
49  CD 15.1: Scriptum est itaque de Cain, quod condiderit ciuitatem; Abel autem tamquam 
peregrinus non condidit. CD 15.7: Sed illud Dei praeceptum Cain sicut praeuaricator accepit. 
Inualescente quippe inuidentiae uitio fratrem insidiatus occidit. Talis erat terrenae conditor 
ciuitatis. Quo modo autem significauerit etiam Iudaeos, a quibus Christus occisus est pastor 
ouium hominum, quem pastor ouium pecorum praefigurabat Abel. 
50 CD 15.8:…discretio quidem, quod ambarum separatim generationes commemorantur, unius 
fratricidae Cain, alterius autem qui uocabatur Seth (natus quippe fuerat et ipse de Adam pro illo, 
quem frater occidit); concretio autem, quia bonis in deterius declinantibus tales uniuersi facti 
fuerant, ut diluuio delerentur, excepto uno iusto, cui nomen erat Noe, et eius coniuge et tribus filiis 
totidem que nuribus, qui homines octo ex illa omnium uastatione mortalium per arcam euadere 
meruerunt. Ruokanen maintains that any kingdom on earth is controlled by the power of the 
transcendental nature of the ciuitas terrena. “This is how the transcendental reality of civitas 
terrena makes its power concrete in the human world…Augustine would never say, however, that 
a certain commonwealth is actually civitas terrena. Just like civitas Dei the diabolic civitas terrena 
is also a transcendental-eschatological reality, and presently it is an object understood only by 
faith”. Ruokanen 1993, 116. For related discussions, see also Xia Dongqi 2007, 240–248. 
51 CD 5.12–19. 
52 For Augustine’s evaluation of Roman virtues, see CD 5.12. See also Irwin 2007, 418–433. 
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Earthly cities and kingdoms comprise orbis terrae, in which there is either peace 
or warfare. The Roman Empire introduced stability to the Mediterranean world, 
but this was ultimately based on the Romans’ desire for domination, praise, and 
glory. In fact, the Romans did not hesitate to die for glory. 53  As Augustine 
observes, “This, forsooth, was the result of that vaunted eagerness for praise and 
passion for glory! In this way, the Romans were led to do many great deeds, first 
by their love of liberty, and then by their desire for praise and glory”.54 Augustine 
quotes the prose of Sallust to express the following opinion, “For glory, honour 
and power are sought by good and base men alike. The former, however, strive 
after them by the true way, whereas the latter, because they have no good arts, 
seek them by means of fraud and deceit”.55 The “good arts”, Augustine notes, are 
the virtuous means for glory and power, rather than treachery. 56  Augustine 
extends his analysis of the morality of the state to the relations between nations by 
adopting the same categories of moral psychology as he does in his discussion on 
the state. He distinguishes between two types of men related to two attitudes for 
dominions:  
(a) Those who worship the true glory of God possess virtues from the 
Holy Spirit and even love their enemies, so as to correct those who resent them 
and forgive those who slander them and instead make them their companions.57  
(b) Those who are eager for dominion lust for earthly glory and power. 
They desire and love luxury and mastery that surpasses even animals.58 Referring 
to the history of Rome, Augustine writes that with libido dominandi, they 
conquered their enemies’ territory, but they also received the corresponding 
                                                 
53  CD 5.12:…“laudis auidi, pecuniae liberales erant, gloriam ingentem, diuitias honestas 
uolebant”; hanc ardentissime dilexerunt, propter hanc uiuere uoluerunt, pro hac emori non 
dubitauerunt; ceteras cupiditates huius unius ingenti cupiditate presserunt. 
54 CD 5.12: Hoc illa profecto laudis auiditas et gloriae cupido faciebat! Amore itaque primitus 
libertatis, post etiam dominationis et cupiditate laudis et gloriae multa magna fecerunt. 
55 CD 5.12:“Nam gloriam honorem imperium bonus et ignauus aeque sibi exoptant; sed ille, 
inquit, uera uia nititur, huic quia bonae artes desunt, dolis atque fallaciis contendit”. 
56 CD 5.12: Hae sunt illae bonae artes, per uirtutem scilicet, non per fallacem ambitionem ad 
honorem et gloriam et imperium peruenire. 
57 CD 5.19: Sed qui contemnit iudicia laudantium, contemnit etiam suspicantium temeritatem, 
quorum tamen, si uere bonus est, non contemnit salutem, quoniam tantae iustitiae est qui de 
spiritu Dei uirtutes habet, ut etiam ipsos diligat inimicos, et ita diligat, ut suos osores uel 
detractores uelit correctos habere consortes non in terrena patria, sed superna. 
58  CD 5.19: Qui autem gloriae contemptor dominationis est auidus, bestias superat siue 
crudelitatis uitiis siue luxuriae. 
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resistance. Even if their rule brought some earthly benefits to their citizens 
through God’s providence, frequent wars brought fatigue and catastrophe. Rather 
than these conquests bringing benefits and happiness, the vast imperial territory 
that sacrificed innumerable lives became a tremendous burden. Furthermore, the 
Romans may be rewarded according to the light of the earthly city, but they lost 
their citizenship in the Heavenly City.59 Augustine concludes that those who serve 
human honour without piety have neither true glory nor virtues, but are instead 
dominated by their vicious desire for power (dominandi libido dominatur). In 
contrast, those who achieve the happiest life are those who are gifted with true 
godliness and who apply their power to benefit human affairs through God’s 
mercy.60  These two types of people are mixed, showing their own values of 
honour in the earthly state.  
As we see, in the historical picture of the evolvement of the two cities, 
Augustine focuses on the role of self-love and regards it as the hallmark of the 
Fall. The two distinguished loves, caritas and cupiditas, are the cornerstones of 
two cities, manifesting distinct tendencies and appearances on the three levels of 
household, city, and world. In a perverted way, the human cupiditas mirrors 
divine love, and the passion for domination and glory turns the divine authority 
into an authority of sinners who exercise their self-chosen autonomy in their quest 
for domination. This misguided imitation and the intermingled reality of two types 
of citizens within one society (corpus permixtum) result in a complex, opaque 
morality and politics. The members of the two cities harbour both good and bad 
intentions. Even the believers have sinful inclinations. However, the theological 
difference between the essences of the two cities is still apparent in the interwoven 
state, the future heavenly citizens being temporal residents in this world. Due their 
fallen nature, they cannot eliminate the shadow of “self-love” in their pursuit of a 
peaceful life in accordance with the natural order or in their attempt to embody the 
                                                 
59 CD 5.18–19: …ut non pro terrenis et temporalibus beneficiis, quae diuina prouidentia permixte 
bonis malisque concedit, sed pro aeterna uita muneribusque perpetuis et ipsius supernae ciuitatis 
societate colatur Deus unus et uerus…eos tamen, qui ciues non sint ciuitatis aeternae, quae in 
sacris litteris nostris dicitur ciuitas Dei, utiliores esse terrenae ciuitati, quando habent uirtutem 
uel ipsam, quam si nec ipsam. 
60 CD 5.19: …qui uera pietate praediti bene uiuunt, si habent scientiam regendi populos, nihil est 
felicius rebus humanis, quam si Deo miserante habeant potestatem. CD 14.28: Illi in principibus 
eius uel in eis quas subiugat nationibus dominandi libido dominatur; in hac seruiunt inuicem in 
caritate et praepositi consulendo et subditi obtemperando. 
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principle of caritas in their family and broader communities. Thus, Augustine’s 
social theory addresses the question of how to control perverse concupiscence and 
avoid libido dominandi. I shall next examine Augustine’s approach to this 
question at the levels of domus, ciuitas and orbis terrae. 
 
4.2. Sexuality, Marriage and Virginity  
 
Some critics maintain that Augustine holds a negative attitude toward sexuality.  
As a consequence, Augustine proposes an ascending ranking for the merits of 
marriage, widowhood and consecrated virginity based on their distance from 
concupiscence, which is rooted in the tradition of asceticism. Some other scholars 
are of the opinion that Augustine shifts his emphasis from asceticism to inner 
moral evaluation in accordance with the grade of humility rather than external 
factors. Let us now address these competitive positions. 
Drawing on the controversy between Augustine and Julian, Mathijs 
Lamberigts maintains that Augustine is firmly in line with the ascetic tradition of 
his predecessors who proposed that marriage is inferior to abstinence, as marriage 
involves concupiscentia, which for Augustine was a sin after the Fall. 61 
Lamberigts stresses that in Augustine’s opinion, it would be better to be without 
sexual desire with the one exception being procreation:62 “It seemed to make more 
sense to Augustine that a person should make a radical break with sexual desire, 
rather than make proper use of it within marriage…Sexual desire was something 
to be avoided at all costs, rather than exploited, however legitimately”. 63 
Lamberigts elaborates on sexual desire, emphasising that it is evil (malum) 
because it is not devoted to God, but to a human’s will. This means that Augustine 
                                                 
61 “…to his own experience with sexuality, which was firmly rooted in the traditional conviction 
that the choice of marriage was inferior to a life of abstinence”. Mathijs Lamberigts, “A Critical 
Evaluation of Critiques of Augustine’s View of Sexuality”, in Augustine and his Critics, ed. 
Robert Dodaro and George Lawless (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 186.  
62 “…such concupiscentia certainly cannot be good and, as such, it would be better neither to make 
use of it nor to ‘know’ it than to use it properly for the sake of procreation”. Lamberigts 2000, 187. 
Mathijs Lamberigts understands concupiscentia as sexual desire, while John Rist considers it to be 
less than an active attitude, “a defect in man which is the effect of sin, the permanent weakness 
which we have inherited from Adam” (Rist 1994, 136). Timo Nisula similarly thinks that it is a 
“reigned sin” or “a tamed and defeated enemy” (Nisula 2012, 311–313). I think that in Augustine’s 
view, concupiscentia as a faculty was created by God but after the Fall, it shows disobedience and 
sinful state. See Augustine’s discussions of the sexuality in paradise in CD 14.17–26.  
63 Lamberigts 2000, 186. 
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rejected any expression of sexuality save for procreation. Thus, forms of 
expression such as sexuality outside marriage, sexuality with one’s spouse for lust, 
or any indulgence in sexual pleasure, was unacceptable for Augustine. 64 
Procreation alone is a permitted act, for which “the filth of marriage” could be 
forgiven.65 Lamberigts adds that Augustine’s vision of marriage and virginity was 
influenced by several examples of asexual marriages (Paulinus and Therasia, 
Turcius Apronianus and Avita, etc.) as well as the ascetic practices of his time and 
this led to his preferential evaluation of continence that was also influenced by St 
Paul (especially 1 Corinthians 7).66 Thus, Lamberigts concludes that Augustine 
provides a grading on marriage and continence, granting the highest regard for the 
life of Christian abstinence and reluctantly accepting sexuality in marriage.67 
 Patrick Gerard Walsh makes a similar observation, arguing that for 
Augustine, the merit of virginity ranks above marriage and married people will 
attain a lesser reward than the consecrated virgins in heaven.68 In his introduction 
to Augustine’s De bono coniugali and De sancta uirginitate, Walsh suggests 
various factors that might have influenced Augustine’s alignment of different 
living modes: (1) Early Christian asceticism influenced Augustine through some 
of his predecessors, such as Tertullian, Cyprian, and Ambrose. Augustine 
frequently adopts their ascetic ideal and virgin worship in his treatises (such as 
Tertullian’s rigorous asceticism, Cyprian’s notion of a virgin’s greater honour in 
heaven, and Ambrose’s vision of Mary as a perfect virgin);69 (2) Paul’s counsel to 
the married and unmarried had a profound impact on Augustine. Paul expresses 
his preference for celibacy over marriage, especially in 1 Cor. 7:3ff and 1 Cor. 
7:25ff, which serve as the scriptural basis for Augustine’s argument in De bono 
                                                 
64 Lamberigts 2000, 186–187.  
65 Lamberigts 2000, 187. 
66 Ibid., 186.  
67 “…Augustine had the highest regard, at least on this question, for a life of Christian abstinence, 
within or without marriage…Augustine and his contemporaries, however, did not believe in 
sexuality as an enriching factor in the marriage relationship. He was firmly rooted in a tradition – 
partly confirmed by the Bible – in which the satisfaction of sexual desires as an end itself was 
rejected”. Ibid., 187–188. 
68 “Marriage is a good [XIII] because of its threefold attributes of proles, fides, sacramentum, but 
these are human goods, whereas consecrated virginity rises above them to angelic heights, 
ensuring for virgins greater distinction in heaven”. Walsh 2001, xxvi.  
69 Walsh 2001, xvi-xvii.     
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coniugali and De sancta uirginitate;70 (3) Manichaean condemnation of marriage 
results in the converted Augustine developing a theological interpretation of 
sexuality in marriage that refutes Manichaean asceticism. A series of works by 
Augustine against Manichaeanism71 are evidence for Augustine’s re-evaluations 
of the (good) meaning of marriage as well as its connections to renunciation; and 
(4) To respond to the controversy caused by the biased positions between Jovinian 
and Jerome, Augustine developed a comprehensive theological stance. Factors 
that contributed to Augustine’s ladder of goodness, virginity above marriage, are a 
positive evaluation of marriage (Jovinian) as well as the superiority of virginity 
(Jerome).72 Walsh concludes that Augustine’s position was that “marriage was a 
good, but consecrated virginity was better”.73 
 In contrast to Lamberigts and Walsh, George Lawless focuses on 
Augustine’s thoughts on morality rather than virginity. Lawless observes that 
Augustine shifts his emphasis from marriage and virginity to humility.74 In his 
discussion on the different ascetic lifestyles and the cult of perfectionism during 
the fourth and fifth century, Lawless notes that Augustine exhibits a decentering 
tendency that moves away from asceticism. Augustine rejects the austere ascetic 
strategies of his time.75 In addition, Augustine avoided perfectionism and elitism 
in his approach against Manichaeanism, Pelagianism, and Donatism. 76 
Nonetheless, when Augustine cites the Pauline source for the position that 
                                                 
70 Walsh 2001, xv-xvi. 
71 In addition to De bono coniugali and De sancta uirginitate, Walsh lists Augustine’s treatises 
against Manichaeanism during 388–400, such as De Genesi adversus Manichaeos, De moribus 
Manichaeorum, Contra Fortunatum, Contra epistolam Manichaei quam uocant fundamenti, and 
Contra Faustum Manichaeum. Walsh 2001, xviii.  
72 “Though he [Augustine] was anxious to emphasize that Jovinian and his followers were the 
main target in his analyses of marriage and virginity, he sought also to dispel the resentment 
among the married laity caused by Jerome’s uituperatio nuptiarum in his disastrous foray into the 
controversy”. Walsh 2001, xx.  
73 Walsh 2001, xxx.  
74 “In virtually every instance, the bishop deliberately shifted the emphasis from virginity and 
marriage to humility and pride, to the extent that even his readers, as he himself acknowledges, 
were justified in thinking that they were reading a treatise on humility rather than virginity”. 
Lawless 2000, 154.  
75 “Both the perfectionism required for a ‘servant of Christ’ by Jerome, and his idealisation of the 
Syrian desert near Chalcis as the type of place most suitable for the practice of asceticism, would 
have been as unacceptable to Augustine…who refused to join him [Jerome] in his austere ascetic 
exercises…No comparable extreme can, to my knowledge, be cited for Augustine; nor does he 
ever urge such a rigorous regimen upon anyone”. Lawless 2000, 144–145. 
76 “Augustine’s much favoured ‘wheat and chaff’ metaphor is as anti-Manichaean (elect versus 
hearers), and anti-Pelagian (elitist versus non-elitist) as it is anti-Donatist (saints versus sinners)”. 
Ibid., 152. 
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virginity is superior to marriage in 1 Cor. 7 (for example, bene facit/melius facit), 
he also states that, “marriage with humility is better (melius) than virginity with 
pride”. 77  Based on a scale of humility, Augustine provides a hierarchical 
alignment of marriage, widowhood, virginity, and martyrdom, with all these 
lifestyles being gifts of God.78 As Augustine’s parable (Serm. 304.3) illustrates, “a 
single garden in which were found not only the roses of the martyrs but also the 
lilies of the virgins, the ivy of married couples and the violets of widows”.79 On 
this basis, Lawless does not assume that there is any order of merits between these 
lifestyles, but what Augustine expressed is rather a moral scale on the various 
gifts of God. 
 Two treatises are important in the above context, De bono coniugali and 
De sancta uirginitate, but late works, such as De nuptiis et concupiscentia and 
Contra Iulianum, are also relevant. Scholars correctly detect in Augustine’s 
position on sexuality and continence various traditions of asceticism. Yet there are 
different interpretations of Augustine’s concept of “merits” and this results in 
divergent opinions on whether the conjugal, widows, and virgins indeed have 
different levels of “merits”. One controversial question is Augustine’s percentage 
analogy in De sancta uirginitate 46, where he asks whether the virginal life 
represents fruit a hundredfold, the widow’s life sixtyfold, and that of the married 
thirtyfold: 
Whether the virgin’s life represents fruit a hundredfold, the widow’s life sixtyfold, and 
married life thirtyfold. Or alternatively, whether fruitfulness a hundredfold is to be 
assigned rather to martyrdom, the sixtyfold to continence, and the thirtyfold to 
marriage…Or what seems to me more likely, since the gifts of divine grace are many, and 
one is greater and better than another (hence those words of the Apostle, ‘Strive for the 
greater gifts’)…In the first place, we must not assess a widow’s continence as bearing no 
fruit, or relegate it to the merits of married chastity, or equate it with the glory of the 
virgin…80 [transl. P. G. Walsh] 
                                                 
77 Ibid., 154. 
78 Ibid., 155. 
79 Ibid., 157. Cf. Serm. 304.3.2: Habet, habet, fratres, habet hortus ille dominicus, non solum rosas 
martyrum, sed et lilia uirginum, et coniugatorum hederas, uiolasque uiduarum. 
80 s. uirg. 46: siue uirginalis uita in centeno fructu sit, in sexageno uidualis, in triceno autem 
coniugalis; siue centena fertilitas martyrio potius inputetur, sexagena continentiae, tricena 
conubio…siue, quod probabilius mihi uidetur, quoniam diuinae gratiae multa sunt munera et est 
aliud alio maius ac melius (unde dicit apostolus: Imitamini autem dona meliora)…Primum, ne 
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Augustine seems to offer a contradictory picture. On the one hand, abstention 
from sexuality is better than intercourse during marriage and abstention will lead 
to achieving greater merits and gift. This means that the fruit of consecrated 
virginity is greater than that of marriage.81 On the other hand, this alignment of 
merits does not exist because a person occasionally has fewer merits, but could 
nevertheless receive more rewards from God.82 This relation between merit and 
reward is emphasised further by Augustine in his late works as he highlights the 
issue of grace and renewal. Concerning the different polemists in various periods, 
such as Manichaeans, Jovinian, and Donatists, Augustine’s emphasis on the issue 
of asceticism and virginity varies, but he makes important adjustments during the 
Pelagian debate. For instance, in Retractationes and De nuptiis et concupiscentia, 
Augustine continues to rectify the viewpoints of both Jovinian and Jerome by 
arguing that marriage is good and that consecrated virginity is rightly preferred to 
marriage. However, Augustine soon shifts the scope to faith and renewal, 
emphasising that there is no true virginity or chastity except that in true faith.83 
Here grace, free will, baptism, and renewal are featured more prominently than in 
his early debate that compared the qualities of chastity and virginity. Augustine 
develops a more accurate theological anthropology, involving more subjects than 
he had in his previous controversies, especially in his debate with Julian (418–
430). Rather than adhere to historical order, I shall begin with the two stages of 
Augustine’s anti-Pelagian works84 to evaluate his concept of “merit” as well as his 
                                                                                                                                     
continentiam uidualem aut in nullo fructu constituamus aut ad coniugalis pudicitiae meritum 
deponamus aut uirginali gloriae coaequemus. 
81  b. coniug. 6: Ac per hoc melior est quidem ab omni concubitu continentia quam uel ipse 
matrimonialis concubitus, qui fit causa gignendi. Sed quia illa continentia meriti amplioris est. 
82 s. uirg. 46: et aliquando alter fructuosus est donis paucioribus sed potioribus, alter inferioribus 
sed pluribus.  
83 See Retr. 2.53 and nupt. et conc. 1.3–5. In nupt. et conc. 1.5, Augustine maintains, “There is, 
then, no true chastity, whether conjugal, or vidual, or virginal, except that which devotes itself to 
true faith. For though consecrated virginity is rightly preferred to marriage, yet what Christian in 
his sober mind would not prefer Catholic Christian women who have been even more than once 
married, to not only vestals, but also to heretical virgins?” [transl. Holmes] 
84 The Pelagian debate took place in two stages. During the first stage (411–418), against Pelagius 
and Caelestius, the issues of grace and nature, merits and baptism, perfection and original sin, were 
discussed in general terms in treatises such as De peccatorum meritis et remissione (411/2), De 
spiritu et littera (412), De natura et gratia (415), De perfectione iusticia hominis (415), De gestis 
Pelagii (416/7), De gratia Christi et peccato originali (418). During the second stage (418–430), 
when Julian of Eclanum emerged as a main opponent, a more detailed discussion was conducted in 
Augustine’s De nuptiis et concupiscientia (419/20), De anima et eius origine (419), Contra duas 
epistolas Pelagianorum (420), De gratia et libero arbitrio (426/7), De correptione et gratia 
  
139 
 
percentage ranking of marriage and virginity in De bono coniugali and De sancta 
uirginitate. 
 
 (1) Grace and the renewal of concupiscentia 
In the early Pelagian debate, Augustine analyses concupiscentia in the context of 
Pauline theology, concentrating on the conceptions of original sin and grace in the 
renewal of concupiscence. To address the objection to infant baptism and the 
heritage of Adam’s sin undertaken by Pelagius and Caelestius, Augustine argues 
in the first book of De peccatorum meritis et remissione that the first man’s sin 
passes on to all men by natural descent and that this causes the punishment of 
bodily death. By citing Paul’s First Letter to Corinthians, Augustine states that in 
reality, all men follow Adam who transgressed the commandment by 
disobedience. This sinful disobedience is transmitted through propagation rather 
than imitation, and thus, all have sinned in Adam, even infants.85 Likewise, the 
renewal does not occur by external imitation, but by inner works through grace. 
Augustine explains that the Apostle Paul observes that the saints accepted Christ 
and His grace dwelled within them and led to illumination, righteousness, and 
obedience. Through baptism, they were infused with grace, which helps them to 
control the disobedience of their flesh and their hidden carnal concupiscence. This 
applies to baptised infants as well.86 Thus, Augustine holds that it is necessary to 
baptise infants because the original sin is inborn and the renewal of grace acts 
inside. Augustine explains in the second book of De peccatorum meritis et 
                                                                                                                                     
(426/7), De praedestinatione sanctorum (428/9), De dono perseuerantia (428/9) as well as two 
long works Contra Iulianum  (421/22) and Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum (429/30). For 
Augustine’s anti-Pelagian controversy and treatises, see Karfíková 2012, 159–211; 297–336; 
Dominic Keech, The Anti-Pelagian Christology of Augustine of Hippo, 396–430 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 14–19; 40–68; 86–100. 
85 In pecc. mer. 1.10, Augustine observes, “No doubt all they imitate Adam who by disobedience 
transgress the commandment of God…‘By one man,’ says he [Paul], ‘sin entered into the world, 
and death by sin.’ This indicates propagation, not imitation; for if imitation were meant, he would 
have said, ‘By the devil.’ But as no one doubts, he refers to that first man who is called Adam: 
‘And so,’ says he, ‘it passed upon all men’”. [transl. Holmes] Augustine argues that the Pelagian 
use of “imitation” would exonerate human generations from the original sin and identify Adam’s 
Fall as a passive personal mistake due to the temptation of the devil. He therefore believes that the 
Pelagian doctrine of “imitation” actually ascribes the fault of the Fall to the devil rather than to 
Adam.  
86 See pecc. mer. 1.9–10. For baptism and original sin in Augustine, see William Harmless, S.J., 
“Baptism”, in Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald 
(Michigan/Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1999), 84–91. 
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remissione that infants are born with evil concupiscence due to the Fall and only 
the baptised infants are saved from condemnation.87  After these infants reach 
adulthood, they should refuse to consent to the temptation of concupiscence 
through their own free will, but this renewal of free will is based on God’s 
assistance.88 
 Pelagius and Caelestius provide a different theological account of original 
sin, nature, and grace. They reason that Adam’s individual sin cannot be 
transmitted to his offspring by natural descent. The assumption is that offences 
committed by offspring imitate the first man’s demerit of sin. However, this does 
not occur through propagation, so original sin is therefore a nullity.89 Pelagius and 
Caelestius claim that nature was neither corrupted nor distorted by sin because it 
was created as something good by the blameless Creator.90 As a consequence, 
humans have access to unspoiled nature and the complete power of their free will 
to achieve their own justification without the grace of Christ.91 They thus argue 
that concupiscence is found in both baptised and unbaptised humans, but the flesh 
and the spirit are both good works of God and the conflict between motives is 
meant to be resolved by the will.92 
   Augustine criticises Pelagius for attributing too much importance to the 
act of human will and for neglecting the radical need for grace. At the end of De 
natura et gratia, Augustine quotes the following passage from Romans: “For the 
good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do” (Rom. 7:19). 
Augustine contemplates whether it is not the punishment for sins that accounts for 
                                                 
87 pecc. mer. 2.4: “Concupiscence, therefore, as the law of sin which remains in the members of 
this body of death, is born with infants. In baptised infants, it is deprived of guilt, is left for the 
struggle [of life], but pursues with no condemnation, such as die before the struggle. Unbaptised 
infants it implicates as guilty and as children of wrath, even if they die in infancy, draws into 
condemnation”. [transl. Holmes] 
88 pecc. mer. 2.4–5. 
89 pecc. mer. 1.15. 
90 nat. et gr. 21. Grace seems to be subtly acknowledged by Pelagius since he argues that being 
good works of God, humans and the nature cannot be depraved (nat. et gr. 11–12), but in a deeper 
sense, Augustine reveals, Pelagius and Caelestius never really acknowledge grace. See gr.et pecc. 
or. 1.31. 
91 As Augustine states in nat. et gr. 58: “By our author, however, it is maintained that our human 
nature actually possesses an inseparable capacity of not at all sinning. Such a statement…causes 
the grace of Christ to be ‘made of none effect,’ since it is pretended that human nature is sufficient 
for its own holiness and justification”. [transl. Holmes] For his detailed discussion on Pelagius’s 
view of human will and nature, see nat. et gr. 53–59. 
92 nat. et gr. 60. 
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humans not having free determination of their will to choose what they are willing 
to do or refrain from erroneous involuntary carnal habit such as lusts.93  This 
indicates that human free will is weakened and has lost control of capacities, with 
human nature being tarnished by a sinful quality. Therefore, the whole discussion 
with the Pelagians, Augustine maintains, centres on the point of grace and its 
function in renewing a perverted nature.94 In the fallen state, men easily succumb 
to the temptation of concupiscentia carnis and they habitually consent to 
unwholesome sexual suggestions. However, the love of grace, when poured into 
their heart, provides crucial aid to improve their control over their sexual passions 
in accordance with righteousness. This renewal, Augustine believes, is attained 
through faith, leading Christians to virtuous actions and a holy life. 95  Thus, 
Augustine attributes the therapy of concupiscentia to the mercy and grace of God 
through the faith. 
 
(2) Obedience and free choice of will 
To avoid over-emphasising the liberty of the human will, Augustine reinforces the 
discussion on grace and free will, faith and merits at the second stage of the 
Pelagian controversy.96 In his first letter (Ep. 214) to Valentinus and the monks of 
Hadrumetum, Augustine advocates the interpretation that the will is free because 
otherwise humans could not exercise obedience. However, free will is assisted by 
the grace of God, and without grace, the will cannot turn towards God. Augustine 
then reasons in the second letter (Ep. 215) that grace will direct one’s steps to the 
straight path and to peace according to the mercy of God. Free will is not 
dispensable here, but it is prepared and assisted by grace.97 These two letters serve 
                                                 
93 nat. et gr. 81. 
94 nat. et gr. 81: “Our whole discussion with them on this subject turns upon this, that we frustrate 
not the grace of God which is in Jesus Christ our Lord by a perverted assertion of nature…we 
ourselves likewise were by nature children of wrath, even as others”. [transl. Holmes] 
95  nat. et gr. 82: “We must first of all exhort them to that faith whereby they may become 
Christians, and be subjects of His name and authority, without whom they cannot be saved. If, 
however, they are already Christians but neglect to lead holy lives, they must be chastised with 
alarms and be aroused by the praises of reward”. [transl. Holmes] 
96 In Retr. 2.66, Augustine states that the background of his composing of De gratia et libero 
arbitrio is to respond to the monks of Hadrumetum and the Pelagians who defend the freedom of 
the will and neglect grace. This treatise and the related work De correptione et gratia were 
composed at the same period around the year 426 or 427.  
97 Letter II [Ep. 215], ch. 5: “Now consider, my brethren, that in these words of Holy Scripture, if 
there were no free will, it would not be said, ‘Make straight paths for thy feet, and order thy ways; 
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as a brief introduction to his position in De gratia et libero arbitrio. 
          On the issue of grace and free will, Augustine refutes two tendencies: (i) the 
defence of man’s free will without the assistance of grace. (ii) The defence of 
God’s grace denying man’s free will.98 At the beginning of De gratia et libero 
arbitrio, Augustine states that the will was created before the Fall and would it 
have obeyed God’s commandments, it would have not been weakened. However, 
it succumbed to sin through the free choice of the forbidden fruit. When the 
obedient state of the flesh was lost in Paradise, the consequence of the sinful 
disobedience in the fallen state is the spontaneous autonomy of the concupiscence 
that requires continuous control by the will. However, the ability to resist the 
temptation of concupiscence often fails because the will consents to things that it 
primarily does not will to do. It is therefore impossible to make the evil desire 
(such as concupiscence) obey chastity without the aid of God’s grace.99 At the 
same time, Augustine lists numerous quotations from the Old and the New 
Testament to illustrate that God’s commandments are supposed to be followed by 
the human will, such as “be not like a horse or a mule, which have no 
understanding”, “peace on earth to men of good will”, and “if I do this willingly, I 
have a reward”.100 At the end of De gratia et libero arbitrio 4, Augustine states 
the following in Rom. 2:12: “He shall reward every man according to his works” 
in order to remind us that the acts of the will in accordance with God’s law will 
eventually be rewarded by Christ and one’s own will should not be detracted.101 
 Augustine’s point is clarified in the latter part of De gratia et libero 
                                                                                                                                     
turn not aside to the right hand, nor to the left.’ Nor yet, were this possible for us to achieve 
without the grace of God, would it be afterwards added, ‘He will make thy ways straight, and will 
direct thy steps in peace’”. [transl. Holmes] 
98 gr. et lib. arb. 1: “But seeing that there are some who so defend God’s grace that they deny 
man’s free will, or who think that free will is being denied when grace is defended, I have taken 
care”. [transl. Russell] 
99 gr. et lib. arb. 8. 
100 gr. et lib. arb. 4. 
101 See gr. et lib. arb. 4: “No man, therefore, when he sins, can in his heart blame God for it…Nor 
does it detract at all from a man’s own will when he performs any act in accordance with 
God…may the reward of a good work be hoped for from Him concerning whom it is written, ‘He 
shall reward every man according to his works’”. [transl. Holmes] Augustine stresses that our love 
for God is preceded by God’s gift of love (voluntas praeparatur a Deo). Augustine assumes that 
this is compatible with free will, but the issue remains a problem in his thought. See Rist 1994, 180; 
Eleonore Stump, “Augustine on free will”, in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. 
Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 136–
139; A. Sage, “Praeparatur voluntas a Deo”, in Revue des études Augustiniennes 10 (1964), 1–20. 
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arbitrio. He stresses the importance of free will in conversion, and maintains that 
it is radically aided by grace. In short, it is God who is able to soften the stony 
heart and convert the depraved will to accept the faith. Faith is thus a gift of God, 
as Augustine maintains: 
God, then, works in us, without our cooperation, the power to will, but once we begin to 
will, and do so in a way that brings us to act, then it is that He cooperates with us. But if 
He does not work in us the power to will or does not cooperate in our act of willing, we 
are powerless to perform good works of a salutary nature.102 [transl. Russell] 
This prepared will (offered by grace) begins to turn toward God, but initially, it is 
feeble and weak. However, the will may become greater and robust in cooperation 
with God.103 In the case of martyrs, their faith matured, displaying free will with 
great love that is obedient to the divine commandments. These were gifts of God 
rather than their own merits because a good will requires the right orientation and 
the power of application, and these two aspects are a consequence of God’s 
grace. 104  Therefore, the conversion of the will from evil to good, or from 
disobedience to obedience, includes the freedom to improve, but merits are the 
fruits of grace. 
 
(3) Habits and virtues of passions  
Augustine’s anti-Julian treatise, De nuptiis et concupiscentia, compares Christian 
and non-Christian behaviour in terms of concupiscence. Augustine argues that 
grace will aid the baptised in cultivating good habits and resisting their 
disobedient sexual desires. These are the virtues of passions.105 In other words, 
Augustine asserts that the regenerated mind will not easily yield to evil 
suggestions. This means that the struggle between the flesh and the spirit will be 
regularly considered in one’s mind and it is here that the will that is influenced by 
grace displays its ability to resist the suggestions of evil desires. As a consequence, 
sexual passions gradually diminish, and love (poured by grace) increases. Due to 
                                                 
102 gr. et lib. arb. 33. Ut ergo uelimus, sine nobis operatur; cum autem uolumus, et sic uolumus ut 
faciamus, nobiscum cooperatur: tamen sine illo uel operante ut uelimus, uel cooperante cum 
uolumus, ad bona pietatis opera nihil ualemus. 
103 gr. et lib. arb. 33. 
104 gr. et lib. arb. 31. Ut homo qui uoluerit et non potuerit, nondum se plene uelle cognoscat, et 
oret ut habeat tantam uoluntatem, quanta sufficit ad implenda mandata...Tunc enim utile est uelle, 
cum possumus; et tunc utile est posse, cum uolumus. 
105 nupt. et conc. 1.25. 
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the Fall, all humans have evil movements of concupiscence, but renewed 
Christians will not commit sins if they do not follow the suggestion—in this case, 
concupiscence is not regarded as a personal sin.106 Furthermore, after addressing 
these issues for a long time, married Christian couples will develop good habits in 
using the passions and virtues of their mind as the corresponding fruits will be 
cultivated. On the contrary, those who refuse grace and pursue sexual pleasures 
(other than for procreation) will witness their lust taking an upper hand. Indeed, 
lusts will induce them to indulge in prurient activities, such as adultery and 
fornication, thus making them the slaves of evil passions. Obscenity thus occupies 
their mind and acts as a king.107 
 Augustine cites examples of a harlot, a conjugal partner, a widow, and a 
virgin in Contra Iulianum 6.55 to demonstrate that the more one yields to 
concupiscence by habit, the greater the efforts required to convert the evil 
passions into good use.108 Augustine claims that a harlot’s sexual inclination leads 
her to indulge in lust more easily than that of a consecrated virgin who has no 
sexual experience. Similarly, lascivious sexual habits in marriage also destroy the 
conjugal chastity and result in prurient indulgences. Augustine thus emphasises 
that habituation to the evil of concupiscence will lead people into a bad moral 
state and will separate them from the Kingdom of God.109 Therefore, the great evil 
power of habitual concupiscence should be conquered by the attractive sweetness 
of the goodness which is God’s grace.110 In brief, Augustine advocated developing 
                                                 
106 nupt. et conc. 1.25. “In the case, however, of the regenerate, concupiscence is not itself sin any 
longer…this guilt [concupiscence], by Christ’s grace through the remission of all sins, is not 
suffered to prevail in the regenerate man, if he does not yield obedience to it whenever it urges him 
to the commission of evil. As arising from sin, it is, I say, called sin, although in the regenerate it is 
not actually sin”. [transl. Holmes] Augustine states that marital sexual desire (concupiscentia 
nuptialis) for procreating is not a sin (Ep. 6.5–8); it seems to be a legitimate use of the damaged 
concupiscible part of the soul. See Rist 1994, 323. See also my discussions on first movements in 
Chapter 3.1. 
107 nupt. et conc. 1.13. 
108 c. Iul. 6.55: Unde etiam contra istam genitalium concupiscentiam, quae ingenita nobis est per 
originale peccatum, uehementius uidua quam uirgo; uehementius meretrix quando casta esse 
uoluerit, quam quae semper fuit casta, confligit: et tanto amplius in ea superanda uoluntas 
laborabit, quanto maiores ei consuetudo uires dedit. 
109 c. Iul. 6.55: Ex isto et cum isto hominis malo nascitur homo: quod malum per se ipsum tam 
magnum est, et ad hominis damnationem atque a regno dei separationem tantum habet 
obligationis. 
110 The concept of “good concupiscence” (bona concupiscentia) is introduced in Ep. 118, in which 
Augustine refers to it as a good longing for the sweetness of goodness. As a love of that love 
(dilectionis dilectio), it has been hidden in one’s heart by God as a gift that provides more 
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various living habits and virtues of passion by practicing continence, chastity, 
virginity, and martyrdom. 
 In the above account of the “grace-obedience-habit”, we have seen that 
Augustine shifts the discussion on concupiscence and continence to the context of 
renewal and grace, emphasising the role of faith and baptism in the therapy. To 
refute the sinlessness doctrine of Julian and the Pelagians, Augustine refers to 
concupiscentia, the innate evil affection in the corrupted humanity as the law of 
sin.111 Augustine also distinguishes between three phases of renewal with the first 
being grace, which has the complete authority in the preparation of salvation 
without any human initiative. To Augustine, only grace is able to heal a corrupted 
human nature as well as a depraved human will (disobedient free will). Grace also 
pours love into the human heart, resulting in conversion and faith. Augustine also 
proposes that during the second phase, the human will cooperate with grace in 
opposing concupiscence. This is in an interior struggle between the flesh and the 
spirit. Eventually, this struggle will produce various good moral qualities and 
virtues of passions, such as conjugal chastity and virginity as the fruits of the third 
phase.112 
 This further clarifies Augustine’s percentage analogy in De bono coniugali 
and De sancta uirginitate. By comparing the merit of married chastity (coniugalis 
pudicitiae meritum) with that of the widow and virgin, Augustine attributes 
various degrees of fruits to God’s love of grace. He states that the future diverse 
rewards in the Kingdom of God will remain as free gifts, not given according to 
human merits. In fact, Augustine maintains that there is no true virginity or 
chastity in this life, but this does not imply that the fruits of these modes of life 
can be regarded as equal. He explains this at the end of De natura et gratia: 
                                                                                                                                     
attractive sweetness to compete evil concupiscence. Ep. 118(8).3: Laudabilis est ista 
concupiscentia, non damnabilis. Non de hac dictum est: Non concupisces, sed de illa qua caro 
concupiscit aduersus spiritum. De hac autem bona concupiscentia qua concupiscit spiritus 
aduersus carnem. For a discussion on Augustine’s bona concupiscentia, see Karfíková 2012, 254–
257; Nisula 2012, 309 (n. 173). 
111 c. Iul. 6.53. “Concupiscence does not remain in the manner of a substance, a kind of body or 
spirit; it is an affection, an evil quality, like sickness”. [transl. Schumacher]  Cf. nupt. et conc. 1.28. 
112 These are not Aristotelian virtues of feeling an emotion well. Psychologically speaking, they 
are states of reduced sexual desire and powers to repel initial sexual impulses as soon as possible. 
From an Aristotelian perspective, these are cases of encracy rather than virtues. See Risto 
Saarinen, Weakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 25; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VII.7. 
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Inchoate love, therefore, is inchoate holiness; advanced love is advanced holiness; great 
love is great holiness; “perfect love is perfect holiness,”—but this “love”…which in this 
life is then the greatest, when life itself is contemned in comparison with it.113 [transl. 
Holmes]  
No one can equal this perfect love (of God), but this true love “by the Holy Spirit 
who is given to us” (per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis) pours into this life, 
cultivating it in various grades that form an increasing process of incipient, 
advanced, and profound love. Virtues that control passions righteously are 
therefore conjugal chastity, virginity, and martyrdom. In this sense, it is evident 
that the proportion of “merit” constitutes the ladder of love. And the perfect grace 
bestows to those who cultivate their good moral habits and their spiritual renewal 
with respect to their emotions.  
This conception of the ascent of love and the moral improvement of 
passions led by grace originates from the theological renewal tradition rather than 
in a programme of exterior asceticism. Lamberigts and Walsh astutely note that 
Augustine echoes the Pauline alignment of marriage and virginity based on the 
distance from concupiscentia, but the authors draw the misleading conclusion that 
Augustine follows the tradition of asceticism in ranking the merit of virgins above 
those who are married. This ranking according to outward human merits is 
rejected by Lawless, as he argues that Augustine distances himself from 
asceticism and that Augustine considers marriage, virginity, and martyrdom to be 
gifts from God. Nonetheless, Lawless does not sufficiently consider how these are 
cultivated habits and constitute various virtues of renewed passions that indicate a 
moral ascent of love led by the Holy Spirit. In Augustine’s discussion, grace is the 
perfect holiness and perfect love whose influence creates rightly ordered souls and 
communities. However, facing the Donatist austere monastery elitism and the 
church’s tendency towards secularism as well as addressing the collision between 
monastic spirituality and secular solicitudes are still important issues for 
Augustine.  
 
4.3. Monastery, the Church and the State  
                                                 
113 nat. et gr. 84: Caritas ergo inchoata inchoata iustitia est; caritas prouecta prouecta iustitia est; 
caritas magna magna iustitia est; caritas perfecta perfecta iustitia est, sed caritas…quae tunc 
maxima est in hac uita, quando pro illa ipsa contemnitur uita. 
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From the time of his conversion, Augustine sought refuge and freedom from 
emotions in his spirituality and this includes him cherishing a monastic ideal.114 
Towards this end, he composed rigid rules to support monks and nuns in their 
meditative monastic life. With the expansion of the church in the Empire, two 
distinct tendencies became increasingly prominent. The first is that the fanatical 
Donatists grew stronger and subsequently advocated the ascetic ideal of 
monastery elitism as opposed to the secularity of the church. The second is that 
many Catholic clergies were more interested in secular powers and preferred to be 
involved in the daily affairs of civil administration rather than participate in 
monastic meditations.115 Let us now turn to examine Augustine’s attitude towards 
these two tendencies. 
 
Ordinate love and the spiritual renewal of emotions  
Augustine’s monastic ideas were formulated before his conversion in Milan. He 
was provided an impetus from the story of Antony of Egypt as well as the 
moderate asceticism of Neoplatonism and Stoicism.116 Being a monk-bishop since 
395, Augustine actively built monasteries, wrote monastic rules and inspired 
others to do the same.117 The primary principle of Augustinian rules is that the 
                                                 
114  Lawless maintains that Augustine’s transition from secularism to asceticism and then 
monasticism is imperceptible rather than abrupt. “I dispute as too facile and possibly misleading 
the viewpoint which claims ‘conversion was not to Christianity, but to Monachism—with its entire 
ascetic ideal’…Augustine had no abrupt interstices in his mind or milieu. So too after his 
conversion: the transition from asceticism to monasticism will again be gradual”. See George 
Lawless, Augustine of Hippo and his Monastic Rule (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1987), 10–11. 
115 Brown 2000, 183–197; 330–339. Cf. Deane 1963, 173–174; Rist 1994, 208–236. 
116 See Conf. 3.4.7; 8.6.14; 8.7.16; 8.7.18; 8.10.22; 10.43.70. Lawless also notes that the stories of 
Antony in Vita Antonii by Athanasius, “libri Platonicorum”, and Cicero’s Hortensius are primary 
references for Augustine’s initial monastic knowledge. See Lawless 1987, 9–11; 155–156. 
117 Nine legislative monastery treatises deriving from Augustine or his circle include: (1) Ordo 
Monasterii; (2) Praeceptum; (3) Praeceptum longius; (4) Regula recepta; (5) Obiurgatio; (6) 
Regularis informatio; (7) Epistula longior; (8) Ordo monasterii feminis datus; (9) Epistula 
longissima. (1) – (4) are for men whereas (5) – (9) are for women. See Lawless 1987, 65–69. On 
the basis of textual studies, Lawless believes that Praeceptum and Obiurgatio are genuinely 
Augustine’s works, and Ordo Monasterii is possibly authentic as well, but overall, Lawless 
approves Henri Marrou’s suggestion that these rules might not be wholly written by Augustine 
though they certainly come from his circle and are faithful to his monastic ideal. See Ibid., 125–
126; Cf. H. I. Marrou, Saint Augustine and his Influence through the Ages (New York, 1957), 
155–156. I shall adopt this view in this section and consider these Rules as reflecting Augustine’s 
monastic ideas. 
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love of God should be united with the love of neighbours.118 On this basis, he 
specifies rigorous precepts to regulate the daily life of monks in terms of their 
activities and comportment, such as their praying, reading, working, bearings, and 
their appropriate attire. Moreover, Augustine also stipulates severe penalties (such 
as whippings) for punishing offences.119 The following paragraph on punishments 
in Praeceptum (Chapter 4) states Augustine’s position: 
If he neglects to mend his ways after such admonition, he should first be reported to the 
superior, before his behaviour is revealed to others whose task it is to expose his failing in 
the event of his denial…When convicted, he must submit to the salutary punishment 
determined by the judgement of the superior, or even that of the priest whose authority 
embraces such matters. If he refuses to submit to punishment even if he is determined not 
to leave, expel him from your society.120 [transl. Lawless]  
The rules uphold the presbyter’s authority and the practioners’ obedience to 
stringent discipline. In comparison to the monasticism of Antony of Egypt and the 
austere Christian asceticism in the Syrian tradition,121 important differences are 
apparent. 
Firstly, while Augustine does not abandon monastic asceticism, his 
objective is spirituality rather than physical mortification—abstinence is good as a 
supporting means but not as the main purpose.122 He supports fasting as being 
beneficial for cultivating virtues and godliness if the physical condition of the 
servants of God permits it;123 fasting should be proportionate to one’s health and 
that the aim of exterior abstinence is to make one’s spirituality richer and more 
                                                 
118 As Ordo Monasterii states at the beginning: “Love God above all else, dearest brothers, then 
your neighbour also, because these are precepts given us as primary principles”. [transl. Lawless] 
Cf. Praeceptum: Primum propter quod in unum estis congregati, ut unanimes habitetis in domo et 
sit uobis anima una et cor unum in Deum.  
119 Ordo Monasterii: Si non emendauerit, sciat se subiacere disciplinae monasterii sicut oportet. Si 
autem talis fuerit aetas ipsius, etiam uapulet. Cf. Praeceptum, ch. 4. 
120 Praeceptum 4.9: Sed antequam aliis demonstretur, per quas conuincenda est, si negauerit, 
prius praeposito debet ostendi…Conuicta uero secundum praepositi, uel etiam presbyteri ad cuius 
dispensationem pertinet arbitrium, debet emendatoriam sustinere uindictam. Quam si ferre 
recusauerit, etiam si ipsa non abscesserit, de uestra societate proiciatur. 
121 Lawless 2000, 143. 
122 For Augustine’s thoughts on asceticism and monasticism, see John Peter Kenney, “Mystic and 
Monk: Augustine and the Spiritual Life”, in A Companion to Augustine, ed. Mark Vessey 
(Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 284–295.  
123  Praeceptum 3.5: Carnem uestram domate ieiuniis et abstinentia escae et potus, quantum 
ualetudo permittit. Quando autem aliquis non potest ieiunare, non tamen extra horam prandii 
aliquid alimentorum sumat, nisi cum aegrotat. 
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powerful.124 This inner spiritual asceticism is an innovation in comparison to the 
Egyptian and Syrian monastic traditions. 
Secondly, Augustine considers asceticism to be for the goodness and 
freedom of people. The seed of asceticism is sown by grace and thus all the 
precepts are based on the law of love. Augustine emphasises this point at the end 
of Praeceptum: “The Lord grant you the grace to observe these precepts with love 
as lovers of spiritual beauty, exuding the fragrance of Christ in the goodness of 
your lives; you are no longer slaves under the law, but a people living in freedom 
under grace”.125 Thus, one’s gratitude for the Lord will naturally transform into 
caritas, the love of God and neighbours (Ordo Monasterii: diligatur Deus, deinde 
et proximus). In this love, the monastery shares possessions and lives 
harmoniously with one heart and soul to worship God.126 The notions of brotherly 
friendship and the father-son relationship expressed by Augustine are 
distinguished from the authoritative hierarchy in Egyptian monasticism (for 
example, the absolute authority of the “abba/amma” or “master-slave” mode).127 
Thirdly, Augustinian monastery is not strictly isolated from the secular 
world, as his form of monastery is distinguished by its return to the spiritual 
renewal of emotions. In fact, Augustine’s monastic paradigm does not permit a 
complete disregard of either one’s fellow humans or the outside world.128 Peter 
Brown describes this as follows: “this monastery was unlike the ascetic 
communities isolated in the Egyptian desert: books were read, study was pursued, 
                                                 
124 Praeceptum 3.5: Nec ibi eos teneat uoluptas iam uegetos, quo necessitas leuarat infirmos. Illi 
se extiment ditiores, qui in sustinenda parcitate fuerint fortiores; melius est enim minus egere, 
quam plus habere. 
125 Praeceptum 8.1: Donet dominus, ut obseruetis haec omnia cum dilectione, tamquam spiritalis 
pulchritudinis amatores et bono Christi odore de bona conuersatione flagrantes, non sicut serui 
sub lege, sed sicut liberi sub gratia constituti. 
126 Praeceptum 1.2: Primum, propter quod in unum estis congregati, ut unianimes habitetis in 
domo et sit uobis anima una et cor unum in Deum. 
127 Adolar Zumkeller compares Augustine’s notion of monastic superiors with that in the Egyptian 
and Eastern monasteries, emphasising that the Augustinian monastery is based on a “father-son” 
relation rather than a “master-slave” relation. “Augustine vividly described the father-and-son 
relationship between superiors and their subjects. In this, he transformed the automatic obedience 
to any command demanded by Eastern monasteries into a more human and personal intercourse 
between superiors and subordinates…Basil himself, to illustrate monastic obedience, uses, not the 
father-and-son image, but the image of a master and his slaves”. Zumkeller, Augustine’s Ideal of 
the Religious Life (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986), 161–162. Also see Xia Dongqi 
2007, 295–296. 
128 Conf. 10.43.70 demonstrates that Augustine was for some time motivated to be a hermit like 
Anthony: “Terrified by my sins and the pile of my misery, I had racked my heart and had 
meditated taking flight to live in solitude”. 
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learned conversation took place in a pleasant garden, in a town whose port 
brought many travellers. By the end of Augustine’s life, visitors had become so 
many, that a hostel was built to lodge them”. 129  Thus, Augustine does not 
conceive of monastic members as holy people without worldly cares or charitable 
emotions. 
To Augustine, a monastery is a micro-association that is stricter than the 
church and is closer to the essence of the true ecclesia, reflecting the ideal of the 
City of God in the earthly world. But a monastery is nevertheless a corpus 
permixtum, which pertains not only to the sphere of administration, but also to the 
spiritual level. Many monks and nuns maintain high virtues of godly emotions and 
distance themselves from secular desires and powers, even if they sometimes 
might be passively disturbed by outside affairs, whereas some members of 
monastic communities are inspired by the temptations and passions pertaining to 
worldly benefits instead of inner spiritual pursuits. But the main objective of 
monastic society is to attain the spiritual purification of emotions as well as to 
achieve moral improvement. This is different from the secular communities of 
unbelievers, as the monastic society shares the love of God, whereas the secular 
community is motivated by various reasons to adhere to earthly desires. 130 
Therefore, from the perspective of the spiritual scale of love and the virtues of 
renewed emotions, the monastery is higher than the church and both of them are 
gifts of divine grace that rank higher than the secular communities.  
In the relations between monastery and church, the Donatists threated to 
create a schism in Catholic unity. Augustine was involved in the polemic with the 
Donatists after he began his presbyterate in 391, and he passionately wrote a 
series of treatises opposing them in the following decades.131 The Donatists spread 
widely throughout North Africa, especially in the ecclesiastical region of Numidia. 
                                                 
129 Brown 2000, 195. Cf. Serm. 356.10. 
130 Kenney 2012, 295. 
131  Augustine’s anti-Donatist works are usually divided into two stages by the year 411 (the 
outbreak of the Pelagian controversy). The first stage works (395–411) include Psalmus contra 
partem Donati (393/394), Contra epistulam Parmeniani (400), De baptismo (400/401), Contra 
litteras Petiliani (402), Epistula ad Catholicos (=De unitate ecclesiae, ca.402), Contra 
cresconium grammaticum (406/409), De unico baptismo (410), and Breuiculus collationis cum 
Donatistis (411), among others. The works of the second stage (411–430) include De correctione 
Donatistarum (417), De patientia (418), Contra Gaudentium (419), and De haeresibus (428). See 
Karfíková 2012, 135–136. 
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They were under the leadership of eminent bishops, such as Donatus, Parmenian, 
Primian and Petilian as well as the weighty defenders Gaudentius and Tyconius, 
whom Augustine listed as his polemic opponents.132 The Donatists considered the 
Catholic Church to be a contaminated society and they advocated purity, 
rebaptism, and martyrdom in their fanatical attacks against the Catholic 
Christians.133 To Augustine, these opponents constituted a heresy more than a 
schism. In correcting Cresconius’s definition of Donatism as a schism, Augustine 
noted that the Donatists were not simply a separated group, but rather represented 
a doctrinal deviation of the heretics.134 Augustine defends his position by basing 
his argument on the following observations: 
(1) Baptism is conferred by Christ, with the priests serving only as 
instruments for Him in forgiving sins, whereas the Donatist rebaptism attributes 
the merits of Christ to the minister and erroneously makes the latter a 
benefactor.135 In De baptismo, Augustine stresses that the sacrament of baptism is 
eternally valid, regardless of whether or not the ordained clergy is pure. Christ is 
the only mediator between the baptised and God in the “sacrament of grace” or 
“the grace of baptism” (sacramentum gratiae, gratia baptismatis) which is holy 
even when it takes place through a murderer’s hands.136 Moreover, the Donatists 
accept the Catholic belief in the doctrine of the Trinity,137 so that the Catholic 
sacrament of baptism should not be repeated. In this sense, Augustine argues that 
rebaptism forms an essential doctrinal deviation and he refers to the Donatists as 
heretics. 
(2) The church is the body of Christ and no one is sinless except through 
                                                 
132 See Rev. J. R. King, “Introductory Essay” and “Preface”, in Nicene & Post-Nicene Fathers IV 
(New York, 1887; Reprint by Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996), 372–374; 405–406. 
133 Ibid., 405. 
134 Lenka Karfíková maintains that Augustine’s attitude toward the Donatists undergoes a process. 
“Augustine refers to the Donatists as schismatics at first, and later as heretics, perceiving a gradual 
transition between the two”. See Karfíková 2012, 137 and n. 26.  
135 See bapt. 5.19.25–5.27.38. 
136 bapt. 5.21.29: Quapropter sacramentum gratiae dat Deus etiam per malos, ipsam uero gratiam 
non nisi per se ipsum uel per sanctos suos…Baptismum uero, quod est sacramentum remissionis 
peccatorum, quia nulli dubium est habere posse etiam homicidas. Cf. bapt. 4.14.22; 4.13.20–21; 
1.1.1–2. Karfíková notes that there is a distinction between the validity of baptism and the 
“sacrament of grace” in Augustine, since the latter (also known as “the grace of baptism”) refers to 
the spiritual sense of salvation rather than to the act of baptism itself. See Karfíková 2012, 139 and 
n. 37. 
137 correct. 1.1.1. 
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the Lord who grants saving grace. However, the Donatists apply this pureness and 
holiness to a specific group, claiming that the Catholic Church is polluted. By 
contrast, Augustine insists that just as tares and wheat, or gold and wood, both 
good and evil members exist in the earthly church, intermixed until the end of the 
world when they will be differentiated by the Lord. They should not be separated 
now by a schism.138 Augustine emphasises that Christ is the head of the church, 
sending out the Holy Spirit as a consequence of the remission of sins. However, 
this does not mean that the baptised members of the visible church necessarily 
belong to the “Dove” (columba) of Christ (una est columba mea, una est matri 
suae),139 as he argues that the remission of sins does not occur during outward 
baptism, but in the true conversion of the heart.140 Augustine therefore argues that 
the true church cannot be divided into many schismatic parts (bapt.1.11.15: nec 
possunt ecclesiae tot esse quot schismata). The schismatics’ separation of 
themselves from the perfection and unity of the dove fights against Christ Himself 
and Augustine states they will “depart into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil 
and his angels”.141 
(3) Martyrdom is encouraged as the great fruit of grace that imitates the 
sacrifice of Christ for true faith in charity,142 but the Donatist “martyrs” (such as 
the Circumcelliones) in their tearing of the body of Christ and assaulting Catholic 
Christians are fanatical persecutors rather than those who endure persecution 
themselves.143 Furthermore, the death of martyrs should defend the holy belief in 
the unity of Christ’s body, shedding blood for caritas rather than for fame. 
                                                 
138 bapt. 4.12.19. 
139  bapt.1.11.15: Ergo est illic Spiritus Sanctus; quia cum insufflante Domino datus esset 
discipulis…Una est enim, quaecumque illa sit de qua dictum est: Una est columba mea, una est 
matri suae, nec possunt ecclesiae tot esse quot schismata. The concept of the dove (columba) is 
related to the appearance of a dove when Jesus was baptised by the Holy Spirit through the hands 
of John. Here it refers to the true kingdom of Christ and the grace of salvation rather than the 
earthly physical church. The meaning of “dove” is discussed in Karfíková 2012, 141 (n. 50). 
140  bapt. 6.32.62: …et non esse consequens, ut quisquis habet Baptismum Christi etiam de 
peccatorum remissione securus sit; si hoc in Sacramento tantum habet nec ueraci cordis 
confessione conuersus est, ut dimittenti dimitteretur. 
141 See bapt. 4.13.21. “That they have no part given them in the saving grace of the Church, who, 
scattering and fighting against the Church of Christ, are called adversaries by Christ Himself…the 
Lord will then say, ‘Depart from me, ye that work iniquity,’ and ‘Depart into everlasting fire, 
prepared for the devil and his angels’”. [transl. Rev. J. R. King] 
142 bapt. 2.1.2. 
143 See Carole Straw, “Martyrdom”, in Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. 
Fitzgerald (Michigan/Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1999), 539. 
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Otherwise, suffering will become senseless and may even become an instrument 
of the Devil.144 The well-marked virtues of true martyrs are therefore charity, 
humility, and patience. Moreover, while true martyrs follow the sufferings of 
Christ to promote harmony in the church and peace of the world, the Donatists 
prefer reputation to any inner progress, and instead of defending virtues, they 
support the vanity of an “elite” group for honour. Thus, the Donatists do not 
represent true martyrdom.145 
Through making these arguments against Donatism, Augustine attempts to 
combine the pureness, holiness, and perfection of the love of Christ with the 
mixed nature of the earthly monasteries and churches. It is clear that Augustine 
focuses most on ordinate love with virtues of renewed emotions, ranking the 
sufferings of Christ as the perfect model and Christian virtues as having various 
degrees dependent on a person’s inner spiritual realm rather than outward honours. 
This is illustrated by the alignment that Augustine advocates. Firstly, the passions 
of true martyrdom exhibit great love, but they are inferior to the passions of Christ 
who grants redemption through the sufferings endured in crucifixion.146 Secondly, 
monks and nuns, being inferior to Christ and martyrs, are free to a considerable 
degree from secular passions, but harbour fervent godly emotions toward God and 
their fellow human beings. Thirdly, the pious laity develops renewed Christian 
passions that are better than the attitudes of secular unbelievers. Augustine 
reiterates at the end of the Rule that all the spiritual virtues of emotions are 
therefore cultivated by grace and they are not the merits achieved by people: 
“When you find yourselves doing what has been written here, thank the Lord, the 
giver of all good gifts”.147 
 
                                                 
144 Ep. 173: “But notice what follows: ‘If I have not charity it profiteth me nothing.’ You are called 
to that charity; you will not be allowed to perish away from that charity, and you think it profits 
you something if you hurl yourself to destruction, whereas it would profit you nothing if another 
put you to death as an enemy of charity. Even if you were burned alive for the name of Christ, you 
would suffer the punishment of eternal torment if you persisted in remaining outside the Church, 
separated from the edifice of unity and the bond of charity”. [transl. Wilfrid Parsons] 
145 Straw 1999, 538. 
146 The passions of martyrdom do not function to remit sins, whereas Christ suffers to redeem 
humanity, which means that martyrs are “far inferior to Him” (Io. eu. tr. 84.2) See Straw 1999, 
541. 
147 Praeceptum 8.2: Et ubi uos inueneritis ea quae scripta sunt facientes, agite gratias domino 
bonorum omnium largitori. 
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Spiritual sublimation: consecrated emotions in the temptations of the world 
Political and ecclesiastical authorities represent different dimensions in social life. 
Political authorities are responsible for the secular political order and 
ecclesiastical authorities for the spiritual domain, but they are not isolated from 
each other.148 For example, emperors are crowned in church to guarantee the 
political legitimacy and many officials seek the aid of bishops to attain prestige in 
politics; likewise, some clergymen are more interested in civil affairs for their 
worldly interests.149 Two values, cupiditas and caritas, are mingled with each 
other in the secular world. Due to this corpus permixtum nature of the humanity, 
the church (as a symbol of the City of God on the earth) and the secular state 
display a hybridity with both good and bad acts, but Augustine stresses that they 
share no essence.150 The distinct missions combined with moral opacity in the two 
cities contribute to a complex relationship between the church and the state. I shall 
next survey Augustine’s view of the moral status of emotions in the church-state 
relations.  
 Firstly, Augustine asserts that libido dominandi and caritas are both found 
in church and state, and these two emotions can be converted into each other. 
While authority and obedience are employed in the ecclesia, and a presbyter has 
the power to supervise the implementation of precepts, serving members in love, 
it is still possible for a presbyter to exercise libido dominandi over them. Indeed, 
Augustine warns that a high position among the Christians is more perilous than a 
low one.151 Likewise, secular political authorities can exert an abuse of power or 
benevolent rule in varying degrees, but if they accept the ecclesiastical values of 
caritas, despotic rule is not possible. 
Secondly, the church and the state could make use of each other for the 
purpose of caritas. For instance, Augustine (after ca. 400) was inclined to accept 
coercion through use of political powers to force the Donatists into the Catholic 
unity, and he argues that this is consistent with humanity and love.152 Meanwhile, 
                                                 
148  Herbert Deane uses the Pauline conception of “two swords” to describe the separate but 
cooperating tasks of the church and the state. See Deane 1963, 172–173. 
149 Deane 1963, 173. 
150 CD 14.28. 
151 Praeceptum 7.4: Quia inter uos, quanto in loco superiore, tanto in periculo maiore uersatur. 
152 Augustine’s attitude to Donatism shows some changes. Before 400, he was hoping to persuade 
the Donatists through moderate dialogues (see Ep. 23), whereas after, especially with the issue of 
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the Roman Empire used the episcopal judicial mediation (episcopale 
iudicium/episcopalis audientia) to improve their corrupted judiciary and civil 
administration.153 Augustine reminds us that the church and the state can also 
restrain each other. The ecclesia provides moral norms for the state and even 
emperors are required to observe these moral rules. It is thus possible for a bishop 
to reinforce his spiritual authority for politics, but his secular power is often 
restrained by the state. 154  As a consequence, both political and ecclesiastical 
authorities are limited, both intermingled with two loves, cupiditas and caritas. 
However, the essence of the ecclesia and that of the state are radically 
different. On behalf of the City of God, the church provides the spirit of caritas, 
whereas the temporal earthly politics often reflect the libido dominandi which 
represent values that are opposite. At this point, Augustine evaluates these two 
loves and morals of emotions on the spiritual level. His concept of the Dove 
(columba) of Christ places more emphasis upon the spiritual dimension of unity 
than on the integration of organisations. How can the members of this Dove settle 
worldly confusions and turbulences (caligo et tumultus saecularium actionum)?155 
Augustine argues that in this suffering world, passions are burned with 
temptations and fears. Even if someone experiences the temporal joy of profit, 
they will be tormented in their deceptive happiness by losses and worries.156 
Moreover, worldly affairs often present great burdens and troubles. Augustine 
comments on his reluctance to deal with the authorities: 
People often ask about me, ‘Why does he go to the authorities? What does a bishop want 
with the authorities?’ But you all know that it’s your needs that force me to go there, even 
though I don’t want to…I have to put up with the humiliation, make my request, 
sometimes succeed, sometimes leave disappointed. Who would put up with all that if he 
                                                                                                                                     
Edictum de unitate in 405, he advocates coercion in the matter of schisms. For his changing 
attitudes on Donatism, see Xia Dongqi 2007, 319; Karfíková 2012, 145; Deane 1963, 185–208. 
153  The Emperor Constantine issued an edict in 318 to support episcopal courts (episcopalis 
audientia) in reconciling and judging the ecclesiastic and civilian disputes. See Xia Dongqi 2007, 
300–301. 
154 Xia mentions the limitation of episcopal authorities in social affairs. As distinct from Peter 
Brown and Brook Manville, Xia argues that the secular power of the ecclesia was weak and 
limited and encountering official infringement, the church could only fight back wtih spiritual 
punishments. See Xia Dongqi 2007, 304–305. 
155 Ep. 48.1: Nostras enim saepe sauciat et debilitat caligo et tumultus saecularium actionum. 
156 Serm. 302.2: Experti sumus quam aerumnosa, quam querelosa; circumdata temptationibus, 
plena timoribus; ardens cupiditatibus, subdita casibus; in aduersis dolens, in prosperis tremens; 
lucris exsultans, damnis excrucians… uera infelicitas, mendosa felicitas. 
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weren’t forced to?...I don’t choose to have dealings with the authorities.157 [transl. Atkins] 
Instead of seeking wealth and excitements, due to the spirit of charity, Augustine 
is compelled to confront these trivial matters. He appears to be neither highly 
fervent, nor indifferent to secular matters, but chooses somewhere in between, 
“turning neither to the right nor to the left”, remaining tranquil in his heart after 
having withdrawn from worldly interests.158 However, these matters are of no 
great importance to him. He maintains further that whether one strives 
passionately or suffers in charity, or takes the middle way, it should all be for “the 
glory of God”: 
This is the direction of the right road, ‘which has its eyes ever towards the Lord, for He 
shall pluck [your] feet from the snare.’ This course of life is not parched by activity, nor 
cooled by sloth, nor stormy, nor withered, nor bold, nor timid, nor headlong, nor faint-
hearted. ‘These things do ye, and the God of peace will be with you.’159 [transl. Parsons] 
This conviction is echoed in his late writings. In CD 19.19, he states that it does 
not matter which of these lifestyles one chooses, such as leisure, action, or a 
combination of both. They are all praiseworthy provided that one follows charity 
according to God’s will. The secular power and honour could be used righteously 
and beneficially for the wellbeing of the poor, following caritas rather than the 
libido. Thus, Augustine responds to those who passionately participate in secular 
affairs but disregard the meditation of God:  
It is the love of truth which seeks a holy leisure, while it is under the impetus of love that 
we should undertake righteous business. If this latter burden is not imposed on us, we 
should devote our freedom to the search for and contemplation of truth. But if it is 
imposed on us, it is to be undertaken because of the impetus of love; and even then the 
delight in the pursuit of truth should not be entirely forsaken. For if these pleasures were 
to be taken away from us, our burden might prove too great for us.160 
Augustine turns from sensual behaviour (or lifestyle) to the spiritual 
dimension, emphasising the scale of virtues of renewed life free from secular 
                                                 
157 Serm. 302.17: Saepe de nobis dicitur: quare it ad illam potestatem? Et quid quaerit episcopus 
cum illa potestate? Et tamen omnes nostis quia uestrae necessitates nos cogunt uenire quo 
nolumus…ferre humilitates, rogare, aliquando impetrare, aliquando tristes abscedere. quis uellet 
haec pati, nisi cogeremur?…nolumus habere rationem cum potestatibus.  
158  Ep. 48: Sicut autem inter ignem et aquam tenenda est uia, ut nec exuratur homo nec 
demergatur…non declinantes neque ad dexteram neque ad sinistram…dilectissimi, diligite 
otium, ut uos ab omni terrena delectatione refrenetis. 
159 Ep. 48: Ipsa est enim actio recti itineris, quae oculos semper habet ad dominum, quoniam ipse 
euellet de laqueo pedes. Talis actio nec frigitur negotio nec frigida est otio nec turbulenta nec 
marcida est nec audax nec fugax nec praeceps nec iacens. Haec agite et Deus pacis erit uobis cum. 
160 CD 19.19. 
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passions. Following the perfect passions of Christ, the true members of the Dove 
of Christ—martyrs, monks and nuns, the clergies, and the laity—represent new 
values in the world of desires. Through various gifts of grace, an ascent of love is 
cultivated toward perfection through inner spiritual improvement. Inward grace-
based dispositions and virtues will build harmonious communities and societies 
that are characterized by the spirit of peace and charity toward neighbours. This is 
an ideal picture, but it is based on the assumption that even the pilgrimaging city 
of God is only moving toward perfection and that its members are not yet free 
from sinful inclinations. Augustine rebukes those who are lenient to damnable 
sins and he advocates harsh punishments on the wicked, even permitting offensive 
wars in some situations. His view of just war has been subject to many 
controversies. I shall next address this question. 
 
4.4. Libido dominandi, Just War and Earthly Peace  
 
In expressing his negative attitude toward war, Augustine believed that removing 
the disguise of military glory from the act of conquest leaves only the naked “lust 
for domination” (libido ista dominandi) and this lures the human race into 
inflicting great terror and suffering.161 In war, “all were wounded together: the 
smitten in body and the smiters in soul”.162 Furthermore, the lust for domination 
drives the earthly city to enslave other nations and offer false glories.163 In brief, 
wars are always an evil that should be either avoided or prevented. 164  Some 
scholars consequently presume that Augustine is a pacifist and that he maintains 
the tradition of early church pacifism. Others, however, notice that in specific 
situations, Augustine permits the application of violence and active attacks, and 
his support of the Christian wars against “unjust” nations implies an acceptance of 
violence rather than pacifism. Let us now review the competing interpretations.  
                                                 
161 CD 3.14: Quid mihi obtenditur nomen laudis nomen que uictoriae? Remotis obstaculis insanae 
opinionis facinora nuda cernantur, nuda pensentur, nuda iudicentur…Libido ista dominandi 
magnis malis agitat et conterit humanum genus. 
162 CD 3.22: mutuis dicam omnino uulneribus, cum percussus in corpore et percussor in animo 
feriretur! 
163 As Augustine notes in Praefatio of CD: Unde etiam de terrena ciuitate, quae cum dominari 
adpetit, etsi populi seruiant, ipsa ei dominandi libido dominator… 
164 CD 19.7: “Let everyone, therefore, who reflects with pain upon such great evils, upon such 
horror and cruelty, acknowledge that this is misery”.  
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 David Lenihan contends that Augustine’s thought is deeply rooted in the 
pacifist tradition of the earlier fathers and the spirit of the Gospel and should not 
be associated with the later theory of just war.165 Lenihan maintains that those 
who believe that Augustine is the principal originator of the just war theory are 
misled by both forged manuscripts and misinterpretations of some decretalists. He 
follows F. H. Russell’s argument that several spurious letters such as Gravi de 
pugna were falsely attributed to Augustine during the sixth century, which led to 
the misconception that the medieval just war theory was established by 
Augustine. 166  By interpreting Augustine’s ideas on war and peace in eight 
Augustinian sources,167 Lenihan concludes that Augustine is not a “just warrior”, 
but rather a genuine pacifist. Lenihan also holds that Augustine’s peaceful 
position was misinterpreted by some medieval theologians such as Aquinas who 
wrongly surmised that Augustine had justified the Christian service in war.168 
According to Lenihan, Augustine rather adheres to the ideas of earlier fathers such 
as Origen and Tertullian, advocating a genuine love of peace,169 being “a personal 
pacifist who would have himself killed rather than exercise a legal right of self-
defense against a criminal”.170 Lenihan offers evidence for his claim as follows: (1) 
As a criterion to evaluate the character of war, Augustine uses the inner order of 
society, referring to the attack of the Visigoths as injustice since it disrupts social 
order. This serves to illustrate that his concept of war differs from that of the just 
                                                 
165 “I attempt to show that the just war theory is not on a continuum from Augustine, whose 
thought is much more complex and that, on the contrary, Augustine is on a continuum with the 
pacifist tradition of the earlier fathers”. David Lenihan, “Just war Theory in the Work of Saint 
Augustine”, in Augustinian Studies 19 (1988), 37.  
166 Lenihan 1988, 37–38. 
167 These works include: (1) De libero arbitrio 1.5; (2) Contra Faustum Manichaeum 22; (3) Ep. 
138, to Marcellinus; (4) Ep. 189, to Boniface; (5) Ep. 222, to Darius; (6) Quaestiones in 
Heptateuchum 6.10; (7) De sermone Domini in monte 30; (8) De civitate Dei. Ibid., 42. 
168 “It would seem that Augustine has been cast into this position by theologians who, like Thomas 
Aquinas, answered the moral question of whether it was always sinful for Christians to engage in 
warfare by ferreting, out of context, small proof texts from Augustine to justify Christian 
participation in warfare”. Ibid., 38.  
169 “Augustine, in my estimation, is not a ‘just warrior’ and the medieval just war is not a direct 
descendent, but a mis-interpretation and simplification by the decretalists who failed to see the full 
Augustinian position with its spiritual complexity. In his interiority, deep spirituality, and genuine 
love of peace, Augustine is in continuity with the earlier fathers and the spirit of the Gospel”. Ibid., 
41. For Augustine’s adherence to predecessors such as Origen and Tertullian and his discontinuity 
with Aquinas on the issue of just war, see Lenihan 1988, 40–46; 55–56. 
170 Lenihan 1988, 41. 
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war theories.171 (2) Augustine distinguishes the concept of the justice of God from 
the justice of the law, arguing that wars may be just in terms of human laws but do 
not represent “true justice” according to God. His dichotomy of “justice” differs 
from the account by Aquinas of “natural justice”.172 (3) Augustine does not form a 
unified theory of “just war”, but discusses it in a disorganised way. In effect, 
minor inconsistencies in his formulations should not be taken to affect his pacifist 
position.173 (4) War is evil and inevitable, but it is needed in God’s plan in the 
world.174 (5) Augustine never advocates militarism, but always underscores peace 
and love.175 (6) Augustine does not forbid Christians from taking up arms, but he 
states emphatically that those who participate on the battlefield should harbour 
love in their hearts.176 Through these points, Lenihan concludes that Augustine is 
“a saint of peace and love”, as he bases the concept of the justice of war on the 
spirit of God, and Augustine’s reluctant permission to use military means is 
related to his considerations concerning God’s plan.177 
 In line with Lenihan, Robert Holmes argues for Augustine’s personal 
pacifist position and his ties to earlier fathers, but Holmes adds that Augustine 
regarded war as a necessary part of historical reality and often justified it from the 
Christian perspective. 178  Holmes suggests that when examining Augustine’s 
position, it is important to take into account the concepts of motive and intention, 
because the moral character of outward acts is determined by the interiority, 
                                                 
171  Lenihan maintains that Augustine did not consider the sackings by the Vandals and the 
Visigoths to be foreign wars in the modern sense, but rather civil wars within the Roman Empire. 
Therefore, the question of justice is based on whether or not the war maintains social order. 
Lenihan 1988, 53. 
172  “[For Aquinas], ‘justice’ is one and unchangeable, and always takes its origin from the 
naturally just…For Augustine, justice was a subjective question, dependent on motivation”. This 
produces distinct notions of just war in Augustine and Aquinas. See Lenihan 1988, 54–55. 
173 Lenihan 1988, 55. 
174 Lenihan 1988, 56. 
175 Lenihan 1988, 56. 
176 Lenihan 1988, 56. 
177 Lenihan 1988, 57. 
178 “That Augustine was almost certainly a personal pacifist may be granted…it is arguable true 
that Augustine stands on a continuum in many respects with earlier Christian writers…Moreover, 
as I shall suggest, nothing in the preceding precludes the possibility that Augustine has carved out 
a position that distinguishes him from both the pacifists of the early church and the just war 
theories of the later church”. Robert Holmes, “St. Augustine and the Just War Theory”, in The 
Augustinian Tradition, ed. Gareth Matthews (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1999), 324 and 330. 
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intentions and motives.179  According to Augustine, in comparison to the true 
justice of God, a temporal order can be somewhat just, in other words, not 
completely just, or entirely unjust. The right intention in waging war is to aim for 
true justice and peace.180 As for motives, Augustine values the role of love in 
maintaining order. When God commands people to wage a war, it is clearly just. 
However, even without this divine command, good motivations combined with 
the right intentions makes a war similarly justified. Nonetheless, Christians can 
also accept military action that fulfils the temporal criteria of justice without its 
leaders having good motivations, because “good deeds” can be done intentionally 
with either good or evil motives, the inner motive being morally decisive.181 The 
ultimate motivation is difficult to determine and this presents a problem in 
Augustine’s discussion on the justification of war. For this reason, Augustine 
tends to accept wars that show temporal justice, but this remains an abstract 
principle for Augustine in comparison to later theories of just wars. As for the 
Christians’ participation in war, the fundamental imperative is to obey the state 
and avoid evils such as cruelty, love of violence, or a lust for power.182 Holmes 
concludes that Augustine’s position is partially in line with the later just war 
theory that foregrounds the unification of pacifism and an acceptance of just war. 
He maintains that Augustine “should have been [a personal pacifist] and, to be 
consistent, should have been a universal pacifist as well”.183 
 Herbert Deane suggests a contrary position: “Augustine follows 
Athanasius and Ambrose in rejecting the pacifism and antimilitarism of many of 
the Church Fathers, such as Tertullian, Origen, and Lactantius”.184 Deane refers to 
two instances when Augustine regards an offensive war as a just war. One 
instance occurs when a country does not make restitution for wrong actions 
committed by its citizens; the other occurs when a country does not return 
                                                 
179  In discussing Augustine’s view of the relation between motivation, intention, and action, 
Holmes states that “both motives and intentions can determine the moral character of acts…But 
motives are basic, because they determine the character of intentions as well as of acts”. Holmes 
1999, 326. 
180 “Peace, for Augustine, entails order, and a given temporal order can be just or unjust (at least, 
can vary in degrees of injustice, since, strictly, no temporal order can be completely just). One 
ought only to aim for a just peace”. Ibid., 332. 
181 Ibid., 326–327. 
182 Ibid., 333–336. 
183 Ibid., 337. 
184 Deane 1963, 155. 
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misappropriated properties.185 Moreover, Deane refers to Augustine’s defence of 
violent acts by the prophet Moses in a way that differs from Faustus’ pacifism: 
Against the doctrinaire pacifism of the Manicheans, he [Augustine] argues that when God 
commanded Moses to carry on wars, He [Moses] “acted not in cruelty, but in righteous 
retribution, giving to all what they deserved, and warning those who needed warning”. 
The pacifist who regards death as the great evil involved in war is ready to buy life at the 
price of subjection to injustice…If he [the monarch] decides that war is necessary, he has 
the right to begin hostilities, and the soldiers and citizens under his command must obey 
his orders, whether or not they agree with his judgment.186 
Deane does not believe Augustine to be a pacifist who will sacrifice justice to 
save lives in wars, since anarchy and injustice are the worst evils in Augustine and 
he accepts violent means necessary to correct wrongs, including wars. 187 
Augustine’s approval of fighting, Deane adds, is in accordance with the 
commandments of Christ who never advocated absolute pacifism or tolerance of 
wrongdoings.188 It is thus clear that Augustine deviated from the earlier church 
fathers’ tendency to be opposed to any Christian military service.189 
  The above interpretations agree on Augustine’s understanding that the 
moral evils of warriors are associated with detestable passions such as “the desire 
for violence, cruelty of revenge, fierce and implacable enmity, furious 
rebelliousness, and the lust for power”.190 They also note that Augustine teaches 
us how to eliminate these desires and restore earthly peace and order. However, 
they hold contrary positions regarding Augustine as a pacifist. I shall suggest that 
neither pacifism nor militarism best describes his thinking on war. The 
commandments of God form the core of his theory of just war and they should 
transform the evil driving passions of war into a sublimated spiritual state through 
the participants’ obedience. Let us turn to some of his writings, such as Contra 
                                                 
185 Quaestiones in Heptateuchum 6.10: “If some nation or some state which is warred upon has 
failed either to make reparation for an injurious action committed by its citizens or to return what 
has been wrongfully appropriated”. [transl. Deane] See Deane 1963, 160 and 312 (n. 24). 
186 Deane 1963, 161–162. 
187 Deane 1963, 161–162. 
188 Deane 1963, 164. 
189 See Deane 1963, 155 and 309 (n. 4). 
190 c. Faust. 22.75: Nocendi cupiditas, ulciscendi crudelitas, inpacatus atque inplacabilis animus, 
feritas rebellandi, libido dominandi et si qua similia. For English texts of Contra Faustum 
Manichaeum, I adopt Stothert’s translation with modifications (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers 
IV) in this chapter. 
  
162 
 
Faustum Manichaeum 22, Quaestiones in Heptateuchum 6.10, Epistulae 93, and 
De civitate Dei, to examine how faith factors into his notion of war. 
 
The Command of God as a justification for war 
Augustine emphasises the decisive role of divine command in justifying wars and 
he thus distinguishes between the true and qualified human justice in the doctrines 
of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.191 From the perspective of jus ad bellum, just 
causes are the primary criteria for evaluating the justifiability of wars. In seeking 
just causes for undertaking a war, the command of God should rank the highest. 
Augustine regards the divine command as the sufficient and necessary condition 
for true justice, whereas other supporting just causes belong to qualified human 
justice that should comply with God’s plan. As explained in Contra Faustum 
Manichaeum 22.75, Augustine stresses the authority of God as well as the control 
of human passions in a just war in accordance with divine command: 
When war is undertaken in obedience to God to rebuke, or humble, or crush the pride of 
man, one should not doubt that it is undertaken in a righteous way; for even the wars 
which arise from human desire cannot harm the eternal God, not even hurt His saints; for 
in the trial of their patience, and the chastening of their spirit, and in bearing fatherly 
correction, they are rather benefited than injured. No one can have any power against 
them but what is given him from above. For there is no power but of God, who either 
orders or permits.192  
It is unjust to be disobedient to God’s command to wage offensive attacks. This 
may be motivated by people being captivated by earthly temptations, such as a 
desire for temporal happiness, and their excuses for sustaining order and peace are 
unjust in the sight of God. Augustine refuses to regard conniving evil endeavours 
as a valuable type of pacifism. Arguing against Faustus’ criticism of the Israelites’ 
                                                 
191  The doctrine of jus ad bellum is primarily concerned with just causes and conditions for 
undertaking wars while jus in bello concerns behaviour in war. There are different dimensions of 
evaluating the righteousness of war. For a detailed discussion on the distinction of jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello, see John Mark Mattox, Saint Augustine and the Theory of Just War (London·New 
York: Continuum, 2006), 45–60. 
192 c. Faust. 22.75: Bellum autem, quod gerendum Deo auctore suscipitur, recte suscipi dubitare 
fas non est uel ad terrendam uel ad obterendam uel ad subiugandam mortalium superbiam, 
quando ne illud quidem, quod humana cupiditate geritur, non solum incorruptibili Deo, sed nec 
sanctis eius obesse aliquid potest; quibus potius ad exercendam patientiam et ad humiliandam 
animam ferendamque paternam disciplinam etiam prodesse inuenitur. Neque enim habet in eos 
quisquam ullam potestatem, nisi cui data fuerit desuper. Non est enim potestas nisi a Deo siue 
iubente siue sinente. 
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invading the Egyptians, Augustine contends that it is rather a sin not to punish 
those who revolt against God: 
In this Moses not only did not sin, but it would have been sin not to do it…The people at 
that time were still carnal, and engrossed with earthly affections; while the Egyptians 
were  in open rebellion against God…Thus the Egyptians deserved the punishment, and 
the Israelites were suitably employed in inflicting it.193  
This intolerant attitude concurs with Augustine’s statement in CD 1.9, where he 
rebukes those who love the temporal sweetness of refraining from fighting against 
the damnable sins of the wicked, claiming that the affliction of good men together 
with the wicked in this world is the right punishment by God: 
Because they are lenient towards the damnable sins of the wicked, the good are justly 
scourged alongside them in this world…It is right that they should know bitterness in this 
life when they are afflicted by God in common with the wicked; for, because they loved 
the sweetness of this life, they neglected to be bitter to the wicked.194 
It is clear that Augustine’s consideration of whether to wage war is not based on a 
pacifist conviction, but on the principle of justice, especially as a decree of God. 
Augustine does not intend to sacrifice justice either to spare the wicked or to 
sustain an evil order, but rather suggests shedding blood to defend divine justice, 
which he considers to be true justice that is preferred above human causes. 
From the standpoint of jus in bello, Augustine appreciates just behaviour, 
but does not object to military deceptions. He emphasises, however, that the 
application of deceptive tactics should be based on faith. For example, in the case 
of Joshua conducting an ambush to conquer the city of Ai under the command of 
God, Augustine notes, “Once an individual has undertaken this kind of war, it 
does not matter at all, as far as justice is concerned, whether he wins victory in 
open combat or through rushes”.195 Violence and deceptive acts are accepted in a 
justified war, which serves to illustrate that his attention is concentrated on ends 
                                                 
193 c. Faust. 22.71: Quod faciendo Moyses usque adeo non peccauit, ut non faciendo 
peccaret…Carnalis itaque adhuc ille populus erat et rerum terrenarum cupiditate occupatus, 
Aegyptii uero sacrilegi et iniqui…Digni ergo erant et isti, quibus talia iuberentur, et illi, qui talia 
paterentur. 
194 CD 1.9: Tamen, quia propterea peccatis eorum damnabilibus parcunt, dum eos in suis licet 
leuibus et uenialibus metuunt, iure cum eis temporaliter flagellantur…iure istam uitam, quando 
diuinitus adfliguntur cum eis, amaram sentiunt, cuius amando dulcedinem peccantibus eis amari 
esse noluerunt. 
195 Quaestiones in Heptateuchum 6.10, quoted in Mattox 2006, 64. Cf. Louis J. Swift, The Early 
Fathers on War and Military Service (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1983), 138. 
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rather than means. This point is explained in Ep. 93.7–8, where he reminds us not 
to be misled by similar performances without paying attention to intentions:  
Let us learn, brethren, when actions are alike, to distinguish the intentions of the actors; 
otherwise, if we shut our eyes to this, we might judge falsely, and we might accuse well-
wishers of doing us harm…It is clear that the bad have always persecuted the good, and 
the good have persecuted the bad; the former to do harm unjustly, the latter to bring about 
amendment by punishment; the one unboundedly, the other within bounds; those as 
slaves of passion, these out of love.196 [transl. Parsons] 
Among all the goals in war, the goal of God ranks highest because that objective 
constitutes absolute good even when it involves violence and punishment. This is 
fundamentally different from the pacifist position that avoids the evil of death and 
maintains the existing order at the cost of saving the wicked. According to 
Augustine, this pacifism is a greed for self-interest to avoid enmities or an infirm 
fear of revenge and injury, which are sins.197 These facets of jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello in Augustine are evidence that he is not a pacifist, as his standpoint is 
based on God’s absolute authority and on the corresponding human obedience 
without lenience towards crimes. From this perspective, one might inquire 
whether the love of “turning the other cheek” and “not resisting evil” in Christ 
contradicts the law of fighting against evil.  
 
The unification of law and love and the renewed emotions in war  
It seems that the Christ Himself violates the Old Testament command of fighting 
against evil when by proposing the new commandment that “ye resist not evil: but 
if any one strike thee on the right cheek, turn to him the left also”.198 Then Christ 
seems to break His own precept by resisting the provocation of being struck on 
                                                 
196  Ep. 93.7–8: Discamus, fratres, in similitudine operum discernere animos operantium, ne 
clausis oculis calumniemur et beniuolos pro nocentibus accusemus…sed plane semper et mali 
persecuti sunt bonos et boni persecuti sunt malos, illi nocendo per iniustitiam, illi consulendo per 
disciplinam; illi immaniter, illi temperanter; illi seruientes cupiditati, illi caritati. On the last line, 
“slaves of cupidity” would be a translation more accurate than “slaves of passion”.  
197  CD 1.9: Plerumque enim ab eis docendis ac monendis, aliquando etiam obiurgandis et 
corripiendis male dissimulator…ne impediant et noceant in istis temporalibus rebus, siue quas 
adipisci adhuc adpetit nostra cupiditas, siue quas amittere formidat infirmitas…tamen, quia 
propterea peccatis eorum damnabilibus parcunt. 
198 Matthew 5:39. Cf. c. Faust. 22.76:…quia dominus postea Iesus Christus, “Ego, inquit, dico 
uobis non resistere aduersum malum; sed si quis te percusserit in maxillam tuam dexteram, praebe 
illi et sinistram”. 
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the face when He was examined by the High Priest.199 The Manichaeans cited 
these two inconsistencies to suggest that the Gospel and the Law are mutually 
opposed and further that the utterance of Christ is opposed to Himself.200 They 
pose the question, “why one and the same God commanded the prophets in the 
old times to make war, and forbade the apostles?”201  
Augustine responds to this accusation in Contra Faustum Manichaeum 
22.76 by briefly stating that what Christ refers to in His new commandment is not 
outward actions, but rather the renewal of inward disposition. To Augustine, the 
virtues of this renewed heart are also consistent with the righteousness of the 
Father in the Old Testament.202 However, Augustine soon shifts to allege a deeper 
intrinsic consistency between the divine law and the gospel. He offers a broader 
theological interpretation of the real meaning of war and peace and accounts for 
why Christ delivered the new commandment to us. Augustine provides the 
following arguments: 
Firstly, he points out that the Father’s earthly promises and the decree to 
attack the ungodly nations in the Old Testament hide the secret of the Kingdom of 
Heaven which is disclosed by the Son in the gospel. Both the Old and the New 
Testament imply the same righteous Heavenly Kingdom, which is the opposite of 
all earthly kingdoms.203 The violent means of the divine command in the old times 
are unified with the virtues of patience and love in the gospel, as both of them 
resist injustice and impiety and reveal the truth of the City of God. Especially the 
new commandment clearly conveys the grace of patience and humility which 
                                                 
199 Ep. 138.2.13: “Our Lord Jesus Himself, our perfect example of patience, when He was smitten 
on the face, answered: ‘If I have spoken evil, bear witness of the evil, but if not, why smites thou 
me?’ If we look only to the words, He did not in this obey His own precept, for He did not present 
the other side of his face to him who had smitten Him, but, on the contrary, prevented him who 
had done the wrong from adding thereto”. See Deane 1963, 164–165. 
200 c. Faust. 22.77: Isti certe, si ista diuersa in testamentis singulis inuenirent, uetere et nouo, 
etiam hoc clamarent duo sibi testamenta esse contraria. Quid ergo nunc respondebunt, cum idem 
ipse dicit. 
201 c. Faust. 22.77: Cur non admittunt certi mysterii gratia eundem unum Deum tunc prophetas 
gerere bella iussisse, nunc apostolos prohibuisse? 
202  c. Faust. 22.76: Si autem propterea putant non potuisse Deum bellum gerendum 
iubere…intellegant hanc praeparationem non esse in corpore, sed in corde; ibi est enim sanctum 
cubile uirtutis, quae in illis quoque antiquis iustis nostris patribus habitauit. 
203 c. Faust. 22.76: Ubi autem uenit plenitudo temporis, ut nouum testamentum reuelaretur, quod 
figuris ueteris uelabatur, euidenti testificatione iam demonstrandum erat esse aliam uitam, pro 
qua debet haec uita contemni, et aliud regnum, pro quo oportet omnium terrenorum regnorum 
aduersitatem patientissime sustineri. 
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reflect the spirit of fight and sacrifice for the sake of eternal felicity. This spirit 
echoes the prophecy in the Old Testament, as Augustine exemplifies the cases of 
martyrs and Saul: 
The number of such witnesses [the sufferings and death of martyrs] is so great, that if it 
pleased Christ—who called Saul by a voice from haven, and having changed him from a 
wolf to a sheep, sent him into the midst of wolves—to unite them all in one army, and to 
give them success in battle, as He gave to the Hebrews, what nation could withstand 
them? What kingdom would remain unsubdued?204 
The words and deeds of the Son of God obey the law, sending Himself and His 
followers as sheep into this world of fighting with wolves, but promising that 
nothing will be lost (not even a hair) in the Kingdom of Heaven.205 Therefore, 
according to the law of the gospel, the theme of fighting against ungodly enemies 
with patience and love for the coming of the eternal kingdom of peace is coherent.
 Secondly, to Christians, the evils of war constitute sinful desires for 
pleasure and power, and fighting against these evil passions is not undertaken for 
temporal happiness, but for eternal peace hereafter. 206  Furthermore, living in 
peaceful subjection is cowardly behaviour. This means that good men should 
undertake wars to punish wicked enemies without desire for violence (nocendi 
cupiditas) or lust for domination (libido dominandi), pursuing true justice and 
peace in obedience to lawful authorities and to Christ’s commandment.207 In other 
words, the correct notion of war and peace should be based on Christ who 
provides an example for both soldiers and rulers alike, such as fighting against 
                                                 
204 c. Faust. 22.76: Quorum numerus tantus effloruit, ut, si eos Christus, qui de caelo Saulum 
uocauit et ex lupo factum ouem in medio luporum misit, congregatos uellet armare atque adiuuare 
pugnantes, sicut hebraeos patres adiuuit, quae gentes resisterent? Quae regna non cederent? 
205 c. Faust. 22.76: Itaque in plenitudine temporum Filius Dei factus ex muliere, factus sub lege, ut 
eos, qui sub lege erant, redimeret, factus ex semine Dauid secundum carnem mittit discipulos uelut 
oues in medio luporum et monet, ne timeant eos, qui corpus occidunt, animam autem non possunt 
occidere, promittit etiam ipsius corporis renouandam integritatem usque ad capilli reparationem. 
206 c. Faust. 22.76:…qua iam docendum erat non propter temporalem in hac uita, sed propter 
aeternam post hanc uitam felicitatem deo esse seruiendum, ea quae uulgo infelicitas dicitur pro 
illa felicitate subeunda fuerat et ferenda. 
207  c. Faust. 22.74: Quid enim culpatur in bello?An quia moriuntur quandoque morituri, ut 
domentur in pace uicturi? Hoc reprehendere timidorum est, non religiosorum. Nocendi cupiditas, 
ulciscendi crudelitas, inpacatus atque inplacabilis animus, feritas rebellandi, libido dominandi et 
si qua similia, haec sunt, quae in bellis iure culpantur, quae plerumque ut etiam iure puniantur, 
aduersus uiolentiam resistentium siue Deo siue aliquo legitimo imperio iubente gerenda ipsa bella 
suscipiuntur a bonis. Cum in eo rerum humanarum ordine inueniuntur, ubi eos uel iubere tale 
aliquid uel in talibus oboedire iuste ordo ipse constringit. 
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idolatry (the slaughter and evil passions in war being comparable to idolatry)208 
and against earthly fallacious peace. From this viewpoint, soldiers will not be 
murderers avenging each other in battles, and emperors will gain great victories 
over ungodly nations.209 
Thirdly, the new commandment established the renewal of inward 
disposition as well as the improvement of the morality of emotions. Against 
ungoverned passions in war, good emotions, such as mercy and benevolence, will 
be cultivated, even though outward punishments are still necessary. Augustine 
explains that the virtue of patience and turning the other cheek “may be in the 
inward disposition, though it is not exhibited in bodily action or in words”,210 as in 
the case of a slapped apostle:  
For when the apostle was struck, instead of turning his other side to the man, or telling 
him to repeat the blow, he prayed to God to pardon his assailant in the next world, but not 
to leave the injury unpunished at the time. Inwardly he preserved a kindly feeling, while 
outwardly he wished the man to be punished as an example.211 
With this kindly affect of heart, one is not attached to earthly things, but seeks 
enjoyment in God with an elevated state of mind.212 Instead of being led by the 
wrong love and ungoverned passions to eternal punishment, a renewed inward 
disposition will receive a just reward, with this conversion made possible by the 
grace of God through Christ.213  
                                                 
208 c. Faust. 22.92: “We must now inquire into the prophetic significance of the command, that 
many of those who, while Moses was absent, made an idol for themselves should be slain without 
regard to relationship. It is easy to see that the slaughter of these men represents the warfare 
against the evil principles which led the people into the same idolatry…And a similar command is 
given by the apostle, when he says, ‘Mortify your members which are on earth; fornication, 
uncleanness, luxury, evil concupiscence, and covetousness, which is idolatry.’[Col. 3.5]” 
209 c. Faust. 22.76: De domino Christo-ipse est enim pax nostra…Christiani quoque imperatores 
plenam gerentes fiduciam pietatis in Christo de inimicis sacrilegis, qui spem suam in sacramentis 
idolorum daemonum que posuerant, gloriosissimam uictoriam perceperunt.  
210 c. Faust. 22.79: Posse esse in praeparatione cordis, etiamsi non exhibeatur gestu corporis et 
expressione uerborum. 
211 c. Faust. 22.79: Quandoquidem apostolus palma percussus potius deum rogauit, ut iniurioso 
homini in futuro saeculo parceretur, in praesenti autem illa iniuria non inulta relinqueretur, quam 
uel praebuit ferienti alteram partem aut ut iterum feriret admonuit. Tenebat certe interius 
dilectionis adfectum et exterius requirebat correctionis exemplum. 
212 c. Faust. 22.78: Fit autem homo iustus, cum ob aliud non adpetit rebus uti, nisi propter quod 
diuinitus institutae sunt, ipso autem Deo frui propter ipsum se que et amico in ipso Deo propter 
eundem ipsum Deum. 
213  c. Faust. 22.78:…et quia de hac iusta poena non liberat nisi misericors gratia, certum 
est…Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius?Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum. 
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 What Augustine offers in the above writings is the unification of the divine 
law and the new commandment in the united spirit of fight and love. He examines 
the concept of war and peace in the context of the City of God, emphasising that 
the spiritual meaning of war is to fight against the lustful passion of seeking 
earthly powers in self-love, whereas true peace is enjoying God in the Kingdom of 
Heaven. On the basis of this theological interpretation, Augustine discerns inward 
dispositions and outward actions in war. He focuses on the question of how to free 
oneself from detestable passions and transform them into gracious and merciful 
emotions with the new spirituality of the heart, without losing one’s readiness for 
just punishments in outward military actions. He maintains that the new 
commandment is coherent with the divine command of violence in the old times, 
but the latter is qualified by the idea of fighting against the wicked with the virtues 
of patience and love.214 This model defines the guidelines for Christian service in 
the military order. Augustine’s position is obviously distinguished from pacifists 
who will tolerate evils to reserve the corrupted order and cowardly life. 
 From a practical standpoint, Augustine’s emphasis on the divine command 
as the central law for identifying ungodly nations as evil objects might support 
offensive attacks using the authority of God to punish sacrilegious deeds and 
support aggressions such as crusades and militarism.215 Moreover, according to 
Augustine, Christian soldiers should obey the commands of a ruler even when he 
is violating the principle of justice to wage aggressive or suppressive wars. Due to 
their duty of obedience to political authority, soldiers are innocent and exempted 
from culpability.216 This means that Augustine does not allow room for them to 
protest the unjust commands of superiors in the military order.217 This is evidence 
that his position has moved away from the earlier fathers who advocated 
nonviolent pacifism.  
                                                 
214 For a related discussion on the virtues of love in war, see Eric Gregory, Politics and the Order 
of Love (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), 298–318.  
215 For the crusades and the influence of Augustine’s theory of just war, see Jonathan Riley-Smith, 
The Crusades, Christianity, and Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 1–44. 
216 c. Faust. 22.75: “it may be an unrighteous command on the part of the king, while the soldier is 
innocent, because his position makes obedience a duty”. Cf. Rom. 13. 
217 “Augustine leaves no room for disobedience based upon the citizen’s or soldier’s individual 
decision that the command he receives is unjust or illegitimate”. See Deane 1963, 163. Cf. Holmes 
1999, 334. 
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 Lenihan and Holmes detect some pacifist elements in Augustine’s theory 
of just war, but the gracious inward feeling only directs one away from the wrong 
passions of war but not from the good intention of punishing evils. Thus, one 
cannot conclude that Augustine is a genuine pacifist in line with his predecessors’ 
pacifism. Deane examines the formulations in which Augustine advocates 
participation in offensive wars and Augustine’s intolerant attitude towards evil, 
which is distinguished from the pacifist proposition. Nonetheless, Deane does not 
attend to Augustine’s evaluation of just war and peace from the transcendental 
perspective of the Kingdom of Heaven, which is hidden in the Old Testament, but 
disclosed by Christ in the gospel. In defending the belief of the City of God, 
Augustine is a proponent of fighting against the libido dominandi in the earthly 
city with patience for the sake of true peace and justice of the Kingdom of God, 
because Christ proclaims, “I came to send fire on the earth, and how I wish it were 
already kindled”.218 
 
Having explored Augustine’s notion of freedom from evil passions in social life 
from the perspective of the three levels of human society in this chapter, I shall 
direct my attention to the issue of redemption and the deification of humans and 
their emotions. I have presented evidence that Augustine adopts an inward 
ranking of consecrated emotions and regards the passions of Christ as the perfect 
model. By virtue of His grace and love, men could cultivate virtuous lifestyles to 
disengage from the bondage of evil desires gradually, progressing toward the 
consummation in their pilgrimaging life. It is now appropriate to explore the goal 
of freedom from passions and consider the significance of the passion of Christ in 
terms of salvation. 
                                                 
218  Luke 12:49. Cf. c. Faust. 22.93: Hanc sacrilegam societatem Dominus Christus illo igne 
conburit, de quo in Euangelio dicit: Ignem ueni mittere in terram. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: BECOMING GOD?—REDEMPTION THROUGH 
PASSION AND THE DEIFICATION OF EMOTIONS 
       
Hoc est enim plenum gaudium nostrum quo amplius non est, frui Trinitate Deo ad cuius 
imaginem facti sumus. (De Trin. 1.8.18) 
  
Ibi uacantes uidebimus quoniam ipse est Deus; quod nobis nos ipsi esse uoluimus, 
quando ab illo cecidimus, audientes a seductore: Eritis sicut dii, et recedentes a uero 
Deo, quo faciente dii essemus eius participatione, non desertione. (CD 22.30) 
 
Si filii Dei facti sumus, et dii facti sumus…diis gentium, daemoniis terribilis; diis a Se 
factis, filiis amabilis. (En. Ps. 49.2)1 
 
The present chapter will further analyse Augustine’s theoretical position on 
deifying emotions by exploring the reasons for Christ’s taking on human passions 
and by inquiring whether the future Heavenly human citizens could become God 
(theosis) by participating in divinity. As we have witnessed in his theory of the 
two cities, Augustine argues that to exercise their own lustful dominion, some 
rational beings display disobedient pride as well as a desire to be God and in 
doing so, they have departed from God.2 Indeed, to Augustine, the hallmark of 
depraved psychology for both fallen angels and humans is their aspiration to be 
God and their attempt to imitate God’s authority. Augustine attempts to explain 
how God provides therapy for the emotion of pride and how humans may become 
filled with amor Dei instead of amor sui.  
In the first section (5.1), I shall evaluate the main lines of Augustine’s 
psychological approach to the Trinity. Following his teaching on the human mind 
as the image of the Trinity, I shall address the relevance of his discussion on 
human passions to interpreting divine “emotions” in section two (5.2). In the third 
part (5.3), I shall survey Christ’s passions during the crucifixion and determine the 
reason that the second person of the Trinity takes on human emotions. At the end 
state of the two cities, good and bad angels will exhibit different mental states, joy 
and suffering, and I shall discuss the nature of these in section four (5.4), 
                                                 
1 The English translation of Augustine’s Expositions of the Psalms comes from Boulding’s edition. 
See The Works of Saint Augustine III, transl. Maria Boulding and ed. John E. Rotelle (New York: 
New City Press, 2000). 
2 See my discussion on the origin of the two cities in 4.1. Augustine repeats the psychology of 
humans’ aspiring to be God in CD 22.30: “Then shall we be still, and know that He is God: that 
He is what we ourselves desired to be when we fell away from Him”. 
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including the human experience in Hell. Section five (5.5) will explore the 
relation between the deified gods and God and will provide a general description 
of Augustine’s approach to the issue of deification. In the last section (5.6), I shall 
review the claim by some Orthodox theologians that Augustine does not offer a 
correct deification theory, as he is blind to the divine essence/energy distinction. 
Evaluating this discussion, I proceed to focus on Augustine’s doctrine of the 
deification of emotions, analysing the validity of the critics’ claim that his 
position regarding the eschatological fulfilment is confined to the human 
beatitude.  
 
5.1. Augustine’s Psychological Approach toward the Trinity  
 
In De Trinitate, Augustine argues that the three persons, the Father, the Son, and 
the Holy Spirit, share the same indivisible essence and divinity. However, owing 
to their eternal intrinsic relations, each of the three differs from the other two. The 
Father is the Father in relation to the Son, the Son is the Son in relation to the 
Father, and the Holy Spirit is neither Father nor Son, but is equal to them as the 
Spirit of the Father and Son.3  On the basis of the Nicene Creed, Augustine 
represents the Trinitarian theology of filioque in which the Spirit proceeds from 
the Father and the Son and appears as a love that bonds the Father and Son 
together. 4  Moreover, Augustine attempts to detect analogies between the 
Trinitarian relations and some triadic human mental agencies or acts, such as 
mens-notitia-amor, memoria-intellegentia-voluntas, and amans-quod amatur-
amor, among others. Scholars offer different critical assessments of Augustine’s 
analogies. One opinion is that Augustine’s psychological approach cannot 
illustrate the essence of the Trinity because he incorrectly places substances and 
attributes on the same level and uses examples that are not strictly Trinitarian. I 
shall address this opinion first.  
                                                 
3 See De Trin. 1.4.7. 
4 See De Trin. 15.17.28–29; 7.3.6. Fitzgerald and TeSelle explain that Augustine’s notion of 
filioque was influenced by Hilary, Ambrose, Marius Victorinus, and Athanasius who recognised 
the eternal procession of the Spirit. Augustine argues that the Spirit proceeds principally from the 
Father and the Son as the societas or communio between the two. See Allan Fitzgerald, “filioque”, 
in Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Michigan/Cambridge: 
Eerdmans, 1999), 369; Eugene TeSelle, “Holy Spirit”, in Augustine through the Ages: An 
Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Michigan/Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1999), 434–436. 
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William Shedd, a famous nineteenth-century theologian, claims that the 
analogies that Augustine employs fail to illustrate the essence of the Trinity in his 
last eight chapters of De Trinitate.5  In Shedd’s annotations on this work, he 
presents a survey on the three triads that Augustine often adopts. In the triad of the 
lover, the loved and love, Shedd attends to the properties of these concepts, 
suggesting that the last term “love” (amor) is essentially different from the first 
two, as it stands for an attribute rather than a substance, as the terms “the lover” 
and “the loved” do, respectively.6 Shedd states that the same holds for the second 
triad of the mind, knowledge, and love, as the mind refers to a substance, while 
knowledge and love refer to its functions. 7  Shedd emphasises that the two 
different types of objects, substances and attributes, are mistakenly treated by 
Augustine as substances.8 As an evidence, Shedd refers to Augustine’s assertion 
in De Trinitate 9.4.5 that “love and knowledge exist substantially, as the mind 
itself does”.9 This mistake, Shedd notes, derives from Augustine replacing the 
term “quaedam” (thing) with “substance” in an ambiguous way: 
The ambiguity of the Latin contributes to this error. The mind and its loving, and also the 
mind and its cognizing, are denominated “duo quaedam”; the mind, love, and knowledge, 
are denominated “tria quaedam”. By bringing the mind and its love and knowledge under 
the one term “quaedam”, and then giving the meaning of “substance” to “thing”, in 
“something”, the result follows that all three are alike and equally “substantial”.10  
                                                 
5 “Augustine is prolix, repetitious, and sometimes leaves his theme to discuss cognate but distantly 
related subjects. This appears more in the last eight chapters, which are speculative, than in the 
first seven, which are scriptural...He discusses many themes which are not strictly trinitarian”. De 
Trinitate, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers III, transl. Haddan and annot. Shedd (New York 
1887; Reprint by Eerdmans in 1998), 10. Shedd emphasises the weakness and limitation of 
Augustine’s analogies in illustrating the essence of the Trinity. See Shedd’s annotations to De 
Trin. IX and X in particular. Shedd’s view is echoed by some critics such as Oswald Bayer who 
insists that Augustine’s psychological doctrine of the Trinity cannot find theological justification, 
“if only because it inevitably leads to equivocations”. See Oswald Bayer, “The Plurality of the one 
God and the Plurality of the Gods”, in Pro Ecclesia 15:3 (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 
353. 
6 “In the case chosen—namely, the lover, the loved, and love—the first two are substances, the last 
is not. The mind is a substance, but its activity in loving is not”. Haddan and Shedd 1887, 126 (n. 
2). 
7 Ibid., 126 (n. 2). 
8 “But no psychology, ancient or modern, has ever maintained that the agencies of a spiritual entity 
or substance are themselves spiritual entities or substances. The activities of the human mind in 
cognizing, loving, etc., are only its energizing, not its substance”. Ibid., 126 (n. 2). 
9 Ibid., 126 (n. 2). De Trin. 9.4.5: Quamobrem non amor et cognitio tamquam in subiecto insunt 
menti, sed substantialiter etiam ista sunt sicut ipsa mens quia et si relatiue dicuntur ad inuicem, in 
sua tamen sunt singula quaeque substantia. Cf. De Trin. 9.4.6: …substantia sit scientia, substantia 
sit amor. 
10 Ibid., 126 (n. 2). 
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As for the third triad – memory, understanding, and will – Shedd declares that this 
particular triad is better than the above two cases because these three objects are 
all the faculties of the mind and thus they have equal being.11 Nonetheless, this 
case also has weaknesses, such as failing to display the Trinitarian distinctiveness 
and being unable to embrace all the functions of the mind such as imagination.12 
Shedd holds that Augustine’s analogical approach is philosophical speculation 
rather than a scriptural exegesis on the word of God. From this perspective, 
Augustine’s discussion appears deficient in that it concentrates on the terms and 
their arrangement rather than on the dogma itself. Thus, Augustine’s approach 
leads to prolix and irrelevant illustrations in the second part of his treatise De 
Trinitate.13 
 Some related weaknesses in Augustine’s psychological analogies are also 
mentioned by Alister McGrath, who states that the Trinity cannot be simplified 
into three allegedly analogous entities in the human mind; Augustine’s method is 
“illustrative”, not “constitutive”. 14  From McGrath’s perspective, Augustine 
considers humanity to be the image of the Trinity so that it is possible to trace the 
Trinity through its imprints on the human mind. This search occurs within one’s 
inner spiritual world rather than with regard to any external relationships. 15 
McGrath claims that Augustine’s triadic illustration is grounded on the 
Neoplatonic view of regarding the intellect as the apex of humanity that is 
interpreted in the light of the doctrine of the creation of man as the image of 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 143 (n. 1). 
12 “The ternary of memory, understanding, and will is an adequate analogue to the Trinity in 
respect to equal substantiality. But it fails when the separate consciousness of the Trinitarian 
distinctions is brought into consideration. The three faculties of memory, understanding, and will, 
are not so objective to each other as to admit of three forms of consciousness, of the use of the 
personal Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. It also fails, in that these three are not all the modes of the 
mind. There are other faculties: e.g., the imagination. The whole essence of the mind is in this 
also”. Ibid., 143 (n. 1). 
13 “The second, or speculative division of the work, is that which will be most foreign to the 
thinking of some trinitarians. In it they will find what seems to them to be a philosophy, rather 
than an interpretation of the word of God…It has its defects; but they pertain to the form more 
than to the matter; to arrangement and style more than to dogma”. Ibid., 6 and 10. 
14 “There are some obvious weaknesses here, possibly even some fatal weakness. As has often 
been pointed out, the human mind cannot be reduced to three entities in quite this neat and 
simplistic manner. In the end, however, it must be pointed out that Augustine’s appeal to such 
‘psychological analogies’ is actually illustrative, rather than constitutive”. Alister McGrath, 
Christian Theology: An Introduction (3rd edition) (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 333. 
15 McGrath 2001, 333. 
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God.16 In the fallen state, the correlation between human psychology and the 
triune model remains prominent: “The human mind is an image – inadequate, to 
be sure, but still an image – of God himself”.17 McGrath distances himself from 
Shedd’s position in arguing that Augustine’s appeal to psychological aids in 
seeking the image of the Trinity is “not ultimately grounded in his analysis of the 
human mind, but in his reading of Scripture, especially of the fourth gospel”.18 
 Lewis Ayres remarks that to Augustine, any direct analogy or 
conceptualisation is bound to fail in revealing the essence of the Trinity portrayed 
in the Scripture as three divine persons, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit.19 Ayres 
cites three reasons as to why it is impossible to fully explicate this highest divine 
simplicity. Firstly, the Trinitarian persons, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, form 
a unity that humans cannot conceive of. Any human account of the Trinity as 
three or one is thus far removed from the simplicity of God, “the unity of that 
which is the source of all, is the source of order and number in the world, but 
cannot be itself numbered”.20 Secondly, the divine simplicity involves an essential 
relationship among the Father, Son, and Spirit, but this related divine reality 
cannot be addressed through the human notions of fatherhood and sonship.21 Each 
of the three divine persons exists in an eternal relation to the other two, and yet 
each of them is also the fullness of the one God without constituting three separate 
Gods. 22  Thirdly, to Ayres, the triad of memory, intelligence, and will that 
Augustine adopts in De Trinitate does not aid in understanding the Trinitarian 
structure because “each divine person is fully all that God is and would have to be 
their own memory, intelligence, and will”.23 On the basis of these points, Ayres 
                                                 
16 “On the basis of his neo-Platonic worldview, Augustine argues that the human mind is to be 
regarded as the apex of humanity. It is therefore to the individual human mind that the theologian 
should turn, in looking for ‘traces of the Trinity’ in creation”. Ibid., 333. 
17 Ibid., 333. 
18 McGrath 2001, 333. 
19 “…for Augustine there cannot be any direct analogy between the nature of God and the world 
that we know - either the material world or the world of the mind - because the divine reality is the 
unique source of all that escapes the categories intrinsic to the creation”. Lewis Ayres, “Augustine 
on the triune life of God”, in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine (second edition), ed. David 
Vincent Meconi and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 70. 
20 Ayres 2014, 70. 
21  “The divine simplicity reveals itself to be very important when we think again about the 
principle that the Father (for example) is named in relationship the Son. For human beings, 
relationships are not of their essence”. Ayres 2014, 70. 
22 Ayres 2014, 71 and 74. 
23 Ayres 2014, 74. 
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concludes that according to Augustine, some sporadic and vague likeness of God 
is found in human psychology but it cannot help us grasp the divine reality in this 
life.24 
 If Augustine is well aware of the limitation of using psychological triads in 
tracing the nature of the Trinity, 25  why does he adopt this uncertain and 
ambiguous approach in his discussion on the ineffable being? Is his psychological 
consideration grounded on a biblical foundation, or is it merely philosophical 
speculation? Before proceeding to address these issues, let us see in which context 
Augustine discusses the Trinitarian structure using the terminology of the Father, 
the Son, and the Holy Spirit. 
 
The terminological aspects of Trinitarian theology  
The Scripture contains neither the term Trinity nor a direct presentation of the 
doctrine of the Trinity, but it does refer to the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. 
The terminology related to these three persons is employed in the Catholic faith of 
the Trinity that Augustine addresses in his De Trinitate 1.4.7: 
…to teach in accordance with the Scriptures that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit 
constitute a divine unity of one and the same substance in an indivisible equality. 
Therefore, they are not three gods but one God; although the Father has begotten the Son, 
and, therefore, He who is the Father is not the Son; and the Son was begotten by the 
Father and, therefore, He who is the Son is not the Father; and the Holy Spirit is neither 
the Father nor the Son, but only the Spirit of the Father and the Son, and He Himself is 
also co-equal with the Father and the Son and belongs to the unity of the Trinity.26  
Shedd contends that the terms Father, Son, and Spirit are, as he defines them, 
“…literal, not metaphorical; because the relations denoted by them are eternally in 
the essence”.27  He asserts that the language of the scriptural, divine terms of 
                                                 
24 “In the case of the relationship between God and anything created we cannot grasp proportions 
and thus there can be no analogies…The more we see how Augustine thinks the divine simplicity 
is beyond our comprehension, the more we see why he thinks that only vague ‘likenesses’ to the 
divine life can be found in our world and experience”. Ayres 2014, 70. 
25 De Trin. 15.27.48–50. 
26 De Trin. 1.4.7: …hoc intenderunt secundum Scripturas docere, quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus 
Sanctus unius substantiae inseparabili aequalitate diuinam insinuent unitatem, ideo que non sint 
tres Dii sed unus Deus - quamuis Pater Filium genuerit, et ideo Filius non sit qui Pater est; Filius 
que a Patre sit genitus, et ideo Pater non sit qui Filius est; Spiritus que Sanctus nec Pater sit nec 
Filius, sed tantum Patris et Filii Spiritus, Patri et Filio etiam ipse coaequalis et ad Trinitatis 
pertinens unitatem. 
27 Haddan and Shedd 1887, 6. 
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Father and Son denote eternal paternity and sonship.28 While this literal realistic 
account of the subsisting relationship (relatio subsistens) sounds plausible, it is 
also problematic, as each of the divine persons is fully all that God is. Ayres 
mentions this in his discussion on the flaws of this interpretation: 
Augustine argues that when we say each of the divine three is God we are saying each of 
the divine three is the fullness of what it is to be God - each is in some sense the one 
God!...there can only be one divine life, only one unique source of all, and so we are 
forced logically to assert the paradox that each of Father, Son, and Spirit must be 
irreducibly fully God and yet each must also be one God. And yet each is also inseparably 
the one God with the other two.29 
Besides this difficulty regarding sameness and difference, the realist interpretation 
also involves some other problems pertaining to the standard views of relations 
and linguistic meanings.  
It is difficult to insert a third personified figure into the Father-Son model 
and determine the derivative relations between them. For instance, in the Eastern 
account of the Trinity, the Spirit only proceeds from the Father, but this 
interpretation poses problems because it contains no distinction between the Son 
coming from the Father and the Spirit coming from the Father, which would in 
turn lead to the conclusion that God the Father has two sons.30 Therefore, the 
Eastern approach is inadequate for illustrating the mutual relations between the 
two hypostases, the Spirit and the Son. In order to avoid the awkwardness of 
adding another “son”, Augustine prefers to regard the Spirit as the love that joins 
the Father and Son together. However, this would result in two fountainheads of 
divinity.31  
Furthermore, the language of the Father and Son does not exclusively 
define the first and the second hypostasis of the godhead because apart from this 
pattern, some other images such as “light from light” and “Wisdom-Word-
                                                 
28 “Scripture clearly teaches that the Father is such from eternity. Consequently, ‘paternity’ can no 
more be ascribed to the first person of the Godhead in a figurative sense, than eternity can 
be…The terms Father, Son, and Spirit, in the baptismal formula and the apostolic benediction, 
must designate primary and eternal distinctions”. Ibid., 6. 
29 Ayres 2014, 74. 
30 McGrath writes, “A failure to distinguish the ways in which Son and Spirit derive from the one 
and the same Father would lead to God having two sons, which would have raised insurmountable 
problems”. See McGrath 2001, 340. 
31 McGrath 2001, 341. 
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Spirit”32 are also used. All of these symbols may reveal some aspects of the 
Trinitarian relations, but they nevertheless fail to equal the ontological structure.33  
However, it is equally erroneous to regard the Father, Son, and Spirit 
merely as names with no reference to the substantive hypostases which would 
lead to the heresy of Sabellianism. As Augustine warns in CD 11.10: 
Nor, as the heretics who follow Sabellius have supposed, is it a Trinity in name only, 
having no distinctly subsisting Persons. Rather, it is called simple because it is what it 
has, except insofar as one Person is spoken of in relation to another.34 
Therefore, the terms Father, Son, and Spirit are neither literal expressions within 
the realm of human understanding, nor merely names without a connection to 
reality. The real essence of the Trinity is beyond the human conception of 
relations and language. Even though we are familiar with the language of the 
“Father” and “Son” that Jesus uses, the real divine structure and spirituality 
remain hidden from us until the moment of seeing God “face to face” (faciem ad 
faciem).35 
 
The intention of using psychological triads 
After exploring the biblical Trinitarian expressions in books 1–4 and the doctrinal 
matters in books 5–7 of De Trinitate, Augustine turns to tracing some likenesses 
of the Trinity in the human mind. His approach seems speculative and loose, and 
occasionally he even diverges from the main theme, which has provoked much 
criticism. Augustine himself recognises these problems, and in the Preface to the 
second book of De Trinitate, he confesses that this seeking is “roughly exercised”, 
and suggests that errors might be defensible in the investigation of an 
unapproachable secret.36 He repeats this argument in the last part of the treatise:  
                                                 
32 McGrath notes that while the three terms, Word, Wisdom, and Spirit, often appear in the Old 
Testament as “personifications” or “hypostatizations” of God, they do not equal the Trinity in the 
strict sense. See McGrath 2001, 320. 
33 De Trin. 1.10.21: Haec uobis locutus sum in similitudinibus; ueniet hora quando iam non in 
similitudinibus loquar uobis, sed manifeste de Patre nuntiabo uobis; id est iam non erunt 
similitudines cum uisio fuerit facie ad faciem. Cf. John 16:25. 
34 CD 11.10: Sicut Sabelliani haeretici putauerunt; sed ideo simplex dicitur, quoniam quod habet 
hoc est, excepto quod relatiue quaeque Persona ad alteram dicitur. 
35 Augustine further explains in his City of God that such “seeing” occurs through the “face” of the 
inner man (interioris hominis facies) rather than our corporeal face. CD 22.29: Et illud, quod ait 
apostolus: Faciem ad faciem, non cogit ut Deum per hanc faciem corporalem, ubi sunt oculi 
corporales, nos uisuros esse credamus, quem spiritu sine intermissione uidebimus. 
36 Prooemium to De Trin. 2: Cum homines Deum quaerunt et ad intellegentiam Trinitatis pro 
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I venture to acknowledge openly that I have said nothing worthy of the ineffability of that 
highest Trinity, among all these many things that I have already said, but confess rather 
that its sublime knowledge has been too great for me, and that I am unable to reach to it.37  
This unattainability, Augustine explains, is derived from the deep divide between 
human and divine nature, “a nature that is made is always less than He who made 
it”. 38  Augustine holds that the human mind cannot equal God and this 
“unlikeness” (dissimilitudo) is eternal.39 However, despite this qualitative gap, the 
image of God in human beings is not entirely inscrutable, and some likeness 
(similitudo) is still retained in humanity in accordance with the biblical narrative 
(specifically, Genesis 1:27). The doctrine of creation in the image of God (imago 
Dei)40 provides a theological foundation for Augustine’s explorations of the inner 
life of the soul, inspiring him to persist in this questioning.41 Let us return to his 
three ternary analogies42 to assess their cognitive value. 
 Regarding the case of the mind, knowledge, and love (mens-notitia-amor), 
Shedd argues that knowledge and love are the energisers of the mind. The mind is 
a substance, whereas knowledge and love are its spiritual attributes and cannot be 
examined on the same level as the substance. This argument seems plausible in 
terms of lexical meaning, but Shedd’s account is nevertheless misguided. When 
                                                                                                                                     
captu infirmitatis humanae animum intendunt, experti difficultates laboriosas siue in ipsa acie 
mentis conantis intueri inaccessibilem lucem siue in ipsa multiplici et multimoda locutione 
litterarum sacrarum (ubi mihi non uidetur nisi atteri Adam ut Christi gratia glorificata 
dilucescat), cum ad aliquid certum discussa omni ambiguitate peruenerint, facillime debent 
ignoscere errantibus in tanti peruestigatione secreti. 
37 De Trin. 15.27.50: Uerum inter haec quae multa iam dixi et nihil illius summae Trinitatis 
ineffabilitate dignum me dixisse audeo profiteri, sed confiteri potius mirificatam scientiam Eius ex 
me inualuisse nec potuisse me ad illam. Cf. Psalm 139:6. 
38 De Trin. 15.16.26: Semper enim natura minor est faciente, quae facta est. 
39 De Trin. 15.16.26: Quamobrem cum tanta sit nunc in isto aenigmate dissimilitudo Dei et Uerbi 
Dei in qua tamen nonnulla similitudo comperta est, illud quoque fatendum est quod etiam cum 
similes ei erimus quando Eum uidebimus sicuti est (quod utique qui dixit hanc procul dubio quae 
nunc est dissimilitudinem attendit), nec tunc natura Illi erimus aequales. 
40 For the scriptural basis of this doctrine, see McGrath 2001, 440–443. 
41 Augustine explains that his motivation lies in the virtue of scriptural teachings such as “You 
who seek God, your hearts shall live” (Psalm 69:32) and “see His face evermore” (Psalm 105:4), 
among others. See De Trin. 9.1.1. 
42  Commentators often use the term “analogy” when referring to Augustine’s psychological 
considerations. Augustine himself does not use this term. Some critics prefer to avoid it because it 
implies that Augustine would offer analogical knowledge (See Peter King, “Augustine’s 
Trinitarian Examples”, in Medioevo 37 (2012), 83–106). I think that the idea of an analogy is not 
entirely alien to Augustine. In his time, “analogy” referred to “a direct line of similarities” of 
relations (see McGrath 2001, 253–256), and Augustine seems to think that it is reasonable to 
consider the Trinitarian persons as relations and that these relations form a unity somewhat 
similarly to the relations that are included in intellectual acts. 
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Augustine refers to the mind, it is not to be understood as a static entity, but rather 
as something that is involved in reflective activities (for instance, knowledge of 
itself and love of itself). Augustine explains this notion in De Trin. 9.4.4: 
But as there are two things (duo quaedam), the mind and the love of it, when it loves 
itself; so there are two things, the mind and the knowledge of it, when it knows itself. 
Therefore the mind itself, and the love of it, and the knowledge of it, are three things (tria 
quaedam), and these three are one; and when they are perfect they are equal.43 [transl. 
Rev. A. W. Haddan] 
The concept of the mind does not stand for a substance in such a way as Shedd 
assumes. He proposes that the “mind” refers to a substance that has spiritual 
activities, asserting that a spiritual attribute is not the substance that supports it.44 
On this basis, he contends that Augustine erroneously replaces the term 
“quaedam” (thing) with the term “substance”, misrepresenting “mind”, “love”, 
and “knowledge” as equally “substantial”. However, Shedd does not realise that 
Augustine is interested in the mind as consciousness, the acts of which involve 
subjective awareness of oneself. This is the source of inseparability and 
correlation in the ternary of mind, knowledge, and love in Book IX (De Trin. 9.4 
in particular).45  
 This correlative model also applies to the case of the lover, the loved, and 
love (amans-quod amatur-amor). “The lover” casts light on “the loved” and the 
concept of “love” reveals the relation between “the lover” and “the loved”. The 
notion of “the loved” likewise makes sense only when it involves the bond of love 
and the lover. When Augustine refers to the term “substance” in this context, his 
intention is to reveal the functioning relationship between substantial terms rather 
than a separate entity. To avoid an unnecessary misunderstanding by the reader of 
                                                 
43 De Trin. 9.4.4: Sicut autem duo quaedam sunt, mens et amor eius, cum se amat; ita quaedam 
duo sunt, mens et notitia eius, cum se nouit. Ipsa igitur mens et amor et notitia eius tria quaedam 
sunt, et haec tria unum sunt, et cum perfecta sunt aequalia sunt. I adopt Haddan’s translation here, 
as McKenna and Matthews’s version is not exact on this point.  
44 “In the case chosen – namely, the lover, the loved, and love – the first two are substances, the 
last is not. The mind is a substance, but its activity in loving is not…The activities of the human 
mind in cognizing, loving, etc., are only its energizing, not its substance”. Haddan and Shedd 
1887, 126 (n. 2). 
45 De Trin. 9.4.6: “…the lover and the love, or the knower and the knowledge, are spoken of in 
relation to each other as are friends; yet mind or spirit are not relative terms, as men are not; in 
spite of this, the lover and the love, and the knower and the knowledge, cannot be separated from 
each other as men can be who are friends”. [transl. McKenna and Matthews] For Augustine’s view 
of the human mind as a self-thinking subject, see Gareth B. Matthews, Thought’s Ego in Augustine 
and Descartes (New York: Cornell University Press, 1992). 
  
181 
 
“substance”, Augustine clarifies the concept of “the loved” (“the lover” and “the 
loved” pertain to the same thing)46 and “love” in the following statement: 
And if love is a substance, it is certainly not body but spirit; the mind is not body but 
spirit. Yet love and mind are not two spirits, but one spirit; not two essences, but one 
essence; and still the two are one, the lover and the love, or, so to say, the beloved and the 
love. And these two are truly said to be mutually related. The lover is referred to the love 
and the love to the lover. For the lover loves with some love, and love is of someone who 
loves.47 
“Love” is considered to be a substance that Augustine prefers to refer to as “the 
mind”, the functioning faculty of reflective acts. This correlation is thus 
understood in terms of substantial sameness. Augustine’s aim is to illustrate the 
relation between the connectivity (such as love) and the acting subject (namely, he 
who loves) in the interactive structure. So the triad of the lover, the loved, and 
love presents an equal substantiality (that is, the love of the self of he who loves) 
in Augustine’s argumentation.  
 The third example of memory, understanding, and will, further illustrates 
the members sharing the same substantiality, as Shedd notes, but this 
substantiality is also embedded in different respects of that basic property of the 
faculty of the mind, the consciousness. Augustine elaborates on their triune 
relations in De Trin. 10.11.18: 
…these three are one in that they are one life, one mind, one essence. And whatever else 
they are called in respect to themselves, they are spoken of together, not in the plural but 
in the singular. But they are three in that they are mutually referred to each other. And if 
they were not equal, not only each one to each one, but each one to all, they would 
certainly not comprehend each other. For not only is each one comprehended by each 
one, but all are also comprehended by each one.48 
                                                 
46 He explains in De Trin. 9.2.2: “For the lover and the beloved are one and the same when one 
loves oneself…But it is one thing to love oneself and another thing to love one’s love. For love is 
not loved unless as already loving something; for where nothing is loved, there is no love. Hence, 
when anyone loves himself there are two: the love and what is loved; for here the lover and the 
beloved are one”. 
47 De Trin. 9.2.2: Et si aliqua substantia est amor, non est utique corpus sed spiritus, nec mens 
corpus sed spiritus est. Neque tamen amor et mens duo spiritus sed unus spiritus, nec essentiae 
duae sed una; et tamen duo quaedam unum sunt, amans et amor, siue sic dicas, quod amatur et 
amor. Et haec quidem duo relatiue ad inuicem dicuntur. Amans quippe ad amorem refertur et 
amor ad amantem; amans enim aliquo amore amat, et amor alicuius amantis est. 
48 De Trin. 10.11.18: Uita est autem unaquaeque ad se ipsam et mens et essentia. Quocirca tria 
haec eo sunt unum quo una uita, una mens, una essentia; et quidquid aliud ad se ipsa singula 
dicuntur etiam simul, non pluraliter sed singulariter dicuntur. Eo uero tria quo ad se inuicem 
referuntur. Quae si aequalia non essent non solum singula singulis sed etiam omnibus singula, 
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Augustine explains this further by explicating the first-person mode of memory, 
understanding, and will as follows: 
For I remember that I have memory, understanding, and will; and I understand that I 
understand, will, and remember; and I will that I will, remember, and understand. At the 
same time I remember my whole memory, understanding, and will…Wherefore, when all 
are mutually comprehended by each one, and are comprehended as wholes, then each one 
as a whole is equal to each other one as a whole, and each one as a whole is equal to all 
together as wholes; and these three are one life, one mind, one essence.49  
Augustine states that memory, understanding, and will are the three activities of 
the mind that reveal the same essence and life of the mind. Thus, memory, 
understanding, and will constitute three distinct modes of the consciousness that 
are present in the same essence of the functioning mind. While Augustine’s 
argumentation is persuasive, one could remark that besides these three modes of 
the mind, imagination and perception are also significant powers that could be 
involved. However, this criticism neglects the fact that Augustine only addresses 
the higher levels of the soul, and imagination as a sensual function of psychology 
cannot be aligned with higher mental acts, such as volition, memory, and 
understanding.50 The same applies to perception.51 It is therefore reasonable for 
Augustine to arrange the cognitive activities of the mind in one unit rather than 
include other lower types. 
 From the above three cases, it is evident that Augustine’s arrangement of 
the ternaries is not arbitrary. He carefully anchors the three analogies in the 
concept of the mind and explores the chosen entities in the relational structure. 
Referring to the doctrine of the image of God, Augustine examines the inner life 
(interius) of the human mind in order to seek the image of the Trinity, but he is 
                                                                                                                                     
non utique se inuicem caperent. Neque enim tantum a singulis singula, uerum etiam a singulis 
omnia capiuntur. 
49  De Trin. 10.11.18: Memini enim me habere memoriam et intellegentiam et uoluntatem, et 
intellego me intellegere et uelle atque meminisse, et uolo me uelle et meminisse et intellegere, 
totam que meam memoriam et intellegentiam et uoluntatem simul memini…Quapropter quando 
inuicem a singulis et tota et omnia capiuntur, aequalia sunt tota singula totis singulis et tota 
singula simul omnibus totis, et haec tria unum, una uita, una mens, una essentia. 
50 Mary Clark notes that animus, mens, and anima are distinguished in Augustine. Animus and 
mens refer to the rational part of soul, while anima refers to the lower, sensual part. As the highest 
level of the soul, mens (mind) includes cognitive activities such as volition, affection, knowledge, 
and remembering, which are different from “the fabrication of images”. See Mary Clark, “De 
Trinitate”, in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman 
Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 97–98. 
51 For Augustine’s view of perception and imagination, see O’Daly 1987, 80–130. 
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well aware of the weakness of the human mind and spirituality and that these 
cannot equal divine things and whose similarities to Trinitarian dynamics are 
ambiguous until the moment of seeing God face to face.52 Augustine’s repetitious 
argumentation attempts to encourage readers to envision the image of the Trinity 
rather than present the Trinitarian structure on an ontological level. This approach, 
as Alister McGrath observes, is “illustrative rather than constitutive”.53  
 In discussing the Trinity, the terms Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit refer 
to the three hypostases of the Godhead, which are different subsistent relations in 
one simple divinity. Augustine states emphatically that his comments about the 
Trinity do not comprise a theory that would make the mystery understandable, but 
he does consider it possible to clarify some aspects of the Catholic doctrinal 
picture by attending to relational phenomena in psychology. Being very interested 
in self-awareness and reflexivity, Augustine was led to think that the relations of 
knowledge and love between the subject and the object can also be applied to the 
cases when the subject and object are the same, the relation being a third in the 
same whole. To Augustine, this indicates that the creative order includes some 
sort of trinities that one becomes easily acquainted with. While this knowledge is 
only about relations in psychology, Augustine considered them to be analogical 
attributes in the Trinity and that his analysis may offer a vague picture of the 
Trinitarian persons as relations. In this sense, his Trinitarian examples are 
appropriate and persuasive. It is of some interest that Augustine endeavours to 
clarify the Trinity by analysing the human experience of love. I shall deal with the 
question of divine emotion in the next section. 
 
5.2. Human Passions as a Confused Image of God’s Metaphorical 
Emotions 
 
As part of the image of God in human psychology, one clue for understanding the 
spiritual nature of God can be found in emotions.54 In attempting to define the role 
                                                 
52 De Trin. 14.19.25: Imago uero quae renouatur in spiritu mentis in agnitione Dei non exterius 
sed interius de die in diem, ipsa perficietur uisione quae tunc erit post iudicium facie ad faciem, 
nunc autem proficit per speculum in aenigmate. 
53 McGrath 2001, 333. 
54 Paul Gavrilyuk provides an exploration on patristic thoughts upon the doctrine of God from the 
point of view of emotions. He argues that some Fathers, such as Tertullian, Lactantius, Novatian 
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of emotions in the image of God, Augustine detects some inconsistencies in the 
relevant biblical narratives. On the one hand, God is transcendent and immutable 
and this seems not to be compatible with human variable sentiments. On the other 
hand, God expresses similar passions as humans, such as jealousy, anger and 
regret.55 How can there be emotions in divinity and how is God’s nature imitated 
in human passions? Let us begin with Augustine’s position on God’s 
(im)passibility.  
 
Is God emotional or impassible?  
At the beginning of the first book of Augustine’s De Trinitate, he introduces three 
classes of people who attempt to understand divine nature. The first class 
endeavors to find God by beginning from corporeal matters. This class of people 
uses their experiences and senses to grasp incorporeal reality. They imagine God 
with the help of sensory representations.56 The second class frames a view of God 
by referring to human mentality and affections, and extends the human attributes 
and habits to include God, such as the characteristics of occasionally forgetting 
and remembering things.57 The third class is not attracted to corporeal matters or 
human psychology in developing their minds to conceive of the immutable being, 
but they formulate false conceptions, such as God having the power to generate 
Himself.58 According to Augustine, due to limitations in their mortal thinking, all 
                                                                                                                                     
and Cyril of Alexandria, are of the opinion that God has certain divine emotions such as anger 
(toward the unrepentant sins) in the eternal sense, especially Tertullian. “He goes so far as to admit 
that ‘human soul has the same emotions and sensations as God’, and these emotions are a part of 
divine image (imago dei) in human beings”. See Paul L. Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the 
Impassible God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 
58. 
55 For instance, “I am a jealous God” (Exodus 20:5) and “I regret that I made man” (Genesis 6:7). 
See De Trin. 1.2.  
56 De Trin. 1.1: Quorum nonnulli ea quae de corporalibus rebus siue per sensus corporeos experta 
notauerunt, siue quae natura humani ingenii et diligentiae uiuacitate uel artis adiutorio 
perceperunt, ad res incorporeas et spiritales transferre conantur ut ex his illas metiri atque 
opinari uelint…Qui enim opinatur Deum, uerbi gratia, candidum uel rutilum, fallitur; sed tamen 
haec inueniuntur in corpore. 
57 De Trin. 1.1: Sunt item alii qui secundum animi humani naturam uel affectum de Deo sentiunt, 
si quid sentiunt, et ex hoc errore cum de Deo disputant sermoni suo distortas et fallaces regulas 
figunt…Rursus qui opinatur Deum nunc obliuiscentem, nunc recordantem uel si quid huiusmodi 
est, nihilominus in errore est; sed tamen haec inueniuntur in animo. 
58 De Trin. 1.1: Est item aliud hominum genus, eorum qui uniuersam quidem creaturam, quae 
profecto mutabilis est, nituntur transcendere ut ad incommutabilem substantiam quae Deus est 
erigant intentionem…Qui autem putant eius esse potentiae Deum ut seipsum ipse genuerit, eo plus 
errant quod non solum Deus ita non est sed nec spiritalis nec corporalis creatura. 
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three classes deviate from the right path of understanding the highest being.59 
Augustine maintains that in order to refute these falsities and misinterpretations, 
the Scripture adapts the language to be suitable even for children: 
Consequently, in order that the human mind may be cleansed from errors of this kind, 
Sacred Scripture, adapting itself to little ones, has employed words from every class of 
objects in order that our intellect, as though strengthened by them, might rise as it were 
gradually to divine and sublime things…For, from the things which are found in the 
creature, the divine Scripture is wont to prepare enticements, as it were, for children. Its 
purpose is to arouse the affections of the weak, so that by means of them, as though they 
were steps, they may mount to higher things according to their own modest capacity, and 
abandon the lower things.60 
In this narrative style, expressions such as “Protect me under the shadow of thy 
wings”, “I am a jealous God”, and “I regret that I made man”,61 are all  formulated 
from the human perspective and serve to enhance human understanding, using the 
language applied to familiar human things that helps people grasp the right 
attitude toward God. Although the “emotions” attributed to God are usual in 
human contexts, they do not represent the real divine realm. Rather, many places 
of the Scripture reveal God’s true immortality and immutable tranquility 
distinguished from the variableness of the human mind and its passions.62 To 
Augustine, the Bible makes an explicit distinction between the immutability of the 
Creator and the changeableness of the creatures, with the scriptural language of 
God’s emotions being metaphorical rather than literal.  
One might suppose that Augustine includes some emotional states in the 
divine impassibility, such as anger, and that God would be able to control His 
emotions so that divine impassibility would be compatible with divine emotions.63 
                                                 
59 De Trin. 1.1: Sed mortalitatis onere praegrauati cum et uideri uolunt scire quod nesciunt et 
quod uolunt scire non possunt, praesumptiones opinionum suarum audacius affirmando 
intercludunt sibimet intellegentiae uias. 
60 De Trin. 1.2: Ut ergo ab huiusmodi falsitatibus humanus animus purgaretur, Sancta Scriptura 
paruulis congruens nullius generis rerum uerba uitauit ex quibus quasi gradatim ad diuina atque 
sublimia noster intellectus uelut nutritus assurgeret…scriptura diuina uelut infantilia 
oblectamenta formare quibus infirmorum ad quaerenda superiora et inferiora deserenda pro suo 
modulo tamquam passibus moueretur aspectus. 
61 See McKenna 1963, 4. 
62 See De Trin. 1.2. 
63  “Augustine does not deny that God can experience anger. Rather Augustine expresses a 
common conviction of the Fathers that divine impassibility does not rule out all divine emotions. 
Instead, divine impassibility entails freedom from and control over those emotional states that 
humans cannot manage easily. God is impassible in the sense of being immune to the negative 
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If this were the case, the difference between human and divine emotions would be 
that God possesses more power to control passions than human beings and He 
experiences certain emotions that humans are incapable of. This literal 
interpretation of divine emotions attempts to offer a new definition of emotions 
that would not refer to them as mental disturbances, but would preserve some 
affective features. This interpretation contradicts Augustine’s (and his 
philosophical predecessors’) characterisation of passio as a perturbation of the 
soul, as we have observed in Chapter 2. Moreover, it would give the impression 
that God’s emotions (such as compassion64) are perfunctory and even hypocritical 
without a real involvement in changing feeling qualities. Augustine explains the 
incompatibility of the literal account of divine anger and repentance with the 
immutability of the divine plan and foreknowledge as follows:  
God’s anger is not a disturbance of His mind; rather, it is a judgment according to which 
punishment is visited upon sin. And when He considers and reconsiders, this is only the 
application of His immutable plan to mutable things: God does not ‘repent’ of any act as 
man does, and His decision as to anything whatsoever is as fixed as His foreknowledge of 
it is certain. But if Scripture did not use such terms, it would not communicate its 
meaning so clearly to all the race of men for whom it has care. If it did not first bend 
down and, as it were, descend to the level of the fallen, it would not terrify the proud, 
arouse the negligent, exercise the inquirer and nourish the intelligent.65 
To Augustine, the divine repentance in the Bible is a figurative expression that 
associates a natural change in things with divine providence. 66  The 
anthropomorphic expressions of God’s love and the economy of salvation include 
                                                                                                                                     
consequences typically associated with human emotions. Augustine emphasizes that God is not 
overpowered by anger or by any other perturbation contrary to reason…divine impassibility was 
quite compatible with certain divine emotions, ever with anger”. See Gavrilyuk 2004, 59–60. 
64 Augustine discusses divine compassion in many places such as ench. 32; CD 10.5–6; Serm. 
106.4; En. Ps. 32.2.1.11; 32.2.2.28. See Allan Fitzgerald, “God’s Mercy”, in Augustine through 
the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Michigan/Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1999), 557.  
65 CD 15.25: Ira Dei non perturbatio animi eius est, sed iudicium quo inrogatur poena peccato. 
Cogitatio uero eius et recogitatio mutandarum rerum est inmutabilis ratio. Neque enim sicut 
hominem, ita Deum cuiusquam facti sui paenitet, cuius est de omnibus omnino rebus tam fixa 
sententia quam certa praescientia. Sed si non utatur scriptura talibus uerbis, non se quodam modo 
familiarius insinuabit omni generi hominum, quibus uult esse consultum, ut et perterreat 
superbientes et excitet neglegentes, et exerceat quaerentes et alat intellegentes. 
66 CD 14.11: “God is, indeed, said to change His decrees; and we even read in the Scriptures that, 
figuratively speaking, God ‘repented’. But such statements reflect a merely human perspective, or 
refer to something which has in fact happened according to the order of natural causes; they do not 
detract from the Almighty’s foreknowledge of what He will do”. (Deus enim etsi dicitur statuta 
mutare (unde tropica locutione in Scripturis etiam paenituisse legitur Deum), iuxta id dicitur quod 
homo sperauerat uel naturalium causarum ordo gestabat, non iuxta id, quod se Omnipotens 
facturum esse praesciuerat). 
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anger, repentance, compassion and other divine “emotions”, which do not stain 
the immutability of divine spiritual nature. Yet this is not to say that God does not 
have free will and the power to take on human mutable emotions in any way; 
instead, the divine involvement in human sufferings through the incarnation of the 
second person of the Trinity is a unique fact that aims at delivering sinners from 
perturbations to the immutable tranquility of the divinity. For Augustine, to 
inquire whether or not God is emotional or impassible is misleading, as his 
approach toward the divine “emotions” includes the Trinitarian theology of the 
paradoxical proposition “the Impassible suffered”, which distances it from the 
Hellenistic and the Semitic conceptions of God as being apathetic or pathetic. I 
shall proceed to the details of this issue in the next section (5.3).  
 
The relationship between human passions and the divine spiritual status 
The doctrine of the image of God teaches that the human soul was “breathed 
forth” (afflatus, not proditus) from God. In contrast to the uncreated and 
immutable nature of God’s spirit, the human spirit is created and changeable.67 
Augustine mentions in Book XIV of the City of God that the first human beings in 
Paradise were without the disturbances of passions and that their emotional 
faculties were fully controlled by their rational will.68 According to Augustine, 
this applied even to their sexual acts, “the sexual organs would have been moved 
by the same command of the will as the other members are. Then, not needing to 
be aroused by the excitement of passion, man would have poured his seed into his 
wife’s womb in tranquility of mind and without any corruption of her body’s 
integrity”.69 The tranquility of the soul of the first human beings imitates the 
divine impassible life and reflects the imprint that God bears on the original 
                                                 
67  CD 13.24: Sed enim Dei flatus, inquiunt, Dei ore exisse intellegitur, quem si animam 
crediderimus, consequens erit, ut eiusdem fateamur esse substantiae parem que illius Sapientiae, 
quae dicit: Ego ex ore altissimi prodii. Non quidem dixit Sapientia ore Dei afflatam se fuisse, sed 
ex eius ore prodisse…quem corpori hominis inserendo inspirasse uel insufflasse conuenientissime 
dictus est, incorporeus incorporeum, sed inmutabilis mutabilem, quia non creatus creatum. 
68 CD 14.10: Sed utrum primus homo uel primi homines (duorum erat quippe coniugium) habebant 
istos affectus in corpore animali ante peccatum, quales in corpore spiritali non habebimus omni 
purgato finito que peccato, non inmerito quaeritur. Si enim habebant, quo modo erant beati in illo 
memorabili beatitudinis loco, id est paradiso? Quis tandem absolute dici beatus potest, qui timore 
afficitur uel dolore? Cf. CD 14.19 and 14.26. 
69  CD 14.26:…sed eo uoluntatis nutu mouerentur membra illa quo cetera, et sine ardoris 
inlecebroso stimulo cum tranquillitate animi et corporis nulla corruptione integritatis infunderetur 
gremio maritus uxoris. 
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human psychology. However, this image of God became confused when the first 
humans transgressed the law. 
For, because of this sin, human nature was made subject to all the great corruption that 
we see and feel, and so to death also. What is more, man came to be distracted by 
turbulent and conflicting emotions, and so became very different from what he had been 
when he dwelt in Paradise before his sin; though, even them, he lived in an animal 
body.70  
Sin introduced the perturbations of emotions that continue to arise due to a 
distorted hierarchy in the levels of the soul.71 As a consequence of this defect, 
humans cannot live an entirely tranquil and sinless life without divine restoration 
to the created good state. This also means that turbulences of the soul become a 
punishment in this life. The natural state of humans has been distorted, which 
indicates that a chasm is created between God and man. It is therefore 
inappropriate at this stage to draw an analogy between divine and human 
emotions and to speculate from a human perspective as to whether God 
experiences certain special emotions that humans cannot easily manage.  
 However, human passions provide an indicator for divine spiritual life, 
although the analogy should not be interpreted to parallel the variable human 
dispositions with divine attributes, nor should one understand the scriptural 
utterances of God’s emotions as being literally true. Metaphorical divine passions 
in the Old Testament reveal God’s providence as well as other immutable 
relations with respect to the created order.72 This does not imply that He cannot be 
                                                 
70 CD 14.12:…ut tantae corruptioni, quantam uidemus atque sentimus, et per hanc subiaceret et 
morti ac tot et tantis tamque inter se contrariis perturbaretur et fluctuaret affectibus, qualis in 
paradiso ante peccatum, licet in corpore animali esset, utique non fuit. 
71  CD 14.19: Hinc est quod et illi philosophi, qui ueritati propius accesserunt, iram atque 
libidinem uitiosas animi partes esse confessi sunt, eo quod turbide atque inordinate mouerentur ad 
ea etiam, quae sapientia perpetrari uetat, ac per hoc opus habere moderatrice mente atque 
ratione… hae, inquam, partes in paradiso ante peccatum uitiosae non erant. Non enim contra 
rectam uoluntatem ad aliquid mouebantur, unde necesse esset eas rationis tamquam frenis 
regentibus abstinere. Nam quod nunc ita mouentur et ab eis, qui temperanter et iuste et pie uiuunt, 
alias facilius, alias difficilius, tamen cohibendo et repugnando modificantur, non est utique sanitas 
ex natura, sed languor ex culpa. 
72 CD 11.21: …quod per omnia dicitur: uidit Deus quia bonum est...Et Plato quidem plus ausus est 
dicere, elatum esse scilicet Deum gaudio mundi uniuersitate perfecta. Ubi et ipse non usque adeo 
desipiebat, ut putaret Deum sui operis nouitate factum beatiorem; sed sic ostendere uoluit artifici 
suo placuisse iam factum, quod placuerat in arte faciendum; non quod ullo modo Dei scientia 
uarietur, ut aliud in ea faciant quae nondum sunt, aliud quae iam sunt, aliud quae fuerunt; non 
enim more nostro ille uel quod futurum est prospicit, uel quod praesens est aspicit, uel quod 
praeteritum est respicit; sed alio modo quodam a nostrarum cogitationum consuetudine longe alte 
que diuerso. Ille quippe non ex hoc in illud cogitatione mutata, sed omnino incommutabiliter uidet. 
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in contact with human passions in any way. In order to break the chasm between 
God and man and renew the confused image of God in man, the second person of 
the Trinity mediates between divine and human emotions through His incarnation. 
Many questions can be posed here, of course, such as how these two distinct 
natures function in Him or whether the whole Trinity suffered the crucifixion. 
 
5.3. Redemption from Earthly Emotions in the Passion of Christ  
 
Some modern theologians note that the patristic doctrine of the impassible God is 
derived from the Hellenistic conception of divine apatheia rather than from the 
Hebrew idea of the passible God. This is said to lead away from the Patripassian 
position to view God as apathetic.73 This account is challenged by other writers 
who maintain that “the Theory of Theology’s Fall into Hellenistic Philosophy” is 
misleading, as the theme of impassible suffering is revealed in the Christian 
doctrine and is not derived from pagan philosophers. Let us examine this 
discussion more closely.  
 In his The Paradox of a Suffering God, A. G. Nnamani aims to clarify the 
notion of God in the Greek and the Semitic contexts. Nnamani argues that the 
early Christian view of divine impassibility stems from the Hellenistic thought of 
apatheia.74 He examines the origin and development of the doctrine of the divine 
apatheia in the Greek tradition and maintains that there is a tendency to disparage 
divine emotions in ancient Greek philosophy and this is in contrast to the 
endorsement of God’s emotional life in the biblical and rabbinical literature.75 
                                                 
73 This is referred to as the “Theory of Theology’s Fall into Hellenistic Philosophy” by Paul 
Gavrilyuk and he summarises its main elements as follows: “(1) divine impassibility is an attribute 
of God in Greek and Hellenistic philosophy; (2) divine impassibility was adopted by the early 
Fathers uncritically from the philosophers; (3) divine impassibility does not leave room for any 
sound account of divine emotions and divine involvement in history, as attested in the Bible; (4) 
divine impassibility is incompatible with the revelation of the suffering of God in Jesus Christ; (5) 
the latter fact was recognised by a minority group of theologians who affirmed that God is 
passible, going against the majority opinion”. See Gavrilyuk 2004, 5 and 176. 
74 “We have examined the axiom of divine impassibility in the light of the Hellenistic and Semitic 
conceptions of God and noted that it stems from the concept of apatheia in the ancient Greek 
philosophy…The adoption of the Greek concept of divine apatheia is characteristic of the 
theologies of the first three centuries of the Church. It can indeed be seen as the basic theological 
presupposition of the patristic Christology and the doctrine of God”. A. G. Nnamani, The Paradox 
of a Suffering God: On the Classical, Modern Western and Third World Struggles to Harmonize 
the Incompatible Attributes of the Trinitarian God (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1995), 56–59. 
75 Nnamani 1995, 40. 
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Nnamani thinks that apatheia is absent from the Semitic understanding of God.76 
The tension between these two conceptions of God (impassible and passible) is 
first addressed in the Hellenisation of Judaism by Philo of Alexandria, who 
introduced the allegorical method so as to reconcile the clash of these traditions in 
explaining divine emotions. 77  According to his allegorical approach, the 
utterances of wrath and repentance of God in the Old Testament should not be 
interpreted literally. In contrast, divine compassion is real, but not subject to a 
change like human passions; divine impassibility and immutability are taken for 
granted.78 Nnamani argues that Philo’s conciliation is in defense of the Greek 
divine apatheia.79 Nnamani contends that this allegorical method is adopted by 
Augustine, who continues to deal with the tension between the two cultural 
notions, in order to assimilate the biblical notions to divine impassibility. Even 
though Augustine attempts to leave space for divine passibility by using a 
“double-pronged” approach, his adherence to the apatheia model is evident.80 
Nnamani asserts that the endorsement of the Greek impassible theory is the result 
of “the Hellenisation of Judaism and Christianity”. 81  In his assessment, the 
dilemma of divine impassibility reflects the “unfinished cultural integration 
between the Semitic and Hellenistic traditions”.82  
 The issue of theology’s fall to Greek philosophy has been analysed with 
considerable seriousness in the twentieth century by theologians such as Adolf 
von Harnack, Hastings Rashdall, Kazoh Kitamori, Jürgen Moltmann and their 
                                                 
76 “In general however, divine apatheia emerges out of the Hellenistic tendency to conceive God 
by way of negation and through the disparagement of emotions…apatheia in the sense explained 
above is totally absent in the biblical and Semitic conception of God”. Nnamani 1995, 57. 
77 Nnamani 1995, 51, 57 and 58. 
78 Nnamani refers to two places in Philo’s writings to show his adoption of the Greek notion of 
divine apatheia. One is in Quod Deus immutabilis sit v, 22: “there could be no greater impiety 
than to suppose that the Unchangeable changes”; the other is in Quod Deus immutabilis sit xi, 52: 
“He is not susceptible to any passions at all”. See Nnamani 1995, 53. 
79 “…we can rightly say that the first significant attempt to harmonise the Jewish and Greek 
notions of God began with Philo. He reinterprets the anthropomorphic expressions of the Bible in 
defence of the concept of divine apatheia”. Nnamani 1995, 53. 
80 “St. Augustine makes optimal effort to show that God’s emotions do not interfere with His 
immutability. He does this employing Philo’s allegorical method”. Nnamani 1995, 86. Nnamani 
believes that Augustine adheres to the axiom of divine impassibility and, in this framework, the 
possibility of divine passibility is also permitted. But Nnamani notes that like Philo, the dilemma 
of the divine impassibility is not addressed satisfactorily in Augustine either. See Ibid., 86–87. 
81 “Reconciling these two contrary conceptions of God – of a pathetic and an apathetic God – has 
been a consistent preoccupation of theology since the Hellenisation of Judaism and Christianity”. 
Nnamani 1995, 57. 
82 Ibid., 56. 
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followers. These scholars worried about the distortion of the gospel by the 
philosophical prism and challenged the traditional position on the impassibility of 
God.83 For Harnack, the Hellenistic invasion derives from the systematisation of 
the theological ideas proposed by the Gnostics.84 The formation of this doctrinal 
system occurred as an enculturation of Christianity in the Hellenistic environment 
that involved the factors of “the speculative philosophical, the cultish-mystical 
and the dualistic-ascetic”.85 Harnack explains this as follows: 
They [Gnostics] were accordingly a class of Christians who essayed through a sharp onset 
to conquer Christianity for Hellenic culture, and Hellenic culture for Christianity, and 
they thereby abandoned the Old Testament in order to fitly close up the breach between 
the two opposing forces. Christianity became an occult theosophy (revealed metaphysics 
and apparition philosophy, permeated with the Platonic spirit and with Pauline ideas, 
constructed out of the material of an old cultus-wisdom which was acquired through 
mysteries and the illumined understanding, defined by a keen and, in part, true criticism 
of the Old Testament religion and the scant faith of the Church).86  
During this doctrinal integration, Harnack suggests, the evangelical account of 
God was adulterated and implanted by the philosophical metaphysics and this led 
to a wrong turn in portraying God as impassible. This portrayal was followed by 
the patristic fathers who criticised Patripassianism.87 Harnack’s questioning of the 
classical understanding of God was echoed by his contemporary theologian, 
Hastings Rashdall. In his Idea of Atonement, Rashdall observes:  
                                                 
83 Gavrilyuk adds that the distortion of the gospel by philosophy was actually noticed by some 
early Fathers, such as Hippolytus and Tertullian, who accused the Gnostic heretical deviation from 
the apostolic tradition by adopting Greek philosophy. He refers to Hippolytus’s Refutatio ominium 
heresium (Proem. 3) and Tertullian’s De praescriptione haereticorum 7 as sources for the view of 
the philosophical deformation of the gospel. See Gavrilyuk 2004, 3–4. For the recent discussion on 
the Fall theory and the doctrine of a suffering God, see the Appendix in Gavrilyuk 2004, 176–179. 
Cf. McGrath 2001, 273–279.  
84  “The gnostics were the theologians of the 1st century; they were the first to transform 
Christianity into a system of doctrines (dogmas); they were the first to treat tradition and the 
primitive Christian Scriptures systematically; they undertook to set forth Christianity as the 
absolute religion, and they therefore placed it in opposition to the other religions, to that of the Old 
Testament as well (not alone to Judaism); but the absolute religion, which they coupled with 
Christ, was to them essentially identical with the results of the philosophy of religion”. Adolf 
Harnack, Outlines of the History of Dogma, transl. Edwin Knox Mitchell (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1893), 60. 
85 Harnack 1893, 61. 
86 Harnack 1893, 60. 
87 Two treatises, Hippolytus’s Contra Noetum and Tertullian’s Adversus Praxeam included an 
important criticism of the Patripassian position. For the issue of whether “Pater passus est” is a 
fictive slogan introduced by anti-Patripassion theologians, see Adolf Harnack, “Monarchianismus”, 
in Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche, ed. Albert Hauck (Leipzig: J. C. 
Hinrichs, 1903), 329; Gavrilyuk 2004, 93–100. 
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We need not be debarred from doing so by the extreme aversion of the patristic and 
scholastic theologians to think of divinity as ‘passible’; for it must be confessed that this 
aversion of theirs, which the Church took over from Greek thought rather than from 
Christ or St. Paul, is hard to reconcile with the essential Christian conception of God as a 
loving Father. The Christian God is not the pure Intelligence—cold, passionless, and 
loveless, ‘Himself unmoved, all motion’s source’—that He was to Aristotle.88 
The conception of the passible God was developed further by Kitamori and 
Moltmann. They based their views mainly on the pain of God the Father, but 
unlike the Patripassianist position, which regarded the passion of Son as the 
suffering of the Father on the cross, Kitamori and Moltmann discerned distinct 
types of pain in the Father and Son. They explained that the Father was suffering 
from losing the Son, but the only crucified one was the Son, who suffers pain and 
death.89 For Moltmann, it is a deficiency and weakness if God the Father cannot 
suffer, because “a God who cannot suffer is poorer than any human”.90 
 In contrast to the above interpretation, Paul Gavrilyuk asserts that a special 
theme in Christian theology that is not found in Hellenistic philosophy and 
mythology is the notion of the suffering of the Impassible. To Gavrilyuk, 
Christian apologists and Greek philosophers were in the same front in their 
refuting the traditional mythological vision of passionate gods.91  Refuting the 
position of mythical anthropomorphism and polytheism, the apologists defended 
the transcendence and supremacy of the divine, arguing that God should be 
impassible and free from all human passions and desires.92 But Gavrilyuk notes 
that the Christian account of divine impassibility is different from the 
philosophical formulations. The first difference is that it is not reduced to apathy 
                                                 
88 Hastings Rashdall, The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology (London: Macmillan, 1919), 
452. 
89 McGrath regards the position of Kitamori and Moltmann as distinguished from Patripassianism. 
“The Father and the Son suffer – but they experience that suffering in different manners. The Son 
suffers the pain and death of the cross; the Father gives up and suffers the loss of the Son”. See 
McGrath 2001, 278.  
90 Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of 
Christian Theology (London: SCM Press, 1974), 222. Cf. McGrath 2001, 277. For Kitamori’s 
view, see his Theology of the Pain of God (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1965). 
91 “The myths spoke of the gods as being endowed with human passions and weaknesses. Happily, 
Christians were not the only ones who understood the impropriety of ascribing human, all too 
human, characteristics to gods. Many philosophically minded pagans and Jews shared the same 
sensibility. Charges of anthropomorphism against the traditional polytheism became commonplace 
among philosophers from the time of Xenophanes”. Gavrilyuk 2004, 48. 
92 Gavrilyuk 2004, 49–50. 
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and indifference. Gavrilyuk suggests that impassibility should be evaluated from 
the perspective of negative/apophatic theology and treated as a surpassing form of 
the divinity, which serves as “an apophatic qualifier of divine emotions”.93 The 
second difference is that according to patristic theology, divine emotions are 
compatible with divine impassibility because God is able to control emotions 
without any negative perturbations: “Divine impassibility was an important 
apophatic qualifier of all divine emotions that ensured that God experiences them 
in the manner appropriate to him alone”.94 The third difference is that the doctrine 
of the incarnation implies the paradoxical position of the impassible divine being 
involved in suffering, which is not found in pagan philosophy. Through many 
dialectical turns against heresies, Gavrilyuk argues, the church fathers defended 
their belief in the “divine involvement worthy of God”.95 Gavrilyuk thus believes 
that patristic theology does not make a choice between the Hellenistic and the 
Semitic sources of God, but rather follows a dialectical approach of its own. In 
this sense, the theory of Theology’s descent into Hellenistic philosophy cannot be 
argued convincingly.96 
 The point at issue here is whether the patristic theology adheres to the 
Hellenistic position on the impassibility of God. In the case of Augustine, the 
scholars generally agree that he adopts the impassibilist position, but they draw 
different conclusions. Some scholars declare that Augustine and his predecessors 
represent the Hellenised reading of the gospel through philosophical concepts that 
leads to the doctrine of divine apatheia. Some others, such as Gavrilyuk, argue 
that such a reduction of theology to philosophy does not exist because 
Augustine’s conception of the divine impassibility, as an apophatic qualifier, 
involves special divine emotions. With these two accounts in mind, let us explore 
Augustine’s position by examining some relevant texts.  
 
The triune spiritual life and the divine kenosis  
Augustine’s consideration of God’s “emotions” is expressed in his account of the 
Trinity. He continues to advocate the same substance of the three persons in the 
                                                 
93 Ibid., 47–48; 60–63. 
94 Ibid., 60. 
95 Ibid., 172. 
96 Ibid., 2, 5, 172 and 179. 
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Trinitarian structure, emphasizing their separate roles in indivisible works. In De 
Trinitate 15.17.29, Augustine clarifies this in the following way:  
Yet it is not without reason that in this Trinity only the Son is called the Word of God, 
and that only the Holy Spirit is the Gift of God, and that only He, of whom the Son was 
begotten, and from whom the Holy Spirit principally proceeds, is God the Father. I have 
added “principally”, therefore, because the Holy Spirit is also found to proceed from the 
Son…therefore, that the common Gift should also proceed from Him, and that the Holy 
Spirit should be the Spirit of both. This distinction in the inseparable Trinity, therefore, is 
not to be touched upon in passing, but is to be carefully considered…If, then, any one of 
these three is to be specially called love, what more fitting than that this should be the 
Holy Spirit? In the sense, that is, that in that simple and highest nature, substance is not 
one thing, and love another thing, but that substance itself is love, and that love itself is 
substance, whether in the Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit, and yet that the Holy 
Spirit is especially called “love”.97 
Augustine carefully outlines the distinct roles of the three persons in the Trinity. 
He identifies the Son as the “Word” (or “Wisdom”), the Spirit as “Love” (or 
“Gift”), both being from God the Father, but in different manners. The Son was 
begotten from the Father, while the Spirit proceeds from both the Father and Son 
as “Love”, binding them together. Nevertheless, they share the same substance, 
which Augustine refers to as love, even though the Holy Spirit is also called love. 
In Augustine’s view, the divine love reveals the spiritual nature of triune life, so 
“God is love”. Love is not therefore confined to the Spirit, but all three persons 
together are one love.98  
 In his description of the Heavenly life of the City of God, Augustine 
interprets Psalm 16:11 as the citizens being filled with the divine spirit and having 
                                                 
97 De Trin. 15.17.29: Et tamen non frustra in hac Trinitate non dicitur uerbum Dei nisi Filius, nec 
donum Dei nisi Spiritus Sanctus, nec de quo genitum est uerbum et de quo procedit principaliter 
Spiritus Sanctus nisi Deus Pater. Ideo autem addidi, principaliter, quia et de Filio Spiritus Sanctus 
procedere reperitur…sic ergo eum genuit ut etiam de illo donum commune procederet et Spiritus 
Sanctus spiritus esset amborum. Non est igitur accipienda transeunter sed diligenter intuenda 
inseparabilis Trinitatis ista distinctio…Sic ergo proprie aliquid horum trium caritas nuncupanda 
est, quid aptius quam ut hoc sit Spiritus Sanctus? Ut scilicet in illa simplici summa que natura non 
sit aliud substantia et aliud caritas, sed substantia ipsa sit caritas et caritas ipsa substantia siue in 
Patre siue in Filio siue in Spiritu Sancto, et tamen proprie Spiritus Sanctus caritas nuncupetur. 
98  De Trin. 15.17.28: “Therefore, ‘God is love’…We should rather so conceive this, that all 
together possess and each one possesses all three of these in their own nature…I do not know why, 
as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are called wisdom, and all together are not three 
wisdoms but one wisdom, so the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit should not be called love, 
and all together one love. For so is the Father God, the Son God, and the Holy Spirit God, and all 
together are one God”. 
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the fruition of God with eternal fullness of joy: “Thou shall fill me with joy with 
thy countenance”.99 Augustine assures us that this joy will suffice because there is 
nothing more that we will need (De Trin. 1.8.17: Illa laetitia nihil amplius 
requiretur quia nec erit quod amplius requiratur). This eternal fullness of joy 
(aeterna perfectio gaudiorum) 100  is one of the divine spiritual attributes that 
humans will attain.101  In brief, the immutable fullness of joy, combined with 
divine inner Trinitarian love reflect the triune spiritual life, but this differs from 
the human understanding of emotions, for the divine realm is transcendent and 
inscrutable. It is important to note that to describe divine attributes, Augustine 
also employs the language of the impassibility of God (impassibilitas Dei), which 
refers to the immutability and the indescribable (ineffabilis) realm of divinity.102 
For Augustine, any description of the divine “emotions” is derived from human 
experiences.103 In this sense, the triune “emotional” life, joy and love, which are 
described as impassible, points to the transcendent spirit of immutable goodness 
that transcends human cognition.  
 However, the issue of God’s emotions is more complicated than what was 
just stated because it includes the question of divine involvement in human 
emotions. In the first two books of his De Trinitate, Augustine maintains that the 
second person of the Trinity suffered in the incarnation and crucifixion rather than 
the Father or the Spirit, although they are inseparable and work inseparably.104 
Augustine proposes that during the incarnation, a specific relation appeared, 
namely, the Son is both equal to and lesser than the Father, Spirit and Himself:  
                                                 
99 De Trin. 1.8.17: Tunc erit quod Scriptum est: Adimplebis me laetitia cum uultu Tuo.  
100  De Trin. 1.8.17: Haec enim nobis contemplatio promittitur actionum omnium finis atque 
aeterna perfectio gaudiorum. 
101 I shall continue this discussion in section 5.6. 
102 Augustine stresses the ineffability of the divine impassibility and “emotions” in De patientia 
1.1:…quem nihil patientem nec tamen impatientem, immo etiam patientissimum dicimus, uerbis 
explicare quis possit? Ineffabilis est ergo illa patientia, non tamen nulla, sicut zelus Eius, sicut ira 
Eius et si quid huius modi est. Gavrilyuk refers to “divine impassibility” as an ontological term. He 
explains, “I will locate the divine impassibility in the conceptual sphere of apophatic theology. I 
will show that in apophatic theology impassibility was first of all an ontological term, expressing 
God’s unlikeness to everything created, his transcendence and supremacy over all things, rather 
than a psychological term implying the absence of emotions. In this conceptual framework divine 
impassibility safeguarded God’s undiminished divinity and transcendence”. Gavrilyuk 2004, 48. 
103  E.g., in Enarrationes in Psalmos 2.4: “The ‘wrath’ of God then is an emotion which is 
produced in the soul which knoweth the law of God, when it sees this same law transgressed by 
the sinner”. [transl. Coxe]. Cf. CD 15.25. 
104 E.g., De Trin. 1.4.7; 1.5.8; 1.7.14; 2.1.2. 
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…the Son of God is understood to be equal to the Father according to the form of God in 
which He is, and less than the Father according to the form of a slave that He has 
received. In this form He has been found to be not only less than the Father but of the 
Holy Spirit as well, and not only that, but He has been found to be even less than Himself, 
not of Himself who was, but of Himself who is, because by the form of a slave which He 
received, He did not lose the form of God...105 
Augustine argues that this paradoxical manner of existence applies to Christ, 
owing to “his having emptied Himself” (exinanivit): “Since He [Son], in the form 
of God being equal to the Father from whom He emptied Himself by taking the 
form of a slave, acts, suffers, and receives in the form of a slave”.106 Augustine 
adopts the kenotic approach to interpret the two natures of the incarnate Son, 
divinity and humanity. In this case, two distinct natures are involved in one 
person: 
Hence, because the form of God took the form of a slave, then both is God and both is 
man. But both God on account of the God who takes, and both man on account of the 
man who is taken. By that taking the one was not turned and changed into the other. For 
the divinity was not changed into the creature so that it ceased to be the divinity, nor the 
creature into the divinity so that it ceased to be a creature.107  
The divine and human spiritual natures are both simultaneously separate and 
inseparable, which seems to imply that in the suffering of Christ, two distinct 
“emotional” realities are without division, without confusion, without 
transformation, and without separation. 108  This mysterious state conveys the 
paradoxical slogan of “the Impassible suffered”. It is important to note again that 
the concept of “the impassible” here does not involve an emotional sense that 
human beings understand, but it refers to God’s enigmatic, spiritual nature and 
His immutable characteristics, such as providence, foreknowledge, love and 
                                                 
105 De Trin. 2.1.2: …intellegatur Dei Filius et aequalis Patri secundum Dei formam in qua est et 
minor Patre secundum serui formam quam accepit, in qua forma non solum Patre sed etiam 
Spiritu Sancto, neque hoc tantum sed etiam Se ipso minor inuentus est, non Se ipso qui fuit sed Se 
ipso qui est quia forma serui accepta formam Dei non amisit… Cf. De Trin. 1.11.22; 1.13.29. 
106 De Trin. 1.13.29: Ille quippe in forma Dei aequalis est Patri, ex quo Se exinaniuit formam serui 
accipiens; in ipsa forma serui et agit et patitur et accipit… 
107 De Trin. 1.7.14: Ergo quia forma Dei accepit formam serui, utrumque Deus et utrumque homo; 
sed utrumque Deus propter accipientem Deum, utrumque autem homo propter acceptum hominem. 
Neque enim illa susceptione alterum eorum in alterum conuersum atque mutatum est; nec 
diuinitas quippe in creaturam mutata est ut desisteret esse diuinitas, nec creatura in diuinitatem ut 
desisteret esse creatura. 
108 For the dogma of two natures in Christ, see Jaroslav Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic 
Tradition (100–600) (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), 256–266. 
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justice.  
 It is therefore apparent that Augustine’s vision of God’s emotions is 
neither simply apathetic nor passionate, but belongs to the Trinitarian theology 
and adopts the classical kenotic approach to Christology. Instead of being a 
psychological conception to Augustine, impassibilitas Dei refers to the divine 
transcendence, supremacy and immutability. Hence the idea of impassible 
suffering transcended the Hellenistic and the Jewish discussion of whether or not 
God is impassible. Moreover, this statement was embedded in a theological 
context that was completely unfamiliar to pagan philosophers: the soteriological 
doctrine of why and how “the impassible” person of Christ suffered for humans.  
 
Divine transaction: Redemption from emotions to take divinity by grace 
In his Exposition 2 of Psalm 30, Augustine clarifies the notion of divine 
transaction (divina commercia) in the following words: 
…he [Christ] who deigned to assume the form of a slave, and within that form to clothe 
us with himself, he who did not disdain to take us up into himself, did not disdain either 
to transfigure us into himself, and to speak in our words, so that we in our turn might 
speak in his. This is the wonderful exchange, the divine business deal, the transaction 
effected in this world by the heavenly dealer. He came to receive insults and give honors, 
he came to drain the cup of suffering and give salvation, he came to undergo death and 
give life. Facing death, then, because of what he had from us, he was afraid, not in 
himself but in us. When he said that his soul was sorrowful to the point of death, we all 
unquestionably said it with him. Without him, we are nothing, but in him we too are 
Christ.109 
To interpret the reason for divine kenosis, Augustine adopts the concepts of 
exchange (commutatio) and transaction (commercia). A series of “equivalent” 
matters are placed on the scales, such as insults and honours, sufferings and 
salvation, death and life, and the transaction takes place in the Passion of Christ. 
                                                 
109 En. Ps. 30 (Enarratio 2): Uerumtamen quia dignatus est assumere formam serui, et in ea nos 
uestire se, qui non est dedignatus assumere nos in se, non est dedignatus transfigurare nos in se, et 
loqui uerbis nostris, ut et nos loqueremur uerbis ipsius. Haec enim mira commutatio facta est, et 
diuina sunt peracta commercia, mutatio rerum celebrata in hoc mundo a negotiatore caelesti. 
Uenit accipere contumelias, dare honores; uenit haurire dolorem, dare salutem; uenit subire 
mortem, dare uitam. Moriturus ergo ex eo quod nostrum habebat, non in se, sed in nobis pauebat; 
quia et hoc dixit, tristem esse animam suam usque ad mortem, et utique nos ipsi omnes cum illo. 
Nam sine illo, nos nihil; in illo autem, ipse Christus et nos. Translation in Boulding 2000, 323–
324. 
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Augustine attempts to demonstrate that Christ emptied Himself as a slave and 
absorbed all the human emotions [perturbations of soul], weakness and even 
death, which implies that as a result of an exchange, participants will receive His 
divinity and eternal life.110  
In the person of the crucified Christ, two distinct spiritual natures are 
involved in implementing the transaction. Based on this business approach and on 
Augustine’s account of the two natures in De Trinitate 1.7.14,111 we could infer 
that the divine spiritual status cannot be stained by human emotions so as to 
abandon its divine attributes, nor can human emotions shift to divinity so that 
Christ would lose His human nature. Nonetheless, these two distinct realities 
cannot be separated, as they are both associated with God and man in the person 
of Christ.  
Through the exchange, humans who live in Christ will abandon the 
miserable emotions of this life and attain the divinity by sharing the same eternal 
joyful life in the Kingdom of God. This is not a meritorious human achievement, 
but derives from God’s grace and charity since, to Augustine, the divine life 
attained in the future is derived from His nature, not our own. He explains this to 
his congregation as follows: 
…He [Christ] is the Selfsame, incapable of any change, we who participate in his divinity 
shall ourselves be immortal and shaped for eternal life. As I have explained to you 
already, holy brethren, God gave us a pledge in the person of his Son: before we could 
become participants in his immortality, he had to become a participant in our mortality. 
But as he became mortal not because of anything in his own nature but by sharing in ours, 
so do we become immortal not in the power of our own nature but through his.112  
The Passion of Christ reveals the divine economy of salvation, in which the 
Trinitarian persons work inseparably. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the 
Father or the Spirit were crucified, dead and resurrected, as in the formula held by 
                                                 
110 Sermones nouissimi 6D (=23B).1: Gerimus mortalitatem, toleramus infirmitatem, exspectamus 
diuinitatem. Vult enim Deus non solum uiuificare, sed etiam deificare nos. Quando hoc sperare 
humana infirmitas auderet, nisi diuina promitteret ueritas?  
111  De Trin. 1.7.14: Neque enim illa susceptione alterum eorum in alterum conuersum atque 
mutatum est; nec diuinitas quippe in creaturam mutata est ut desisteret esse diuinitas, nec 
creatura in diuinitatem ut desisteret esse creatura. 
112 En. Ps. 146.5.11: Igitur si ipse idem ipse est, et mutari ex nulla parte potest; participando Eius 
diuinitatem erimus et nos immortales in uitam aeternam. Et hoc nobis pignus datum est de Filio 
Dei, quod iam dixi sanctitati uestrae, ut antequam efficeremur participes immortalitatis ipsius, 
fieret ipse prius particeps mortalitatis nostrae. Sicut autem ille mortalis, non de sua substantia, 
sed de nostra, sic nos immortales, non de nostra substantia, sed de ipsius. 
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the Patripassion theologians such as Noetus and Praxeas,113  whose position is 
refuted by Augustine in his De Trinitate (1.4.7; 1.5.8; 1.7.14 in particular). For 
Augustine, only the person of Christ who is the mediator between the divine 
transcendent spiritual state and human emotions is directly involved in the 
crucifixion. Christ is the redeemer who delivers humans from the earthly emotions 
to adopt divine, joyful life. God the Father and the Holy Spirit are also involved, 
but assuming different roles. 114  However, Augustine does not continue to 
speculate whether the Father suffered in a different manner. This is because 
Augustine considers human language and thoughts to be inadequate to capture the 
nature of God. Therefore the imagery of God as either impassible or not is only 
human speculation.  
 It is thus clear that Augustine’s approach is fundamentally different from 
the Hellenistic position. His interpretation is rooted in biblical foundations and 
anchored in the theological theme of the impassible suffering that is not found in 
Greek philosophy. Gavrilyuk is right to debunk the misinterpretation of the fall of 
theology into Hellenistic philosophy and to regard impassibilitas as an ontological 
term referring to the transcendence of God. Yet his attempt to reconcile the 
tension between the emotions and apatheia in the divine sphere becomes 
problematic when he reduces these ontological conceptions to a psychological 
model, arguing that God has more power than humans in controlling emotions.115 
For Augustine, the divine realm is far above human cognition and cannot be 
reduced to the level of the human affective domain. If this were possible, God 
would be as poor as humans. In the next discussion on the spirituality of angels in 
eschatology, I shall further explain how the emotions are essentially unworthy of 
God in Augustine. 
 
                                                 
113 The formula of the Father crucified and suffered is maintained in this school which attempts to 
defend the notion of one single God, as Noetus argues: “If I acknowledge Christ to be God; He is 
the Father himself, if He is indeed God; and Christ suffered, being Himself God; and consequently 
the Father suffered, for He was the Father Himself” (Contra Noetum 2.3). See Gavrilyuk 2004, 93.  
114 De Trin. 1.4.7: Non tamen eandem Trinitatem natam de uirgine Maria et sub Pontio Pilato 
crucifixam et sepultam tertio die resurrexisse et in caelum ascendisse, sed tantummodo Filium… 
Nec eandem Trinitatem dixisse de caelo: Tu es Filius meus… sed tantummodo Patris uocem fuisse 
ad Filium factam–quamuis Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sicut inseparabiles sunt, ita 
inseparabiliter operentur. 
115 See Gavrilyuk 2004, 59–63. 
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5.4. Division of Angels and Emotions as Punishments in Hell 
 
As explained in the previous chapter, the division between the two cities derives 
from the depravity of some angels who abandoned God to exercise their own 
desire and glory.116 Augustine proceeds to identify this event from the biblical 
text. In his exegesis of Genesis 1:4, Augustine portrays the division of light and 
darkness as the separation of the angels: 
Now it does not seem to me an absurd interpretation of God’s works if we understand that 
the angels were created when that first light was made, and that the separation of the holy 
and the unclean angels was made when, as is said, ‘God divided the light from the 
darkness; and God called the light Day, and the darkness He called Night’…But as 
regards that ‘light’ which is the holy company of the angels, intelligibly refulgent with the 
illumination of truth, and that opposite ‘darkness’ which designates the most loathsome 
minds of those wicked angels who are turned away from the light of righteousness: only 
God Himself could divide these from one another; for the future evil of the wicked 
angels—not a defect of their nature, but of their will—could not be hidden from Him or 
unknown to Him.117  
Augustine asserts that the divine testimony of “Let there be light” (fiat lux) 
implies the creation of the angels and their participation in the eternal light of 
God.118 Originally, all the angels were created good and enlightened by the light. 
When some angels turned away from the light, darkness entered their being, 
because the light was not from them, but from God. In this sense, the angelic 
darkness constitutes the absence of good and true light.119 The depravity of those 
angels, Augustine observes, is due to the wrong direction of their will. On the 
basis of their different choices, the angels were divided into two groups living in 
                                                 
116 See Chapter 4.1.  
117 CD 11.19: Non mihi uidetur ab operibus Dei absurda sententia, si, cum lux prima illa facta est, 
angeli creati intelleguntur, inter sanctos angelos et inmundos fuisse discretum, ubi dictum est: et 
diuisit Deus inter lucem et tenebras; et uocauit Deus lucem diem et tenebras uocauit 
noctem…Inter illam uero lucem, quae sancta societas angelorum et inlustratione ueritatis 
intellegibiliter fulgens, et ei contrarias tenebras, id est malorum angelorum auersorum a luce 
iustitiae taeterrimas mentes, ipse diuidere potuit, cui etiam futurum non naturae, sed uoluntatis 
malum occultum aut incertum esse non potuit. Cf. CD 11.9; 11.11; 11.20. 
118 CD 11.9: Cum enim dixit Deus: fiat lux, et facta est lux, si recte in hac luce creatio intellegitur 
angelorum, profecto facti sunt participes lucis aeternae, quod est ipsa incommutabilis Sapientia 
Dei. 
119 CD 11.9: Lumen quippe uerum, quod inluminat omnem hominem uenientem in hunc mundum, 
hoc inluminat et omnem angelum mundum, ut sit lux non in se ipso, sed in Deo; a quo si auertitur 
angelus, fit inmundus; sicut sunt omnes, qui uocantur inmundi spiritus, nec iam lux in Domino, sed 
in se ipsis tenebrae, priuati participatione lucis aeternae. Mali enim nulla natura est; sed amissio 
boni mali nomen accepit.  Cf. CD 11.11. 
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different areas. One group of angels continues to live in the holy city praising 
God,120 whereas the other group has fallen and inhabits the air.121 Let us examine 
Augustine’s formulation of the different lives of these groups at the end of the 
world, focussing on the nature of joy and suffering in their own realm.  
 
The spiritual life of the good angels in the celestial city 
In the beginning of CD 11.13, Augustine specifies two elements as being involved 
in the concept of blessedness (beatitudo), the fruition of the immutable Good and 
certain knowledge of the eternality of this enjoyment: 
From all this, anyone will now see without difficulty that the blessedness which an 
intellectual being desires as its proper goal will result from a conjunction of two things: 
namely, the enjoyment without interruption of the immutable Good which is God; and the 
certain knowledge, free from all doubt and error, that it will remain in the same 
enjoyment forever. That the angels of light have such blessedness we piously believe.122  
Augustine contends that the true happy life of the good angels consists of eternal 
enjoyment without any disturbances (sine ulla molestia perfruatur). Although all 
the angels were created to become happy, rational beings, some of them lost this 
condition because they succumbed to pride. The evil angels did not recognise their 
fall from the beginning, but the good angels became convinced of their eternal 
felicity after the fall of others.123 Thus, the everlasting fruition without changes 
                                                 
120 CD 11.9: Laudate Eum omnes angeli Eius…Nunc, quoniam de sanctae ciuitatis exortu dicere 
institui et prius quod ad sanctos angelos adtinet dicendum putaui, quae huius ciuitatis et magna 
pars est et eo beatior, quod numquam peregrinate. 
121 CD 8.15: Iam uero de loci altitudine, quod daemones in aere, nos autem habitamus in terra. Cf. 
CD 8.14 and En. Ps. 94.6. 
122 CD 11.13: Quocirca cuiuis iam non difficulter occurrit utroque coniuncto effici beatitudinem, 
quam recto proposito intellectualis natura desiderat, hoc est, ut et bono incommutabili, quod Deus 
est, sine ulla molestia perfruatur et in eo se in aeternum esse mansurum nec ulla dubitatione 
cunctetur nec ullo errore fallatur. Hanc habere angelos lucis pia fide credimus.  
123  Augustine does not believe that bad angels were given foreknowledge of their fall. He 
speculates that there are two possibilities. One possibility is that angels were originally unequal in 
the sense that some of them knew their eternal fortune whereas others did not; the other possibility 
is that angels were equal and good angels came to know their eternal felicity only after the ruin of 
others. (CD 11.13: Cuius illi alii quia certi non fuerunt (non enim erat eorum aeterna felicitas 
cuius certi essent, quae finem fuerat habitura), restat, ut aut inpares fuerint, aut, si pares fuerunt, 
post istorum ruinam illis certa scientia suae sempiternae felicitatis accesserit.) Frederick Van 
Fleteren thus erroneously states that “the devil was a good angel, happy but with foreknowledge of 
his own future evil deed and eternal punishment”. See Frederick Van Fleteren, “Devil”, in 
Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
Eerdmans, 1999), 268. See also Peter King, “Augustine and Anselm on Angelic Sin”, in A 
Companion to Angels in Medieval Philosophy, ed. Tobias Hoffmann (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 271–
273.  
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belongs to the good angels. At the same time, Augustine adds that angels 
experience joy (gaudium) in their praising God. He poses the following question:  
When we say that it is a fault of the angelic creature if it does not cleave to God, we 
thereby declare more plainly that it belongs to its nature to cleave to God. And who can 
worthily conceive or express how great a joy it is to cleave to God: to live in Him, to 
draw wisdom from Him, to rejoice in Him, and to enjoy so great a good without death, 
without error and without grief?124 
From the description of this eternal fruition of God, we see that angelic joy is not 
an emotion known to humans, since it does not involve the fluctuations of the soul 
that are typical of emotions. Rather, this joy reveals a higher spiritual realm in the 
divine life.  
 It is noteworthy that this eternal joy (fruens indeficienter aeternorum 
iucunditate gaudiorum) will also belong to the human citizens of the Heavenly 
City.125 Augustine claims that redeemed people will fill up the places left by the 
fallen angels and that they will be equal to good angels (erunt aequales angelis 
Dei).126 Moreover, humans will attain divinity by participating in the divinity of 
Christ.127 Following this reasoning, it is evident that the eternal joy of created 
beings refers to the spiritual state of both the angelic and the human citizens in 
Heaven and is manifested in their participation in divinity. Augustine does not 
provide a clear picture on whether the human beings and the good angels share the 
same type of divinisation and spiritual life; instead, he is more concerned with the 
deification of the humans. I shall proceed to this subject in section 5.5. 
 
Suffering as a punishment for demons and their human followers in Hell  
                                                 
124 CD 12.1: cum uitium creaturae angelicae dicitur, quo non adhaeret Deo, hinc apertissime 
declaratur, eius naturae ut Deo adhaereat conuenire. Quam porro magna sit laus adhaerere Deo, 
ut ei uiuat, inde sapiat, illo gaudeat tantoque bono sine morte sine errore sine molestia perfruatur, 
quis digne cogitare possit aut eloqui? 
125 CD 22.30. 
126  CD 22.1: …qui de mortali progenie merito iusteque damnata tantum populum gratia sua 
colligit, ut inde suppleat et instauret partem, quae lapsa est angelorum, ac sic illa dilecta et 
superna ciuitas non fraudetur suorum numero ciuium, quin etiam fortassis et uberiore laetetur. 
CD 11.13: Veritas quippe in euangelio sanctis fidelibusque promittit, quod erunt aequales angelis 
Dei. Cf. Matthew 22.30; Luke 20.36.  
127 CD 21.16: …hominem Christum Iesum, qui factus est particeps mortalitatis nostrae, ut nos 
participes faceret diuinitatis suae. Sermones nouissimi 6D (=23B).1: Parum tamen fuit Deo nostro 
promittere nobis in se diuinitatem, nisi et nostram susciperet infirmitatem, tamquam dicens: “Vis 
nosse quantum te diligam, quam certus esse debeas daturum me tibi diuinum meum?” Cf. CD 
14.13; De Trin. 10.5.7; 14.12.15; 2 Peter 1:4. 
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In his last two books of De civitate Dei, Augustine explores the nature of Hell and 
the punishment of the damned demons and humans. He poses the question of how 
the material fire of Hell could burn the wicked spirits as their deserved 
punishment. Following the scriptural teaching of “their worm shall not die, neither 
shall their fire be quenched” (Isaiah 66:24; Mark 9:43–48) in Hell, Augustine 
contemplates whether “fire” and “worm” pertain to the suffering of body: 
But some wish to say that these words—that is, “fire” and “worm”—pertain to the 
punishment of the soul, not the body…Others, however, are in no doubt that both body 
and soul will suffer pain in that future punishment; and these affirm that the body will be 
burned with fire, while the soul is to be, as it were, gnawed by the worm of anguish. This 
is a more appropriate suggestion, for it is clearly absurd to suppose that in that state either 
body or soul will be free from pain. For my own part, however, I find it easier to say that 
“fire” and “worm” both pertain to the body than to suppose that neither does.128  
Responding to the argument that only the soul will suffer, Augustine maintains 
that the punishment in Hell will involve both the body and the mind by the “lake 
of fire and brimstone” (stagnum ignis et sulphuris); this fire, he explains, is 
material (corporeus ignis erit).129 The corporeal interpretation of the fire is based 
on Augustine’s speculation on the human state in Hell, which contains both the 
body and the spirit: “the spirits of men are certainly incorporeal; yet they are now 
enclosed within the material members of the body, and in the world to come they 
will again be indissolubly joined to their own bodies”.130 Consequently, Augustine 
holds that the pain of burning will not only pertain to the spirits, but also to the 
bodies of the condemned demons and men.  
 Responding to the assertion that demons might only have spirits, not 
bodies, Augustine contends that the material flame could torment the incorporeal 
soul of demons in an ineffable and wondrous way.131 He explains that during this 
burning, the material fire cannot be animated (inspirentur) and the afflicted object 
                                                 
128 CD 21.9: Utrumque autem horum, ignem scilicet atque uermem, qui uolunt ad animi poenas, 
non ad corporis pertinere…qui uero poenas et animi et corporis in illo supplicio futuras esse non 
dubitant, igne uri corpus, animum autem rodi quodam modo uerme maeroris adfirmant. Quod etsi 
credibilius dicitur, quia utique absurdum est, ibi dolorem aut corporis aut animi defuturum: ego 
tamen facilius est ut ad corpus dicam utrumque pertinere quam neutrum. 
129 CD 21.10: At uero gehenna illa, quod etiam stagnum ignis et sulphuris dictum est, corporeus 
ignis erit et cruciabit corpora damnatorum, aut et hominum et daemonum. 
130 CD 21.10: …si spiritus hominum, etiam ipsi profecto incorporei, et nunc potuerunt includi 
corporalibus membris et tunc poterunt corporum suorum uinculis insolubiliter alligari. 
131 CD 21.10: Adhaerebunt ergo, si eis nulla sunt corpora, spiritus daemonum, immo spiritus 
daemones, licet incorporei corporeis ignibus cruciandi. 
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is only the spirit of the demons; this mode of suffering, he emphasises, is beyond 
our understanding, though similar to the awareness of the body by the soul.132 
However, to elaborate on the notion that spirits without bodies can be burned, 
Augustine describes the suffering of the soul before resurrection. By introducing 
the story of the rich man who cried, “I am tormented in this flame” (Luke 16:24), 
Augustine attests that “the flames in which the rich man burned and the drop of 
water which he sought were incorporeal: they were like the visions of those who 
sleep or those in a trance, to whom incorporeal things appear in corporeal 
form”.133 This example influenced the later doctrine of purgatory that shares a 
similar interpretation of the flames.134 Nevertheless, Augustine emphasises that 
demons and their followers will be eternally tormented.135 
 It is clear that the suffering in Hell involves both the body and the soul and 
that it applies even if demons have no bodies. Emotions such as grief, anguish, 
and torment are not metaphorical in this condition, but present the real misery of 
deserved eternal condemnation. It is evident that the Heavenly spiritual life 
involves no fluctuations of the soul that are typical of passions, nor any negative 
feeling qualities, whereas passions will exist in Hell as sufferings to punish 
unclean rational beings. Freedom from the human life of passions therefore 
becomes a vital part of the divine plan of salvation to deliver sinners to a blessed 
eternal life and to attain divinity in the Kingdom of God. This raises the 
interesting question that if the punishment of bad angels is due to their desire to be 
God, but the salvation of humans is aimed at bestowing divinity to them, how will 
humans come to participate in the divine life? Let us now proceed to examine 
Augustine’s approach to the deification of believers and their emotions. 
 
5.5. Becoming gods (dii) and the Fruition of God in Heaven 
                                                 
132 CD 21.10: …non ut ignes ipsi, quibus adhaerebunt, eorum iunctura inspirentur et animalia 
fiant, quae constent spiritu et corpore, sed, ut dixi, miris et ineffabilibus modis adhaerendo, 
accipientes ex ignibus poenam, non dantes ignibus uitam. 
133 CD 21.10: Sic ergo incorporalis et illa flamma qua exarsit et illa guttula quam poposcit, qualia 
sunt etiam uisa dormientium siue in ecstasi cernentium res incorporales, habentes tamen 
similitudinem corporum. 
134 Isabel Moreira, Heaven’s Purge: Purgatory in Late Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 34-36. For Augustine’s discussions on purgatory, see ench. 18.69; 29.109; Gn. adv. Man. 
2.20.30; En. Ps. 37.3; Serm. 159.1; 172.2; CD 21.13; 21.16; 21.24; 21.26. 
135 CD 21.10; 21.23. 
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A collection of twenty-six lost sermons by Augustine, the “Dolbeau sermons”, 
were discovered in 1990.136  One of them, Sermon 23B (Dolbeau 6), explains 
Augustine’s idea of deification. This sermon, which is dated at the intersection of 
the year 403–404,137 records Augustine’s preaching of “becoming gods” to his 
congregation in Carthage. He begins as follows:  
…we look forward to divinity. For God wishes not only to vivify, but also deify us…Still, 
it was not enough for our God to promise us divinity in himself, unless he also took on 
our infirmity, as though to say, “Do you want to know how much I love you, how certain 
you ought to be that I am going to give you my divine reality? I took to myself your 
mortal reality.” We mustn’t find it incredible, brothers and sisters, that human beings 
become gods, that is, that those who were human beings become gods. More incredible 
still is what has already been bestowed on us, that one who was God should become a 
human being. And indeed we believe that that has already happened, while we wait for 
the other thing to happen in the future. The Son of God became a son of man, in order to 
make sons of men into sons of God.138  
The theme of attaining divinity and becoming gods is anchored in following the 
biblical statements: “you may be partakers of the divine nature” (2 Peter 1:4) and 
“You are gods” (John 10:34; Psalm 82:6). Instead of referring to a human 
initiative, Augustine contends that salvation is brought by the real benefactor, 
God, who deifies men. The promise of this deification is through the incarnation 
of the Son of God. Using the popular exchange (commutatio) formula of the 
patristic period, Augustine inquires if the Son of God by nature became a man, 
                                                 
136 A manuscript of these sermons was accidentally found by François Dolbeau in the library of 
Mainz in 1990. The sermons are dated at two periods, the late spring of 397 and the early spring of 
404. For more details, see Brown 2000, 443–444; David Vincent Meconi, S.J., “Augustine’s 
Doctrine of Deification”, in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine (second edition), ed. David 
Vincent Meconi and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014a), 216. 
137 Brown 2000, 443; Meconi 2014a, 216. 
138 Sermones nouissimi 23B. 1: …exspectamus diuinitatem. Vult enim Deus non solum uiuificare, 
sed etiam deificare nos…Parum tamen fuit Deo nostro promittere nobis in se diuinitatem, nisi et 
nostram susciperet infirmitatem, tamquam dicens: “Vis nosse quantum te diligam, quam certus 
esse debeas daturum me tibi diuinum meum? Accepi mortale tuum.” Non nobis uideatur 
incredibile, fratres, deos fieri homines, id est qui homines erant dii fiant. Incredibilius est quod 
iam nobis praestitum est, ut qui Deus erat homo fieret. Et illud quidem iam factum credimus, 
alterum futurum exspectamus. Filius Dei factus est filius hominis, ut filios hominum faceret filios 
Dei. Cf. Meconi 2014a, 216. The English citations of the sermon 23B in this Chapter are obtained 
from Hill’s translation. See Newly Discovered Sermons III/11, transl. Edmund Hill, ed. John E. 
Rotelle (Hyde Park, New York: New City Press, 1997). 
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would men by nature be made the sons of God?139 He formulates this as “the Son 
of God became a son of man, in order to make sons of men into sons of God” 
(Filius Dei factus est filius hominis, ut filios hominum faceret filios Dei) as well as 
“To make gods those who were men, He was made man who was God” (Deos 
facturus qui homines erant, homo factus est qui Deus erat).140 This involves three 
related issues. Firstly, what is the ontological relation between the status of God 
and the gods that humans are becoming? Are they equal in the divine life? 
Secondly, how are the new sons of God related to Christ, the Son of God? 
Thirdly, what is the relation between the deified spirit of humans and the Holy 
Spirit? 
 
The relation between God and the gods 
According to Augustine, the concept of gods in the pagan worship and in the 
Christian context should be kept separate, since the former refers to gods that are 
made by humans and the latter refers to the gods whom God makes Himself.141 
Making idol “gods”, Augustine remarks, will hinder believers from becoming 
gods because they have thus turned away from the true One.142 Moreover, they do 
not truly make gods but merely attach a divine name to materials such as gold or 
stone.143 It is thus an insult for these people to appeal to these idols rather than the 
                                                 
139 See De Trin. 13.9.12: Si enim natura Dei Filius propter filios hominum misericordia factus est 
hominis filius (hoc est enim, Uerbum caro factum est et habitauit in hominibus), quanto est 
credibilius natura filios hominis gratia Dei fieri Dei filios et habitare in Deo in quo solo et de quo 
solo esse possint beati participes immortalitatis eius effecti, propter quod persuadendum Dei 
Filius particeps nostrae mortalitatis effectus est? Cf. CD 21.15. The exchange formula was 
popular in the patristic time. Following Irenaeus’s statement of “factus est quod sumus nos, uti nos 
perficeret esse quod et ipse” (Adversus Haereses 5, Praef.), Athanasius states in his De 
Incarnatione 54: “Αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐνηνθρώπησεν, ἵνα ἡμεῖς θεοποιηθῶμεν”. A similar formulation also 
appears in the works of Alexandrian Fathers such as Clement, Origen, and Cyril of Alexandria as 
well as Cappadocian Fathers such as Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa. See 
Norman Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 164–234; Michael J. Christensen and Jeffery A. Wittung (ed.), Partakers 
of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions 
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2008), 95–114.  
140 Meconi 2014a, 214; Gerald Bonner, Freedom and Necessity: St. Augustine’s Teaching on 
Divine Power and Human Freedom (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 
2007), 62. 
141 For the distinction of the concept of dii in the pagan and Christian understandings, also see 
Meconi 2014a, 216–217. 
142 Sermones nouissimi 23B. 3: Vos adoratis Deum, qui uos facit deos; illi autem adorant deos, 
quos faciendo et adorando perdunt ut ipsi dii fiant, faciendo falsos cadunt a uero. 
143 Sermones nouissimi 23B. 3: Cui diuinum nomen imponis, uocabitur deus; erit autem uel lignum 
uel lapis uel aurum, uel quidquid aliud est. 
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Highest being, as it reduces a human’s inner self (homo interior) to lower 
unintelligent things, such as stones. “How can human beings become like dumb 
idols?”144 Augustine answers: 
Well, according to this likeness which we are suggesting, if the inner self becomes 
somehow or other insensitive, stupid, he becomes in a certain manner like an idol, and 
having ruined in himself the image of the one by whom he was made, he wishes to take 
on the image of the one which he has made.145 
Augustine notes further that when one adores these numb and lifeless idols, they 
are actually admiring demons, since the pagan worshipers would claim that they 
do not appeal to the outward forms, but to the spirit of their gods.146 Augustine 
reminds hearers to pay attention to certain biblical texts such as “All the gods of 
the nations are demons, while it is the Lord who made the heavens” (Psalm 96:5) 
and “What the nations sacrifice, they sacrifice to demons and not to God. I do not 
wish you to become the associates of demons” (1 Cor. 10:20).147 These “gods”, 
Augustine warns, are not actually idols, but demons who will induce believers 
into the eternal fire.148 These unclean spirits deceive humans to worship them as 
gods in order to block their approach toward the Blessed City.149 The ulterior 
motives of these demons are their desire to be gods and their begrudging humans’ 
eternal felicity. The demons incite God’s wrath and damnation, and for them, God 
is a source of terror.150 
                                                 
144 Sermones nouissimi 23B. 5: Vnde similes possunt fieri homines mutis simulacris? 
145 Sermones nouissimi 23B. 5: Sed secundum istam similitudinem quam commendamus: si fiat 
insensatus quodammodo homo interior, fit ad quendam modum similis simulacro et, perdita in se 
imagine eius a quo factus est, eius quem fecit uult capere imaginem. 
146 Sermones nouissimi 23B. 8. 
147 Sermones nouissimi 23B. 9: “Omnes dii gentium daemonia, Dominus autem caelos fecit”… 
“Quae immolant gentes, daemoniis immolant et non Deo. Nolo uos socios fieri daemoniorum”. 
Cf. CD 1.29. 
148 Sermones nouissimi 23B. 9: Non ait: “Nolo uos fieri socios idolorum”…Adtendite enim, fratres, 
quid dicam. Socius esse idoli, etsi uelis, non potes; socius autem daemoniorum, si uelis, eris, si 
nolis, non eris. Omnibus enim sociis diaboli et angelorum eius in fine dicetur: Ite in ignem 
aeternum, qui paratus est diabolo et angelis eius. 
149  CD 2.29:…isti daemones, quos adhuc deos putas, omni generi hominum sedes inuident 
sempiternas…patere asseri libertatem tuam aduersus inmundos spiritus, qui tuis ceruicibus 
inposuerant sacrandam sibi et celebrandam ignominiam suam. 
150 En. Ps. 49.2: …et dii qui non sunt dii, quibus ille Deus deorum terribilis est. Dicit enim alius 
psalmus: Terribilis est super omnes deos. Et quasi quaereres: quos deos? Quoniam omnes dii 
gentium daemonia. Diis gentium, daemoniis terribilis. For Augustine’s view of demons, see 
Frederick Van Fleteren, “Demons”, in Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. 
Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1999), 266–268. 
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Augustine explains that while God hates the self-deifying spirits, He loves 
those whom He deifies.151 This account provides a vivid picture for discerning the 
identities of gods (dii) and God (Deus). In Augustine’s opinion, the dividing line 
between the Creator and the creation should not be blurred. He emphasises that 
the deified gods are “not gods by nature but by adoption, by grace” (non natura 
deorum, sed adoptione, sed gratia),152 “We are like God, but not equal to Him” 
(nos enim similes, non aequales)153 and “God called human beings ‘gods’ in the 
sense that they were deified by his grace, not because they were born of his own 
substance”154. “By adoption” and “by grace” refer to the difference between the 
nature of dii and Deus, even though humans will receive immortality and share 
divinity in the inner life of God.155 Augustine regards the deification of humans as 
a process from the unlikeness to the likeness of God. This process is described as 
a movement toward the perfect form, although the destination is the perfect image 
of God rather than equality to Him.156 Then humans as the image of God will be 
fully renewed and included in the relation of the “full likeness” in the vision of 
“face to face”. Augustine states that “the full likeness to God will then be realised 
in this image of God when it shall receive the full vision of Him”.157  
 Thus, desiring to become god in a sinful way and becoming gods through 
grace and participation are two distinct modes of relation between God and the 
gods in which Augustine carefully draws the line between the Creator and the 
deified gods. Augustine cautions against any desire to be equal to God, as he 
considers it to be the wrong approach to deification; instead, to be “like God” by 
                                                 
151 En. Ps. 49.2: diis a se factis, filiis amabilis. 
152 Sermones nouissimi 23B. 2. 
153 En. Ps. 49.2. 
154 En. Ps. 49.2: …quia homines dixit deos, ex gratia sua deificatos, non de substantia sua natos. 
155 Augustine maintains that the Heavenly human citizens will attain the divine life by grace, but 
their nature cannot be made equal to the Creator, as explained in De Trin. 15.23.43: “And when 
they shall be cured of every infirmity and shall be mutually equal, even then that thing, which 
through grace shall not be changed, will not be made equal to the thing that is unchangeable in its 
nature, because the creature is not equal to the Creator, and will undergo a change when it shall be 
cured of every infirmity”. Cf. De Trin. 13.9.12. 
156 De Trin. 15.16.26: …formata erit creatura quae formabilis fuit ut nihil iam desit eius formae ad 
quam peruenire deberet; sed tamen coaequanda non erit illi simplicitati ubi non formabile aliquid 
formatum uel reformatum est sed forma. 
157 De Trin. 14.18.24: Hinc apparet tunc in ista imagine Dei fieri eius plenam similitudinem 
quando eius plenam perceperit uisionem. Cf. De Trin. 15.11.21. 
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participation is what God wishes in His plan of creation.158 Augustine explains 
this further in his interpretation of Psalm 82:1: 
Our God, the true God, the one God, has stood up in the synagogue of gods, many of 
them of course, and gods not by nature but by adoption, by grace. There is a great 
difference between God who exists, God who is always God, true God, not only God but 
also deifying God; that is, if I may so put it, god-making God, God not made making 
gods, and gods who are made, but not by a craftsman.159  
 
The relation of the sons of God to the Son of God 
A fundamental issue in deification is the question of how the new sons of God are 
related to the Son of God. Following the exchange formula, Augustine argues in 
one of his sermons that “because he is also us…So we too are him” (Serm. 133.8: 
quia et nos ipse est…ergo et nos ipse). The idea of “we are Christ” (nos Christus 
essemus) occurs several times in his sermons, in which he conveys the relation 
between Christ and us through the notion of the whole Christ (totus Christus).160 
Augustine states in his Enarrationes in Psalmos: 
He is like a spotless lamb who redeemed us by his own spilt blood, uniting us into one 
body with himself and making us his members, so that in him we too are Christ…we are 
the body of Christ, being all anointed. In him all of us belong to Christ, but we are Christ 
too, because in some sense the whole Christ is Head and body. This anointing will make 
us spiritually perfect in the life which is promised to us.161 
Christ’s dwelling in us to make us live in Him and thus to attain spiritual 
perfection is the end of the salvation in Christ. The analogy of the head and body 
reveals the organic relationship between the Son of God and His members in the 
unity of Christ. Augustine does not use the “Christ-like” terminology here, but he 
                                                 
158  CD 22.30: Eritus sicut dii et recedentes a uero Deo, quo faciente dii essemus eius 
participatione, non desertione.  
159 Sermones nouissimi 23B. 2: Deus noster, Deus uerus, Deus unus stetit in synagoga deorum, 
utique multorum, non natura deorum, sed adoptione, sed gratia. Multum interest inter Deum 
exsistentem, Deum semper Deum, uerum Deum, non solum Deum, sed etiam deificatorem Deum, 
hoc est, ut ita dicam, deificum Deum, Deum non factum deos facientem, et deos qui fiunt, sed non 
a fabro. 
160 Meconi explains the concept of the totus Christus in Augustine’s theory of deification, which, 
he argues, conveys Augustine’s idea of union with Christ: “As ‘head’, Christ makes his body his 
very own, thereby forging union of mutual identification so real that therein, he becomes us and 
we become him”. Meconi 2014a, 223–224.  
161 En. Ps. 26 (2.2):…tamquam agnus immaculatus fuso sanguine suo redimens nos, concorporans 
nos sibi, faciens nos membra sua, ut in illo et nos christus essemus…inde autem apparet Christi 
corpus nos esse, quia omnes ungimur; et omnes in illo et Christi et Christus sumus, quia 
quodammodo totus Christus caput et corpus est. Unctio ista perficiet nos spiritaliter in illa uita, 
quae nobis promittitur. Cf. Meconi 2014a, 223–224. 
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says, “we are Christ”. This saying is applied to present-day life, referring to the 
community of believers, but it also pertains to the future divinised condition. As 
the body of Christ, the members will be gradually renewed and attain the final 
consummation in Him. Augustine asserts that in this sense, the title “Christ” refers 
to the unity of the head and body being anointed together.162 
This does not, however, imply that the adopted sons are equal to the Son 
of God because Augustine states: “we are not like God in the same way as the Son 
is, for He is of one nature with the Father from whom He is born; we are like God, 
but not equal to Him; the only Son is like Him because equal to Him”. 163 
Augustine employs the doctrine of the imago Dei in arguing that we are 
approaching the full image of God the Son and the full likeness of God (fieri Eius 
plenam similitudinem) at the moment of seeing God face-to-face.164 He states, 
“the likeness of the image that was made approaches, insofar as it can, to the 
likeness of the image that was begotten, whereby God the Son is proclaimed as 
substantially like the Father in all things…when the image, therefore, has been 
renewed by this transformation, and so brought to perfection, then we shall be like 
to God”.165 This likeness in the perfect state, Augustine explains, is the same 
image of Him, as stated in 2 Corinthians 3:18: “we might be transformed into the 
same image from glory to glory, as through the Spirit of the Lord”. 166  The 
difference between the likeness of the created image in humans and the likeness of 
the begotten image in Christ reveals the relation between the adopted sons and the 
                                                 
162 En. Ps. 26 (2.2): utroque munere unus Christus, et ideo Christus a Chrismate. Non solum autem 
caput nostrum unctum est, sed et corpus eius nos ipsi. 
163 En. Ps. 49.2: Non enim ita similes ut ille, qui hoc est quod ille a quo genitus est; nos enim 
similes, non aequales; ille quia aequalis, ideo similis. 
164 De Trin. 14.18.24: Hinc apparet tunc in ista imagine Dei fieri Eius plenam similitudinem 
quando Eius plenam perceperit uisionem, quamquam possit hoc a Iohanne Apostolo etiam de 
immortalitate corporis dictum uideri. As far as the immortality of the body is concerned, humans 
may become an image of the Son of God. See De Trin. 14.18.24: …quamquam possit hoc a 
Iohanne Apostolo etiam de immortalitate corporis dictum uideri. Et in hac quippe similes erimus 
Deo sed tantummodo Filio quia solus in Trinitate corpus accepit in quo mortuus resurrexit atque 
id ad superna peruexit. 
165 De Trin. 15.11.20–21: Sic accedit quantum potest ista similitudo imaginis factae ad illam 
similitudinem imaginis natae qua Deus Filius Patri per omnia substantialiter similis 
praedicatur…Cum ergo hac transformatione ad perfectum fuerit haec imago renouata similes Deo 
erimus. In this translation by McKenna and Matthews, I have made a slight change by replacing 
the word “born” with “begotten”.  
166  De Trin. 15.8.14; 15.11.20: …in eandem imaginem transformemur de gloria in gloriam 
tamquam a Domini Spiritu… 
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Son of God. We will attain the likeness of God as an image of Him when this 
image will be perfected in Heaven,167 but we cannot be equal to Him in substance.  
 
Eternal fruition of God in Heaven being filled with the Holy Spirit 
When interpreting the deification of Christians in Christ, Augustine concludes that 
they share one Spirit (unus Spiritus) with Him, since He breathed the Spirit on 
them (John 20:22).168 As love, the Spirit unites not only the Father and the Son, 
but also God and humans as well as the community of believers.169 Thus, by the 
indwelling of the Spirit, humans will attain spiritual perfection in Heaven. 
Augustine discusses the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in his Tractates on the First 
Letter of John (ca. 406–407): 
…“If we love one another, God abides in us and his love will be perfected in us.” Begin 
to love; you will be perfected. Have you begun to love? God has begun to dwell in you; 
love him who has begun to dwell in you that by indwelling more perfectly he may make 
you perfected…Ask your heart; if it is filled with love, you have the Spirit of God. How 
do we come to know that you come to know from that that the Spirit of God dwells in 
you? Ask Paul the Apostle: “Because the love of God has been poured forth in our hearts 
by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us.”170 [transl. Rettig] 
The basis for deified gods to attain the divine spiritual life is being filled by the 
Spirit. As the image of the Son of God, all adopted children will receive the same 
Spirit in Him, by which the old corrupted soul will be healed and perfected with 
no more fluctuations in Heaven. The fruition of God will be the fulfilment of the 
salvation of humans from experiencing evil emotions. At this moment, the deified 
gods will participate in the inner divine life by the love bond of the Holy Spirit, 
which is the perfect union of divine persons and deified human beings. While 
Augustine comments on the perfect union in Heaven, he also emphasises the 
                                                 
167 De Trin. 14.18.24: Hinc apparet tunc in ista imagine Dei fieri Eius plenam similitudinem 
quando Eius plenam perceperit uisionem. 
168 De Trin. 6.5.7: Nos autem ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso beati quia ipsius munere inter nos 
unum; cum illo autem unus Spiritus quia agglutinatur anima nostra post eum. Ep. Io. 8.12: In hoc 
cognoscimus quia in ipso manemus et ipse in nobis, quia de Spiritu suo dedit nobis…Quia hoc ipse 
Iohannes dixit: quia de Spiritu suo dedit nobis. 
169 See Meconi 2014a, 221–222. 
170 Ep. Io. 8.12: Si diligamus inuicem, Deus in nobis manebit et dilectio eius erit perfecta in nobis. 
Incipe diligere; perficieris. Coepisti diligere? coepit in te Deus habitare. Ama eum qui in te coepit 
habitare ut perfectius habitando faciat te perfectum…interroga uiscera tua. Si plena sunt caritate, 
habes spiritum dei. Unde cognoscimus quia inde cognoscis habitare in te Spiritum Dei? Paulum 
interroga apostolum: Quoniam caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum 
qui datus est nobis. Cf. Meconi 2014a, 222. 
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degrees of indwelling of the Spirit and new love in the believers in the present 
life.171 
 Augustine highlights the difference in how the Spirit exists in the Trinity 
and in the deified gods. In the Trinity, the Spirit is equal to the Father and the Son 
in essence as well as the unity of these three persons together.172 Furthermore, 
their communion is not through participation, but is essentially consubstantial and 
coeternal. 173  The Holy Spirit, as the love that binds the Father and the Son 
together, is the same substance and the uncreated God Himself. Yet the union of 
the deified gods with the Trinity in the divine spiritual life is through participation 
and adherence by grace, not through their own essence. Augustine compares these 
two distinct relations: “…in Him they [the Trinitarian persons] preserve the unity 
of spirit through the bond of peace, not by a participation but by their own 
essence, not by the gift of anyone superior to themselves but by their own gift. 
And we are commanded by grace to imitate the unity, both in our relations with 
God as well as among ourselves”.174 The immortality and the fruition of the divine 
“emotional” life of believers are due to their adherence to God and their being 
filled with the Spirit, not by a substitution of human nature with the ousia of God 
and thus being equal to the Holy Spirit. The deified gods are creatures who 
undergo a transformation rather than immutable beings with no beginning or end. 
Therefore, the fruition of God will be a perfect Spirit-filled state and an attainment 
of divine spiritual reality. 
 The theory of the divine adoption and the approach to the full likeness of 
God is evidence that Augustine’s vision of becoming gods is based on the 
doctrine of the imago Dei, with three important points. Firstly, those whom God 
deifies will be the sons of God. Their becoming gods occurs through participation 
                                                 
171 For progress, see De Trin. 14.17.23: In agnitione igitur Dei iustitiaque et sanctitate ueritatis qui 
de die in diem proficiendo renouatur transfert amorem a temporalibus ad aeterna, a uisibilibus ad 
intellegibilia, a carnalibus ad spiritalia, atque ab istis cupiditatem frenare atque minuere illisque 
se caritate alligare diligenter insistit. Tantum autem facit quantum diuinitus adiuuatur Dei quippe 
sententia est: Sine me nihil potestis facere. 
172 De Trin. 6.8: Cum itaque tantus est solus Pater uel solus Filius uel solus Spiritus Sanctus 
quantus est simul Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, nullo modo triplex dicendus est. 
173 De Trin. 6.5.7: Spiritus ergo sanctus commune aliquid est Patris et Filii, quidquid illud est, aut 
ipsa communio consubstantialis et coaeterna. 
174 De Trin. 6.5.7: …sint que non participatione sed essentia sua neque dono superioris alicuius 
sed suo proprio seruantes unitatem spiritus in uinculo pacis. Quod imitari per gratiam et ad Deum 
et ad nos ipsos iubemur. 
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by grace instead of the self-deification of the fallen spirits. Secondly, the final 
divinised state will be the perfect likeness of God as the perfection of the original 
created imago Dei. Therefore, the ontological gulf between dii and Deus will 
remain clear. Thirdly, human emotions will be transformed into spiritual 
perfection through the bond of the Holy Spirit. The participation in the triune 
spiritual life is the emotional orientation of ontologically dependent imago Dei. 
Augustine’s notion of becoming the full likeness of God has often been criticised 
by Orthodox theologians. Even though the newly discovered sermons of 
Augustine mentioned above were not available to the critics, it is useful to 
examine this discussion.  
 
5.6. Evaluation of Augustine’s Doctrine on the Deification of Emotions 
 
Some Orthodox theologians 175  have accused Augustine of being blind to the 
Greek patristic deification theory, as his major concern is the fulfilment of 
humanity rather than the genuine deificatory transformation of human beings. 
This is claimed to have led to the doctrinal breach between the West and the East. 
Some main evaluations in this approach are as follows. 
 Myrrha Lot-Borodine was a pioneer in addressing the Greek patristic 
theories of deification in the twentieth century.176 In La déification de l’homme, 
she argues that Augustine does not formulate a proper doctrine of deification. 
Commenting on Augustine’s approach, Lot-Borodine remarks that it is “toward 
beatitude, not deification”, since his orientation lies in the fulfilment of human 
nature and spirituality, without involving the thought of the genuine 
                                                 
175 Important figures in the patristic revival of the last century were Orthodoxy theologians such as 
Myrrha Lot-Borodine, Vladimir Lossky, and Georges Florovsky. They were protagonists in the 
neo-Palamite school and tried to revive the spiritual theology and deification doctrine of the Greek 
and Orthodoxy Fathers. For the background of this revival, see Andrew Louth, “The Patristic 
Revival and its Protagonists”, in The Cambridge Companion to Orthodox Christian Theology, ed., 
Mary B. Cunningham and Elizabeth Theokritoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
188–202; Jeffrey D. Finch, “Neo-Palamism, Divinizing Grace, and the Breach between East and 
West”, in Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the 
Christian Traditions, ed., Michael J. Christensen and Jeffery A. Wittung (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: Baker Academic, 2007), 233–249. 
176 For an introduction of Lot-Borodine’s role in the modern studies of the patristic doctrine of 
deification, see Heleen E. Zorgdrager, “A Practice of Love Myrrha Lot-Borodine (1882–1954) and 
the Modern Revival of the Doctrine of Deification”, in Journal of Eastern Christian Studies 64 
(2012), 288–290.  
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transformative divinisation of elevating human beings to the nature of God.177 
Lot-Borodine notes that Augustine adopts an apophatic reading to explore the 
essence of the Trinity. While carefully discerning the ontological demarcation 
between the Creator and the created, Augustine is unable to conceive of the 
“compénétration” (or “consubstantialité”) as a manner for humans to participate in 
divine nature. 178  For Lot-Borodine, the statement of “partaker in the divine 
nature” in 2 Peter 1:4 refers to becoming divine, but this deifying relationship 
with God does not undo the ontological gulf between the created and the 
uncreated in terms of essence; instead, it refers to the interpenetration between 
humanity and uncreated divine energies. This means that a distinction needs to be 
drawn between these two concepts, the essence and the energies of God.179 Lot-
Borodine maintains that in the spirit of Palamite theology, it is impossible to 
access the essence (ousia) of God, whereas the uncreated energies (“énergies”) are 
accessible and communicable. 180  This is due to the transcendence and 
incomprehensibility of God which is addressed in apophatic theology 
(“théognosie apophatique”).181 Thus, deification is referred to as a communion 
with the energies and light of God (“Voir la lumière, c’est voir Dieu”) rather than 
with the ousia of God. 182  According to Lot-Borodine, the Greek theological 
tradition makes the crucial distinction between the divine essence and its 
operations within the nature of the deity, but this is not found in the Western 
                                                 
177 Myrrha Lot-Borodine, La déification de l’homme selon la doctrine des pères grecs (Paris: 
Editions du Cerf, 1970), 39–40. Lot-Borodine’s works are in French; for the English interpretation 
of her works, see Mary N. R. Marrocco, Participation in the Divine Life in St. Augustine’s De 
Trinitate and Selected Contemporary Homiletic Discourses (Toronto: Ph.D. Dissertation, 2000), 
15-16; Paul M. Collins, Partaking in Divine Nature: Deification and Communion (London: 
Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2010), 69–73; Zorgdrager 2012, 287–307. 
178 Lot-Borodine 1970, 37 and 40. Cf. Marrocco 2000, 15–16; Zorgdrager 2012, 296. 
179 Lot-Borodine 1970, 29; Zorgdrager 2012, 295 and n. 30. 
180 Myrrha Lot-Borodine, “La doctrine de la déification dans l’Église Grecque jusqu’au XI siècle”, 
in Revue de l’histoire des religions (Paris: Librairie Ernest Leroux, 1933), 42–43; Cf. Lot-
Borodine 1970, 35–36; Marrocco 2000, 16 and n. 26. For Palamas’s theory and the tradition of 
Orthodox theology, see Augustine Casiday, “Church Fathers and the Shaping of Orthodox 
theology”, in The Cambridge Companion to Orthodox Christian Theology, ed., Mary B. 
Cunningham and Elizabeth Theokritoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 167–
187. For Palamism in Lot-Borodine, see Louth 2008, 192–193. 
181 Zorgdrager notes that Lot-Borodine’s use of “théognosie apophatique” is taken from Clement 
of Alexandria. See Zorgdrager 2012, 295. 
182 Lot-Borodine 1970, 169; Zorgdrager 2012, 305. 
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thought influenced by Augustine.183 In fact, a gulf between East and West on the 
matter of divinisation is evident in the absence of the doctrine of interpenetration 
and the distinction between essence and energies in the Latin theology (especially 
in Augustine).184  
 This negative attitude toward Augustine and the Latin doctrine of 
deification is repeated by other Neo-Palamite authors, such as Vladimir Lossky, 
Georges Florovsky, and John Meyendorff, who draw on the spiritual theology of 
Maximus Confessor and the mystical theology of Simeon “the New Theologian” 
and Palamas. These authors emphasise that God is unknown (apophatic) in His 
essence, but is recognised in His energies, and that salvation is a deificatory 
transformation through a participation in divine energies. Lossky asserts that 
while Augustine also appeals to the path of negations in speaking about God, the 
issue is that the apophatic approach is unable to reach an infinite being. 185 
Explaining Augustine’s description of the fleeting contact of the soul with eternal 
wisdom (or “ecstacy of Ostia”) in Conf. 9.4.10, Lossky remarks, “the whole 
question of St. Augustine’s mysticism depends on the interpretation of this 
‘contact’. But he does not define its nature”.186  According Lossky, failing to 
distinguish between the essence and the energies of God makes it impossible to 
understand the meaning of deification;187 it appears paradoxical that while God is 
ineffable and inaccessible, the divinisation implies an access to the nature of God. 
Thus, the deity is incommunicable and yet communicable and God is “both totally 
inaccessible and at the same time accessible”. 188  Although God’s essence is 
                                                 
183  Lot-Borodine 1970, 36; Cf. Finch 2007, 240–241. Zorgdrager notes that Lot-Borodine’s 
position is primarily influenced by Gregory of Palamas. In addition, she is also inspired by Basil, 
Gregory of Nyssa, Denys the Areopagite, and Maximus Confessor who made the distinction 
between the divine essence and energies with various expressions. See Zorgdrager 2012, 295; 305. 
184 Lot-Borodine 1970, 39–40. Zorgdrager explains that “Lot-Borodine comments that at this point 
[Augustine’s fails to understand the vision of ‘mutual permeation of the divine and human nature’] 
the bridges between East and West were already broken down, long before the official schism”. 
Zorgdrager 2012, 296; Cf. Marrocco 2000, 15–16; Finch 2007, 240; Meconi 2014, 209; Collins 
2010, 69. 
185 Vladimir Lossky, “Elements of ‘Negative Theology’ in the Thought of St. Augustine”, in St. 
Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 21 (1977), 73–74. 
186 Lossky 1977, 74. 
187 Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (London: James Clarke, 1957), 
69-71; Vladimir Kharlamov, “Basil of Caesarea and the Cappadocians on the Distinction between 
Essence and Energies in God and Its Relevance to the Deification Theme”, in Theōsis: Deification 
in Christian Theology (Volume II), ed., Vladimir Kharlamov (London: James Clarke, 2012), 102. 
188 Lossky 1957, 69–70. 
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transcendent and inaccessible, His grace of energies is accessible and 
communicable, and this makes deification possible. Lossky explains this 
theological doctrine in his Mystical Theology: 
The divine nature must be said to be at the same time both exclusive of, and, in some 
sense, open to participation. We attain to participation in the divine nature, and yet at the 
same time it remains totally inaccessible. We need to affirm both at the same time and to 
preserve the antinomy as a criterion of right devotion…even in the very least degree, we 
should not at the moment be what we are, we should be God by nature…God, therefore, 
is and remains inaccessible to us in His essence…This distinction is that between the 
essence of God, or His nature, properly co-called, which is inaccessible, unknowable and 
incommunicable; and the energies or divine operations, forces proper to and inseparable 
from God’s essence, in which He goes forth from Himself, manifests, communications, 
and gives Himself.189  
Deification, for Lossky, refers to a union with God’s essence through its uncreated 
operations or energies so that the deified realisation of attaining the deity is 
real.190 In this sense, Lossky complains that Augustine’s static interpretation of 
the divine nature as immutable, indivisible, incomprehensible, and inaccessible 
can only block the human approach to the inner life of the Godhead and turn the 
divine promise of participation in divine nature into an illusion.191 
In line with the neo-Palamite school, Christos Yannaras and Philip 
Sherrard claim that the inability to recognise the essence-energy distinction and 
their homogeneous nature in divinity is a serious shortcoming in Augustine and 
the Latin theology. Yannaras warns that if one does not make a distinction 
between essence and energy in divinity, but mistakenly regards “energy” as 
“heteroessential”, that is, a created result of the divine cause, this implies that “the 
theosis of man, his participation in the divine life, becomes impossible”. 192 
Yannaras further claims that the Western doctrine of deification is misled by the 
                                                 
189 Lossky 1957, 69–70. Lossky’s understanding of divinised participation in the nature of God is 
also explained by Jeffrey D. Finch in his “Neo-Palamism, Divinizing Grace, and the Breach 
between East and West”, see Finch 2007, 234 and 245 (n. 5). 
190 By referring to St. Palamas, Lossky states: “‘The divine and deifying illumination and grace is 
not the essence but the energy of God’, a ‘divine power and energy common to the nature in 
three’. Thus, according to St. Gregory Palamas, ‘to say that the divine nature is communicable not 
in itself but through its energy, is to remain within the bounds of right devotion’”. Lossky 1957, 
70.  
191 Lossky 1957, 70, 95 and 96. Cf. Finch 2007, 236–237. 
192 Christos Yannaras, “The Distinction between Essence and Energies and Its Importance for 
Theology”, in St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 19 (1975), 242–243; Cf. Finch 2007, 234. 
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logic of “whatever is not essence does not belong to God”, which excludes the 
divinising grace of energies and powers of God from uncreated nature.193 This 
weakness in the Latin theology, influenced by Augustine, entails its break with 
Orthodox theology. 194  Philip Sherrard concurs that Augustine’s inability to 
conceive of possessing the nature of God by the uncreated grace of energies is due 
to his vision of God as an “absolute simplicity and indivisibility”.195 Sherrard 
maintains that Augustine’s ideal state of a soul in union with the essence of God is 
not “the deiform νουϛ”, for a human soul cannot attain the transcendent divine 
essence. 196  Sherrard notes that the failure of Augustine’s theory to admit the 
distinction of the essence and the uncreated energies, causes the soul to “remain 
separate from it [the Godhead], and outside it, and in no way becomes its own 
nature”. 197  Thus, Augustine’s proposal of deification is to be “untransformed 
through participation in the spiritual knowledge of the intellect”, which is a matter 
of human beatitude rather than the deified realisation of attaining the deity.198 
Sherrard levels a more critical viewpoint when he argues that Augustine’s 
approach is “tantamount to condemning man to a state of insurmountable 
ignorance concerning his life and destiny, and hence open the door to all manner 
of doubts”.199  
Jaroslav Pelikan supports a more inclusive attitude toward the different 
interpretations of deification in Augustinian and Orthodoxy theology in his work 
                                                 
193 Yannaras 1975, 242–243; Cf. Finch 2007, 234.  
194 “The problem of the distinction between essence and energies determined definitely and finally 
the differentiation of the Latin West from the Orthodox East”. Yannaras 1975, 242. Vladimir 
Kharlamov explains that “The problem, according to Yannaras, is even worse than that. The 
inability of the West, mislead by Augustine (and subsequently by Scholasticism), to recognize this 
distinction helped to plant heresy, atheism, and rationalism in the West”. Kharlamov 2012, 103. 
195 “For this deification proceeds from God and from man’s direct intuition of His transfiguring 
light. In that light, man knows, in an absolute sense, both his own divine cause, and the causal 
energies of all created things. If, therefore, either the immanence of God in man, or the possession 
by man of such a faculty as that indicated, is denied, then the realization in question will be 
regarded as impossible…Yet precisely the possibility of this realization was, if not denied, at least 
obscured by the main conceptions of much Latin theology, particularly in its Augustinian and 
Thomist forms…[For Augustine] The Being of God is therefore of an absolute simplicity and 
indivisibility, and any qualities or properties attributed to God, such as those St. Augustine calls 
the ‘principal forms, or stable and immutable essences of things’, and the Fathers His uncreated 
powers and energies, must be indistinguishably identified with His Being…But here precisely one 
comes up against a difficulty”. Philip Sherrard, The Greek East and the Latin West: A Study in the 
Christian Tradition (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 141–143.  
196 Sherrard 1959, 143. 
197 Sherrard 1959, 143–144. 
198 Sherrard 1959, 152. 
199 Sherrard 1959, 155. 
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The Spirit of Eastern Christendom. Pelikan discusses the doctrinal background of 
the theologians in the setting of the theosis in the Byzantine Orthodoxy.200 He 
notes that a divergence indeed occurs between their understanding of deification 
and Augustinian interpretations, but it rather reflects different definitions of 
Christianity. 201  An attractive point of the Byzantine account of deification is 
becoming God through a mystical union. For instance, Simeon describes a vision 
of God who tells him: “Yes, I am God, the one who became man for your sake. 
And behold, I have created you, as you see, and I shall make you God” (Ethical 
Orations 5).202 In interpreting how to participate in divine nature, Simeon and 
Palamas employ three themes of the Eastern spiritual theology, “theology as 
apophaticism, revelation as light, and salvation as deification”.203  These three 
aspects are interrelated: according to the apophatic theology, God is transcendent 
and inaccessible; the path toward the vision of God is found through participating 
in the shining of the true light which is God Himself; 204  and the divine in 
deification is not symbolic but the reality of salvation. Following these 
formulations, Pelikan concludes that Palamas wisely interprets the deification: 
“the deifying gift of the Spirit is not the superessential ousia of God, but the 
deifying activity of the superessential ousia of God”.205 This distinction between 
ousia and actions in the Godhead forms the basic characteristic in the Eastern 
approach of deifying salvation that leads to the break with Augustinian and 
Western doctrines.206 
                                                 
200 See Jaroslav Pelikan, “The Last Flowering of Byzantine Orthodoxy”, in The Spirit of Eastern 
Christendom (600–1700) (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), 252–
298. 
201  “The divergences between the Eastern and Augustinian definitions of Christianity were 
expressed in connection with this doctrine of deification”. Pelikan 1974, 260. 
202 Pelikan 1974, 260. Pelikan also exemplifies two other cases in Ethical Orations 1.10, where 
Simeon interprets deification by using the exchange formula [συνάλλαγμα]: “Christ had received 
his flesh from his mother and had conferred divinity on her in return; on the other hand, he did not 
receive flesh from the saints but conferred upon them his own deified flesh instead”. Ibid., 260. 
203 Pelikan 1974, 264. 
204 “The way to acquire the vision of God was through acts of thanksgiving and love…There was 
no other way for anyone to come to know God except by the vision of this true light. The supreme 
manifestation of the light on earth was the transfiguration of Christ, when ‘his face shone like the 
sun, and his garments became white as light.’ What shone here was ‘the light of deity’ rather than 
a sign or symbol”. Pelikan 1974, 260–261. 
205 Gregory Palamas, Triads 3.1.34. Pelikan 1974, 267. 
206 Pelikan 1974, 269–280. 
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Let us take a look at some formulations of “becoming God” in the Eastern 
Church Fathers that the Neo-Palamite theologians rely on. Irenaeus and 
Athanasius are two precursors who use this formula. Irenaeus declares that the 
Word of God “became what we are in order to make us what he is” (factus est 
quod sumus nos, uti nos perficeret esse quod et ipse).207 Athanasius states that 
“God became man so that man might become God” (Αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐνηνθρώπησεν, 
ἵνα ἡμεῖς θεοποιηθῶμεν). 208  Cappadocian Fathers, such as Basil of Caesarea, 
write that when the Holy Spirit dwells in the soul of the Heavenly citizens, they 
will “become like God, and, the highest of all desires, becoming God”. 209 
Maximus the Confessor similarly states that the incarnation “makes God a man by 
the deification of the man, and man a God by the humanization of God” and “Man 
becomes God to the extent that God becomes man, for man is elevated by the 
divine ascension to the same degree that God is overcome by His love of men in 
descending without change to the last extremities of our nature”.210 The issue at 
point concerns the sense and manner in which humans will be deified.   
To avoid the full identity between God and man, Maximus emphasises that 
“All that God is, except for an identity in ousia, one becomes when one is deified 
by grace”. 211  In line with Maximus’s teaching, the Palamite essence-energy 
                                                 
207 John Kaufman offers the English translation of Irenaeus’s Latin text (Adversus Haereses 5, 
Praef.) as follows: “the only sure and true Teacher, the Word of God, Jesus Christ our lord, who 
because of his immeasurable love became what we are in order to make us what he is”. Kaufman 
presents a systematic survey on the deification ideas in Irenaeus, attesting that the Latin term 
perficere (to complete, perfect) in the above quotation reveals that man will become the Son who 
is “God”. See John Kaufman, Becoming Divine, Becoming Human: Deification Themes in 
Irenaeus of Lyons (Oslo, MF Norwegian School of Theology: PhD Dissertation, 2009), 8 and n. 
27. 
208  The term “θεοποιηθῶμεν” has various translations, such as “we might become God” or 
“become divine/gods”, but in Athanasius’s context, these expressions refer to the same divinised 
matter. For various translation versions, see Kaufman 2009, 7 and n. 24–25. 
209 Basil of Caesarea, On the Holy Spirit 9.23: “When a sunbeam falls on a transparent substance, 
the substance itself becomes brilliant, and radiates light from itself. So too Spirit-bearing souls, 
illumined by Him, finally become spiritual themselves, and their grace is sent forth to others. From 
this comes knowledge of the future, understanding of mysteries, apprehension of hidden things, 
distribution of wonderful gifts, heavenly citizenship, a place in the choir of angels, endless joy in 
the presence of God, becoming like God, and, the highest of all desires, becoming God”. See 
Michael Christensen, “The Problem, Promise, and Process of Theosis”, in Partakers of the Divine 
Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions, ed., Michael J. 
Christensen and Jeffery A. Wittung (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2007), 23. 
Augustine Casiday translates the final sentence as: “…the being made like to God, and, highest of 
all, the being made God”, see Casiday 2008, 170. 
210 Maximus Confessor, Book of Ambiguities 60. See Sherrard 1959, 44. 
211  Maximus Confessor, Book of Ambiguities 41. Pelikan 1974, 267. Elizabeth Theokritoff 
comments, “Maximus speaks of deification as ‘being identical with God’- but he makes it clear 
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distinction indicates that “becoming God” does not mean being identical with 
God, thus increasing the “three hypostases” into “myriads of hypostases”, but 
rather sharing and acquiring the uncreated powers of God in divine nature. 
Through participating in these commutable divine energies, we unite with the 
Trinitarian persons. As Lossky argues, “we do not ourselves become the divine 
hypostasis of the Son by the fact of the Incarnation. We are unable, therefore, to 
participate in either the essence or the hypostases of the Holy Trinity”. 212 
Deification occurs through the energies and powers which are “common to the 
nature in Three [hypostases]”.213 Thus, the distinction between essence and energy 
and the thesis of uncreated grace in energies is the crux of the matter of theosis for 
Eastern theologians. Keeping in mind this distinction, let us turn to Augustine’s 
account of the “emotional” features of the citizens of Heaven in order to 
determine whether his vision is merely “untransformed” divinisation.  
 
Constant spiritual state by attaining the deity of eternality 
Augustine asserts that even though one can apply numerous attributes to God, 
such as “immortal, incorruptible, unchangeable, living, wise, powerful, beautiful, 
just, good, blessed, and spirit”, they could be reduced to only three (eternal, wise, 
and blessed) or even just one, for the nature of God is simple.214 God is the 
highest simplicity (summa simplicitas) as He told Moses, “I AM WHO I AM” 
(Exodus 3:14). 215  His non-temporal eternity, Augustine explains, is without 
beginning and without end (sine initio, sine fine)216, and it is compatible with 
other attributes, denoting the one and the same substance of God.217 Thus, the 
                                                                                                                                     
that this is an identity in every respect apart from essence”. Elizabeth Theokritoff, “Creator and 
creation”, in The Cambridge Companion to Orthodox Christian Theology, ed., Mary B. 
Cunningham and Elizabeth Theokritoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 67. 
212 Lossky 1957, 70. 
213 Ibid., 70. 
214  De Trin. 15.5.8–15.6.9: Proinde si dicamus: “aeternus, immortalis, incorruptibilis, 
immutabilis, uiuus, sapiens, potens, speciosus, iustus, bonus, beatus, spiritus” …Nam si una 
eadem que res in Dei natura potest esse sapientia et potentia aut uita et sapientia, cur non una 
eadem que res esse possit in Dei natura aeternitas et sapientia aut beatitudo et sapientia? 
215 De Trin. 6.5.7:…et si aequalis in omnibus aequalis propter summam simplicitatem quae in illa 
substantia est. 
216 De Trin. 15.5.7: Ipsa est etiam uera aeternitas qua est immutabilis Deus sine initio, sine fine, 
consequenter et incorruptibilis. 
217 De Trin. 15.6.9: Ac per hoc sicut nihil intererat utrum illa duodecim an ista tria diceremus 
quando illa multa in istam redegimus paucitatem, ita nihil interest utrum tria ista dicamus an illud 
unum in cuius singularitate duo cetera similiter redigi posse monstrauimus. Cf. De Trin. 15.5.8. 
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eternal nature of God is the highest and ineffable essence that only the Trinitarian 
persons can share.  
 As a deificatory gift in Heaven, the nature of “eternality” will be bestowed 
upon human citizens by the grace of God. In the new heaven and earth, Augustine 
anticipates, “There we shall rest and see, see and love, love and praise. Behold 
what will be, in the end to which there shall be no end!”218 Acquiring the quality 
of eternity is a prerequisite for deification, which denotes that humans will be 
separated from the old corruptible life and be granted the immortality of God. It is 
more than the fulfilment of humanity, referring to a real transformation. However, 
eternity for humans is not non-temporal as it is for divine persons, which is 
indicated by Augustine’s remarks on the mode of life of the resurrected persons in 
Heaven. Therefore, the transformation does not take place by becoming included 
in the divinity as is understood in Palamism. This divinised reality of eternal life 
is essentially distinguished from the previous human mortality and reflects the 
promise of God (2 Peter 1:4; Genesis 1:26–27; Genesis 3:5; Psalms 82:6; John 
10:34–35; Matthew 5:48; and 2 Corinthians 3:18). 219  In his Enarrationes in 
Psalmos 101.2.10, Augustine explains: 
God’s years will exist in us…In the same way that God himself will be in us…God’s 
years are not something different from God himself. God’s years are God’s eternity, and 
eternity is the very substance of God, in which there is no possibility of change.220 
The statement “God’s years will exist in us” connotes that humans will come to 
participate in the divine eternity. This provides them with immortality, “the end to 
which there shall be no end!”221 But it is not meant that sharing an unending life 
makes human eternity identical with that of the Trinitarian persons (hypostases) 
who are beyond time and create time. The adopted “gods” have experienced a past 
mortal lifetime before being divinised, and after adoption, the human mode of an 
unending life is to participate in the atemporal eternity insofar as it is possible for 
created beings who are not atemporal. Augustine does not explain the nature of 
                                                 
218 CD 22.30: Ibi uacabimus et uidebimus, uidebimus et amabimus, amabimus et laudabimus. Ecce 
quod erit in fine sine fine. 
219 For the Scriptural passages related to the promise of theosis, see Christensen 2007, 24. 
220 See also David Vincent Meconi, S.J., “Heaven and the ecclesia perfecta in Augustine”, in The 
Cambridge Companion to Augustine (second edition), ed. David Vincent Meconi and Eleonore 
Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014b), 253. 
221 CD 22.30. 
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this atemporal aspect of the life of resurrected persons. What remains particularly 
unclear is how the resurrected body functions. Augustine states: “When the body 
is made incorruptible, all the members and inward parts which we now see 
assigned to their various necessary offices will join together in praising God; for 
there will then be no necessity, but only full, certain, secure and everlasting 
felicity”.222 Augustine thinks that the central burden of an emotional life is one’s 
uncertainty of the future and that this uncertainty results in fear and changeable 
passions, disturbing one’s tranquility. These sources of emotional trouble 
disappear when one participates in divine eternity and when one has the 
unchanging divine matters as the continuous content of cognition in Heaven. 
Another factor of the freedom from passions is the improvement of the soul and 
the psychosomatic balance of the resurrected person.223  
 
The attainment of divine joy by the operations of the Holy Spirit 
The deified human beings will participate in the Trinitarian life through the bond 
of divine love, in which the Holy Spirit functions as the love that joins not only 
the Trinitarian persons but also humans.224 It is noteworthy that Augustine regards 
the gift of the Spirit and the Holy Spirit as a person of the Trinity as the same 
divinity. He states this principle clearly in De Trinitate 15.19.36: 
Since they already see that the Holy Spirit has been called the Gift of God, consequently, 
we must warn them that…the Gift of the Holy Spirit is nothing else than the Holy Spirit. 
He is, therefore, the Gift of God, inasmuch as He is given to those to whom He is 
given…Nor because they[the Trinity] give and He is given is He, therefore, less than 
they, for He is so given as the Gift of God that He also gives Himself as God. For it is 
impossible to say of Him that He is not the master of His own power…And in the 
writings of the Apostle which I have mentioned above: “And one and the same Spirit 
works, dividing what is proper to each one according as he will.” There is here no 
subordination of the Gift and no domination of the Givers, but the concord between the 
Gift and the Givers.225  
                                                 
222 CD 22.30: Omnia membra et uiscera incorruptibilis corporis, quae nunc uidemus per usus 
necessitatis uarios distributa, quoniam tunc non erit ipsa necessitas, sed plena certa, secura 
sempiterna felicitas, proficient laudibus Dei. 
223 For a discussion on the heavenly tranquility of the soul in Augustine, see King 2012a, 20–21.  
224 See section 5.5. 
225  De Trin. 15.19.36: Sane admonendi sunt quandoquidem Donum Dei iam uident dictum 
Spiritum Sanctum…Donum Spiritus Sancti nihil aliud est quam Spiritus Sanctus. In tantum ergo 
Donum Dei est in quantum datur eis quibus datur…Nec quia illi dant, ipse datur, ideo minor est 
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This same divinity ensures that when the Spirit works in a human soul, the soul is 
also made divine. Through this operation, which Augustine refers to as grace 
(gratia), the substance of humans will be “changed into something better” 
(mutatur in melius) when they become sons of God; God, on the other hand, 
becomes their Father without any change in His substance. 226  The adoptive 
children of God include both men and women who will retain their gender in the 
resurrection.227 For Augustine, the power (ops) that fills the renewed human heart 
is the Holy Spirit who is given to us.228 This means that we receive a supernatural 
influence that renews us toward perfection. Augustine emphasises the role of 
divine operations in the process of salvation and deification. In Confessions, he 
describes the ecstatic experience that he refers to as “the first fruits of the Spirit” 
(primitias Spiritus) as follows: 
Our minds were lifted up by an ardent affection towards eternal being itself. Step by step 
we climbed beyond all corporeal objects and the heaven itself, where sun, moon, and stars 
shed light on the earth…We moved up beyond them so as to attain to the region of 
inexhaustible abundance where you feed Israel eternally with truth for food…That is how 
it was when at that moment we extended our reach and in a flash of mental energy 
attained the eternal wisdom which abides beyond all things. If only it could last, and 
other visions of a vastly inferior kind could be withdrawn! Then this alone could ravish 
and absorb and enfold in inward joys the person granted the vision. So too eternal life is 
of the quality of that moment of understanding after which we sighed. Is not this the 
meaning of “Enter into the joy of your Lord”?229  
                                                                                                                                     
illis. Ita enim datur sicut Dei Donum ut etiam Se ipsum det sicut Deus. Non enim dici potest non 
esse suae potestatis de quo dictum est…et apud Apostolum quod iam supra commemoraui: Omnia 
autem haec operatur unus atque idem Spiritus diuidens propria unicuique prout uult. Non est illic 
conditio Dati et dominatio Dantium sed concordia Dati et Dantium. 
226 De Trin. 5.16.17: Sic et Pater noster esse incipit cum per Eius gratiam regeneramur quoniam 
dedit nobis potestatem filios Dei fieri. Substantia itaque nostra mutatur in melius cum filii Eius 
efficimur; simul et ille Pater noster esse incipit, sed nulla suae commutatione substantiae. 
227  CD 22.17: Sed mihi melius sapere uidentur, qui utrumque sexum resurrecturum esse non 
dubitant…Qui ergo utrumque sexum instituit, utrumque restituet. 
228 nat. et gr. 84: Ubicumque autem et quandocumque ita plena sit, ut ei non sit quod adiciatur, 
non tamen diffunditur in cordibus nostris uel naturae uel uoluntatis opibus quae sunt in nobis, sed 
per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis, qui et infirmitati nostrae opitulatur et sanitati 
cooperatur. 
229 Conf. 9.10.24–25:…erigentes nos ardentiore affectu in id ipsum perambulauimus gradatim 
cuncta corporalia et ipsum caelum, unde sol et luna et stellae lucent super terram…transcendimus 
eas, ut attingeremus regionem ubertatis indeficientis, ubi pascis israhel in aeternum ueritate 
pabulo…sicut nunc extendimus nos et rapida cogitatione attingimus aeternam sapientiam super 
omnia manentem, si continuetur hoc et subtrahantur aliae uisiones longe imparis generis et haec 
una rapiat et absorbeat et recondat in interiora gaudia spectatorem suum, ut talis sit sempiterna 
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The words “ardent affection” (ardens affectus) refer to the operation of the Spirit. 
By being filled with divine presence, the soul is elevated to a mysterious realm of 
inexhaustible abundance and experiences inexplicable rejoicing. During this 
process, Augustine distinguishes between the elevating power of the Spirit and the 
eternal wisdom that the soul attains. This distinction refers to the roles of the 
Spirit and the Wisdom in bringing humans into a perfect union with divine nature. 
Through the reception of the Holy Spirit, the soul is united with the indwelling 
Spirit and the work of grace begins.230 This union, however, is unstable, and the 
believer longs to be improved by the Spirit to achieve a perfect and perpetual 
union with the Trinity. As Augustine remarks, the divine ecstasy is momentary, 
but he wishes it could last forever. 
Augustine hopes that the earthly ecstasy will be transformed into a divine 
joy in Heaven by the sustained operations of the Spirit. In the final part of his 
work De civitate Dei, Augustine describes this heavenly joy as “constant 
enjoyment of the happiness of eternal joys” (fruens indeficienter aeternorum 
iucunditate gaudiorum), characterised by copious positive qualities such as well-
ordered peace, an absence of deficiencies, abundant goodness, eternal felicity, and 
conforming to one’s free will. 231  The concepts included in Augustine’s 
description, “eternal joys”, “enjoyment of the happiness”, and “constant 
enjoyment”, refer to a subjective feeling of happiness about participating in 
divine, eternal joys. Augustine argues that this constant joy is free from the 
delight of sinning and has the new freedom of will of not being able to sin.232 This 
is owing to the grace that permits the adopted gods to participate in divine nature:  
                                                                                                                                     
uita, quale fuit hoc momentum intellegentiae, cui suspirauimus, nonne hoc est: intra in gaudium 
Domini tui? 
230 Augustine adds in his later works that attaining the grace of divinity actually begins at the first 
dwelling of the Spirit. See De peccatorum meritis et remissione 2.8.10 (dated 411): “We now have 
the first fruits of the Spirit, and in that respect we have now really become the children of God”; 
De perfectione justitiae hominis 7.16 (dated 415): “The perfection of this work of grace is even 
now being realized in those who are making progress, and it will attain total fulfillment”. For a 
detailed account of this point, see Meconi 2014b, 268–269. On this basis, Meconi offers the 
slogan: “Heaven even on earth”.  Ibid., 268–270. 
231 CD 22.30: Erit ergo illius ciuitatis et una in omnibus et inseparabilis in singulis uoluntas 
libera, ab omni malo liberata et impleta omni bono, fruens indeficienter aeternorum iucunditate 
gaudiorum, oblita culparum, oblita poenarum. 
232 Augustine emphasises that there is gradation of grace in granting free will to humans. For the 
first human beings, their human nature has the power to sin, but in Heaven, the redemptive men 
will receive a “more abundant gift of grace”, the impossibility to sin. CD 22.30: Magis quippe erit 
liberum a delectatione peccandi usque ad delectationem non peccandi indeclinabilem liberatum… 
  
225 
 
For it is one thing to be God, and another to be a partaker of God: God is by nature unable 
to sin; but he who partakes of God’s nature receives the impossibility of sinning only as a 
gift from God.233  
Augustine depicts becoming God as participating in God’s nature. Only by 
sharing the divine nature by grace can humans be granted their freedom from 
sin.234 Yet they are not equal to the Trinitarian persons and they do not increase 
the number of the three hypostases. Desiring to become God in this sense 
(becoming a hypostasis) is completed rejected by Augustine:  
But when we are restored by Him and perfected by His greater grace, we shall be still for 
all eternity, and know that He is God, being filled by Him when He shall be all in all.235   
Two principles are established here concerning the relationship to God. The first 
principle is that we shall be filled with the divine power and thus participate in 
His divinity; the second principle is that God’s essence remains transcendent 
when we see the Trinity face-to-face. The first principle states that by the Spirit 
operating, the deification will take place and we shall receive greater grace in 
Heaven to achieve the deified reality in communion with the Trinitarian persons 
through divine love. The term “gratia maiore” (“greater/more grace”) refers to the 
genuine deified transmutation into a better substance (substantia itaque nostra 
mutatur in melius)236 in the union with God. Due to the better form of our human 
substance, we receive a new freedom of will (being unable to sin), a tranquility of 
mind through participation in divine eternality, and constant joy in the fruition of 
God in the beatific vision. All these are gifts evidently superior to both the 
previous stage of the first human beings in Paradise and such a restoration of 
humanity that would still permit the possibility to sin.  
The second principle defines deification as not becoming a person of the 
Trinity. The transformation of the substance, in which the personal identity is 
retained, results in a new creature who lives in a community with the Trinitarian 
                                                                                                                                     
sed quia peccauit ista natura cum peccare potuit, largiore gratia liberatur, ut ad eam perducatur 
libertatem, in qua peccare non possit. 
233 CD 22.30: Aliud est enim esse Deum, aliud participem Dei. Deus natura peccare non potest; 
particeps uero Dei ab illo accepit, ut peccare non possit. 
234 CD 22.30: Seruandi autem gradus erant diuini muneris, ut primum daretur liberum arbitrium, 
quo non peccare homo posset, nouissimum, quo peccare non posset, atque illud ad comparandum 
meritum, hoc ad recipiendum praemium pertineret. 
235 CD 22.30: A quo refecti et gratia maiore perfecti uacabimus in aeternum, uidentes quia ipse est 
Deus, quo pleni erimus quando ipse erit omnia in omnibus. 
236 See De Trin. 5.16.17, quoted in note 226. 
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persons, but the transformed substance is made by God, not a constitutive part of 
God. Augustine conveys in his interpretation of deification that although there is a 
communion with the Trinity through the divine bond of the Holy Spirit, the 
transformed substance will still remain as an imago Dei. 
When Augustine discusses the simplicity and indivisibility of God, he 
refers to God’s essence, which is transcendent and incommunicable. However, 
there is another level of the divine operation of the Spirit that shapes the believers’ 
divinised life. Augustine speaks about the “first fruits of the Spirit” (the gift of the 
Spirit being the real presence of the Spirit itself) where the soul has received the 
divine power and is united with the divinity, progressing toward the final 
consummation. This is more than the fulfilment of humanity as it is mistakenly 
understood by Augustine’s Eastern critics. Instead, it refers to a genuine elevation 
by grace, in which the human substance is transformed into a better form, 
although not equal to Trinitarian persons. To avoid any misconception of this type 
of deification, Augustine formulates this as “becoming like God”. Many of 
Augustine’s formulations, such as the real presence of the Spirit and the 
transformation of the substance, seem not very far from the Orthodox notion of 
“becoming God” by attaining divine nature through uncreated energies. Both 
admit the basic fact that the Trinitarian essence (ousia) is inaccessible and explain 
the mode of the union with God by stating that our nature is transformed. In brief, 
the assertion that Augustine’s paradigm is “toward beatitude, not deification” is 
not well-founded. However, the theological details of the supranaturally caused 
transformation in these traditions are beyond the scope of this study.237  
 
I have explored Augustine’s approach to the deification of emotions and analysed 
his perspective on how humans could become free from earthly passions and 
attain the deificatory realm. In the fallen state, the Trinitarian relations and 
“emotions” are inscrutable and ineffable for human beings, but this is not to say 
                                                 
237 For a comparison of theosis in Augustine and Palamas and his followers, see Gerald Bonner, 
“Augustine’s Conception of Deification”, in Journal of Theological Studies 37 (1986), 369–386; 
George E. Demacopoulos and Aristotle Papanikolaou, “Augustine and the Orthodox: ‘The West’ 
in the East”, in Orthodox Readings of Augustine (Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir Seminary 
Press, 2008), 11–40; David Vincent Meconi, The One Christ: St. Augustine’s theology of 
Deification (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2013).  
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that they are entirely inscrutable or irrelevant to present human life. In order to 
attain a general picture of the triune life, Augustine attends to relational 
phenomena in human psychology such as self-reflexivity as well as to emotions in 
the image of God. The psychological approach provides some sporadic ideas of 
the Trinity, but they remain obscure. Only by virtue of the person of Christ, who 
bridges the divine and human emotions through His kenosis and divine 
transaction, can humans abandon their miserable emotions in this life and attain 
the divine spiritual perfection that represents the advent of deification. The 
soteriological approach to the improvement of the will and emotions is essentially 
detached from a human initiative and is wholly dependent on God’s salvation. 
God will give the gift of the Spirit to believers to elevate them to the divine realm 
in a perfect union with God. This deification through redemption and grace does 
not make humans a hypostasis of the Trinity, nor does it stop at the beatitude of 
humanity, but rather includes a real transformation of humanity into a better form 
by participating in the triune spiritual life through the bond of the Holy Spirit.  
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
        
In the introductory Chapter, I defined the main objective of this study, which was 
to provide a systematic analysis of Augustine’s conception of passions and his 
approach to the salvation from their domination as well as the sanctification of 
passions. 
Chapter 2 presents an analysis of the language of passions in Augustine’s 
texts to determine the historical background of his terminology. Augustine 
followed Cicero, the Platonists and the Stoics in envisioning passio as a 
perturbation of the soul which is, or tends to be, contrary to reason. Moreover, 
Augustine’s use of passio and its four subspecies (desire, fear, joy, and grief) 
displays a sound understanding of received doctrines. Contrary to what is 
sometimes suggested, there is no textual evidence for a systematic dichotomy in 
his texts that passio is negative and affectus is positive. Instead, he employed 
these terms rather flexibly, often using passio in a negative sense, but occasionally 
also in a positive sense, and while he referred to affectus as both a positive and a 
negative term, Augustine also used passio, affectio, and perturbatio 
interchangeably. Furthermore, he was flexible in his usage of the subcategories of 
passio (cupiditas, laetitia, metus, and tristitia) and constantiae (voluntas, gaudium, 
cautio) in either a good or a bad sense. Occasionally, Augustine even utilised 
passio and other related terms interchangeably to express all types of emotions.  
It is also important to mention that Augustine employed the concept of 
“godly passions” to demonstrate that Christian passions can be regarded as being 
good. In this case, passions are tools for Christians to improve their dispositions 
and foster virtues. We see that Augustine shifted the discussion on the semantics 
of passions to a new domain, focussing on theological conceptions such as will 
and love in weighing the quality of passions. If love and will are righteous, then 
passions must also be righteous, and if they are evil, the passions are perversely 
directed. In this context, the lexical meaning of passio becomes less important, 
giving way to the underlying motivation and love as a new set of criteria. The 
transition of the evaluation focus denotes that Augustine’s consideration goes 
beyond the scope of philosophical discussions. 
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 After analysing the usage of passio and other related terms in Augustine’s 
texts, I turned to the doctrinal background of Augustine’s psychology of passions 
that adhered to two crucial schools, Neoplatonism and Stoicism. I examined the 
doctrinal connections between these and Augustine as well as his connections to 
earlier Christian thinkers such as Clement, Origen, Antony, Evagrius, Jerome, 
Ambrose, and the Cappadocian Fathers. While it is not difficult to detect some 
traces of their influence in Augustine’s texts, the references are often fragmentary 
and ambiguous, as Augustine did not fully commit himself to the teachings of any 
of these predecessors. He eclectically applied two influential traditions, Platonism 
and Stoicism, transforming their terminologies and psychology of passions from 
his own Christian perspective. After surveying these doctrinal sources, I 
proceeded to the subject of controlling and moderating passions to consider how 
Augustine integrated his predecessors’ therapy of passions and their ideal of 
freedom from emotion in his own theory, and I attempted to determine whether he 
misunderstood their doctrines during in his approach.  
 In Chapter 3, I examined a range of controversial conceptions related to 
the notion of freedom from passions, such as propatheia, metriopatheia, apatheia, 
and eupatheia, by tracing Augustine’s views throughout his works. I have 
demonstrated that intricate changes occurred in his thinking during the different 
stages of his life. Augustine’s views are not accurately reflected by either the 
allegation that he misunderstood his predecessors, or the argument that he simply 
adhered to Stoic or Platonic doctrines. For instance, in his account of propatheia 
in CD 9.4, Augustine deliberately changed the phrase by Gellius of “motibus 
rapidis et inconsultis” into “his passionibus praevenientibus”. He did not adopt 
the Stoic position on first movements as innocent reactions to images (phantasia) 
or visions (visum), nor did he abide by his own early- and middle-period position 
that was in line with the Stoic criticism of passions. Augustine interpreted first 
movements as “passions” in his late works, attributing some of the first 
movements experienced by believers, such as fear, desire, or anger, to a 
psychological state of momentary infirmity, hesitation, and doubt that result from 
insufficient faith in God. According to Augustine, first movements ultimately 
derive from original sin, but they are not regarded as personal sins or evils if they 
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are expelled as soon as possible. Thus, Augustine refuted the Stoic “pride” that 
suggested that the wise can resist the agitations of involuntary passions, deeming 
it incompatible with his own theological perspective. 
Augustine continued to argue that no substantial difference exists between 
metriopatheia and apatheia in the Stoics and the Peripatetics and that their 
controversies concerning these terms were nonsensical. The Stoic ideal of 
freedom from emotion (apatheia) and the Platonic therapy of passions 
(metriopatheia) appealed to Augustine in his early and middle works, and he 
advocated their teachings on controlling one’s passions through intellectual acts. 
However, Augustine later changed his position, referring to the Stoic apatheia as 
insensitivity. He maintained that the alleged virtues of the Stoics and Platonists 
are in fact vices that represent injustice, arrogance, and inhumanity, and provide 
no acceptable criteria for evaluating the quality of passions. In Augustine’s late 
theological interpretations, the philosophical therapies aiming at metriopatheia 
and apatheia were modified in light of the model of Christ. This means that as the 
mediator between God and humans, Christ deliberately undertakes human 
passions in order to implement God’s redemptive plan of saving humans from 
passions and their sinful condition in general, presenting the perfect unity of 
divine impassibilitas and human sensibility. In comparison to the passion of 
Christ and His saving work, the philosophical controversies over apatheia and 
metriopatheia become non-essential.  
Augustine was interested in the essence of eupatheia in the Stoics. In his 
early works, he adopted the Stoic position and regarded eupatheia as a rational as 
well as tranquil state of mind. This is characterised by indifference towards 
external matters and by an ability to make morally right judgements that result in 
genuine goodness. Thus, indifference as a connotation of the Stoic notion of wise 
eupatheia needs to be distinguished from the fools’ irrational reactions and 
imprudent behaviour. Later, however, Augustine equated the Stoic eupatheia with 
stupor because he was not convinced of the human ability to achieve this ideal 
state. This doubt was based on his pessimistic theological interpretation of the 
human condition.  
By analysing Augustine’s uses of the four conceptions above, it becomes 
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evident that Augustine deviated from the philosophical framework and introduced 
a theological synthetic evaluation. However, he continued to employ 
philosophical terminology in his late theology. This may have led to the 
misjudgment that Augustine “misrepresented” philosophical doctrines, 
particularly if one is not aware that they have been applied through new 
connotations to Christian values. In other words, Augustine did not completely 
adhere to any of his philosophical predecessors. Instead, he offered a theological 
anthropology developed from a different perspective by reinterpreting the 
terminology and doctrines of his predecessors accordingly. Based on these 
observations, I presented the outlines of Augustine’s theological framework of 
passions, identifying two crucial concepts, original sin and grace, and discussed 
his understanding of the uncontaminated values of Christ (Chapter 3.4). Before I 
proceeded to a more detailed discussion on the theological context of passions in 
Augustine, I provided a general overview of how he addresses emotions on the 
basis of his framing of philosophical theories (Chapter 3.5). 
In the light of Augustine’s theological anthropology, I turned to the 
domain of social life to examine his notion of freedom from passions in the 
earthly city (Chapter 4). Following Augustine’s conception of the three levels of 
the human society, domus, ciuitas, and orbis terrae, I argued that he discerned 
two loves, caritas and cupiditas, as distinct characters of the two cities, regarding 
the passion for egoistic glory or pride as a sign of the fallen state that perversely 
mirrors the authority of God in exercising a lustful dominion. An important theme 
for Augustine was how one frees oneself from these rapacious passions to attain 
spiritual perfection. Rejecting all human initiatives and alleged merits, Augustine 
emphasised that only divine grace would be able to transform depraved passions 
into a gracious emotional state (voluntas praeparatur a Deo). However, the 
question as to how this can be reconciled with the freedom of the human will, 
which Augustine also argued for, remains unresolved. To Augustine, it is through 
grace that an improvement in renewed passions may become a gradient ascent 
process that abandons the libido dominandi and instead cultivates virtues as a 
consequence of divine love. Nonetheless, Augustine held the pessimistic view that 
this improvement of passions cannot attain perfection on earth and refuted the 
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pacifists who tolerated the evils of this world in order to maintain temporal peace. 
His notion of fighting against lust domination with gracious emotions does not 
imply that he was either a pacifist or a militarist, but rather that he was anchored 
in a religious position, defending the faith of the Heavenly Kingdom where the 
cupiditas should be completely transformed into caritas through the enjoyment of 
God. 
Augustine’s social theory is based on the concept of two cities as well as 
the underlying notion of two distinct loves. The concepts of corpus permixtum 
and peregrinatio describe the terrestrial state of the sacred Heavenly City, which 
represents an intermediate stage of its evolvement. From the origin to the end, 
self-love is regarded as the dominant characteristic of the fallen city. So the 
fundamental issue in Augustine’s social theory is the question of how to turn the 
perverse direction of desire from lower objects back to the supreme good. Against 
this theological background, Augustine presented his insight into renewing 
passions by following three central ideas. 
As regards concupiscence and continence, Augustine refuted the notion of 
sinlessness proposed by Pelagius and Julian, arguing that concupiscentia is an 
innate evil affection that is present in infants as the result of original sin. He 
distinguished between three phases of renewal, highlighting the fundamental role 
of grace throughout the process and the participatory function of the obedient will 
in the intermediate stage, which represent phases one and two, respectively. 
During the third phase, there will be various fruits in virginity and chastity, but 
they are merits provided by God, who creates the virtues of passions that form 
new, good lifestyles. Moreover, by pouring love into one’s heart, the grace of the 
Holy Spirit cultivates different inward dispositions, which result in an 
improvement of one’s inner life and an ascent of love. Augustine therefore argued 
that true virginity and chastity do not exist in this life when compared to the 
model of Christ. They can be regarded as merits in the sense of being various gifts 
from God.  
Concerning ecclesiastical elitism and secularism, Augustine rebuked the 
Donatist schismatic doctrines of rebaptism, purism, and martyrdom, emphasising 
the hybridity of the Dove (columba) of Christ on earth. He argued that the effect 
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of baptism derives from the merits of Christ rather than those of priests, and that 
martyrdom does not entail external fame for a fanatically defended “elite” group, 
but rather is an attempt to attain the unity of Christ in patience and love. It is clear 
that to provide an ordinate spirituality of emotions, Augustine shifted to 
inwardness. To Augustine, the suffering of Christ provides the perfect model for 
martyrs, monks, and the laity, and those that follow Him display different grades 
of renewed emotions. Augustine did not strictly distinguish between the lifestyles 
of monasteries and the outside world, but he did compose several rules to aid 
practitioners in developing consecrated love when encountering the temptations of 
this world. In this sense, he did not approve of clergies who are involved with 
civil affairs, neglecting their monastic meditations.  
Concerning earthly war and peace, Augustine replied to the Manichaean 
accusation that the new commandment of Christ contradicts the command of God 
in the old times. He argued that the real evils of war are lustful passions, whereas 
true peace is found in the future Kingdom of God; the distinction between one’s 
inward personal attitude and the requirements of a just war is necessary in the 
military service. In addition, he believed that a gracious inward feeling does not 
contradict the struggle against evil with just violence, and that this is consistent 
with the Law and the Gospel. Thus, Augustine believed that Christ’s teaching of 
“turning the other cheek” presents the idea of the renewal of inward disposition 
and emotions. 
Augustine formulated a ranking of consecrated attitudes and emotions, 
adopting Christ’s passions as a perfect model. Moreover, Augustine considered 
virtuous modes of life as not being human merits, but the work of Christ who 
sends out the grace of love to cultivate different levels of the human mind. This 
means that by virtue of grace, one will acquire the power to control evil desires 
and gradually ascent to the perfection of spirituality in the future Heavenly City. 
In this pilgrimaging life, instead of seeking one’s own power or idolatry on earth, 
the citizens of ciuitas Dei peregrina will direct their will and passions toward the 
supreme good and follow the perfect model of Christ.  
Chapter 5 addressed the issue of how to understand the “emotions” of God 
and to attain the divine realm in an effort to free oneself from the perturbations of 
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emotions. For Augustine, the triune psychology of “emotions” transcends human 
knowledge and comprehension, but this does not imply that it is entirely 
inscrutable in this life. To conduct this type of exploration, an appeal to human 
psychology and to passions might be helpful because, as part of the imprints of 
God in humanity, human passions serve as an indicator of divine psychology. 
Augustine provided a psychological approach for envisioning the Triune life with 
respect to the doctrine of imago Dei. Augustine’s position was that the tranquility 
of the original human soul displays some traces of a divine immutable spiritual 
status, but this image of God was distorted when the first men transgressed the 
law and this led their created peaceful minds to experience perturbations. Thus, 
Augustine maintained that human passions are not a direct reflection of divine 
psychology, but a confused image of God’s “emotions”. This means that any 
approach to trace the psychology of God can neither involve constructing a direct 
analogical parallel from the human point of view, nor interpreting the scriptural 
utterances of God’s passions as being literally true. In this sense, divine 
(im)passibility is a metaphorical conception that should not be interpreted as an 
emotional or impassible psychology as in humans. Instead, divine (im)passability 
serves as an apophatic qualifier to refer to the transcendence and immutability of 
God.  
Augustine argued that a real approach to the divine realm and to the triune 
spiritual life is through the salvation of the person of Christ. As the mediator 
between divinity and humanity, the “impassible” person of Christ takes on human 
sufferings to make a transaction of emotions, absorbing all human sufferings and 
granting His divine spiritual nature to sinners. The person of Christ does this in 
order to deliver humans to the deified realm. In this divine transaction, the divine 
and human natures are both separate and inseparable in the crucified person of 
Christ. Thus divine and human emotions are both associated with Jesus Christ, 
without division, confusion, transformation or separation. This divine 
involvement in human emotions through the incarnation and crucifixion of the 
second person of the Trinity reveals a deeper theological theme, the deification of 
emotions as a salvation. The divine kenosis contains the redemption of human 
beings from their miserable earthly emotions to the deified state of participation 
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into the divine spiritual nature, so that the divine economy of salvation involves 
the deification of emotions.   
 As we have witnessed,  Augustine considered emotions to be perturbations 
of the soul that are essentially unworthy of God, and he maintained that it will be 
through suffering that the demons and their human followers will be punished in 
Hell. Augustine’s position is that anguish and torment in the lake of fire are not 
therefore merely metaphorical, but they involve the real misery of eternal 
condemnation. In contrast to this pain, Augustine believed that the Heavenly 
human citizens will be divinised as adopted sons of God, participating in the inner 
divine life and showing an eternal fruition of God by the bond of the Holy Spirit. 
Furthermore, they will be constantly rejoicing in their union with God and this 
signifies the attainment of the divine spiritual reality, but the gulf between dii and 
Deus will remain clear. According to Augustine, the deified human citizens will 
be fully filled with the Holy Spirit and become the perfect likeness of God as an 
image of Him. But they will not replace their substance with that of the Trinitarian 
persons. Furthermore, it is evident that Augustine based this vision of deification 
on the doctrine of the imago Dei. 
However, it is misleading to claim that due to Augustine’s blindness to the 
divine essence/energy distinction, his theory of deification is merely a matter of 
the fulfillment of humanity without a genuine transformation. As we have seen, 
the divine economy of salvation involves the process of delivering humans and 
granting them the freedom from passions in the divinisation in the City of God. 
For Augustine, this divinised approach begins from “the first fruits of the Spirit” 
when the human soul receives the divine powers from the real presence of the 
Holy Spirit. Through the Spirit’s sustained operations as well as through the 
redemption of Christ as mediator, the sinners will be gradually become 
disengaged from the bondage of the earthly disturbances of their passions and 
share divine joy in their perfect union with God in Heaven. Three divinised 
characterisations of emotions, that is, a new freedom of the will from the 
possibility of sinning, eternal and immutable spiritual life, and the constant 
rejoicing and full rest in God, all convey that the substance of humanity has been 
transformed into something better. This means that the saved ones have achieved 
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real participation in divine spiritual life, which is more than re-establishing the 
human nature and emotions that existed in the original good state in paradise. This 
substantial transformation is involved in Augustine’s concept of “greater grace” 
(gratia maiore). To avoid the blasphemous assumption of changing the substance 
of humanity into the person of the Trinity, Augustine adopted a prudent approach 
of “becoming like God”, which should not be misinterpreted, as some critics have, 
as a wrong deification theory of simple “beatitude of humanity”.  
It is clear that Augustine’s ideal of freedom from passions points to the 
deification of emotions in his late theology. He had learned the philosophical 
predecessors’ theories of the soul and their therapeutic techniques to control 
emotions, but their approaches to the ideal of peace of mind proved to be 
problematic in Augustine’s later evaluations. Instead of appealing to a human 
initiative when he addressed the issue of passions, Augustine designated the 
central role to grace. Furthermore, he argued that an important aspect of the divine 
economy of salvation is an emotional transformation in which the sinners will be 
delivered to the divine realm and they will participate in the triune spiritual life as 
a hallmark of divinisation. To summarise, Augustine’s vision of the future City of 
God implies the notion of freedom from passions and the deification of emotions 
with real participation in the divine spiritual nature.  
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